Cristini #244014 v. Loman et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
JAMES CRISTINI #244014, 	Case No. 2:25-cv-10
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
U.S. District Judge
v.
CULLEN LOMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses a motion for summary
judgment due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies filed by
three of the remaining Defendants. (ECF No.27.)
Plaintiff – State prisoner James Cristini – filed a verified complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his First Amendment and Eighth
Amendment rights while he was incarcerated at the Alger Correctional Facility
(LMF). 	(ECF No .1.) 	In short, Cristini alleges that Defendants violated his rights
by releasing him from protective custody, labeling him a snitch, allowing him to be
assaulted by another inmate, housing him in a feces-covered cell, and depriving him
of his property. (Id.)
Cristini’s original complaint, which was filed on Jan. 17, 2025, named the
following four Defendants: Prison Counselor (PC) Loman, Corrections Officer (CO)
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Knoxman, 1 	PC 	Hubble, 	and 	Resident 	Unit 	Manager 	(RUM) 	Naeyaert. 	(Id.,
PageID.3.) On May 9, 2025, Cristini moved to amend his complaint, seeking to add
an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Warden Schroeder.
(ECF No. 21, PageID.184-85.) The Court granted that motion on May 27, 2025. (ECF
No. 23.) 	On June 26, 2025, the undersigned entered an order noting that it was
construing the original complaint to include Schroeder and ordering service. 	(ECF
No. 31.) 	A waiver of service was subsequently received by the Court on Sept. 30,
2025. (ECF No. 41.) Thus, Warden Schroeder is also a Defendant in this case.2
On March 25, 2025, this Court issued an opinion dismissing multiple claims
from Plaintiff’s lawsuit. (ECF No. 11.) At this point, the following claims remain in
this case:
1. 	Cristini’s First Amendment retaliation claims against PC Loman, PC Hubble,
CO Knoxman, and RUM Naeyaert;
2. 	Cristini’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against CO Knoxman;
and
3. 	Cristini’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims against RUM
Naeyaert and Warden Schroeder.
1 	Defendants’ motion spells “Knoxman” as “Nachtman.” For consistency, and in
accordance 	with 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint, 	the 	undersigned 	will 	continue 	to 	use
Knoxman.
2 	Warden Schroeder filed a separate motion for summary judgment based on
exhaustion on October 23, 2025. 	(ECF No. 43.) 	The undersigned does not consider
this motion in the present report and recommendation.
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On June 23, 2025, three of the remaining Defendants – PC Hubble, CO
Knoxman and RUM Naeyaert – filed a motion for summary judgment based on
exhaustion. (ECF No. 27.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust his Eighth
Amendment failure-to-protect claims against CO Knoxman and did not exhaust any
claims against PC Hubble and RUM Naeyaert. (Id., PageID.218.) Defendants do not
argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his First Amendment retaliation claim against
CO Knoxman.
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
this Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. If the Court adopts this
recommendation, the following claims will remain:
1. 	Cristini’s First Amendment retaliation claims against PC Loman and CO
Knoxman; and
2. 	Cristini’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against
Warden Schroeder.
II. Factual Allegations
Cristini’s allegations against CO Knoxman, PC Hubble and RUM Naeyaert
were set forth in the Court’s March Screening Opinion. There, the Court provided in
pertinent part:
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Ionia Correctional Facility in Ionia, Ionia
County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at the
Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County, Michigan.
Plaintiff sues the following LMF staff: Prison Counselor Unknown
Loman, Correctional Officer Unknown Knoxman, Prison Counselor
Unknown Hubble, and Resident Unit Manager Unknown Naeyaert.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
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In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges that on May 25, 2022, Defendants
Loman, Hubble, and Naeyaert “eject[ed]/reject[ed] Plaintiff’s re-entry
into [the] []R.I. Program (quasi-protective custody) Cedar Unit” after
Plaintiff had been found not guilty of two Class II misconduct charges.
(Id., PageID.6.)
[…]
On that same date, as Plaintiff was being released from segregation,
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Defendant 	Knoxman 	“label[ed] 	Plaintiff 	a
rat/snitch” in front of another inmate, named Platte, who was also being
released from segregation. (Id., PageID.9.) Defendant Knoxman said
that Plaintiff had “rat[ted] and snitch[ed] on [his] last bunky[]” and that
“someone (his next bunky) need[ed] to teach [Plaintiff] a lesson about
‘snitching’ 	on 	bunky’s, 	a 	lesson 	[Plaintiff] 	will 	never 	forget.” 	(Id.,
PageID.9, 10.)
