Taylor et al v. Hodge, et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
DOUGLAS RICHARD TAYLOR, JR.,
JESSICA SUE TAYLOR, 	Case No. 	2:24-cv-00145
Plaintiffs, 	Hon. 	Robert J. Jonker
U.S. District Judge
v.
COLE HODGE, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses:
 	a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Hodge, ECF No. 41;
 	a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Tulppo and Iron County, ECF
No. 44; and
 	a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendants Harrington,
Geneman and Iron River, ECF No. 45.
Plaintiffs Douglas Richard Taylor, Jr., and Jessica Sue Taylor sue police
officers involved in the search of their home during the evening hours of September
12, 2022, until the early morning hours of September 13, 2022. 	The officers were
looking for a suspect who was not located at Plaintiffs’ home.
Plaintiffs sue the following seven Defendants: 	Michigan State Trooper Cole
Hodge in his individual capacity, Michigan State Trooper Michael Groleau in his
individual capacity, Iron River Police Officer Curt Harrington in his official and
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 1
of 26

2
individual capacities, Iron County Sheriff Deputy Michael Tulppo in his official and
individual capacities, Iron River Police Officer Geneman in his official and individual
capacities, the City of Iron River, and the County of Iron.
Initially, Plaintiffs concede that Defendant Harrington is entitled to dismissal
from their amended complaint. 	ECF No. 57, PageID.1039.
For reasons explained below, it is respectfully recommended that the Court
grant in part, and deny in part, Defendant Hodge’s motion to dismiss. 	It is
recommended that the Court allow Plaintiffs to proceed against Defendant Hodge on
their Fourth Amendment knock and announce claim.
It is further respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants
Harrington, Tulppo, Geneman, Iron River, and Iron County’s motions to dismiss or
for judgment on the pleadings and dismiss these parties from this lawsuit.
II. Factual allegations
The first amended complaint asserts that on September 7, 2022, Mr. Taylor,
while driving a blue 2004 GMC Sierra truck, was pulled over by Defendant Geneman
because of a bad license plate light. 	ECF No. 40, PageID.628. 	Thereafter, on
September 12, 2022, Mr. Taylor and Amber Henning were customers at the Iron River
Dollar General. 	Id., PageID.629. 	Mr. Taylor and Amber Henning separated in
the store. 	Id. 	Mr. Taylor purchased tape, and Amber Henning purchased several
items, but she failed to pay for a $1.00 frozen food item. 	Id. 	The encounter
appeared on the store security video. 	Id. 	The Iron River Police Department
became involved after contact from a store employee. 	Id.
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 2
of 26

3
Defendants Harrington and Hodge went to the Dollar General store to
investigate, 	and 	Harrington 	viewed 	the 	store 	security 	video 	recording. 	Id.
Harrington 	claimed 	to 	identify 	Mr. 	Cooper, 	who 	was 	wanted 	for 	suspected
methamphetamine trafficking, on the security video recording 	Id., PageID.631.
Mr. Taylor claims that he did not look like Mr. Cooper and that he has no business or
personal relations with Mr. Cooper. 	Id. 	Mr. Taylor asserts that Harrington
communicated the identification information to Hodge. 	Id., PageID.632. 	Then,
Defendant Hodge allegedly viewed the video tape and identified Mr. Cooper. 	Id.
Defendant Hodge allegedly observed the blue 2004 GMC Sierra truck that Mr. Cooper
had driven from the Dollar General store, parked at Plaintiffs’ address. 	Id. 	That
vehicle was owned by Mr. Taylor’s employer. 	Id.
On September 12, 2022, Defendant Hodge and other Michigan State Police
officers claim to have observed Mr. Cooper through a window inside Plaintiffs’ home.
Id. 	The officers obtained a search warrant to search Plaintiffs’ home for Mr. Cooper.
Id., PageID.633. 	Plaintiffs say that Defendants did not do anything to identify the
owners and residents of their home. 	Id. 	Plaintiffs allege that while Defendant
Hodge obtained a search warrant for their home, Defendant Tulppo kept the home
under surveillance and saw no one enter or leave the home. 	Id.
At about 11:00 PM that evening, Defendants Hodge and Groleau, with
assistance from Magnuson and other officers, executed the search warrant on
Plaintiffs’ home. 	Id. 	Plaintiffs say that, although the front door was unlocked, the
officers broke down the door and entered the home. 	Defendants Geneman and
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 3
of 26

