Troy v. Grand River Navigation et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Laura De La Cruz and Matthew D. Shaffer, SCHECTER SHAFFER & HARRIS
LLP, 3200 Travis Street, Floor 3, Houston, TX 77006; Michael A. Bryant,
BRADSHAW & BRYANT PLLC, 1505 Division Street, Waite Park, MN 56387,
for Plaintiff David Troy.
Anne St. Amaant and Vince C. Reuter, ECKLAND & BLANDO, 800 Lumber
Exchange Building, 10 South Fifth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for
Defendant Grand River Navigation.
Timothy K. Masterson, DONNA LAW FIRM, P.C., 7601 France Avenue South,
Suite 350, Minneapolis, MN 55435, Defendant for Wisconsin Central Ltd.
In early January 2023, Plaintiff David Troy, a second mate on an ore carrier, slipped
and fell on a dock owned by Defendant Wisconsin Central Ltd. (“WCL”) as he approached
a vessel owned by Defendant Grand River Navigation (“Grand River”) in Duluth,
DAVID TROY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GRAND RIVER NAVIGATION,
Defendant, Cross-
Claimant, and Cross-
Defendant;
WISCONSIN CENTRAL LTD.,
Defendant, Cross-
Claimant, and Cross-
Defendant.
Civ. No. 23-2961 (JRT/SGE)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 1 of 48

-2-
Minnesota. 	Troy initiated this action against Grand River and WCL (collectively,
“Defendants”) seeking damages related to his injuries. 	Troy asserts claims against (1)
Grand River for negligence under the Jones Act and for maintenance and cure and (2)
WCL for negligence, premises liability, and for breach of the implied warranty of
workmanlike service. WCL and Grand River bring crossclaims against each other seeking
contribution and indemnity. Defendants now move for summary judgment. First, Grand
River moves for summary judgment on its crossclaim for indemnity against WCL under
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1956) (also known as Ryan
indemnity). Second, WCL moves for summary judgment on all claims filed against it. 1
After careful consideration of relevant legal principles and record evidence, the
Court will deny Grand River’s summary judgment motion. 	As to WCL’s summary
judgment motion, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part. The Court
will grant WCL’s motion as to Troy’s claim that WCL breached the implied warranty of
workmanlike 	service 	and 	to 	Grand 	River’s 	crossclaim 	against 	WCL 	seeking 	Ryan
indemnity. The Court will deny WCL’s summary judgment motion in part because WCL is
not entitled to summary judgment on Troy’s negligence and premises liability claims. Nor
is WCL entitled to summary judgment on Grand River’s contribution claim—or Grand
River’s indemnity claim to the extent it is based on a theory other than Ryan indemnity.
1 WCL does not move for summary judgment on its own crossclaim against Grand River
for contribution and indemnity.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 2 of 48

-3-
BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
David Troy served as a second mate on the Defiance (a tug) and the Ashtabula (a
barge) (collectively, the “Ashtabula”).2 (Troy Dep. at 36, 51, 184.)3 Grand River employed
Troy and operated the Ashtabula. 	(Id. at 36; Lees Dep. at 9–10.) 	On January 3, 2023,
while reporting for duty aboard a vessel owned by Grand River, Troy slipped and fell on
taconite pellets that covered WCL’s ore dock.
The Court will first summarize the events prior to Troy’s arrival at the ore dock on
the day of Troy’s injury and then describe what happened upon Troy’s arrival.
A. 	The Ashtabula Arrives at WCL’s Dock in Duluth, Minnesota
At approximately 4:30 a.m. on January 3, 2023, the Ashtabula arrived at WCL’s ore
dock in Duluth, Minnesota. (Lees Dep. at 13.) An ore dock is equipped with machinery
used to load cargo such as taconite pellets onto the ships. 	(Troy Dep. at 64–65, 179;
Brewer Dep. at 15.) 	Even though WCL owned the dock, Grand River’s crew was
responsible for loading operations. (Brewer Dep. at 31–32.) It is undisputed that WCL
2 The tug is the power for moving the barge, and they are connected in a way that they
are essentially just a single ship. (See Troy Dep. at 51–52.)
3 The parties rely on excerpts from six depositions submitted across several declarations.
For clarity, a chart specifying each deposition and the page ranges of the excerpts included with
each declaration is attached as an Appendix.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 3 of 48

-4-
and Grand River were not parties to a written contract. (Decl. of Timothy Masterson ¶ 2,
Exs. F, G, May 30, 2025, Docket No. 60.)
When the Ashtabula arrived, Jayrome Rimolde, a control operator for WCL, was
sweeping the dock because another vessel, the Arthur Anderson, had completed loading
ore and departed earlier that morning. (Decl. of Jayrome Rimolde (“Rimolde Decl.”) ¶ 2,
May 30, 2025, Docket No. 61; Brewer Dep. at 30.) To sweep the dock, Rimolde used a
“skidsteer-type vehicle” equipped with a brush and several lights on the front, roof, and
rear of the vehicle. (Rimolde Decl. ¶ 3.) He expected the Ashtabula crew to easily see his
vehicle because the vehicle’s lights were activated, and it was moving back and forth on
the dock. (Id. ¶ 4.)
There is no evidence that anyone on the Ashtabula checked in with WCL to ask
whether more time was needed to clean the dock before arrival. (Lees Dep. at 35.) Nor
is there any evidence that anyone from WCL contacted the Ashtabula crew to inform
them that it was unsafe to moor, even though vessels, such as the Ashtabula, may not
dock without WCL’s permission. (Brewer Dep. at 42, 46, 76.) WCL’s dock foreman was
responsible for communicating with arriving vessels. (Id. at 34.)
Despite Rimolde’s ongoing cleanup, the Ashtabula pulled up to the dock. (Rimolde
Decl. ¶ 5.) Rimolde asserted that he stopped sweeping because the vehicle must exit the
dock before a ship attaches to the dock with its “lines.” (Id.) WCL’s dock foreman, George
Brewer, confirmed that Rimolde informed him that he could not finish sweeping due to
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 4 of 48

-5-
the Ashtabula’s arrival, though Brewer could not recall whether that conversation
occurred before or after Troy’s injury. (Brewer Dep. at 38, 42.)
WCL’s port manager, Louis Weichseldorfer, confirmed that dock had “not yet
[been cleaned] in the area of the incident.” (Weichseldorfer Dep. at 29; see also Decl. of
Laura B. De La Cruz (“De La Cruz Decl.”) ¶ 6, Ex. E, June 20, 2025, Docket No. 68 (email
from Weichseldorfer shortly after Troy’s injury indicating that some cleaning of the dock
“was performed, but not yet in the area of the incident”).) Weichseldorfer acknowledged
that WCL “has an obligation to maintain its dock facility in a reasonably safe condition[.]”
(Weichseldorfer Dep. at 16.) 	WCL policy required that dock aprons be cleaned before
each vessel’s arrival; in fact, the policy stated that vessels, in most circumstances, should
not be allowed to moor until the dock has been cleaned. (Weichseldorfer Dep. at 19–20.)
Weichseldorfer further testified that WCL personnel were responsible for warning ship
crews about unsafe conditions and that he was not aware of any such warning being given
to the Ashtabula crew, or Troy, on January 3, 2023. (Id. at 44–45.) Weichseldorfer agreed
that there should have been additional communication between dock personnel and the
Ashtabula regarding the dock’s condition. 	(Id. at 45.)
WCL’s dock features an elevated catwalk system, which enables workers to travel
the full length of the dock without walking on the dock surface. (Johnson Dep. at 77–78.)
The workers are trained to refrain from walking under loading shuttle/chutes because
material being loaded onto the ship, such as taconite, could fall and hit workers. (Kahn
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 5 of 48

-6-
Dep. at 28–29.) Though not necessarily mentioned in any training materials, the falling
material could create a walking hazard on the dock. (Id. at 29.) Troy testified that he did
not recall anybody advising him that this catwalk existed. (Troy Dep. at 122–23.)
B. 	Troy’s Incident
When Troy arrived at the facility, he asked a security guard for instructions on how
to access the ship. 	(Troy Dep. at 69.) 	The security guard was employed by General
Security Services Corporation, a company hired by WCL to provide security services.
(Decl. of Allen Edberg, June 7, 2025, Docket No. 74.) The security guard simply instructed
Troy “to walk toward the vessel,” and Troy did not request further direction. (Troy Dep.
at 69, 91.) As Troy walked toward the Ashtabula, he noticed that the path was covered
with “piles” and “single layers” of taconite pellets. 	(Id. at 84–85, 105.) 	He recalled
encountering pellets as soon as he passed beneath a unit/structure. 	(Id.at 83–84.)
Although he did not recall observing a shuttle or chute overhead, he did recall seeing
pellets falling. (Id. at 132.)
Troy testified that he moved cautiously, “carefully paying attention to how [he]
was placing [his] feet due to so much ore and clutter” but that it was difficult to do so
because of “the time of day and the lighting.” (Troy Dep. at 84.) Troy noted “[t]here was
no lighting for [him] to actually see.” (Id. at 103.) Nor was there any signage at the dock
to guide Troy to the vessel. 	(Id. at 218–19.) 	Troy described the surface as feeling like
“walking on marbles,” with the pellets “rolling underneath [his] feet.” (Id. at 107.)
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 6 of 48