Ultimately, Plaintiff and Inmate Platte became cellmates when they
were released from segregation. (See id., PageID.10.) Plaintiff states
that as he and Inmate Platte were unpacking their property into their
new cell, Inmate Platte asked: “What did all of [Defendant] Knoxman’s[]
comments and statements mean?[] Why did []that officer[] put you on
blast about being a f[***]ing ‘rat’ and ‘snitch?’” (Id., PageID.11.) In
response, Plaintiff told Inmate Platte that he had “just beat two (2)
tickets.” (Id.) Inmate Platte then asked: “What did []Officer Knoxman[]
mean when he stated ‘you ratted/snitched’ on []your last bunky[] in []R.I.
(protective custody)[], in order to beat them [sic] two (2) misconducts?[]
You know I am a ‘gang-member[],’ and me and ‘my fam,’ don’t lock with
‘rats/snitches.’” (Id.) Plaintiff said that he had been in prison for “almost
thirty (30) years” and “ain’t ‘no rat or snitch.’” (Id.) Plaintiff states that
he “brushed off Platte’s comments, as not to give them any energy or
traction, to de-escalate.” (Id.)
From May 25, 2022, through June 21, 2022, Plaintiff and Inmate Platte
“had very few[] conversations,” “but every now and then Platte kept
referencing [Defendant] Knoxman’s[] comments.” (Id.) On June 21,
2022, Inmate Platte came into the cell that he and Plaintiff shared, and
threw boiling liquid on Plaintiff, shouting: “F[***] you snitch!” (Id.,
PageID.12.) Following this attack, Plaintiff was taken to an offsite
hospital where he was diagnosed with “first and second-degree burns
over 15% of [his] body.” (Id., PageID.13.) The emergency room physician
advised Plaintiff that he should remain on “complete bed rest for thirty
(30) days, so [the] burn wounds could” heal. (Id.)
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The next day, June 22, 2022, non-party Warden Schroeder came to
Plaintiff’s cell in segregation, and Plaintiff told Schroeder that the cell
“had ‘feces[] smeared’ all over it,” and Plaintiff “was ‘afraid of infection.’”
(Id., PageID.16.) Warden Schroeder “assured Plaintiff,” stating that he
would 	“be 	moved 	immediately.” 	(Id., 	PageID.17.) 	That 	same 	day,
Defendant Naeyaert also came to Plaintiff’s cell, and Plaintiff told
Naeyaert 	what 	Warden 	Schroeder 	had 	said. 	(Id., 	PageID.19.) 	In
response, Defendant Naeyaert said that “if Warden Schroeder stated
that, you can believe it[;] []she[] runs this prison.” (Id.) Defendant
Naeyaert also stated: “[]I have authority []myself[] to move you . . . out
of that ‘feces-smeared cell’ immediately.” (Id.) Plaintiff told Defendant
Naeyaert that he would be filing a grievance and “civil litigation”
against the LMF officials “responsible for [Plaintiff’s] brutal assault.”
(Id.) On June 24, 2022, Defendant Naeyaert again came to Plaintiff’s
cell, and Plaintiff advised Naeyaert that Plaintiff had to be transferred
since he had been labeled a snitch at LMF. (Id.)
(ECF No. 11, PageID.133-36) (footnotes omitted.)
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury[3] or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan, 421
F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
3 	The Seventh Amendment does not always require courts to submit factual
disputes about exhaustion to a jury. 	Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir.
2015). However, when the exhaustion issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim,
the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial on the exhaustion issue. 	Perttu v.
Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 479, 145 S.Ct. 1793, 1807 (2025).
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251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and
admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing
the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
When, as here, the non-movant fails to respond to a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must “examine the movant's motion for summary judgment to
ensure that he has discharged his initial burden.” Stough v. Mayville Cmty. Sch., 138
F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir.
1991)).
III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A prisoner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense, which Defendants have the burden to plead and prove. 	Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 212-16 (2007). “[W]here the moving party has the burden -- the plaintiff on
a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense -- his showing must be
sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than
for the moving party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986).