4
Tulppo remained outside the residence. 	Plaintiffs assert that before entering their
home, the officers did not knock on their door and only gave them about four seconds
to respond after announcing their presence. 	Id. 	At the time, Plaintiffs were asleep
on their couch. 	Id. 	Plaintiffs say that the curtains on their windows blocked
outside lights from shining into their home and that only the kitchen light was on
inside their home. 	Id., PageID.634-635. 	The noise from the officers breaking down
the front door caused Plaintiffs dogs to start barking. 	Id., PageID.635. 	Plaintiffs
say that the barking awakened them. 	Seven police officers, including state, county,
and local officers, entered Plaintiffs’ home and conducted a search. 	Id. 	Mr. Taylor
informed the officers that he just had spinal surgery. 	Id. 	Although he says that he
was compliant and on the ground, a Michigan State Police Trooper placed handcuffs
on Mr. Taylor. 	Id. 	An officer helped him up into a standing position. 	Id.
Plaintiffs had two pit bull dogs in the house and an officer stated: “We’ll shoot the dog
if we have to!” 	Id., PageID.636.
Mr. Taylor warned the officers that the dog would bite them if they opened the
office door. 	Id. 	Defendant Groleau allegedly responded “don’t come at me when I’m
talking to you!” 	Id. 	When Defendant Groleau again tried to enter the home office,
Mr. Taylor warned him not to do so. 	Id. 	Defendant Groleau turned and put his
hands on Mr. Taylor’s shoulder and yelled “f * * * it!” 	Id. 	Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant Groleau tried to throw Mr. Taylor over his shoulder but tripped and landed
on his knees. 	Id. 	Then Mr. Taylor says that Groleau charged him and tried to
tackle him to the ground, but Mr. Taylor avoided the tackle. 	Id. 	Allegedly, Groleau
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 4
of 26

5
put all his body weight on Mr. Taylor. 	Id. 	Mr. Taylor says he felt his back popping
where he had spinal surgery and Mrs. Taylor yelled: “Stop. You can’t do this.” 	Id.
Groleau then let him go. 	Id. 	Mr. Taylor was in handcuffs for approximately two
hours. 	Id. 	Before uncuffing, Mr. Taylor was threatened with arrest. 	Id.
Ms. Henning was also in the home, and the officers interrogated her about Mr.
Cooper. 	Id. 	The officers left Plaintiffs’ home at about 12:30 AM, September 13,
2022. 	Id.
Plaintiffs assert violations of federal and state laws. 	Plaintiffs allege in Count
I that Defendants Groleau, Hodge, Tulppo, Groleau, and other unknown Michigan
State Police Officers violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.1
In 	Count 	II, 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	Defendants 	Groleau, 	Hodge, 	Tulppo,
Groleau, 	and 	unknown 	Michigan 	State 	Police 	Officers 	violated 	the 	Michigan
Constitution by conducting an unreasonable search and seizure of their home.
And Plaintiffs allege in Court III that Defendants Hodge, Tulppo, Groleau, and
unknown Michigan State Police Officers falsely imprisoned them.
Plaintiffs allege in Count IV that Defendants Groleau, Hodge, Tulppo, Groleau,
and unknown Michigan State Police Officers committed trespass on their property.
Plaintiffs allege in Count V that Defendants Groleau and Hodge committed an
assault and battery.
1 	Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “Graleau” also violated his rights. 	ECF No.
40, 	PageID.639, 	640, 	641. 	He 	also 	names 	a 	Defendant 	as 	“Pulppo.” 	Id.,
PageID.641. 	But these “Defendants”, whose names are likely misspelled, have not
been identified in the complaint or served with a summons and complaint.
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 5
of 26

