USA v. Lopez

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Isabel Lopez,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cr-230 (JRT/DJF)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Isabel Lopez’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment
for Failure to State an Offense (ECF No. 41) and Motion to Dismiss Count 3 as Unconstitutional
(ECF No. 42). Neither party requested an opportunity to submit testimonial evidence in
connection with these motions, and the Court determined that a hearing was unnecessary. (ECF
Nos. 48, 50.) Ms. Lopez, through her counsel, further declined the opportunity to submit additional
briefing on the issues. (See ECF No. 59.) Based on the parties’ written submissions and on the
entire file, the Court recommends Ms. Lopez’s Motions be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The Affidavit filed in support of the Complaint that initially charged Ms. Lopez
(“Affidavit”) states that, at around 10:00 AM on June 3, 2025, federal agents began execution of
a search warrant at the Cuatro Milpas restaurant, located at 1526 East Lake Street in Minneapolis,
Minnesota. (ECF No. 1-1 at 6.) The federal agents included members of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”), Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”), and Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”). (Id. at 3.) Special Response Teams
(“SRT Teams”), and a detective and Sheriff’s deputies from the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office
(“HCSO”) assisted the federal agents. (Id. at 6-8.) The search was conducted in relation to
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suspected criminal conspiracy by a drug trafficking organization. (Id at 3.) During the execution
of the warrant, a crowd of roughly 100 people formed in protest. (Id. at 7.) The federal agents
believed the crowd to be under the mistaken belief that law enforcement was present to arrest
individuals for immigration offenses. (Id.) The federal agents explained to the crowd that the
search warrant was unrelated to immigration offenses. (Id.)
As the crowd grew more agitated, federal agents called for backup. (Id. at 7.) More federal
agents, HCSO Sheriff’s deputies, and officers from the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD)
arrived to assist. (Id. at 7-8.) Crowd members allegedly assaulted both federal agents and local
law enforcement officers. (Id. at 8.)
Following an investigation, federal agents reviewed body-worn camera footage and open-
source videos and identified Ms. Lopez as one of the individuals who assaulted law enforcement
officers during the protest. (Id.) According to the Affidavit, Ms. Lopez was first captured
attempting to hit at least one FBI SWAT agent with her arms and/or a closed fist. (Id. at 10.)
While fellow crowd members restrained her, Ms. Lopez allegedly kicked an FBI SWAT officer
and resisted other officers. (Id.) Ms. Lopez broke free of the crowd members restraining her and
allegedly pushed another FBI SWAT officer with her arms. (Id. at 11.)
According to the Affidavit, Ms. Lopez was standing on a trash can in the middle of the
street obstructing law enforcement vehicles six minutes later, when FBI SWAT officers
approached her to attempt to remove her from the trash can. (Id. at 12.) Ms. Lopez fell into the
trash can. (Id. at 13.) As the officers attempted to help Ms. Lopez get out of the trash can, she
allegedly pushed and kicked at them. (Id.)
As federal officers and local police were leaving the scene sometime later, Ms. Lopez
allegedly again targeted the officers. (Id. at 14.) Ms. Lopez allegedly threw what appeared to be
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a softball or other ball-shaped object at law enforcement officers, including an HCSO Sheriff’s
deputy and ATF Task Force Officer. (Id.) Ms. Lopez then retrieved the softball or ball-shaped
object and allegedly threw it at another HCSO Sheriff’s deputy. (Id.)
On June 10, 2025, a federal grand jury indicted Ms. Lopez on two counts of Assaulting,
Resisting, and Impeding Certain Officers and one count of Obstruction of Law Enforcement
During Civil Disorder relating to the June 3, 2025 assaults. (ECF Nos. 9, 10-1.) In addition to the
charges stemming from the June 3, 2025 protest incidents, the Indictment also charges Ms. Lopez
on a fourth count with Assaulting, Resisting, and Impeding Certain Officers on June 9, 2025, when
the Indictment alleges Ms. Lopez “did forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, and
interfere with an officer and employee of the United States.” (ECF No. 9 at 3.) In its Response to
Ms. Lopez’s motions, the Government clarifies that Count Four stems from Ms. Lopez’s conduct
during her arrest on the June 3, 2025 charges. (ECF No. 46 at 5.) The Government alleges that,
during her arrest, Ms. Lopez, “punched an FBI agent who was taking her into custody in the ear
while holding a soda can. She also attempted to flee the agents’ vehicle after being placed under
arrest.” (Id.)