-7-
Troy ultimately slipped and fell on the dock, approximately twenty feet from the
boat. (Brewer Dep. at 20.) As he laid injured on the dock, he overheard a nearby dock
worker on a hand-held radio say that “they were supposed to clean the dock, but they
had not.” (Troy Dep. at 117.) One of the paramedics who responded commented that
the walking conditions were “terrible” and that “they were having a hard time getting to
[Troy].” (Id. at 118.)
The Ashtabula’s captain, Kevin Lees, responded to the scene. (Lees Dep. at 21.)
He observed the large amounts of taconite pellets, which he believed should have been
swept. 	(Id. at 22, 26.) 	Although Lees could not determine the dock’s condition at the
time of the fall because pellets were falling when he arrived, he believed the dock was
unsafe when he arrived. (Id. at 28.) Similarly, WCL’s dock foreman, George Brewer, also
testified that he believed that loading operations were occurring when Troy slipped and
fell. (Brewer Dep. at 21.)
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Troy initiated this action against Grand River and WCL. (Compl., Sept. 25, 2023,
Docket No. 1.) Troy brings claims against Grand River for (1) negligence under the Jones
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 7 of 48

-8-
Act4 and (2) for maintenance and cure.5 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 14–20, Jan. 21, 2025, Docket
No. 50.) 	Troy also raises claims against WCL for negligence, premises liability, and for
breach of implied warranty of workmanlike service. (Id. ¶¶ 21–34.) WCL and Grand River
bring crossclaims against each other seeking contribution and indemnity. (WCL’s Answer
¶¶ 42–43, Oct. 26, 2023, Docket No. 9; Grand River’s Answer at 8–9, Dec. 14, 2023, Docket
No. 14.)
Defendants now move for summary judgment. Grand River moves for summary
judgment on its crossclaim for indemnity against WCL. (Grand River’s Mot. Summ. J., May
30, 2025, Docket No. 53.) WCL moves for summary judgment on all claims filed against it
(by Grand River and by Troy). (WCL’s Mot. Summ. J., May 30, 2025, Docket No. 58.)
4 “A Jones Act claim is an in personam action for a seaman who suffers injury in the course
of employment due to negligence of his employer, the vessel owner, or crew members.” Lewis v.
Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001). The Jones Act provides that “[a] seaman
injured in the course of employment . . . may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of
trial by jury, against the employer.” 46 U.S.C. § 30104. A Jones Act claim has four elements: (1)
an employer’s duty to provide a safe work environment to its seamen, (2) breach of that duty,
(3) the employer’s awareness of the unsafe condition, and (4) a causal link, however slight,
between the breach and the seaman’s injury. Ribitzki v. Canmar Reading & Bates, Ltd., 111 F.3d
658, 662–64 (9th Cir. 1997).
5 A maintenance and cure claim “concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to provide food,
lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark
Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001). Because the shipowner duty to pay maintenance and cure
is distinct from the shipowner’s liability under the Jones Act, “a seaman is entitled to
‘maintenance and cure’ payments in addition to any damages for negligence he or she might win
under the Jones Act.” 	Stanislawski v. Upper River Servs., Inc., 6 F.3d 537, 540 (8th Cir. 1993)
(emphasis added).
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 8 of 48

-9-
DISCUSSION
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the moving party can demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit,
and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could lead a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
II. 	THRESHOLD ISSUES
Although the parties agree that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over this case,
the parties dispute which statutory provisions confer such jurisdiction and, thus, whether
state or maritime law applies.
The parties do not dispute that Troy’s Jones Act negligence claim and maintenance
and cure claim against Grand River fall within the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction. 	The
parties also do not dispute that Troy’s implied warranty claim against WCL falls under the
Court’s admiralty jurisdiction.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 9 of 48

-10-
Troy asserts that the Court has original jurisdiction over all of his claims pursuant
to the Court’s admiralty or maritime jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).6 	But WCL
argues the Court must exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Troy’s negligence and
premises liability claims against WCL under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Because of this dispute,
the parties likewise dispute whether maritime law or state law applies to Troy’s
negligence and premises liability claims against WCL.
A. 	Jurisdiction
The judicial power extends “to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Congress codified this power in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), which provides
that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States,
of . . . [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all
other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” When at least one claim falls within
the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, the Court may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over any related claims that form part of the same case or
controversy.
In 1948, Congress enacted the Admiralty Extension Act (AEA), which extended
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to “cases of injury or damage, to person or property,
caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even though the injury or damage is done or
6 Troy argues, in the alternative, that the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over his claims against WCL under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 10 of 48

-11-
consummated on land.” 	46 U.S.C. § 30101(a). 	“The purpose of the Act was to end
concern over the sometimes confusing line between land and water, by investing
admiralty with jurisdiction over ‘all cases’ where the injury was caused by a ship or other
vessel on navigable water, even if such injury occurred on land.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc.
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 532 (1995).
Following the Act, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions clarifying the
scope of admiralty jurisdiction, culminating in Grubart, which set forth the current test
for establishing federal admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). 	To satisfy
§ 1333(1), a party must satisfy the (1) location test and (2) the maritime connection test.
Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. To satisfy the location test, the plaintiff must show that either
“the tort occurred on navigable water,” or if the injury occurred on land, the harm “was
caused by a vessel on navigable water.” Id. To satisfy the maritime connection test, the
plaintiff must show that the matter has “a potentially disruptive impact on maritime
commerce” and that the “general character of the activity giving rise to the incident
shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Troy argues that maritime jurisdiction applies to his negligence and premises
liability claims against WCL. But WCL argues that the Court should not exercise maritime
jurisdiction over those claims because Troy was injured on a dock—an extension of land.
Because Troy was injured on land, WCL asserts that Court should instead exercise
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 11 of 48

-12-
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims under 28 U.S.C § 1367. The Court agrees with
WCL and concludes that it will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims for
two reasons.
First, Troy’s negligence and premises liability against WCL are against the dock
owner—not Grand River, the owner of the vessel. The plain text of 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a)
extends admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to only “cases of injury or damage . . . caused
by a vessel on navigable waters.” 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (emphasis added). Because Troy’s
negligence and premises liability claims are lodged against WCL, the dock owner, the AEA
does not confer admiralty jurisdiction over those claims.
The case cited by Troy, Duluth Superior Excursions, Inc. v. Makela, 623 F.2d 1251
(8th Cir. 1980), supports the conclusion that Troy’s negligence and premises liability claims
are not covered by the AEA. In Mekela, the plaintiff asserted claims against the vessel
owners and operators after being injured on land. 	Id. at 1252. 	The Eighth Circuit
concluded that in light of the Admiralty Extension Act, admiralty jurisdiction existed. Id.
at 1253. 	Unlike the plaintiff in Makela, Troy’s negligence and premises liability claims
against WCL are asserted against the dock owner, not the vessel’s owner or operator.
Contra id. (“It is sufficient for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction in this case that a
passenger is suing for personal injuries allegedly due to the negligence of the vessel’s
owners and crew on navigable waters.”). The AEA therefore does not apply.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 12 of 48

-13-
Second, Troy was injured on a dock, not navigable waters. It is well-established
the “[p]iers and docks [have been] consistently deemed extensions of land” and thus
injuries that occur on them are “not compensable under the maritime law.” 	Victory
Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 206–07 (1971) (holding that no admiralty jurisdiction
existed when a longshoreman was injured while operating a forklift to move cargo to a
location on the pier where it was to be loaded onto a vessel). 	To invoke maritime
jurisdiction under the AEA, injury must be “caused by an appurtenance of a ship” or the
ship itself. Id. at 211. Here, Troy was injured on a dock, an extension of land and is not
alleging that those injuries were caused by an appurtenance of the ship or the ship itself.
The AEA therefore does not apply. 	See, e.g., Adamson v. Port of Bellingham, 907 F.3d
1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that maritime jurisdiction did not extend to an injury
sustained by a crew member on a permanent passenger ramp connecting a port terminal
building to a ferry); MLC Fishing, Inc. v. Velez, 667 F.3d 140, 141, 142 (2d. Cir. 2011)
(concluding that no maritime jurisdiction existed where ship passenger slipped and fell
on a ramp linking the marina to the floating dock used by passengers to reach the vessel).
Because Troy’s negligence and premises liability claims fail the location test, the
Court may not exercise maritime jurisdiction over those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
But these claims easily fall under the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 because Troy’s claims share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with his claims
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 13 of 48