6
Finally, Plaintiffs allege in Count VI that Defendants Hodge, Tulppo, Groleau,
and unknown State Police Officers intentionally inflicted emotional distress.
III. Motion to Dismiss and Judgment on the Pleadings
The Federal Rules provide that a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	“A motion for
judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) generally
follows the same rules as a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Bates v. Green Farm Condominium Assoc., 958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir., 2020). 	To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Put differently,
if plaintiffs do “not nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,
their complaint must be dismissed.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a claim has facial plausibility, a court must construe
the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff, 	accept 	the 	factual
allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Those
factual allegations “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 	League
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 6
of 26

7
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted). “When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may
consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items
appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion so
long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained
therein.” 	Id.
IV. 	Analysis
1. 	Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiffs allege in their amended complaint that Defendants Groleau, Hodge,
and 	Tulppo 	violated 	their 	Fourth 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	rights 	when
Defendants obtained a search warrant and searched their home. 	ECF No. 40,
PageID.639. 	Plaintiffs assert that these Defendants violated their right to be free
from unreasonable searches of their home and persons. 	Id. 	Defendant Groleau has
not moved to dismiss the complaint.
Defendant 	Hodge 	argues 	that 	Plaintiffs 	cannot 	maintain 	their 	Fourth
Amendment claim against him because the search warrant was issued by a detached
magistrate 	and 	supported 	by 	probable 	cause. 	(ECF 	No. 	42, 	PageID.673.)
Defendant Geneman states that Plaintiffs fail to assert an unlawful search and
seizure claim against him by alleging only that he remained outside the residence
and that he did not participate in the search or entry of the home. 	(ECF No. 46,
PageID.743.) 	Finally, Defendant Tulppo argues that the Plaintiffs failed to properly
plead a Fourth Amendment claim against him because (1) the officers relied upon a
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 7
of 26

8
judicially authorized search warrant, (2) he did not assist in obtaining the search
warrant, and (3) he did not participate in the search or entry of the home. (ECF No.
44, PageID.709.)
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, 	against 	unreasonable 	searches 	and 	seizures, 	shall 	not 	be
violated, 	and 	no 	Warrants 	shall 	issue, 	but 	upon 	probable 	cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
The protections under the Fourth Amendment are enforceable against the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 	Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650, 655
(1961); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985). 	The “chief evil” against which
the Fourth Amendment protects is the “physical entry of the home.” 	Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). 	Thus, searches and seizures within the home
without 	a 	warrant 	are 	“presumptively 	unreasonable.” 	Id. 	at 	586. 	Before
embarking on a search, police must obtain a warrant based on probable cause from a
neutral and disinterested magistrate. 	Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978).
Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability, given the totality of the
circumstances, that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. 	United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing United
States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991)).
In the context of searches and seizures, “police officers are entitled to rely on a
judicially secured warrant for immunity from a § 1983 action for illegal search and
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 8
of 26

9
seizure unless the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause, that official belief
in the existence of probable cause is unreasonable.” 	Yancey v. Carroll Cty., 876 F.2d
1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989). 	That is because “the fact that a neutral magistrate has
issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively
reasonable manner or ... in ‘objective good faith.’” 	Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565
U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984)).
Plaintiffs attach the search warrant affidavit to their amended complaint.
The affidavit states in part:
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 9
of 26

10
ECF No. 40-2, PageID.657.
Plaintiffs state that Defendant Hodge violated their Fourth Amendment rights
when he used his personal knowledge to identify Cooper in the Dollar General
security footage, observed Cooper at the Plaintiffs’ home, sought and obtained a
search warrant for the Plaintiffs’ home, and executed the search warrant on the
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 10
of 26

