Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Gary L.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of
Social Security
Defendant.
Case No. 24-cv-3955-EMB
ORDER
Plaintiff Gary L. seeks judicial review of the final administrative
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his application for
Title XVI Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. The matter is
before me for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1(c).
I have reviewed the administrative record (Dkt. No. 7), Plaintiff’s brief (Dkt.
No. 12), and the Commissioner’s motion and brief (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16). See R.
Supp. R. for Social Security Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), R. 5. For the
following reasons, Plaintiff’s brief is DENIED, the Commissioner’s motion is
GRANTED, and the complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice.
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last
initial of any non-governmental parties on orders in Social Security matters.
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I. 	Background
a. Prior Proceedings
Plaintiff Gary L. filed an application for SSI benefits. See (Admin R. at
211.)2 That application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Id. at
119, 133.) An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing and issued an
unfavorable decision. (Id. at 16–24, 29–62.)
Plaintiff then filed an action in federal court seeking review of that
decision. See Lange v. Kijakazi, Case No. 23-cv-17 (KMM/ECW) (D. Minn.).
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright issued a report recommending the
action be remanded for two reasons—first to resolve the following
inconsistency:
However, given that the ALJ claimed in his decision that the
limitations imposed by the state agency psychologists did not go
far enough, the fact that the ALJ did not include any restriction as
to the quality of contact (superficial or some greater restriction)
with Plaintiff’s supervisors or co-workers, not just the duration of
those 	contacts, 	remand 	is 	warranted 	to 	further 	address 	the
evidence in the record as to this issue and clarify the RFC in this
regard.
(Admin. R. at 642.) Second, Judge Wright recommended remand so the ALJ
could reconsider the supportability and consistency of the medical opinion of
psychiatric nurse practitioner Jenny Bliss. (Id. at 649–51.) District Judge
2 Citations to the administrative record reference the Bates numbers at the
bottom of each page, while citations to the parties’ briefs reference the
CM/ECF pagination.
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Katherine Menendez summarily adopted the report and recommendation and
remanded the action. (Id. at 654–55.)
b. Current Proceedings
After remand, the Appeals Council (“AC”) issued an order sending the
case back to the ALJ. (Admin. R. at 658–62.) The AC ordered the ALJ to
consolidate Plaintiff’s claim files (Plaintiff had filed a separate claim in the
interim), associate the evidence, and issue a new decision on the consolidated
claims. (Id. at 660.)
On remand, the ALJ held a July 12, 2024 telephonic hearing. (Admin.
R. at 539–89.) Plaintiff and vocational expert (“VE”) Glee Ann Kehr testified
at the hearing. (Id. at 539.) The ALJ issued his unfavorable decision on
August 5, 2024. (Id. at 518–31.) He did so after conducting the familiar five-
step evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) to determine whether
Plaintiff qualified as disabled under the Social Security Act. Although the
ALJ found severe impairments for bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress
disorder, and primary insomnia at step two, he ultimately concluded the
Plaintiff was not disabled. See, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). I focus only on
the disputed steps.
The only portion of the ALJ’s analysis at issue is his determination of
the Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which is determined as a
precursor to steps four and five.
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Here, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff retained the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels.
(Admin. R. at 524.) But the ALJ included the following nonexertional
limitations:
The claimant is limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks that
are not performed at a fast production rate pace, such as that found
in an assembly-line work. He can have occasional interactions with
co-workers and supervisor, where the individual’s primary job is
taking 	instructions 	from 	supervisors 	and 	performing 	tasks
consistent with those instructions. He cannot work around crowds
of people where the primary task of the job would not involve direct
communication with the public, such as in customer service and
cashiering positions.
(Id.)
Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to
perform any past relevant work. (Admin. R. at 529.) 	The burden then
shifted to the Commissioner to establish that Plaintiff, in light of the
determined RFC, could perform other work existing in a significant number
of jobs in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v); see also Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s RFC,
age, education, and work history and determined he could perform other
work, including as a laundry worker, store laborer, and industrial cleaner.
(Admin. R. at 529–30.) Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled
under the Social Security Act. (Id. at 531.) Plaintiff then filed this action
seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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II. 	Standard of Review
Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether
the ALJ legally erred, Nash v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 907 F.3d 1086, 1089
(8th Cir. 2018), or whether “substantial evidence on the record as a whole”
supported the decision, McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence . . . is more than a mere
scintilla.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court must examine the entire administrative record, including
both evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s decision and evidence that
supports it. See Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002).