-14-
that do fall under the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction See United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
B. 	Choice of Law
Troy argues that substantive maritime law should apply to all of his claims because
he asserts claims under admiralty jurisdiction. WCL argues that Troy’s argument fails with
respect to his negligence and premises liability claims because he is improperly lumping
all of his claims into a single jurisdictional analysis.
Federal maritime law applies if the claim falls within the Court’s maritime
jurisdiction. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986). Put
another way, “if Plaintiff’s claims fall within maritime jurisdiction, then substantive
maritime law controls; if they do not, however, then the court must apply other
substantive law.” 7 Espinoza v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1210 (C.D.
Cal. 2022) (citing Adamson, 907 F.3d at 1126).
Because the Court concludes that Troy’s claims for negligence and premises
liability against WCL do not fall under its maritime jurisdiction, the Court will apply
Minnesota substantive law to those claims. 8
7 It is true that, generally speaking, “[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of
substantive admiralty law.” E River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 864. But courts do not “synchronize
the jurisdictional enquiry with the test for determining the applicable substantive law” because
doing so “would discard a fundamental feature of admiralty law, that federal admiralty courts
sometimes do apply state law.” Grubart, 513 U.S. at 546.
8 The parties do not argue that any state’s law other than Minnesota’s should apply.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 14 of 48

-15-
III. 	GRAND RIVER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Grand River moves for summary judgment on its crossclaim for indemnity against
WCL, asserting that the doctrine of implied warranty of workmanlike service requires WCL
to indemnify Grand River for losses suffered on WCL’s dock. WCL opposes Grand River’s
summary judgment motion, arguing that (1) the implied warranty claim fails because a
contract did not exist between WCL and Grand River and (2) even if a contract had existed,
Grand River is not entitled to indemnification because Grand River interfered with the
performance of WCL’s purported contractual duties. The Court will deny Grand River’s
summary judgment motion because it is not entitled to Ryan indemnity.9
A. 	History of Ryan Indemnity
Grand River argues that WCL must indemnify Grand River if it is found liable for
Troy’s injuries under Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
Ryan 	permits 	indemnification 	if 	a 	contractor 	breaches 	the 	implied 	warranty 	of
workmanlike service.
Before turning to Ryan, the Court will define a few key terms and then provide an
overview of the maritime legal landscape.
9 As discussed in infra Section IV.B., the Court will grant WCL’s motion for summary
judgment to the extent Grand River seeks Ryan indemnity.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 15 of 48

-16-
“Seamen” work on a vessel on navigable waters.10 “Longshoremen” (sometimes
also referred to as dockworkers) are professionals who load, unload, and secure cargo on
ships at ports. Longshoreman, Black’s Law Dictionary (12 th ed 2024). “Stevedores” can
refer to either a “person or [a] company that hires longshore and harbor workers to load
and unload ships.” Stevedore, Black’s Law Dictionary (12 th ed 2024).
Traditionally, if a seaman was injured during the course of their employment,
maritime law recognized two causes of action: (1) maintenance and cure and (2)
unseaworthiness. See Knight v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 154 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir.
1998). A maintenance and cure claim “concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to provide
food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship.” 	Lewis v.
Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001). Under maintenance and cure, vessel
owners are strictly liable for a seaman’s injuries suffered in service of the vessel. Calmar
S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938). The seaworthiness doctrine is grounded in
the “vessel owner’s duty to ensure that the vessel is reasonably fit to be at sea.” Lewis,
531 U.S. at 441. 	The vessel owner’s duty to provide a seaworthy ship is absolute and
nondelegable, and therefore, “a shipowner is strictly liable” once the plaintiff shows that
the unseaworthiness of the ship caused their injuries. Knight, 154 F.3d at 1044. Because
10 “Under the Jones Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, [a
seaman is] a person who is attached to a navigating vessel as an employee below the rank of
officer and contributes to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission.”
Seaman, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 16 of 48

-17-
liability under these doctrines was absolute, a vessel’s owner’s negligence was irrelevant.
Id. 	Apart from these two causes of action, until 1920, a seaman possessed no further
right to recover from the shipowner for injuries suffered onboard.
In 1920, Congress changed this traditional framework by passing the Jones Act,
which gave seamen the right to bring negligence actions against their employers. Id.11
In 1956, the Supreme Court in Ryan sought to remedy inequities created by
traditional maritime law and several prior Supreme Court decisions. First, in Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki, the Supreme Court held that the unseaworthiness doctrine, which
traditionally covered seamen, extended to longshoreman, noting that the doctrine “is not
confined to seamen who perform the ship’s service under immediate hire to the owner,
but extends to those who render it with his consent or by his arrangement.” 328 U.S. 85,
95 (1946). Several years later, the Supreme Court held that a shipowner could not seek
contribution from the injured longshoreman’s employer. 	Halcycon Lines v. Haenn Ship
Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952). As a result, shipowners could be held
liable for injuries to longshoremen caused by unseaworthy conditions on the vessel, even
11 See also Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995) (“Under general maritime law
prevailing prior to the [Jones Act’s] enactment, seamen were entitled to ‘maintenance and cure’
from their employer for injuries incurred ‘in the service of the ship’ and to recover damages from
the vessel’s owner for ‘injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of
the ship,’ but they were ‘not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the master,
or any member of the crew.’”).
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 17 of 48

-18-
when those conditions were created not by the shipowner but rather by a third-party
contractor.
In 1956, the Supreme Court in Ryan sought to correct this inequity after it was
confronted with the question of whether a stevedoring contractor had to reimburse a
shipowner for damages paid by the shipowner to one of the contractor’s longshoremen
on account of injuries suffered by the longshoreman in the course of his employment on
ship. 350 U.S. at 125. In Ryan, a 3,200-pound roll of pulpboard broke loose and struck a
longshoreman and injured him because the loading stevedore did not secure the roll
properly. Id. at 126. The plaintiff then brought an action against the shipowner, who in
turn sought indemnity from the plaintiff’s employer, Ryan Stevedoring Co., with whom
the shipowner had contracted to provide stevedoring services. 	Id. 	The Court inferred
from the shipowner’s contract with the stevedoring company an implied warranty of
workmanlike service, which obliges the stevedoring company to complete its work
“properly and safely.” 	Id. at 134. 	At the same time, the Court read the contract as
implicitly granting the shipowner a right to indemnification from the stevedore for losses
arising from a breach of this warranty. 	Id. at 133–34. 	In other words, under Ryan, a
shipowner is entitled to indemnification from the stevedore if the stevedore breaches the
implied warranty of workmanlike service.
Shortly after Ryan, the Court offered an escape hatch for contractors: A shipowner
was entitled to indemnity only “absent conduct on its part sufficient to preclude
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 18 of 48

-19-
recovery.” Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 567 (1958).
Around that same time, the Court also held that shipowner was entitled to indemnity
from the stevedore company, even though neither party acted negligently, when
defective equipment brought on board by the stevedore caused a longshoreman’s
injuries. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315,
324 (1964). In doing so, the Court acknowledged that “liability should fall upon the party
best situated to adopt preventive measures and thereby to reduce the likelihood of injury.
Where, as here, injury-producing and defective equipment is under the supervision and
control of the stevedore, the shipowner is powerless to minimize the risk; the stevedore
is not.” Id.
Then 	in 	1972, 	Congress 	amended 	the 	Longshore 	and 	Harbor 	Workers’
Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., which barred seaworthiness actions
by longshoreman against shipowners as well as indemnity actions by shipowners against
contractors (e.g., stevedores) based on breaches of express or implied warranties that
caused injuries to longshoremen. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). In other words, as a result of
the 1972 LHWCA amendments, longshoremen could not bring unseaworthiness claims
under Sieracki, and shipowners could not seek indemnification under Ryan from
contractors arising from claims by longshoremen. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 262 (1979) (recognizing that the LHWCA amendments
effectively overruled Sieracki and Ryan).
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 19 of 48