11
Plaintiffs’ home. 	ECF No. 40, PageID.629-634. 	Defendant Hodge obtained a
warrant to search Plaintiffs’ home for Mr. Cooper based upon Cooper’s identified
presence at the Plaintiffs’ home. 	Although Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant
Hodge executed an invalid warrant, they have failed to allege facts that support this
conclusory allegation. 	Plaintiffs suggest that the search warrant is invalid because
the officers misidentified Mr. Taylor as Mr. Cooper. 	Plaintiffs allege:
ECF No. 40, PageID.631. 	Misidentification of a suspect to obtain a search warrant
does 	not 	automatically 	render 	the 	search 	warrant 	invalid, 	unless 	the
misidentification was made recklessly or knowingly. 	United States v. Purifoy, 396
F. App’x 202, 209 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Under the circumstances, this was a plausible
mistake. A reasonable misidentification cannot be made ‘recklessly’ and a mistake
cannot be made ‘knowingly.’ 	Thus, [the officer’s] misidentification of the male
observed near the condominium was neither reckless nor knowing”).
Plaintiffs have not alleged facts supporting their allegation that the warrant
Hodge sought was not supported by probable cause. 	Plaintiffs have not alleged the
warrant was issued by a biased magistrate or that the warrant was based on falsified
facts or statements. 	Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that suggest Hodge’s reliance
on the warrant was unreasonable. 	At best, Plaintiff suggests that Hodge made a
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 11
of 26

12
mistake 	of 	identification 	but 	Plaintiffs 	have 	failed 	to 	allege 	plausible 	factual
allegations which could provide a reasonable inference that any identification error
was reckless or knowing. 	Thus, the undersigned respectfully recommends the Court
dismiss Plaintiffs’ unreasonable search and seizure claim against Defendant Hodge.
Plaintiffs’ only direct references to Defendant Geneman in their complaint are
in relation to the alleged traffic stop involving Douglas on September 7, 2022, at
which time the officer allegedly took down Douglas’s address, and that he remained
outside the home during the execution of the search warrant. 	Id., PageID.628-629,
634. 	Plaintiffs do not name Defendant Geneman in any of the Counts in the
Amended Complaint. 	Id., PageID.639-644.
Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant Geneman was personally involved in
obtaining the allegedly invalid search warrant. 	Plaintiffs also do not allege that
Defendant Geneman executed the search warrant by entering their home. 	Thus,
Plaintiffs have failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim upon which relief could be
granted against Defendant Geneman.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Tulppo violated their rights by
surveilling their home while Defendant Hodge obtained an invalid search warrant
and by breaking down the door to their house while executing the search warrant.
(Id.) 	Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant Tulppo assisted Hodge in obtaining the
search warrant. 	Plaintiffs do not allege that any information Tulppo gathered while
surveilling the home was utilized in obtaining the warrant for their home. 	Plaintiffs
conceded that Tulppo remained outside the home while the search warrant was
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 12
of 26

13
executed. 	Id., PageID.634. 	Plaintiffs do not allege that false statements or
omissions were made to obtain the warrant. 	Plaintiffs have not plead facts
suggesting it would have been unreasonable for Tulppo to rely on the judicially sealed
warrant to search their home. 	Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to state a Fourth
Amendment claim against Tulppo.
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants Hodge and Groleau entered their home
without knocking or giving them enough time to respond before entering their home
to execute the search warrant. 	Plaintiffs conceded that Defendants Geneman and
Tulppo did not enter their home and that they remained outside during the execution
of the search warrant. 	Defendant Groleau has not moved for dismissal. 	Defendant
Hodge argues that the entry of the home was reasonable because the officers did not
violate the knock and announce rule before entering the residence.
The Fourth Amendment requires that law enforcement officers knock and
announce their presence before entering a dwelling. 	Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.
927, 929 (1995). 	The knock and announce rules “forms a part of the reasonableness
inquiry 	under 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment.” 	Id. 	To 	determine 	whether 	officers
complied with the knock and announce rule, courts must analyze the facts and
circumstances on a case-by-case basis. 	Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394
(1997). 	The Sixth Circuit has explained that mere knocking by an officer protects
no interests in privacy, thus residents must be given “ample time to respond” to
officers. 	United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 985 (6th Cir. 2000). 	The Sixth Circuit,
however, has declined to adopt a bright line rule as to what constitutes a reasonable
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 13
of 26