Remand is required if the ALJ’s opinion contains factual findings that,
“considered in light of the record as a whole, are insufficient to permit [the]
Court to conclude that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
decision.” Scott ex rel. Scott v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2008). If
the record would permit the Court to draw two different conclusions from the
evidence, and one of those conclusions is the same as the ALJ’s, the Court
must affirm. See Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992);
Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 2012).
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III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff’s sole challenge involves the ALJ’s determination of his RFC.
Specifically, he claims the ALJ legally erred by “reject[ing] the limitation to
‘brief, superficial and infrequent interactions’ as being ‘not vocationally
defined, and thus, does not adequately articulate the limitation for use in a
residual functional capacity assessment.’” (Pl. Br. at 12 (quoting Admin. R.
at 528).)
The RFC represents the most that a claimant can do despite his
limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945. The RFC determination “must be ‘based on
all of the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations of
treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of [his]
limitations.’” LeeAnthony C. v. Berryhill, 18-CV-77 (NEB/TNL), 2019 WL
2343732, at *3 (D. Minn. May 13, 2019) (quoting Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d
521, 527 (8th Cir. 2013)), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL
2341688 (D. Minn. June 3, 2019). When formulating an RFC, the ALJ is not
required to “us[e] the specific limitations or wording suggested by medical
experts, so long as the RFC appropriately accounts for those limitations.”
Julie P. v. O’Malley, 23-CV-2980 (LMP/ECW), 2024 WL 4880375, at *2 (D.
Minn. Nov. 25, 2024) (citing Lane v. O’Malley, No. 23-1432, 2024 WL 302395,
at *1 (8th Cir. Jan. 26, 2024)).
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In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found two state agency
psychologists’ prior administrative findings to be partially persuasive.
(Admin. R. at 528 (citing id. at 94–101, 103–10).) As is relevant here, Dr.
Mary Sullivan opined that Plaintiff had the following social interaction
capacities and limitations:
[Plaintiff] retains the capacity to handle brief, infrequent and
superficial 	contact 	with 	the 	general 	public, 	co-workers 	and
supervisors. SAPC: Ability to handle supervision would be reduced
secondary to some conflicted reactions to authority, but in the
context 	of 	reasonably 	supportive, 	non-over-the-shoulder
supervision, 	would 	be 	adequate 	to 	handle 	ordinary 	levels 	of
supervision found in most customary work settings.
(Id. at 99.) With respect to Plaintiff’s sustained concentration and
persistence capacities, Dr. Sullivan opined he could “carry out routine,
repetitive and 3–4 step tasks with adequate persistence and pace.” (Id.) Dr.
Jeffrey Boyd, a second psychologist, articulated identical limitations. (See id.
at 108–09.)
In his opinion, the ALJ noted that certain terms used in those
administrative findings were not vocationally defined and therefore didn’t
adequately articulate the limitation for use in an RFC assessment. (Admin.
R. at 528.) The ALJ specifically mentioned the terms “3–4 step tasks,” “brief,
superficial and infrequent interactions,” and “reduced supervision but
adequate for ordinary levels of supervision found in most customary work
settings.” (Id.) The ALJ therefore found the opinions of Dr. Boyd and Dr.
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Sullivan “persuasive only insofar as they indicate that there are indeed
limitations in the areas of: understanding, remembering and applying
information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting and
maintaining pace; and adapting and managing oneself.” (Id. at 528.) The
ALJ further recognized that the undefined terms “suggest limitations in both
the quantity and quality of the interactions that the claimant may engage in
in a work setting.” (Id.)
Plaintiff contends the ALJ committed legal error by rejecting the
limitations articulated by Drs. Sullivan and Boyd. Plaintiff argues that
because the term “superficial” is widely recognized as a qualitative limitation,
the ALJ’s basis for rejecting the term was “disingenuous.”3 (Pl. Br. at 11.)
Plaintiff implies that by rejecting the doctors’ formulation of limitations, the
ALJ conflated the quality and quantity limitations necessary for Plaintiff’s
interactions. Plaintiff first cites to several cases that stand for the proposition
that “superficial” bears on the quality of time, while “occasional” relates to
quantity. (See Pl. Br. at 7–9 (citing cases).) The Commissioner does not
dispute this interpretation, (see Def.’s Br. at 5–6), and the ALJ’s decision
3 The ALJ concluded the identified terms were “not vocationally defined” and
“ha[d] no vocational meaning under Social Security regulations.” (Admin. R.
at 528.) He did not, as Plaintiff contends, find the terms “ha[d] no vocational
relevance.” (Pl. Br. at 11.)
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recognized that the “imprecise” terms related to “both the quantity and
quality of interactions,” (Admin. R. at 528). Nothing in the record supports
the conclusion that the ALJ impermissibly conflated the terms “superficial”
and “occasional,” as Plaintiff suggests he did. (See Pl. Br. at 9.)