-20-
Despite the 1972 LHWCA amendments, courts have recognized that a shipowner
may be entitled to Ryan indemnity in seamen cases. See, e.g., Knight, 154 F.3d at 1045
(“This and other circuits, however, have recognized the continued vitality of Ryan
indemnity in seamen cases.”).
B. 	Applicability of Ryan Indemnity
To determine whether Grand River is entitled to summary judgment, the Court
must determine whether Ryan indemnity is appropriate in this case. The Court concludes
the Grand River is not entitled to Ryan indemnification for two independent reasons.
First, Ryan requires that a shipowner be a party to a contract or a third-party beneficiary
to a contract. Because Grand River has failed to show that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact that it is a party to a contract or a third-party beneficiary, Ryan is
inapplicable. Second, because Troy asserts a Jones Act negligence claim, Ryan indemnity
is not appropriate, and comparative fault principles should apply.
1. 	Ryan’s Contract Requirement
Grand River asserts that WCL should indemnify it for Troy’s claims because Ryan
indemnity does not require an express, written contract between the shipowner and dock
owner. WCL argues that Ryan indemnity does not apply unless a contract exists. Despite
a potentially conflicting holding in the Sixth Circuit, the Court concludes that Ryan
indemnity requires a contract. Because Grand River has failed to show that there is no
genuine dispute of material fact that it is a party to a contract or a third-party beneficiary
to a contract, Grand River is not entitled to Ryan indemnity.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 20 of 48

-21-
a. 	Olgebay
Grand River relies on the Sixth Circuit case, which stated—in a footnote—that a
contract is not required for Ryan indemnity. Oglebay Norton Co. v. CSX Corp., 788 F.2d
361, 364 n.4 (6th Cir. 1986) (“A contractual relationship, however, is not considered an
essential element to imply this warranty.”). Although courts have sent mixed signals on
whether a contract is required for a shipowner to seek Ryan indemnity from a stevedore,
the Court concludes that Oglebay is mistaken on this point because it misreads another
United States Supreme Court case, Waterman S.S. Corp v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364
U.S. 421 (1960). Explaining that conclusion, however, requires further discussion.
In Ryan, the Supreme Court read a warranty of workmanlike service into an existing
contract between the shipowner and a stevedore. Ryan, 350 U.S. at 133. The Court then
implied that the shipowner possessed a right of indemnification against the stevedore for
damages caused by the stevedore’s breach of the warranty.12 Id. In doing so, the Court
noted that the implied warranty “is not a quasi-contractual obligation implied in law or
arising out of a noncontractual relationship. It is of the essence of petitioner’s stevedoring
contract.” Id. (emphasis added) The Court also emphasized that the “shipowner’s action
here is not founded upon a tort . . . . The third-party complaint is grounded upon the
12 “The shipowner here holds [the stevedore’s] uncontroverted agreement to perform all
of the shipowner’s stevedoring operations at the time and place where the cargo in question was
loaded. That agreement necessarily includes [the stevedore’s] obligation not only to stow the
pulp rolls, but to stow them properly and safely.” Ryan, 350 U.S. at 133.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 21 of 48

-22-
contractor’s breach of its purely consensual obligation.” Id. at 131. On its face, a contract
appears to be essential under Ryan. This proposition is further bolstered by the fact that
the Court declined to address whether the implied warranty created a “non-contractual
right of indemnity.” Id. at 133 (noting that because the shipowner’s claim rested on the
stevedore’s contractual duties, the Court declined to address “the question of a
noncontractual right of indemnity”).
Despite the emphasis by the Supreme Court in Ryan on the contractual nature of
the implied warranty, the Sixth Circuit stated in Oglebay that a contract is not required. 13
13 The facts in Olgebay bear some resemblance to the facts presented in this case. 	In
Oglebay, the shipowner sought indemnity from the dock owner after a seaman was fatally
crushed between the Sylvania, a vessel owned by Oglebay Norton, and a dock owned by
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway (C&O) during mooring operations in a storm-related power outage.
788 F.2d at 362–63. The Sylvania had been instructed to dock at an unlit, coal-covered pier that
lacked emergency lighting. Id. at 363. The dock featured two tiers: the upper tier served as the
main deck, while the lower tier—three feet below and only a few feet wide—contained the
mooring spiles. Id. No ladders or handrails connected the two levels, requiring seamen to step
down from the upper to the lower tier to secure the vessel. Id. Because the dock was fitted with
coal unloading machinery, coal routinely accumulated on its surface, and at the time of the
incident, C&O had not swept the dock. Id. Combined with the storm’s moisture, the coal-covered
dock was wet and slippery. 	Id. 	As the Sylvania approached, the seamen and another crew
member were lowered to the upper dock to handle the mooring lines. Id. Although the ship’s
floodlight initially illuminated their work area, the hull soon cast a shadow over the lower tier,
and no one adjusted the light or provided assistance. Id. When the seaman stepped down to
the lower level, he slipped, fell into the narrow gap between the dock and the vessel, and was
crushed as the ship moved against the dock. Id. The seamen’s estate brought a wrongful death
claim under the Jones Act. Oglebay settled the matter and sought indemnification from C&O,
the dock owner. Id.
The district court concluded that the dock owner breached its implied warranty of
workmanlike performance but denied indemnity, holding that the Sylvania’s captain was
primarily responsible for the seamen’s death because he failed to provide sufficient lighting and
proceeded to dock without adequate lighting. Id. at 363. The district court also determined that
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 22 of 48

-23-
788 F.2d at 364 n.4 (“A contractual relationship, however, is not considered an essential
element to imply this warranty.” (citing Waterman, 364 U.S. 421)). The Court disagrees
with Oglebay that Waterman dispensed with the contract requirement.
In Waterman, a longshoreman, who was employed by a stevedore, was injured on
a ship while unloading it. 	Waterman, 364 U.S. at 422. 	The longshoreman brought an
action 	against 	the 	shipowner. 	Id. 	The 	shipowner 	settled 	its 	lawsuit 	with 	the
longshoreman. 	Id. 	But the shipowner, by way of a third-party complaint, sought
indemnification from the stevedore. Id. The stevedore argued that it was not required
to indemnify the shipowner because there was “no direct contractual relationship”
between the stevedore and the shipowner. 	Id. 	At trial, the parties stipulated that
stevedore and the shipowner did not have a contract because it “appear[ed] that the
consignee of the cargo, not the [shipowner], had actually engaged the [stevedore] to
unload the ship.” Id. The district court then directed a verdict in favor of the stevedore,
“holding that a shipowner had no right of indemnity against a stevedore under the
circumstances alleged in the absence of a direct contractual relationship between them.”
the captain was aware of the dock’s hazards “and was in a better position to avoid the injury than
the wharfinger.” Id. at 364.
The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that Oglebay was entitled to indemnity under Ryan
because the warranty of workmanlike service exists between the shipowner and a maritime
contractor in the absence of any contract whatsoever. Id. at 364 n.4, 367.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 23 of 48

-24-
Id. at 422–23. 	The Third Circuit affirmed. 	Id. at 423. 	The Supreme Court reversed,
explaining that:
In the Ryan and Weyerhaeuser cases considerable emphasis was placed
upon the direct contractual relationship between the shipowner and the
stevedore. If those decisions stood alone, it might well be thought an open
question whether such contractual privity is essential to support the
stevedore’s duty to indemnify. But the fact is that this bridge was crossed
in the Crumady case. 	There we explicitly held that the stevedore’s
assumption of responsibility for the shipowner’s damages resulting from
unsafe 	and 	improper 	performance 	of 	the 	stevedoring 	services 	was
unaffected by the fact that the shipowner was not the party who had hired
the stevedore. That case was decided upon the factual premises that the
stevedore had been engaged not by the shipowner, but by the party
operating the ship under a charter.
Id. at 423–24. The Waterman Court then quoted the following passage from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Crumady in support of its holding:
We think this case is governed by the principle announced in the Ryan case.
The warranty which a stevedore owes when he goes aboard a vessel to
perform services is plainly for the benefit of the vessel whether the vessel’s
owners are parties to the contract or not. That is enough to bring the vessel
into 	the 	zone 	of 	modern 	law 	that recognizes 	rights 	in 	third-party
beneficiaries. 	Moreover, as we said in the Ryan case, “competency and
safety of stowage are inescapable elements of the service undertaken.”
They are part of the stevedore’s “warranty of workmanlike service that is
comparable 	to 	a 	manufacturer’s 	warranty 	of 	the 	soundness 	of 	its
manufactured product.” 	We conclude that since the negligence of the
stevedores, which brought the unseaworthiness of the vessel into play,
amounted to a breach of the warranty of workmanlike service, the vessel
may recover over.
Id. at 424 (citations omitted) (quoting Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S.
423, 428–29 (1959)).
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 24 of 48