14
length of time that officers must wait before entering a residence after announcing
their 	presence. 	United 	States 	v. 	Spikes, 	158 	F.3d 	913, 	926 	(6th 	Cir. 	1998).
However, the Sixth Circuit has noted that the time of day when executing a search
warrant is critical to establishing reasonableness. 	United States v. Pinson, 321 F.3d
558, 567 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that the length of time it would reasonably take a
person to answer the door in the dead of night is considerably longer than it would be
reasonable to assume it would take in the middle of the day).
Plaintiffs’ attach the Michigan Department of State Police incident report to
their amended complaint, which states in part:
ECF No. 40-3, PageID.666.
Body camera video discloses that the officers arrived at Plaintiffs’ residence
with vehicle overhead lights flashing. 	ECF No. 18 (body cam video). 	A light inside
the home can be seen shining from a window. 	Id. 	It took the officers approximately
40 more seconds to announce their presence at the door of the residence, and they
entered the residence approximately seven seconds after making the announcement.
Id. 	After the officers announced their presence, Plaintiffs’ dogs can be heard barking
on the video audio. 	Id. 	Ultimately, whether officers violate the knock and
announce rule is dependent on the amount of time the officers gave the residents to
open the door.
The amount of time officers need to wait before entering a home
necessarily depends on how much time it would take for a person in the
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 14
of 26

15
house to open the door. When the police execute a warrant in the dead
of night or have some other reason to believe that a prompt response
from the homeowner would be unlikely, the length of time the officers
should wait increases. See Griffin v. United States, 618 A.2d 114, 121
(D.C.App.1992) (entering a person’s home after a thirty second wait at
1:40 a.m. was held to be unreasonable because “at that time of night,
most people are in bed, and many are asleep”). Correspondingly, when
officers execute a warrant in the middle of the day or have requested
admittance from the occupant face-to-face, the length of time the officers
must tarry outside diminishes. See United States v. Kemp, 12 F.3d 1140
(D.C.Cir.1994); LaFave, § 4.8(c). When the police entered 505 North
State Street in mid-morning, the chance that those inside the home
would not hear and have an opportunity to respond to the officers'
request for entry within 15 to 30 seconds was slim.
Spikes, 158 at 927.
In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to
state a knock and announce claim against Defendant Hodge. 	Plaintiffs stated that
officers arrived at the house late at night. 	Plaintiffs say that they were asleep in
their home at the time of the officers’ arrival. 	Plaintiffs say that officers did not
knock on their door and only waited seconds after announcing their presence before
breaking down the unlocked front door of their home. 	ECF No. 40, PageID.634. 	In
the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiffs’ have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim
for relief under Fourth Amendment against Defendant Hodge for breaking down their
unlocked front door and entering their home without giving them adequate time to
open the door.
However, Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim based upon an improper search
fails to state a claim against Defendant Hodge because he could rely on the judicially
authorized search warrant to enter Plaintiffs’ home and execute a search for Mr.
Cooper. 	Further, because Defendants Tulppo and Geneman were not involved in
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 15
of 26

