Myers v. Itasca County HRA et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Tricia Marie Myers, General Delivery, Duluth, MN 55806, pro se Plaintiff.
Mary G. Dobbins, LANDRUM DOBBINS LLC, 7400 Metro Boulevard, Suite
100, Edina, MN 55439, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Tricia Marie Myers had her housing vouchers terminated after the Itasca
County Housing and Redevelopment Authority (“HRA”) discovered Myers had engaged in
illicit drug use. 	Myers brought an action against HRA and several of its employees
(collectively, Defendants) alleging violations of her due process and equal protection
rights due to the loss of her housing vouchers. The Court granted Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment because it found that HRA had provided Myers and her family with
the kind of notice and opportunity to be heard that the relevant regulations and the
Constitution require—including offering Myers an informal hearing to contest the HRA’s
TRICIA MARIE MYERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ITASCA COUNTY HRA, DIANE LARSON,
CARRIE SCHMITZ, and KENDA
RODDENBERG,
Defendants.
Civil No. 24-1395 (JRT/LIB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
VACATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
EXTEND TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL
AND APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN
FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
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findings that Myers waived. (Mem. Op. Order, Aug. 19, 2025, Docket No. 68.) The Court
entered judgment on August 20, 2025 (Docket No. 69).
On September 23, 2025, Myers filed a motion to vacate the Court’s summary
judgment order (Docket No. 70), but before the Court could act on that motion, on
October 15, 2025, Myers filed a Notice of Appeal to the Eighth Circuit and a motion to
Extend Time to File Notice of Appeal. On October 16, 2025, Myers filed an application to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal.
Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment
Myers’ Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment (Docket No. 70) was filed more than
28 days after entry of the summary judgment. For this reason alone, the Court will deny
the motion. The Court will also deny the motion because, as explained below, it was an
improperly brought motion to reconsider.
Myers indicates in her Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment (Docket No. 70) that
the motion is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).1 	But in her
memorandum in support of the motion (Docket No. 71), Myers does not seek to alter or
amend the Court’s judgment but, rather, to have the Court reconsider its prior Order and
issue one in her favor.
1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B) states that if “a party files a notice of
appeal after the court announces or enters a judgment—but before it disposes of any motion
listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A) [which includes a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59]—
the notice becomes effective to appeal a judgment or order, in whole or in part, when the order
disposing of the last such remaining motion is entered.
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“Rule 59(e) motions cannot be used to introduce evidence that was available prior
to entry of judgment, to re-litigate old issues or to advance new theories and are not
intended to routinely give litigants a second bite at the apple, but to afford an opportunity
for relief in extraordinary circumstances.” Nordgren v. Hennepin Cnty., Civ. No. 21-125,
2022 WL 1125955, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Thus, when a motion under Rule 59(e) seeks essentially the same relief as that denied
by the [Court's previous] Order, the Motion will be construed as a motion to reconsider.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Petters, Civ. No. 08-5348, 2016 WL 4925783, at *1 (D. Minn.
Sept. 15, 2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Myers’ Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment seeks virtually the same relief that
was denied by the Court’s summary judgment order, so the motion will be construed as
a motion to reconsider. 	But in this District, a party cannot file a motion to reconsider
unless the party obtains the court’s permission and shows “compelling circumstances.”
D. Minn. LR 7.1(j). Because Myers neither sought nor received the Court’s permission to
file such a motion and has not otherwise shown compelling circumstances, the Court will
deny Myers’ Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment.
Motion to Extend Time
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) states that an appeal in a civil case
must be filed within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered. In this
instance, Myers did not file her notice of appeal until October 15, 2025, more than 30
days after judgment was entered. A district court may, however, extend the time to file
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a notice of appeal if: (1) the motion is filed within thirty days of the original thirty-day
deadline to file a notice of appeal; and (2) the moving party shows excusable neglect or
good cause. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5).
Myers has satisfied the first requirement of Rule 4(a)(5)(A) because her motion to
extend her time to file her appeal2 was filed within 30 days after the deadline for filing
her notice of appeal.
The inquiry as to whether a party has shown good cause or excusable neglect is an
“equitable one” that takes “account of all relevant circumstances.” 	Gibbons v. United
States, 317 F.3d 852, 854 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Courts may consider several
factors, including potential prejudice to other parties, the length of the delay at issue, and
the “good faith” of the party seeking an extension of the filing deadline. 	Id. However,
the most critical factor will always be the “reason-for-delay factor,” which considers the
nature, credibility and persuasiveness of the excuse proffered by the moving party. Id.
(quoting Lowry v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 463 (8th Cir. 2000)).
Myers indicates that she was not immediately aware of the entry of judgment and,
operating pro se, found the post-judgement procedural rules complex. While the Court
notes that Myers chose to appeal only after Defendants’ memorandum pointed out that
her motion to vacate the Court’s summary judgment order was not timely, the Court
2 Myers concurrently filed a Notice of Appeal. (October 15, 2025, Docket No. 77.)
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nevertheless finds both of her excuses credible. Myers has frequently been unhoused,
making notice (even by electronic means) more difficult. Moreover, the Court does not
expect the same familiarity with the relevant rules from pro se litigants as it expects from
counsel. Accordingly, the Court finds good cause to extend the deadline for Myers to file
a notice of appeal and will extend that deadline to October 18, 2025, meaning that Myers’
October 15, 2025 Notice of Appeal was timely.
IFP on Appeal
A party seeking to be excused from paying the filing fee for an appeal in a federal
case may apply for IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. To qualify for IFP status, the litigant
must demonstrate that they cannot afford to pay the full filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Even if a litigant is found to be indigent, IFP status will be denied if the Court finds that
the litigant’s appeal is “not taken in good faith.” Id. § 1915(a)(3).
Myers has satisfied both requirements to proceed IFP on appeal. 	First, Myers’
application demonstrates that she is unable to pay the full filing fee. 3 Second, while the
Court believes Myers’ appeal is unlikely to be successful for the reasons set forth in its
summary judgment opinion, the Court believes Myers’ appeal is made in good faith—and,
thus, Myers has the right to be heard on appeal.
The Court will, therefore, grant Myers’ application to proceed IFP.
3 The Transmittal of Appeal also indicates that the statutory filing fee has been waived
because an “Application for IFP [was] granted at beginning of case[.]” (Oct. 16, 2025, Docket No.
79.)
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Myers’ Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment [Docket No. 70] is DENIED.
2. 	Myers’ Motion to Extend Time to File Notice of Appeal [Docket No. 78] is
GRANTED.
3. 	Myers’ Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal [Docket No. 80]
is GRANTED.
DATED: December 4, 2025
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
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