-25-
Applying the Crumady rationale, the Supreme Court concluded that a stevedore
had a duty to indemnify the shipowner. Waterman, 364 U.S. at 424 (“We can perceive
no difference in principle, so far as the stevedore’s duty to indemnify the shipowner is
concerned, whether the stevedore is engaged by an operator to whom the owner has
chartered the vessel or by the consignee of the cargo.”) Yet the Sixth Circuit in Oglebay
cited Waterman to support the proposition that the warranty of workmanlike service
exists between the shipowner and a third-party in the absence of a contractual
relationship. Oglebay, 788 F.2d at 364 n.4.
The Court concludes that Oglebay’s contention that Waterman dispensed with the
contract requirement entirely is erroneous. Instead, Waterman and Crumady held that
the implied warranty of workmanlike service also arises when shipowner is third-party
beneficiary to a contract.14 	Waterman, 364 U.S. at 425 (“The owner, no less than the
14 Another problem with Oglebay is that the Sixth Circuit relied on Sims, another Sixth
Circuit case, which appeared to plant the seed that a contract is immaterial to the existence of
the implied warranty. 	In Oglebay, the court noted that the implied warranty of workmanlike
service extends from a dock owner to a shipowner, as the warranty implies a “duty to furnish a
safe means of egress and ingress to berthed ships.” Id. at 365 (quoting Sims v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. Co., 520 F.2d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 1975)).
In Sims, the Sixth Circuit implied that Ryan did not impose a contract requirement.
Instead, the implied warranty of workmanlike service simply depended on “the nature of the
services performed by the wharfinger.” 520 F.2d at 561. In support of this proposition, the Sixth
Circuit relied on a Fifth Circuit case, Dow Chem.Co. v. Barge UM-23B, which held that the
wharfinger was required to indemnify barge owners and operators after two barges broke away
and damaged a third party’s dock because the contractor “breached its duty under the contract”
with such owners and operators by acting negligently. 424 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1970) (emphasis
added). It thus appears that Sims failed to acknowledge that the wharfinger contracted with the
barges’ owners and operators.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 25 of 48

-26-
ship, is the beneficiary of the stevedore’s warranty of workmanlike service.” (emphasis
added)); Crumady, 358 U.S. at 428 (emphasizing that because the warranty “is plainly for
the benefit of the vessel whether the vessel’s owners are parties to the contract or not[,]”
the vessel is covered by the warranty as a third-party beneficiary). 15
Waterman did not dispose of the contract requirement entirely; rather, it
recognized that Ryan indemnity may also apply when the shipowner is a third-party
beneficiary to a contract. 	Accordingly, the warranty of workmanlike service is implied
when a contract exists between the shipowner and the contractor or when the shipowner
is a third-party beneficiary to a contract.
b. 	Application
Having concluded that Ryan indemnity requires either the existence of a contract
between the shipowner and the contractor or that the shipowner be a third-party
Olgebay also cites Ammesmaki v. Interlake S.S. Co., 342 F.2d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 1965).
Oglebay, 788 F.2d at 365. 	In Ammesmaki, the Seventh Circuit held that a dock owner was
required to indemnify a shipowner for injuries that occurred on the dock because the dock owner
breached the implied “warranty to maintain the dock in a reasonably safe manner.” 342 F.2d at
632. 	But unlike Oglebay, a contract was involved in Ammesmaki. 	Id. at 630 (noting that the
shipowner “predicated its action for indemnity on alternative theories of tort and contract” and
the contract theory was submitted to the jury to consider factual issues “includ[ing] whether the
railroad expressly or impliedly had agreed to keep its dock in a reasonably safe condition”).
Again, Olgebay appears to disregard the fact that the implied warranty claim was based on a
contract.
15 See also In re Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d 184, 198 (3d. Cir. 2013) (acknowledging
that under Crumady and Waterman, “vessels are automatic third-party beneficiaries of
warranties of workmanlike service made to their charterers by stevedores who unload vessels at
docks”).
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 26 of 48

-27-
beneficiary of a contract, the Court must determine whether Grand River has shown that
there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether it was a party to a contract or
a third-party beneficiary to one. First, it is undisputed that WCL and Grand River were
not parties to a written contract. (Masterson Decl. ¶ 2, Exs. F, G.) Grand River asserts
that Grand River and WCL formed a contract because Grand River was an invitee on WCL’s
dock, which “included negotiations regarding time and process.” 	(Grand River’s Reply
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 5, July 7, 2025, Docket No. 71.) WCL argues that a contract
is not formed merely because WCL granted Grand River permission to dock.
The flaw in Grand River’s argument is that it rests on its status as an invitee—a
concept from tort law, not contract law. 	Under either Minnesota or general maritime
law, the elements of contract formation are (1) an offer, (2) acceptance, and (3)
consideration—regardless of whether the purported contract is written or oral. See Taxi
Connection, v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp., 513 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 2008); In re Tasch,
Inc., 46 F. App’x 731, 2002 WL 1973464, at *4 (5th Cir. 2002). 	Grand River’s purported
status as an invitee has no bearing on whether these elements are met. Because Grand
River has not shown that it is a party to a contract, Grand River is not entitled to Ryan
indemnity, unless it can show that it is a third-party beneficiary to a contract.
Grand River argues that it is a third-party beneficiary to any contracts WCL may
have had with another party concerning the loading and delivery of the taconite pellets.
The problem with Grand River’s argument is that it points to no specific contract that WCL
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 27 of 48

-28-
may have had with another party. As a result, the Court cannot assess whether Grand
River was a third-party beneficiary to a particular contract. Grand River’s position is also
undermined by evidence that Grand River was responsible for loading operations, a fact
that suggests that Grand River was not a beneficiary to a contract between WCL and some
other third-party contractor (e.g., a stevedore).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Grand River is not entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of Ryan indemnity because it cannot show that, as a matter of law,
it was a party to a contract with WCL or that it was third-party beneficiary to a contract
WCL had with another party.
2. 	Relationship Between Ryan Indemnity, Traditional Maritime Tort
Claims, and Comparative Fault
Even if Grand River later shows that it is a party to a contract or a third-party
beneficiary to a contract, Grand River is not entitled to Ryan indemnity.16 	The Court
concludes that Ryan indemnity does not apply when the plaintiff’s claim is based on
negligence, and when the plaintiff brings a negligence claim, comparative fault principles
apply. 	Because Troy asserts a negligence claim, Ryan indemnity is inappropriate, and
16 WCL argues that Ryan is inapplicable because Troy did not bring a seaworthiness claim.
Grand River argues that Ryan indemnity should nonetheless apply because Troy brings a claim
for maintenance and cure, a claim for which Grand River is strictly liable. 	After careful
consideration, the Court concludes that it need not resolve the question of whether a
seaworthiness claim (or a maintenance and cure claim, for that matter) is essential to invoke
Ryan indemnity. Instead, for the reasons set forth in this section, the proper inquiry centers on
whether the plaintiff has asserted negligence claim.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 28 of 48

-29-
comparative fault principles should therefore apply. To explain why the Court reaches
this conclusion, the Court must discuss the relationship between Ryan indemnity,
traditional maritime tort claims, and comparative fault principles.
Under the seaworthiness doctrine, a shipowner has an absolute, nondelegable
duty to provide a seaworthy ship, and is strictly liable for breaching this duty. Knight, 154
F.3d at 1044. The Ninth Circuit has stated that if a seaman raises a Jones Act negligence
claim, a negligent shipowner is not entitled to Ryan indemnity from a maritime contractor
because “Ryan indemnity was tied to the seaworthiness doctrine.” 	Knight, 154 F.3d at
1045 (recognizing that the Ninth Circuit has “never allowed . . . a negligent shipowner to
obtain Ryan indemnity outside the seaworthiness doctrine”); California Home Brands, Inc.
v. Ferreira, 871 F.2d 830, 836 (9 th Cir. 1989) (“Since Jones Act suits are based on
negligence, not any absolute duty of the shipowner, the rationale for implying a warranty
of workmanlike performance does not apply here.”). On their face, Knight and California
Home Brands emphasize the relationship between Ryan indemnity and seaworthiness
claims, which are subject to strict liability. 	If Ryan indemnity is inextricably connected
with seaworthiness claims, then Grand River is not entitled to indemnification because
Troy has not brought a seaworthiness claim.
Tacitly recognizing this issue, Grand River argues that the inquiry should center on
whether Grand River is subject to strict liability. Grand River relies on Campbell Industries,
Inc. v. Offshore Logistics International, Inc., a Ninth Circuit case, which held that a
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 29 of 48