16
entering the Plaintiffs’ residence or the search of the home, they are entitled to
dismissal from this case. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, the Plaintiffs have failed
to state a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants Geneman and Tulppo.
2. 	Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, Defendants move for qualified immunity. 	“Under the doctrine
of qualified immunity, ‘government officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” 	Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a defendant raises
the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable
official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987)).
The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. 	Martin v. City of Broadview Heights,
712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First, the court must “determine if the facts
alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 	Id. 	(citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the court asks if the right at issue was
“‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such that a reasonable officer would
have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A
court may address these steps in any order. 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 16
of 26

17
A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if either step of the analysis
is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir.
2016).
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
Defendants Hodge, Tulppo, and Geneman assert they are entitled to qualified
immunity because they did not violate Plaintiff’s rights. 	The undersigned agrees as
to Defendants Tulppo, and Geneman. 	Because the Plaintiffs have not asserted
sufficient facts to state a claim against them, these Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity in their individual capacities. 	In the opinion of the undersigned,
Plaintiffs have, however, stated sufficient facts to state a Fourth Amendment knock
and announce claim against Defendant Hodge.
The court considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme
Court has observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point
for a right to be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78
(2017) (internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear
foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be “settled law,”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589
(1991) (per curiam), which means it is dictated by “controlling authority”
or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’ ” al–Kidd,
supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 17
of 26

18
603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It is not enough that
the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be
clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish
the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply. See Reichle, 566 U.S., at
666, 	132 	S.Ct. 	2088. 	Otherwise, 	the 	rule 	is 	not 	one 	that 	“every
reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63−64 (2018).
It is clearly established that police must knock and announce their presence
before entering a home to execute a warrant and give the occupants reasonable time
to open the door. 	Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that they were not given reasonable
time to open the door. 	Defendant Hodge asserts that the video evidence contradicts
the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint. 	In the opinion of the undesigned, although
the officers arrived at the scene with overhead lights flashing and it took them
approximately 40 seconds to walk to the front door of the residence after parking their
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 18
of 26

19
vehicles, the Plaintiffs stated that they were asleep on their couch and did not awaken
until their dogs began to bark. 	The video shows that the dogs began barking after
the officers announced their presence. 	Approximately seven seconds later, the
officers broke down the unlocked front door of their home. 	In the opinion of the
undesigned, Plaintiffs have asserted enough facts in their amended complaint to state
a claim for relief against Defendant Hodge. 	Thus, Defendant Hodge is not entitled
to 	qualified 	immunity 	in 	his 	individual 	capacity 	related 	to 	Plaintiffs’ 	Fourth
Amendment knock and announce claim.
3. 	Municipal Liability
Plaintiffs seek to assert claims against the City of Iron River and Iron County.
Local governments and their officials may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are
not subject to absolute immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 	Monell, 436 U.S.
at 694–701. 	When a plaintiff sues a municipal actor in their official capacity, “in all
respects other than name,” the plaintiff is suing the municipality. 	Graham, 473 U.S.
at 166 (citing Brandon, 469 U.S. 464 (1985)). 	However, plaintiffs cannot sue a local
government based merely on the unconstitutional conduct of its official. 	Monell, 436
U.S. at 694. 	Instead, the plaintiff must show that a municipal policy or custom is a
“moving force” behind the violation. 	Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (quoting Polk Cty.,
454 U.S. at 326).
In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Geneman worked
for the Iron River City Police Department and Defendant Tulppo worked for the Iron
River County Sheriff’s Department. 	ECF No. 40, PageID.627. 	Plaintiffs assert
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 19
of 26