Instead, the Commissioner counters that the ALJ “use[d] specific terms
that better define Plaintiff’s limitations and abilities in a work setting.”
(Def.’s Br. at 7.) I agree.
The ALJ limited Plaintiff to “occasional interactions with co-workers
and supervisor, where the individual’s primary job is taking instructions from
supervisors and performing tasks consistent with those instructions.”
(Admin. R. at 528); cf. Charles A. C. v. Bisignano, CV 25-746 (JWB/DTS),
2025 WL 2838959, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 7, 2025) (dismissing complaint on
nearly identical RFC limitation where “psychologists did not explain what
they meant by ‘brief and superficial’ in a way that is clearly at odds with the
ALJ’s findings”). This limitation includes both quantity—“occasional”—and
quality, namely that the interactions should be limited to “taking instructions
from supervisors.” There is no requirement for Plaintiff to engage further,
beyond performing the tasks instructed. Receipt of instructions is consistent
with a superficial interaction.
The ALJ also limited Plaintiff to “no work around crowds of people
where the primary tasks of the job would not involve direct communication
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with the public, such as in customer service and cashiering positions.”
(Admin. R. at 528.) These limitations are not incongruous with the opinions
of Drs. Sullivan and Boyd.
The ALJ’s decision is also supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole. Plaintiff specifically identified “be[ing] in crowds” as a
challenge. (Admin. R. at 263; see also id. at 559.) His mental status
examinations usually showed Plaintiff was well-groomed, had normal speech,
an appropriate affect, a cooperative attitude, a normal mood, a good insight,
and intact thought process, attention span, concentration, and judgment.
(See id. at 331, 337, 343, 355, 367, 440, 446, 452, 497, 503.) Plaintiff’s mood
was sometimes noted as depressed or anxious, (id. at 331, 337, 343, 355, 503),
or irritable, (id. at 446), and he sometimes had a flat, worrisome, or blunted
affect, (id. at 343, 446, 503, 992). A January 2022 note indicated Plaintiff
had a monotone affect. (Id. at 991–92.) The ALJ also explained he did not
find the opinion of psychiatric nurse practitioner Jenny Bliss to be persuasive
because Plaintiff’s symptoms showed improvement over time. (Id. at 529
(citing id. at 327–75, 509–11).) Additionally, the ALJ noted Plaintiff “ceased
treatment in 1/2022 for no clear reason, [] has not returned to see a provider,”
and has “chosen to stop taking medications” despite improved symptoms. (Id.
at 529.) This record evidence, and more, supports the limitations the ALJ
imposed in his RFC.
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The only other authority Plaintiff presents in support of his argument
is Social Security Ruling 24-3p. (Pl. Br. at 11.) Under this Ruling, he argues,
the ALJ exceeded his authority in determining “superficial” was not
vocationally relevant. (See id. at 11–13.) That ruling permits VEs to rely on
the Dictionary of Occupational titles and to “provide evidence based on their
professional experience and any reliable source of occupational information
that is commonly used in the vocational profession and relevant under [SSA]
rules.” SSR 24-3p, 2024 WL 4988840, at * 97160 (Dec. 6, 2024). In light of
this ruling, Plaintiff argues, the VE—not the ALJ—should have been the one
to decide whether a term was vocationally relevant. (Pl. Br. at 12–13.) To be
sure, “‘[s]uperficial” is not a defined term in the Social Security regulations or
other sources (e.g., the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Social Security
Rulings, and the HALLEX manual).” Jennifer L. v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec.
Admin., 23-CV-1822 (KMM/TNL), 2024 WL 4003021, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 30,
2024). But SSR 24-3p didn’t take effect until January 6, 2025—several
months after the ALJ issued his decision—so it does not apply here. SSR 24-
3p, 2024 WL 4988840, at *97158 (Dec. 6, 2024). Indeed, SSR 24-3p expressly
states: “We expect that Federal courts will review our final decisions using
the rules that were in effect at the time we issued the decisions.” Id. at 97159
n.1; see also P. v. Bisignano, 25-CV-1078 (SGE), 2026 WL 539182, at *4 n.10
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(D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2026). Because SSR 24-p3 was not in effect when the ALJ
issued his decision, Plaintiff’s arguments under that rule are inapposite.
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the above, and on the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
1. Plaintiff’s request for relief (Dkt. No. 12) is DENIED;
2. Defendant’s motion and brief (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16) are GRANTED; and
3. The Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: March 31, 2026 	s/ Elsa M. Bullard
ELSA M. BULLARD
United States Magistrate Judge
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