-30-
shipowner was entitled to Ryan indemnity from a negligent contractor after it paid
maintenance and cure benefits to an injured seaman. 816 F.2d 1401 (9 th Cir. 1987). Grand
River’s point is well-taken. But Campbell differs from the case here in a critical way: Troy
has also asserted a Jones Act negligence claim against the shipowner, Grand River.17
Courts are divided on whether a negligent shipowner can secure Ryan indemnity
for its own negligence and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. Knight, 154 F.3d at
1046. 	On one hand, several circuits still recognize Ryan indemnity, even when the
shipowner shares some degree of fault—reasoning that the contractor is in a better
position to avoid the incident than the shipowner. 18 On the other hand, some courts have
applied comparative fault principles in seamen personal injury cases, rejecting Ryan
indemnity.19 In Knight, the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the courts electing to
apply comparative fault—where the plaintiff brought claims for unseaworthiness,
17 See Knight, 154 F.3d at 1045 (distinguishing Campbell on the ground that the injured
seamen there did not assert a Jones Act negligence claim against the shipowner, and the
shipowner was not at fault for their injuries).
18 See, e.g., Cooper v. Loper, 923 F.2d 1045, 1051 (3d. Cir. 1991) (applying Ryan indemnity
even when shipowner was 20 percent at fault); Oglebay, 788 F.2d at 366 (applying Ryan
indemnity even when shipowner was 75 percent at fault); Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Carolina Shipping
Co., 509 F.2d 53, 54 (4th Cir. 1975) (applying Ryan indemnity even when shipowner was 25
percent at fault).
19 See Knight, 154 F.3d at 1046; Smith & Kelly Co. v. S/S Concordia TADJ, 718 F.2d 1022,
1025, 1028–29 (11th Cir. 1983); Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 500 (5th Cir.
1982); Black v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 860 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1988).
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 30 of 48

-31-
maintenance and cure, and Jones Act negligence—and held that “a negligent shipowner
is not entitled to receive Ryan indemnity from a negligent contractor when the shipowner
is found liable under both negligence and unseaworthiness theories.” 154 F.3d at 1047.20
Although the Eighth Circuit has not opined on this issue, the Court concludes that the
latter approach is the proper one, and comparative fault principles should be applied
when an injured seamen asserts a Jones Act negligence claim for at least four reasons.
First, Ryan indemnity sought to remedy a specific inequity—allowing a faultless
shipowner to recover from a negligent contractor the damages the shipowner was
compelled to pay to an injured party. See Knight, 154 F.3d at 1046. Therefore, it stands
to reason that Ryan indemnity should not apply if the shipowner is at fault. 21 Here, it is
possible that Grand River will be held liable for Jones Act negligence, as that claim is
presently is preserved for trial.
20 In Smith & Kelly, an Eleventh Circuit case, a seaman was injured because of both the
shipowner and stevedore’s negligence. 	718 F.2d at 1028. 	The court refused to apply Ryan
because “the original justification for Ryan indemnity [did not apply] to controversies involving
seamen injured at sea.” Id. In a subsequent case, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that unlike pier-
side accidents “where contractors are better positioned to avoid injuries during cargo operations,
shipowners are best able to protect seamen from injuries aboard ship while at sea.” Vierling v.
Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 339 F.3d 1309, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). The Vierling court
then held that Ryan indemnity applied when a passenger was injured on the gangway connecting
the pier to the ship, reasoning that the port authority—not the shipowner—was in a better
position to avoid the accident. Id. at 1318. At first blush, Vierling supports Grand River; however,
Vierling is distinguishable because the shipowner contracted with the port authority to provide
passengers with a means of boarding the ship. Id. at 1316. Whereas here, there is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether a contract exists between WCL and Grand River.
21 For reasons discussed below, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Grand River was negligent.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 31 of 48

-32-
Second, allocating liability according to comparative fault most effectively serves
the objectives underlying Ryan. Id. The Ryan doctrine primarily sought to promote safety
by assigning responsibility to the party best positioned to prevent accidents, thereby
incentivizing that party to take steps to avoid such accidents. Id. Ryan’s goal of accident
avoidance is advanced by imposing a duty on “all responsible parties to exercise
reasonable care.” 	Id; see also Smith & Kelly Co. v. S/S Concordia TADJ, 718 F.2d 1022,
1029 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[A] system which imposes complete liability on the party best able
to avoid accident in each case provides little incentive for the other party to take
prophylactic steps.”).
Third, comparative fault prevents the injustice created by Ryan. 	That is, a non-
negligent party may be required to indemnify the negligent party because Ryan indemnity
does not depend on fault. 	Knight, 154 F.3d at 1046–47 (noting that comparative fault
principles prevent the situation where the shipowner, who was 35 percent at fault, is
required to pay “all of the damages under the seaworthiness doctrine or none of the
damages under Ryan”).
Fourth, the comparative fault approach more closely aligns with U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, which has adopted comparative fault principles in other maritime cases.
See Knight, 154 F.3d at 1047 (collecting Supreme Court cases in which the Court endorsed
the application of comparative fault principles in maritime cases).
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 32 of 48

-33-
In sum, the Court declines to address whether Ryan indemnity may be applied in
the absence of a seaworthiness or maintenance and cure claims. 	The Court, however,
concludes that when an injured seaman asserts a Jones Act negligence claim, comparative
fault principles should apply—even if the shipowner is also subject to a strict liability
claim, such as seaworthiness or maintenance and cure. 	If Grand River is found strictly
liable for maintenance and cure, it may be entitled to reimbursement from WCL in an
amount proportionate to its share of fault. See Black v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co.,
860 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying Ryan indemnity due to absence of contractual
relationship but applying comparative fault under equity principles and thus requiring the
contractor to reimburse the shipowner for maintenance and cure benefits paid to the
injured seamen).
* 	* 	*
The Court will deny Grand River’s motion for summary judgment on its indemnity
claim for two independent reasons. First, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Grand River is a party to a contract or is otherwise a third-party beneficiary to a
contract. 	The Oglebay case, which is cited by Grand River for the proposition that
contracts are not essential to a Ryan indemnity claim, misreads the holding of U.S
Supreme Court precedent. Second, even if Grand River later shows that it is party to a
contract or a third-party beneficiary to a contract at trial, Grand River is not entitled to
Ryan indemnity because Troy is asserting a Jones Act negligence claim; as a result, a
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 33 of 48

-34-
comparative fault approach is more appropriate and reflects the broader trend in
maritime law to apply comparative fault principles in seamen personal injury cases. The
Court will, therefore, deny Grand River’s summary judgment motion seeking indemnity
from WCL to the extent that the indemnity claim is based on Ryan.22
IV. 	WCL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WCL faces claims on two fronts. Troy asserts claims against WCL for negligence,
premises liability, and for breach of implied warranty of workmanlike service. 	(Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 21–34.) Grand River asserts a crossclaim against WCL seeking contribution and
indemnity. 	(Grand River’s Answer at 8–9.) 	Likewise, WCL brings a crossclaim against
Grand River for contribution and indemnity. 	(WCL’s Answer ¶¶ 42–43, Oct. 26, 2023,
Docket No. 9.) WCL moves for summary judgment on all claims, except its own crossclaim
against Grand River for contribution and indemnity. 	(Docket No. 58.) 	The Court will
address each claim in turn.
22 Because the Court concludes that Ryan indemnity is inappropriate, the Court need not
address WCL’s argument that Grand River engaged in conduct sufficient to preclude recovery.
See Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 567 (1958) (A shipowner is
entitled to Ryan indemnity only “absent conduct on its part sufficient to preclude recovery.”).
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 34 of 48

-35-
A. 	Troy’s Claims Against WCL
1. 	Premises Liability and Negligence Claims
WCL contends that Troy’s premises liability and negligence claims fail as a matter
of law because (1) Troy fails to show that WCL breached its duty to Troy or caused his
injuries and (2) the risks of walking on taconite pellets were known and obvious. 23
“A dock owner’s duty to seamen using the dock is defined by the application of
state law, and not maritime law.” Westewald v. Foss Mar. Co., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1009
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 206–07 (1971)). Under
Minnesota law, to establish a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must
demonstrate: “(1) the existence of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) an injury,
and (4) the breach of the duty being the proximate cause of the injury.” 	Gradjelick v.
Hance, 646 N.W2d 225, 230 (Minn. 2002). If “the record reflects a complete lack of proof
on any element,” summary judgment must be granted to the defendant. Oien v. Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 69 F.4th 487, 490 (8th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
With respect to a premises liability negligence claim, a landowner owes a duty “to use
reasonable care for the safety of all such persons invited upon the premises, regardless
23 Because the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Troy’s premises liability and
negligence claims against WCL, the Court will cite to Minnesota law. That said, the elements of
negligence are essentially the same under both maritime law and Minnesota law. 	Compare
Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W2d 225, 230 (Minn. 2002) (listing elements of negligence under
Minnesota law), with Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012) (listing
negligence elements under maritime law). The Court’s conclusions at this stage are therefore
unaffected by any choice-of-law determinations.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 35 of 48