20
that: “Defendants City and County, acting under color of state law, and acting under
their customs, policies, and practices, authorized, tolerated, ratified, or acquiesced in
the . . . constitutional violations.” 	Id., PageID.639. 	Importantly, Plaintiffs have
failed to identify any policy or practice held by either the City or the County that
relate to their claims. 	Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that support their
assertion that their injuries are the result of any policy or practice. 	Plaintiffs’
assertions are conclusory in nature. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiffs’
conclusory claims against Iron River and Iron County fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
4. 	State Law Claims
a. Defendant Tulppo
Plaintiffs 	assert 	that 	Defendant 	Tulppo 	violated 	Michigan 	law 	under
Michigan’s Constitution Article I, Section 11 right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizure (Count II); false imprisonment (Count III named as “Pulppo”);
Trespass (Count IV); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VI).
In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the
avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly
deciding state law issues.” 	Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178,
1182 (6th Cir. 1993). 	Ordinarily, when a district court has exercised jurisdiction
over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal
claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 20
of 26

21
claims. 	Id. 	Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” 	Carlsbad Tech.,
Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v.
Johnny's Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012).
In 	the 	analysis 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	concluded 	that 	the 	Plaintiffs’
Constitutional claims against Defendant Tulppo failed to meet the Rule 12(b)
standard. 	Without Plaintiffs’ federal claims in the suit, the balance of the relevant
considerations 	would 	therefore 	weigh 	against 	the 	exercise 	of 	supplemental
jurisdiction. 	As such the undersigned would respectfully recommend that the Court
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against
Defendant Tulppo.
b. Defendant Hodge
Plaintiffs 	assert 	that 	Defendant 	Hodge 	violated 	Michigan 	law 	under
Michigan’s Constitution Article I, Section 11 right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizure (Count II); false imprisonment (Count III); Trespass (Count IV);
assault and battery (Count V); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count
VI).
1. 	Michigan Constitution
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Hodge violated their rights under the Article
I § 11 of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads in pertinent part, “[t]he person,
houses, papers, possessions, electronic data, and electronic communications of every
person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.” 	(ECF No. 24-1,
PageID.266−67.)
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 21
of 26

22
“The Michigan Constitution in this regard is generally construed to provide the
same protection as the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”
People v. Chowdhury, 285 Mich. App. 509, 516 (2009) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). 	Therefore, the analysis of Plaintiffs’ Michigan Constitutional claim
against Defendant Hodge is identical to the Fourth Amendment analysis set forth
above.
Nevertheless, Defendant Hodge argues that damages are not available against
him under the Michigan Constitution in his individual capacity. 	First, it is noted
that the Supreme Court of Michigan has indicated “[a] claim for damages against the
state arising from violation by the state of the Michigan Constitution may be
recognized in appropriate cases.” 	Bauserman v. Unemployment Ins. Agency, 509
Mich. 673, 693 (2022). 	Hodge argues that those damages may be obtained from the
State of Michigan but not from him in his individual or personal capacity.
Here, Plaintiffs have named Defendant Hodge in his individual capacity and
therefore, this lawsuit is not against the State of Michigan. 	See Reeves v. Cnty. of
Wayne, No. 367444, 2025 WL 1635273, at *8 (Mich. Ct. App. June 9, 2025), appeal
granted, 	29 	N.W.3d 	498 	(Mich. 	2026) 	(finding 	that 	damages 	for 	a 	Michigan
Constitutional violation may be available against the state of Michigan).
Under these circumstances, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Plaintiffs’
repetitive knock and announce claim under the Michigan Constitution be denied
against Defendant Hodge. 	As set forth above, Plaintiffs have an alternative remedy
against Defendant Hodge under their Fourth Amendment claim.
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 22
of 26

