Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Amina A.M.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Frank J. Bisignano,1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Case No. 22-cv-00840 (ECW)
ORDER
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to
Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §406(b)(1). (Dkt. 35.) Plaintiff
seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of $9,466.75 related to a contingency fee agreement
between Plaintiff and her legal counsel. (Id. at 1; see also Dkt. 36-3.) 	For the reasons
stated below, the Motion is granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed this case seeking judicial review of a final
decision by Defendant denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits. (Dkt.
1.) On August 14, 2023, this Court remanded this case back to Defendant (“the
1 	The Complaint named Kilolo Kijakazi, who was the Acting Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration when Plaintiff filed his Complaint. (See Dkt. 1.) Frank
Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. Pursuant to
Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano should be
substituted as the Defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this
suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
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Commissioner” or “the Government”) pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
(Dkt. 22.) On remand, Plaintiff was awarded benefits, including past benefits. (Dkt. 35
at 1; Dkt. 36-1.)
On December 1, 2023, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees
Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and awarded
fees in the amount of $7,068.67. (Dkt. 34).
On January 26, 2026, Plaintiff received a notice that the Social Security
Administration (“the SSA”) withheld twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits
awarded to Plaintiff for legal expenses in the event the SSA needed to pay that amount to
Plaintiff’s representative. (Dkt. 35 at 1; Dkt. 36-1 at 1.) The withheld amount was
$9,466.75. (Id.)
On February 9, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel filed the present Motion, seeking
$9,466.75 in attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Dkt. 35 at 1.) The
Commissioner did not file a response to the Motion. Plaintiff represents that the parties
met and conferred, and “Defendant does not take a position either for or against counsel’s
request for attorney’s fees.” (Dkt. 37 at 1.)
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Legal Standard
The relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), provides:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this
subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court
may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due
benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and
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the Commissioner of Social Security may, notwithstanding the provisions
of section 405(i) of this title, but subject to subsection (d) of this section,
certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not
in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. In case of any such
judgment, no other fee may be payable or certified for payment for such
representation except as provided in this paragraph.
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Social Security Act has no “design to
prohibit or discourage attorneys and claimants from entering into contingent-fee
agreements.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 791 (2002). Instead, a court must
independently determine whether attorney’s fees sought under such an agreement are
reasonable. See id. at 808. Contingency agreements are unenforceable when they require
fees in excess of 25 percent of the past-due benefits, and when “[w]ithin the 25 percent
boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is
reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. at 807 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)). “[T]he
award set by the contingency agreement must be the anchor of the court’s reasonableness
analysis under § 406(b).” Kertz v. Colvin, 125 F.4th 1218, 1221 (8th Cir. 2025) (citation
modified).
In looking at whether the amount of a contingency award is reasonable, a court
may also be aided by the number of hours spent by counsel, an attorney’s normal billing
rate, any delay caused by counsel, and the character of the representation—i.e., the results
yielded by the representation. Id. at 1220; see also Shane T. v. Saul, Civ. No. 18-634
(BRT), 2020 WL 5743075, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2020) (“A reduced fee may be
appropriate where the legal representation was substandard, counsel was responsible for
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delay that increased the fund from which the fee was payable, or if benefits were large in
comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case.”) (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S.
at 808). When a court awards attorney’s fees to a plaintiff under the EAJA and awards
fees to the plaintiff’s attorney under Section 406(b), the attorney must refund the amount
of the smaller received fee to the plaintiff. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 789; see also Shane T.,
2020 WL 5743075, at *2.
B. 	Reasonableness of Fees and Costs
Here, Plaintiff’s attorney fee agreement states in relevant part:
If the federal court case is successful, [Plaintiff’s counsel] will apply for
fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) which (if awarded by
the Court) means that the government will bear the fees for having to
present my case in federal court; since the check for those fees will in most
cases be made out to me, I hereby assign my rights in any fees payable to
me under the EAJA to my attorneys at OBL. I do not pay any attorney fee
UNLESS mv federal court case is decided in mv favor.
If a federal appeal is successful and I am awarded benefits after my new
hearing, I agree to pay a fee of 25% of my past due benefits, even if that
amount is greater than the amount set forth in 42 U.S.C. 406(a)(2) (that is,
more than $6,000). In that event, my attorney would be required to submit a
petition for fees to the Social Security Administration and/or Federal Court.
(Dkt. 36-2 at 1.)
As stated above, the SSA withheld approximately $9,466.75 (25%) from
Plaintiff’s past-due benefits to pay attorney fees. (Dkt. 35 at 1; Dkt. 36-1 at 1.) While
the total amount of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits is not in the record before the Court, no
party disputes that $9,466.75 is twenty-five percent of that amount. Plaintiff asks the
Court to award fees in that amount and represents that the prior EAJA award of
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$7,068.67 will be returned to Plaintiff in the event that the Court grants this Motion.
(Dkt. 35 at 5.)
Plaintiff’s counsel represent that they spent 40.9 hours of attorney time on behalf
of Plaintiff. (Dkt. 35 at 4, Dkt. 36-3 at 2.) An award of $9,466.75 for this amount of
work would amount to an hourly rate of $231.46. Plaintiff’s counsel represents that their
“typical noncontingent hourly rate for work of a like nature is $400.00 per hour.” (Dkt.
35 at 4.)
The Court finds that an hourly rate of $231.46 is reasonable in this case. See
Matthew L. v. O’Malley, No. 21-CV-1009 (JFD), 2024 WL 1694839, at *2 (D. Minn.
Apr. 19, 2024) (approving effective rate of $1,250/hour but noting that it was “on the
high end of what courts in this District have found reasonable”). Considering that
Plaintiff’s attorneys’ legal representation resulted in a disability benefit award in a
contested case (as opposed to a stipulated remand); there is no indication counsel were
responsible for any delay; and counsel spent a reasonable amount of time on the case, the
Court finds no reason here to reduce the award based on the hourly rate of $231.46. See
Jones v. Berryhill, 699 F. App’x 587, 588 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at
807-808); Shane T., 2020 WL 5743075, at *1 (“A reduced fee may be appropriate where
the legal representation was substandard, counsel was responsible for delay that increased
the fund from which the fee was payable, or if benefits were large in comparison to the
amount of time counsel spent on the case.”) (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that an award of $9,466.75 is reasonable in this case.
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III. 	ORDER
Based on the above, and on the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to Section § 206(b) of the Act
(Dkt. 35) is GRANTED;
2. 	The Court authorizes a payment to Karl E. Osterhout, Esquire, in the
amount of $9,466.75 in attorney’s fees being withheld from Plaintiff’s past-due benefits
for court related services; and
3. 	Upon receipt of this sum, counsel for Plaintiff shall remit $7,068.67 directly
to Plaintiff, representing the sum already paid to counsel on Plaintiff’s behalf pursuant to
the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
Date: 	February 13, 2026 	s/Elizabeth Cowan Wright
ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT
United States Magistrate Judge
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