-36-
of the status of the individuals.” Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. 2009). This
“duty of reasonable care is modified according to the expected use of the land.” Id. at
321.
a. 	Breach and Causation
WCL asserts that Troy’s negligence and premises liability claims fail as a matter of
law because he cannot establish the elements of breach and causation. Because there is
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether WCL breached its duty owed to Troy and
caused Troy’s injuries, WCL’s motion for summary judgment on these claims will be
denied.
WCL’s argument is that, since it is undisputed that taconite was falling from the
overhead chutes as Troy walked toward the ship, the condition of the dock was
continuously changing. And because of the dock’s changing condition, WCL reasons that
Troy cannot establish that Troy slipped due to WCL’s failure to sweep the dock. In support
of this argument, WCL relies on Captain Lees’s testimony in which he observed that
taconite “pellets were actively falling” from above when he arrived at the scene and that
the dock’s conditions were constantly changing as a result. (See Lees Dep. at 28.) Captain
Lees further testified that because pellets continued to fall, he could not opine on the
dock’s condition at the time Troy fell.
The problem with WCL’s argument is that it fails to cure a factual dispute central
to this case: did Troy slip on taconite pellets that were not swept after the Arthur
Anderson departed, pellets that fell from the loading chutes overhead, or a combination?
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 36 of 48

-37-
It undisputed that WCL personnel could not finish sweeping due to the Astabula’s arrival.
It is also undisputed that WCL’s failure to finish sweeping the dock violated its own policy.
The fact that taconite pellets were actively falling and Captain Lees could not speculate
as to the dock’s condition at the time of Troy’s accident does not resolve the question of
whether Troy slipped on taconite pellets left over from the Arthur Anderson or pellets
that fell during Ashtabula’s loading operations.
Nor is this factual dispute resolved by evaluating who was responsible for the
falling taconite pellets. Although WCL was responsible for sweeping the dock, the record
reflects that Grand River was responsible for loading operations. (See Brewer Dep. 31–
32.) Assuming Grand River is responsible for loading operations, the question of who was
responsible for the taconite pellets on which Troy slipped would remain.
Accordingly, the Court will deny WCL’s motion for summary judgment with respect
to Troy’s negligence and premises liability claims because there is a genuine dispute of
material fact regarding who was responsible for the taconite pellets that caused Troy to
slip and fall. The Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that WCL breached its
duty to Troy and that this breach caused his injuries.
b. 	Known and Obvious Hazard
As noted above, to establish a premises liability negligence claim, a plaintiff must
show that the landowner owed a duty “to use reasonable care for the safety of all such
persons invited upon the premises, regardless of the status of the individuals.” Foss, 766
N.W.2d at 320. Although a “landowner generally has a continuing duty to use reasonable
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 37 of 48

-38-
care for the safety of all entrants,” the duty “is not unlimited.” Senogles v. Carlson, 902
N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 2017). If the “danger is known or obvious,” the landowner is not
liable “unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or
obviousness.” Id. (quoting Peterson v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., 144 N.W.2d 555, 557–58 (Minn.
1966).24 	Stated differently, WCL may be held liable for Troy’s injuries arising from a
condition on WCL’s dock, except if the danger was known and obvious to Troy, unless
WCL should have anticipated the harm to Troy.
The test for whether a condition is “known” is subjective, and this test is satisfied
if the entrant actually recognized the danger and appreciated the “probability and gravity
of the threatened harm.” Id. at 44 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A cmt. b
(Am. Law. Inst. 1965)). The test for whether a danger is “obvious” is objective, and this
test is satisfied if “both the condition and the risk are apparent to and would be
recognized by a reasonable [person] in the position of the visitor.” 	Id. (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
WCL will be liable for known and obvious dangers if it “should anticipate the harm
despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Id. at 47. This requirement assesses whether
it was foreseeable that Troy would proceed to encounter the danger. 	Id. 	To assess
24 Minnesota courts have usually stated that the existence of a legal duty is a question of
law. See, e.g., Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. 2009). But in Senogles, the Court
concluded that question of whether the danger was obvious was question of disputed fact for
the jury to decide. 902 N.W.2d at 47.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 38 of 48

-39-
foreseeability, courts “look at whether the specific danger was objectively reasonable to
expect, not simply whether it was within the realm of any conceivable possibility.” 	Id.
(quoting Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322). A reason to anticipate the harm may arise when the
landowner “has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or
obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so
would outweigh the apparent risk.” Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 1997)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A cmt. f (Am. Law Inst. 1965)).
WCL argues that (1) Troy was aware that he was encountering taconite in a dimly
lit area, but despite these conditions, Troy continued to proceed to the ship and that (2)
WCL could not anticipate that Troy would walk on the dock because it provided an
elevated catwalk as an alternative means of accessing the dock. 	The Court concludes
there is a genuine factual dispute whether the “known and obvious” hazard exception
should apply. The Court will first address whether the hazard was known and obvious,
and then the Court will address whether WCL should have anticipated the harm to Troy.
First, there is a genuine factual dispute about whether the danger was known. On
one hand, the record appears to demonstrate the Troy knew about the danger. 	It is
undisputed that when Troy arrived at the dock, he asked a security guard for instructions
on how to access the Ashtabula, and the security guard only instructed him “to walk
towards the vessel.” (Troy Dep. at 69.) 	The security guard did not mention the presence
of taconite pellets. 	Despite this lack of direction, Troy proceeded to the ship, and he
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 39 of 48

-40-
recalled encountering taconite pellets right when he “walked underneath the unit.” (Id.
at 84.) In fact, he recalled that the path was covered with “piles” and “single layers” of
taconite pellets. (Id. at 84, 105.) He also testified that, as he walked, he had to pay careful
attention to his foot placement because of the significant amounts of ore. (Id. at 84) He
explained that it felt like he was “walking on marbles” as pellets “roll[ed] underneath [his]
feet.” 	(Id. at 107.) 	Taken together, these facts suggest that Troy, despite the lack of
lighting, saw and felt significant amounts of taconite and recognized that the taconite
pellets made it difficult to walk.
On the other hand, the record can be read to suggest that Troy did not appreciate
the “probability and gravity” of the threat of harm posed the taconite pellets. Senogles,
902 N.W.2d at 42. Troy testified that area was poorly lit. (Id. at 103.) He also testified
that he did not recall whether he felt unsafe while walking on the ore-covered dock. (Id.
at 86, 91–92, 108.) Even after encountering the ore, Troy never felt compelled to return
to the guard shack to seek clarification that he was taking the correct path. (Id. at 85–86.)
Taken together, these facts suggest that although Troy recalled encountering the ore, he
did not fully appreciate the danger the taconite posed to his safety.
Because a reasonable jury could conclude that Troy did not appreciate the danger
the taconite presented, WCL cannot show that the danger was known as a matter of law.
Second, there is a genuine factual dispute about whether the danger was obvious.
On one hand, the record shows that a taconite-covered dock would present an obvious
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 40 of 48

-41-
risk that a reasonable person would recognize. It is undisputed that WCL policy required
that dock aprons be cleaned before each vessel’s arrival. (Weichseldorfer Dep. at 19–20.)
It is also undisputed that WCL’s dock has a catwalk system which allows workers to
traverse the dock without walking on the dock’s surface. (Johnson Dep. at 77–78.) The
workers are also trained to avoid walking under loading shuttle/chutes because material
being loaded onto the ship, such as taconite, could fall and hit workers and could create
a walking hazard on the dock. (Kahn Dep. at 28–29.)
On the other hand, a reasonable jury could reach the opposite conclusion. Troy
testified that the area was poorly lit. (Troy Dep. at 103.) Nor did Troy observe any signage
to direct Troy safely to the vessel. (Id. at 218–19.) Given the lack of lighting and signage,
a reasonable jury could conclude that a reasonable person would not perceive the risk
posed by the ore-covered dock, and therefore WCL cannot show that the danger was
obvious as a matter of law.
Third, WCL argues that because the dock had an elevated catwalk system, WCL
had no reason to anticipate that Troy would walk on the ore-covered dock. The problem
with WCL’s argument is that the presence of a safer alternative (i.e., the catwalk) was not
readily apparent; a reasonable jury could therefore conclude that it was foreseeable that
Troy would walk on the ore-covered dock. When Troy arrived at the facility, a security
guard simply instructed “to walk toward the vessel.” (Id. at 69, 91.) The security guard
never mentioned a catwalk. 	Nor did Troy recall anyone advising him of the catwalk’s
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 41 of 48