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that the party with the burden of proof
“must show the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that
the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.”
Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly,
summary 	judgment 	in 	favor 	of 	the 	party 	with 	the 	burden 	of 	persuasion 	“is
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inappropriate 	when 	the 	evidence 	is 	susceptible 	of 	different 	interpretations 	or
inferences by the trier of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
Pursuant to the applicable portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must exhaust his available administrative remedies. Porter
v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733 (2001). 	A
prisoner must first exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner
may not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative
process. Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215
F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1999).
In order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable
procedural rules. 	Jones, 549 U.S. at 218−19; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90−91
(2006). 	“Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is
required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” 	Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19. 	In rare
circumstances, the grievance process will be considered unavailable where officers
are 	unable 	or 	consistently 	unwilling 	to 	provide 	relief, 	where 	the 	exhaustion
procedures may provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can navigate it, or “where
prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process
through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” 	Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S.
632, 644 (2016).
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“Beyond doubt, Congress enacted [Section] 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and
improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524. In the Court’s view,
this objective was achieved in three ways. 	First, the exhaustion requirement
“afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally
before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” 	Id. at 525. 	Second, “the internal
review might ‘filter out some frivolous claims.’” Id. (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 737).
And third, “adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative record that clarifies
the contours of the controversy.” 	Id. 	When institutions provide adequate notice as
required under the PLRA, the opportunity to address the claims internally furthers
the additional goals of limiting judicial interference with prison administration.
Baker v. Vanderark, 1:07-cv-004, 2007 WL 3244075, *5 (W.D. Mich., Nov. 1, 2007).
The most common procedure through which a prisoner in MDOC custody
exhausts 	his 	administrative 	remedies 	is 	the 	grievance 	procedure 	set 	forth 	in
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) Policy Directive 03.02.130 (effective
March 18, 2019). 	According to the Policy Directive inmates must first attempt to
resolve a problem orally within two business days of becoming aware of the grievable
issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control. Id. at ¶ Q. If oral
resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may proceed to Step I of the grievance process
and submit a completed grievance form within five business days of the attempted
oral resolution. 	Id. at ¶¶ Q, W. 	The inmate submits the grievance to a designated
grievance coordinator, who assigns it to a respondent. Id. at ¶ Y. The Policy Directive
also provides the following directions for completing grievance forms: “The issues
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should be stated briefly but concisely. 	Information provided is to be limited to the
facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where, why, how).
Dates, times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved are to
be included.” Id. at ¶ S (emphasis in original).
If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a
timely response, he may appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within ten
business days of the response, or if no response was received, within ten days after
the response was due. 	Id. at ¶ DD. 	The respondent at Step II is designated by the
policy. Id. at ¶ FF.
If the inmate is still dissatisfied with the Step II response, or does not receive
a timely Step II response, he may appeal to Step III using the same appeal form. 	Id.
at ¶¶ HH. 	The Step III form shall be sent within ten business days after receiving
the Step II response, or if no Step II response was received, within ten business days
after the date the Step II response was due. Id. The Grievance and Appeals Section
is the respondent for Step III grievances on behalf of the MDOC director. Id. at ¶ II.
In addition, the grievance policy provides that, where the grievance alleges
conduct that falls under the jurisdiction of the Internal Affairs Division pursuant to
Policy Directive 01.01.140, the prisoner may file his Step I grievance directly with the
inspector of the institution in which the prisoner is housed, instead of with the
grievance coordinator, as set forth in ¶ W of Policy Directive 03.02.130. 	Id. at ¶ R.
In such instances, the grievance must be filed within the time limits prescribed for
filing grievances at Step I. Id. Regardless of whether the grievance is filed with the
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grievance coordinator or the inspector, the grievance will be referred to the Internal
Affairs Division for review and will be investigated in accordance with MDOC Policy
Directive 01.01.140. The prisoner will be promptly notified if an extension of time is
needed to investigate the grievance. Id.
Where the grievance procedures are not available because the issue presented
is non-grievable, exhaustion of prison grievance procedures is not required. It is well-
established that a prisoner “cannot be required to exhaust administrative remedies
regarding non-grievable issues.” 	Figel v. Bouchard, 89 F. App’x 970, 971 (6th Cir.