II. FAILURE TO STATE AN OFFENSE
Ms. Lopez’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State an Offense (ECF No. 41)
moves to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 of the Indictment on the ground that they fail to properly plead
the offenses charged. The Government argues the Indictment fulfills the requirements of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c). (ECF No. 46 at 18.) The Court agrees with the Government and
recommends Ms. Lopez’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State an Offense (ECF No.
41) be denied.
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A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v) allows a party to move for dismissal of
a charge in an indictment for “failure to state an offense.” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
7(c) requires that an indictment “must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged[.]” “The test of the sufficiency of an indictment is
not whether it could not have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the
elements of the offense charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be
prepared to meet, and in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense,
whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or
conviction.” United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955, 962 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953)). “An indictment is normally
sufficient if its language tracks the statutory language.” United States v. Sewell, 513 F.3d 820, 821
(8th Cir. 2008) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)).
B. Count 2
Count 2 of the Indictment charges Ms. Lopez with Assaulting, Resisting, and Impeding
Certain Officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) in connection with an assault on an HCSO
Sheriff’s deputy who was assisting federal officers. (ECF No. 9 at 1-2.) Ms. Lopez asks the Court
to dismiss Count 2 on the ground that it does not specify the federal officer or employee whom the
deputy was assisting in the performance of official duties. (ECF No. 41 at 1.) Ms. Lopez further
argues that “there is no way to determine if and how the sheriff deputy was assisting a federal
officer in performance of official duties as required for this charge to apply to conduct towards a
non-federal officer.” (ECF No. 41 at 2.)
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Count 2 of the Indictment tracks the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a), which
codifies liability for “[a]ssaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees,” and 18
U.S.C. § 1114, which includes in its definition of “certain officers or employees,” “any person
assisting” “any officer or employee of the United States … while such officer or employee is
engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties.” Ms. Lopez points to no prior case
law, rule or statutory provision requiring the Indictment to include information identifying the
federal officers involved or detailing exactly how the non-federal officer was assisting a federal
officer. The Indictment contains all the elements of the offense. Crucially, the Indictment
expressly states that the HCSO Sheriff’s deputy whom Ms. Lopez allegedly assaulted was assisting
an officer and employee of the United States in the performance of official duties. (ECF No. 9 at
2.) Courts find indictments insufficient when they neglect to include key elements of a charge,
not when an indictment fails to lay out an extensive factual bridge between the defendant’s alleged
actions and the charge. Compare United States v. Olson, 262 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 2001)
(finding indictment insufficient when it neglected to include reference to “force and violence, or
… intimidation” element found in bank robbery statute), with United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d
702, 707 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding indictment for felon in possession of firearm sufficient, despite
omitting the nature of defendant’s prior felony offenses as violent felonies or serious drug
offenses).
Furthermore, based on this record, any suggestion that Ms. Lopez lacks sufficient notice of
exactly how the Sheriff’s deputy was assisting federal officers is disingenuous. The Complaint
Affidavit filed at the outset of this case states that federal agents were conducting a high-risk search
with a SWAT team and vehicles in a large-scale narcotics, money laundering and human-
trafficking investigation, and that HSCO deputies arrived at the scene to assist with perimeter
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security and crowd control. (ECF No. 1-1 at 6, 8.) The Affidavit further alleges Ms. Lopez threw
a softball at a “Sheriff’s deputy, who was directing pedestrians away from a moving Bearcat
vehicle.” (Id. at 14.) To the extent Ms. Lopez believes these details should have been included
the Indictment, she could have moved for a bill of particulars pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. That she did not do so is unsurprising, since Count 2 of the
Indictment meets the Government’s burden of apprising Ms. Lopez of the charge she should be
prepared to meet and sufficiently tracks the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a). Her motion
to dismiss Count 2 should be denied accordingly.