-42-
existence. (Id. at 122–23.) Troy also testified that the dock was poorly lit and that the
dock lacked signage—including signage directing him to the catwalk—that would help
guide him safely to the vessel. 	(Id. at 103, 218–19.) 	In light of the record evidence, a
reasonable jury could conclude that WCL should have anticipated this harm because it
was foreseeable that Troy would proceed to encounter the risk.
* 	* 	*
Because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether WCL breached
its duty owed to Troy and caused Troy’s injuries, WCL is not entitled to summary judgment
on its negligence and premises liability claims. There is also a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the danger was known and obvious to Troy. Accordingly, the Court will
deny WCL’s motion for summary judgment as to Troy’s negligence and premises liability
claims against WCL.
2. 	Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Service
Troy claims that WCL breached the implied warranty of workmanlike service. WCL
argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim for three reasons. First, no
contract between WCL and Grand River exists. 	Second, even if a contract existed, it
cannot be invoked by Troy because plaintiffs do not need indemnity on their own claims.
Third, the implied warranty does not apply since there is not a contribution bar or any
strict-liability claims present here.
The Court will grant WCL’s motion as to Troy’s implied warranty claim because Troy
is not a shipowner in need of the indemnity the implied warranty of workmanlike service
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 42 of 48

-43-
provides. 	See, e.g., Knight, 154 F.3d at 1044. 	The Court will, therefore, grant WCL
summary judgment as to Troy’s implied warranty claim.
B. 	Grand River’s Crossclaims Against WCL
Grand River asserts crossclaims against WCL seeking contribution and indemnity.
(Grand River’s Answer at 8–9.) WCL moves for summary judgment on those crossclaims.
1. 	Ryan Indemnity
As explained in Section III, the Court concludes that comparative fault principles
should be used to apportion fault, if any, between WCL and Grand River. Accordingly, the
Court will grant WCL’s motion for summary judgment as to Grand River’s claim for
indemnity under Ryan, 350 U.S. 124. To be clear, just because the Court will grant WCL’s
motion for summary judgment as to Grand River’s Ryan indemnity claim, Grand River is
not necessarily precluded from seeking contribution or some other type of indemnity at
trial. 	See T. Schoenbaum, 1 Admiralty & Maritime Law § 6.19 (7th ed.) (explaining that
under the Jones Act and general maritime law, concurrent tortfeasors are generally
entitled to contribution). 25
2. 	Contribution
WCL argues that Grand River’s claim for contribution against WCL fails as a matter
of law because WCL is not at fault for Troy’s injury. For the reasons set forth in Section
25 (See also WCL’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 17 (recognizing that if Court denies Grand
River’s Ryan indemnity claim, “Grand River is not barred from claiming contribution”).)
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 43 of 48

-44-
IV.A.1.a., a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether WCL, Grand River, or
some unidentified third party was responsible for the taconite pellets on the dock that
caused Troy to slip and fall. In addition, if WCL is found to be entirely or partially at fault,
Grand River will have the right to seek contribution on Troy’s maintenance and cure claim,
which does not depend on Grand River’s fault but on the contractual relationship
between Grand River (the shipowner) and Troy (the seaman). See Adams v. Texaco, Inc.,
640 F.2d 618, 619 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a negligent shipowner is entitled to
contribution from a third-party tortfeasor whose negligence contributed to a seamen’s
injuries that resulted in the shipowner paying the seamen maintenance and cure
benefits).
Accordingly, the Court will deny WCL’s motion for summary judgment as to Grand
River’s contribution claim.
CONCLUSION
Grand River and WCL each filed motions for summary judgment. First, Grand River
moves for summary judgment on its crossclaim for indemnity against WCL under Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The Court will deny Grand
River’s motion for summary judgment on its indemnity claim because there is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Grand River is a party to a contract or is otherwise
a third-party beneficiary to a contract. Even if Grand River is party to a contract or a third-
party beneficiary to one, Grand River is not entitled to Ryan indemnity because Troy is
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 44 of 48

-45-
asserting a Jones Act negligence claim, and consequently, comparative fault principles
should apply. The Court will, therefore, deny Grand River’s summary judgment motion.
Second, WCL moves for summary judgment on all claims filed against it.26 	The
Court will grant WCL’s motion in part and deny it in part. 	The Court will deny WCL’s
motion as to Troy’s negligence and premises liability claims. The Court will grant WCL’s
motion as to Troy’s claim that WCL breached the implied warranty of workmanlike
service. The Court will grant WCL’s motion as to Grand River’s crossclaim to the extent
Grand River’s crossclaim relies on indemnity under Ryan. Grand River is not precluded
from seeking contribution or some other type of indemnity. Finally, the Court will deny
WCL’s motion as to Grand River’s crossclaim against WCL for contribution.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendant Grand River Navigation’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No
[53]) is DENIED.
2. 	Defendant Wisconsin Central Ltd.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No
[58]) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:
26 WCL does not move for summary judgment on its own crossclaim against Grand River
for contribution and indemnity.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 45 of 48

-46-
a. 	Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s negligence and premises
liability claims (Counts 3 and 4).
b. 	Summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s implied warranty of
workmanlike service claim (Count 5).
c. 	Summary judgment is GRANTED as to Grand River’s crossclaim against
WCL 	to 	the 	extent 	such 	crossclaim 	seeks 	indemnity 	under 	Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). Summary
judgment is DENIED as to Grand River’s crossclaim against WCL to the
extent such crossclaim seeks contribution. Grand River is not precluded
from seeking contribution or indemnity on grounds other than under
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
DATED: March 10, 2026
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 46 of 48

-47-
APPENDIX
Dep. of David Troy (“Troy Dep.”) 	• First Decl. of Vince C. Reuter (“First Reuter
Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. A, May 30, 2025, Docket No.
55: 68–70, 83–86, 92–94, 96–98, 102–108,
116–120, 135–137, 227.
• Decl. of Timothy Masterson (“Masterson
Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. A, May 30, 2025, Docket No.
60: 1–231.
• Decl. of Laura B. De La Cruz (“De La Cruz
Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. A, June 20, 2025, Docket No.
68: 69–70, 84–87, 97, 132–133, 136, 181,
218–220.
Dep. of George T. Brewer (“Brewer Dep.”) 	• First Reuter Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B, Docket No. 55:
16–18, 21–23, 29–32, 34–36, 40–41, 46–48,
81.
• Masterson Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. C, Docket No. 60:
1–4, 13–16, 21–24.
• Second Decl. of Vince C. Reuter (“Second
Reuter Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. A, June 20, 2025,
Docket No. 65: 23–25, 28–30, 37–39, 41–
43, 45–47, 58–60, 74–77.
• De La Cruz Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. D, Docket No. 68:
1, 16, 20, 23–24, 38, 41–42, 46, 49–50, 58–
59, 62, 65.
Dep 	of 	Louis 	H. 	Weichseldorfer
(“Weichseldorfer Dep.”)
• First Reuter Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C, Docket No. 65:
15–18, 40–43, 49.
• Second Reuter Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B, Docket No.
65: 1, 18–19, 40–43.
• De La Cruz Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B, Docket No. 68:
14, 16–20, 23, 29, 34, 36, 44–45.
• Third Decl. of Vince C. Reuter (“Third Reuter
Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. A, July 7, 2025, Docket No.
72: 1, 18–21, 43–45, 49.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 47 of 48

-48-
Dep. of Kevin M. Lees (“Lees Dep.”) 	• Masterson Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. B, Docket No. 60:
1–4, 9–16, 21–28, 33–36, 89–96.
• De La Cruz Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C, Docket No. 68:
1, 10–14, 21–22, 28.
• Decl. 	of 	Alexandra 	Zabinski 	(“Zabinski
Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. A, June 20, 2025, Docket No.
70: 1–97.
Dep. of Eric Johnson (“Johnson Dep.”) 	• Masterson Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. D, Docket No. 60:
1, 32, 77–78
Dep. of Kyle Kahn (“Kahn Dep.”) 	• Masterson Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. E, Docket No. 60:
1–4, 25–32.
• De La Cruz Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. F, Docket No. 68: 1,
14–15.
CASE 0:23-cv-02961-JRT-SGE Doc. 81 Filed 03/10/26 Page 48 of 48