2004); Mays v. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections, 2018 WL 4603153, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept.
25, 2018) (“It is beyond debate that an inmate cannot be required to exhaust
administrative remedies regarding non-grievable issues.”); Reeves v. Hobbs, 2013 WL
5462147 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 3, 2013) (“Defendants cannot treat a complaint as non-
grievable, and therefore not subject to the grievance procedure, and then turn around
and maintain the claim fails because [the plaintiff] failed to follow the grievance
procedure. As the well known proverb states, they cannot have their cake and eat it
too.”).
However, where other administrative remedies are available, the prisoner is
required to exhaust those available remedies prior to filing a federal lawsuit. For
example, where an inmate claims that he received a retaliatory false misconduct,
whether a Class I misconduct or a Class II or III misconduct4 , the inmate must first
4 	Violations of written rules within the MDOC are classified as either Class I,
Class II or Class III misconducts. Class I consists of the most severe violations, and
Class III consists of the least severe. 	While Class I misconducts are considered
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raise the issue during the Misconduct Hearing. 	Siggers v. Campbell, 652 F.3d 681,
693-94. 	If the inmate is claiming to have received a retaliatory Class I misconduct,
he or she must then must “file a motion or application for rehearing [of his misconduct
conviction] in order to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before seeking
judicial review of the final decision or order.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.255(1); see also
Siggers, 652 F.3d at 693-94. Alternatively, if the inmate is claiming to have received
a retaliatory Class II or III misconduct, he or she must file an appeal based on
retaliation. 	MDOC PD 03.03.105 ¶¶ UUU-XXX; see also Jones v. Heyns, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 55712 at *13−17 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2014).
When prison officials waive enforcement of these procedural rules and instead
consider a non-exhausted claim on its merits, a prisoner’s failure to comply with those
rules 	will 	not 	bar 	that 	prisoner’s 	subsequent 	federal 	lawsuit. 	Reed-Bey 	v.
Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 2010). 	The Sixth Circuit has explained:
[A] 	prisoner 	ordinarily 	does 	not 	comply 	with 	MDOCPD 	130—and
therefore does not exhaust his administrative remedies under the
PLRA—when he does not specify the names of each person from whom
he seeks relief. See Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324-25 (6th
Cir. 2010) (“Requiring inmates to exhaust prison remedies in the
manner 	the 	State 	provides—by, 	say, 	identifying 	all 	relevant
defendants—not 	only 	furthers 	[the 	PLRA’s] 	objectives, 	but 	it 	also
prevents 	inmates 	from 	undermining 	these 	goals 	by 	intentionally
defaulting their claims at each step of the grievance process, prompting
unnecessary and wasteful federal litigation process.”). 	An exception to
this rule is that prison officials waive any procedural irregularities in a
grievance when they nonetheless address the grievance on the merits.
“major” misconducts and are “subject to all hearing requirements set forth in MCL
791.252”, Class II and III misconducts are considered “minor” misconducts and are
“subject to all requirements currently set forth in Department Administrative Rules
and policy directives for ‘minor’ misconducts.” MDOC Policy Directive (PD) 03.03.103
¶ B (eff. date 07/01/18).
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See id. at 325. 	We have also explained that the purpose of the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement “is to allow prison officials ‘a fair opportunity’
to address grievances on the merits to correct prison errors that can and
should be corrected to create an administrative record for those disputes
that eventually end up in court.” Id. at 324.
Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 590−91 (6th Cir. 2017).5
V. Grievances Identified by Defendant(s)
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants RUM Naeyaert, PC
Hubble, and CO Knoxman identify several grievances that Cristini filed with MDOC
during the relevant timeframe. 	They claim that a review of these grievances will
demonstrate that Cristini has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. These
grievances are summarized below.
Grievance
No.
Person
Named
Allegation 	Date or
Date
Range of
Incident(s)
Results
at Step
1
Results
at Step
2
Results
at Step
3
LMF-22-07-
0696-17i
(LMF-696)
CO Chetnik
(non-
defendant)
CO Chetnik (non-
defendant) did not
place numerous
photos of Cristini’s
injuries into his
medical file.
6-23-2022 	Denied 	Denied 	Denied
LMF-22-06-
0661-03b
(LMF-661)
RUM
Naeyaert
and Warden
Schroeder
After Cristini
returned from a
hospital visit to treat
injuries caused by
his cell mate, RUM
Naeyaert and
Warden Schroeder
refused to place him
in protective custody.