C. Count 3
Count 3 charges Ms. Lopez with Obstruction of Law Enforcement During Civil Disorder
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). (ECF No. 9 at 2.) Ms. Lopez moves to dismiss Count 3 on
the grounds that it “lacks sufficient allegations to enable Ms. Lopez to ascertain whether or how
there was a civil disorder, that law enforcement was lawfully responding to that civil disorder, that
Ms. Lopez knowingly committed an act to obstruct and impede law enforcement, and [sic] nature
of the federally protected function she was allegedly interfering with.” (ECF No. 41 at 2.) Count
3 tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) nearly verbatim, including all key elements of the
offense, and is specific to Ms. Lopez’s alleged conduct. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2.) The Indictment
need not include the robust set of facts that Ms. Lopez requests. See United States v. Sharpe, 438
F.3d 1257, 1263 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) (“It is not necessary for an indictment ... to allege in detail
the factual proof that will be relied upon to support the charges.”); see United States v. Afremov,
No. CRIM.06-196(JRT/SRN), 2007 WL 3237630, at *13 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2007) (“To comply
with Rule 7(c), an indictment need not provide the evidentiary details of the government’s case.”)
(citing United States v. Ellender, 947 F.2d 748, 755 (5th Cir.1991)). Moreover, as with Count 2,
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Ms. Lopez has more than ample notice of the underlying factual details in the Complaint Affidavit.
(See ECF No. 1-1.) Ms. Lopez points to no applicable caselaw requiring a charging indictment
under Section 231(a)(3) to contain factual allegations at the level of detail she requests. Count 3
fairly apprises Ms. Lopez of the charge she should be prepared to meet and sufficiently tracks the
statutory language of Section 231(a)(3). For these reasons, the Court recommends Ms. Lopez’s
Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State an Offense (ECF No. 41) be denied in its entirety.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
Ms. Lopez also moves to dismiss Count 3 (Obstruction of Law Enforcement During Civil
Disorder in violation of Section 231(a)(3)) as unconstitutional. (ECF No. 42.) She argues that:
(1.) this charge violates the free speech and freedom of assembly protections of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; and (2.) this charge violates Ms. Lopez’s due process rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. (ECF No. 42 at 1.) The
Government argues this motion is foreclosed under established, binding precedent. (ECF No. 46
at 22-25.) The Court agrees with the Government that binding precedent precludes Mr. Lopez’s
arguments and recommends her Motion to Dismiss to Dismiss Count 3 as Unconstitutional (ECF
No. 42) be denied.
A. First Amendment
The Court is bound by Eighth Circuit decisions that have upheld the constitutionality of
Section 231(a)(3). See Xiong v. Minnesota, 195 F.3d 424, 426 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
district court “ha[s] no power to replace governing circuit law with its own view.”); see Hood v.
United States, 342 F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that district courts are bound to apply
the precedent of the circuit). In United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1971), the Eighth
Circuit clearly held that that Section 231(a)(3) does not violate the First Amendment.
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Ms. Lopez acknowledges that Mechanic “complicate[s]” her First Amendment challenge,
but she argues the Indictment does not sufficiently allege any violent physical acts that would
qualify under Mechanic. (ECF No. 42 at 2-3.) In Mechanic, the Eighth Circuit held Section
231(a)(3) does not violate the First Amendment because it, “has no application to speech, but
applies only to violent physical acts.” Mechanic, 454 F.2d at 852.
Ms. Lopez contends the Indictment “does not allege any violent acts which would be
sufficient to justify the application of [Section] 231(a)(3) based on the 8th Circuit’s interpretation
of the statute,” and that “even the underlying allegations against Ms. Lopez involve at most a de
minimis use of force.” (ECF No. 42 at 3.) As previously discussed, Count 3 of the Indictment
tracks the language of Section 231(a)(3) nearly verbatim, including the element that Ms. Lopez is
alleged to have “committed and attempted to commit an act to obstruct, impede, and interfere with
law enforcement officers lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of their official duties ….”
(ECF No. 9 at 2, emphasis added.) In Mechanic, the Eighth Circuit found the use of “obstruct,
impede, and interfere” to be key to the statute’s constitutionality, specifically stating that those
acts are not speech. Mechanic, 454 F.2d at 852 (“the statute does not purport to reach speech of
any kind. It reaches only acts to impede, obstruct, or interfere”). The acts alleged in the Indictment
necessarily are not protected speech, as the Eighth Circuit explicitly held.
Furthermore, the Government alleges underlying facts in the Complaint Affidavit
including conduct that is more serious than a “de minimis use of force.” The Affidavit alleges Ms.