6-22-2022 	Denied 	Denied 	Denied
5 	In Mattox, the Sixth Circuit held that a prisoner may only exhaust a claim
“where he notifies the relevant prison . . . staff” regarding the specific factual claim
“giving the prison staff a fair chance to remedy a prisoner’s complaints.” 	Id. at 596.
For example, grieving a doctor about his failure to give cardiac catheterization did
not grieve the claim that the doctor erred by not prescribing Ranexa.
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Grievance
No.
Person
Named
Allegation 	Date or
Date
Range of
Incident(s)
Results
at Step
1
Results
at Step
2
Results
at Step
3
LMF-22-06-
0560-27b
(LMF-560)
COs Loman
and
Knoxman,
and
Warden
Schroeder
After Cristini was
found not guilty of
two misconduct
tickets, COs Loman
and Knoxman, under
Warden Schroeder’s
supervision,
returned Cristini to
the general
population instead of
the R.I. Program.
5-25-2022 	Rejected
(grieving
contents
of policy)
Rejection
affirmed
Rejection
affirmed
VII. Analysis
First, in his Step I grievance in LMF-696, shown below, Cristini asserts that
photographs were taken from his medical files.
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(ECF No. 27-3, PageID.245.)
Cristini identifies multiple non-defendants in this grievance but does not
assert allegations against any named defendants. As such, Cristini did not exhaust
any of his claims with grievance LMF-696.
Next, Step I of grievance LMF-560, shown below, Cristini asserts that PC
Loman and CO Knoxman retaliated against him. (ECF No. 27-3, PageID.253.)
(Id.)
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Here, Cristini alleges that PC Loman and CO Knoxman returned him to
general population rather than R.I. program housing because Cristini was “victorious
against two (2) charges of: assault and battery and threatening behavior.” 	(Id.)
Accordingly, Cristini’s retaliation claims against PC Loman and CO Knoxman remain
in this case. However, Cristini does not mention RUM Naeyart in the above grievance
alleging retaliation.
Cristini mentions RUM Naeyart in one other identified grievance. In Step I of
grievance LMF-661, shown below, Cristini asserts that RUM Naeyaert and Warden
Shroeder failed to protect him by not placing Cristini in protective custody.
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(Id., PageID.249.)
In the above grievance, Cristini only asserts failure-to-protect claims against
RUM Naeyaert. 	At the screening stage, this Court dismissed Cristini’s failure-to-
protect claims against RUM Naeyaert. 	(ECF No. 11, PageID.146.) 	Cristini did not
include retaliation or conditions of confinement allegations against RUM Naeyaert in
any of the three identified grievances. 	Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that the Court dismiss Cristini’s First Amendment retaliation claim
and Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against RUM Naeyaert.
Additionally, Cristini’s only remaining failure-to-protect claim is against CO
Knoxman. 	But Cristini did not identify CO Knoxman in the above grievance.
Therefore, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully 	recommends 	that 	the 	Court 	dismiss
Cristini’s failure-to-protect claim against CO Knoxman.
Finally, Cristini did not identify PC Hubble in any of the three relevant Step I
grievance forms. Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court
dismiss Cristini’s claims against PC Hubble.
VIII. Recommendation
The undersigned respectfully recommends that this Court grant Defendants’
motion for summary judgment because there are no genuine issues of material fact
as to whether Cristini exhausted his available administrative remedies with respect
to the specific claims identified by Defendants. 	Accordingly, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that this Court dismiss the following claims for lack of
exhaustion:
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1. 	Cristini’s First Amendment retaliation claims against PC Hubble and RUM
Naeyaert;
2. 	Cristini’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against CO Knoxman;
and
3. 	Cristini’s Eight Amendment conditions of confinement claim against RUM
Naeyaert.
If the Court adopts this recommendation, the following claims will remain:
1. 	Cristini’s First Amendment retaliation claims against PC Loman and CO
Knoxman; and
2. 	Cristini’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Warden
Schroeder.
Dated: 	October 27, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within
fourteen days of service of this notice on you. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b). All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR
72.3(b). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any further right
of appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Case 2:25-cv-00010-JMB-MV ECF No. 45, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/27/25 Page 17
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