Lopez “attempted to hit at least one … [officer] with her arms and/or closed fist” and “kicked [an]
FBI SWAT officer with her foot.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 10.) The Affidavit continues, alleging Ms.
Lopez pushed another FBI SWAT officer with her arms (id. at 11) and later threw a “softball or
ball-shaped object” at officers at least twice (id. at 14). Though these acts may differ from the
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violent act at issue in Mechanic (a cherry bomb thrown at a police officer), they describe physical
assaults on several law enforcement officers. Such conduct is not speech. Because Ms. Lopez’s
alleged conduct qualifies as “violent physical acts” under Mechanic, her First Amendment
argument is foreclosed under binding precedent and should be rejected.
B. Due Process
Ms. Lopez further argues Section 231(a)(3) violates the Due Process guarantees established
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because it is unconstitutionally vague. (ECF No. 42
at 3-4.) Specifically, Ms. Lopez argues that: (1) the language “obstruct, impede, or interfere” could
be interpreted to prohibit innocuous interactions with law enforcement officers, such as speech;
and (2) it is not clear whether the defendant must participate in civil disorder or obstruct, impede,
or interfere with officers to violate Section 231(a)(3). (Id.)
This argument is also foreclosed under Mechanic, which held that Section 231(a)(3) is not
unconstitutionally vague.1 With respect to Ms. Lopez’s argument that the statute could be read to
prohibit protected speech, in its ruling the Mechanic court reasoned, “since the statute does not
attempt to curtail speech[,] the defendants may not challenge it as vague or overly broad if their
own conduct may be constitutionally prohibited[.]” Mechanic, 454 F.2d at 853. In Ms. Lopez’s
case, her alleged conduct—punching, kicking, pushing, and throwing objects at law enforcement
officers—clearly may be constitutionally prohibited.
1 In its discussion of whether Section 231(a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague, the Mechanic
court did not explicitly reference the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but the Eighth Circuit has
otherwise analyzed void-for-vagueness arguments under those Amendments. Stephenson v.
Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1308 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The void-for-vagueness
doctrine is embodied in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.”) (citing
D.C. and M.S. v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 795 F.2d 652, 653 (8th Cir.1986)). The Court thus
interprets the Mechanic vagueness analysis as invoking the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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The Mechanic court also considered Ms. Lopez’s argument that the statute might be
misapplied to broadly encompass peaceful protesters. In rejecting this argument, the court wrote,
“The crime set forth by the statute is not mere presence at a civil disorder… but an act committed
during the course of such a disorder. The term ‘civil disorder’ simply describes the environment
in which the act must be committed in order to be subject to prosecution under section 231(a)(3).”
Mechanic, 454 F.2d at 853.
The Indictment does not charge Ms. Lopez with merely being present during a civil
disorder. She is charged with committing acts to obstruct, impede and interfere with law
enforcement officers engaged in the lawful performance of their duties. (ECF No. 9 at 2.) Though
the law enforcement activity that day drew a crowd of approximately 100 people (see ECF No. 1-
1 at 7), there is no evidence in the record to suggest the officers carried out mass arrests or
attempted to sweep up peaceful protesters. Indeed, the allegations in the Complaint Affidavit
detail how law enforcement agents were forced to leave the scene and abandon their pursuit of
evidence against a dangerous drug-trafficking organization due to conduct such as Ms. Lopez’s.
(Id. at 8.) Only after the operation had ended and upon investigating who, among the crowd, had
participated in overt acts of assault against the officers did they single Ms. Lopez out for
prosecution. (Id.) On this record there is no plausible basis on to conclude that the Government
misapplied the statute to chill peaceful protest activity.
The Court is bound by Eighth Circuit precedent finding Section 231(a)(3) to be neither
violative of the First Amendment nor unconstitutionally vague. The Court therefore recommends
Ms. Lopez’s Motion to Dismiss Count 3 as Unconstitutional (ECF No. 42) be denied.
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RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant Isabel Lopez’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment for
Failure to State an Offense (ECF No. 41) and Motion to Dismiss Count 3 as Unconstitutional (ECF
No. 42) be DENIED.
Dated: November 25, 2025 s/ Dulce J. Foster
Dulce J. Foster
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a
copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14
days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and
responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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