23
2. 	False Imprisonment and Trespass
Under Michigan law, false imprisonment is the “unlawful restraint of an
individual's personal liberty” 	Moore v. City of Detroit, 252 Mich. App. 384, 387, 652
N.W.2d 688, 690 (2002). 	Similarly, under Michigan law a trespass involves the
“unauthorized invasion on the private property of another.” 	Dalley v Dykema
Gossett PLLC, 287 Mich. App. 296, 315 (2010). 	The trespasser must intend to enter
or intrude on the plaintiff’s land or real property without authorization to do so.
Moher v. United States, 875 F. Supp. 2d 739, 755 (W.D. Mich. 2012). 	If a defendant’s
intrusion onto the plaintiff's private land is authorized by law, there is no trespass.
Id.
In their complaint, Plaintiffs acknowledge that Defendant Hodge obtained a
search warrant before the officers entered Plaintiffs’ property and searched for Mr.
Cooper. 	As discussed above, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim of unreasonable
search 	and 	seizure 	against 	Defendant 	Hodge, 	because 	Hodge 	relied 	upon 	the
judicially authorized search warrant. 	The undersigned previously concluded that
Plaintiffs failed to plead facts suggesting Hodge unreasonably relied on the warrant
to conduct a search. 	Defendant Hodge was authorized by the search warrant to be
on the premises and to invade the Plaintiffs’ privacy. 	Therefore, in the opinion of
the undesigned, Plaintiffs have failed to state claims of either trespass or false
imprisonment against Defendants Hodge.
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 23
of 26

24
3. 	Assault and Battery
Under Michigan law an assault is “an attempt to commit a battery or an
unlawful act which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an
immediate battery. ” 	Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 315 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
People v. Nickens, 470 Mich. 622, 685 N.W.2d 657, 661 (2004)). “A battery is ‘an
unintentional, unconsented and harmful or offensive touching of the person of
another, or of something closely connected with the person.” 	Naji v. City of
Dearborn, 709 F. Supp. 3d 398, 412 (E.D. Mich. 2023), aff’d sub nom. Naji v. City of
Dearborn, Michigan, 120 F.4th 520 (6th Cir. 2024). 	Here, Plaintiff has failed to
plead facts showing that Defendant Hodge committed an assault and/or battery
during the execution of the search warrant. 	The fact that Defendant Hodge executed
a valid judicially approved search warrant is insufficient to state a claim against him
for assault and battery.
4. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted for intentional infliction of
emotional distress a plaintiff must assert allegations that could show (1) that the
defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) that the conduct was
intentional or reckless, (3) causation, and (4) that plaintiff experienced severe
emotional distress. 	Burton v. City of Detroit, No. 340592, 2019 WL 1866593, at *4
(Mich. App. Apr. 25, 2019). 	“To be considered extreme and outrageous, the conduct
must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 24
of 26

25
a civilized community.” 	Id. (citation omitted) 	Plaintiffs base this claim on their
objectively false assertion that Defendant Hodge lacked probable cause and legal
authority to search their home. 	ECF No. 40, PageID.643. 	As set forth above,
Defendant Hodge entered Plaintiffs’ home pursuant to a valid judicially authorized
search warrant. 	The facts do not come close to asserting an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim based upon the entry of the home pursuant to the search
warrant. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, it is respectfully recommended that the
Court rule that Plaintiffs have failed to state an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim.
V. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant in part
Defendant Hodge’s motion to dismiss all claims asserted against him except for the
Fourth Amendment knock and announce claim.
It is further respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants
Harrington, Tulppo, Geneman, Iron River, and Iron County’s motions to dismiss or
for judgment on the pleadings, thus dismissing these parties from this lawsuit.
If the Court accepts this recommendation, the remaining claims are against
Defendants Hodge for a Fourth Amendment knock and announce violation (Count I)
and against Defendant Groleau under the Fourth Amendment (Count I), under the
Michigan Constitution (Count II), for false imprisonment (Count III), for trespass
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 25
of 26

26
(Count IV), for assault and battery (Count V) and for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (Count VI). 2
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	June 12, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
2 	Although, the amended complaint seems to contain misspellings of other
potential 	Defendants 	(Pulppo, 	Groleau), 	asserts 	allegations 	against 	unserved
individuals (Magnuson), and names “Unknown State Police Officers”, none of these
individuals have been served with a summons and complaint. 	In the opinion of the
undersigned, to the extent that these other individuals are considered Defendants, it
is recommended that the Court dismiss them without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(m), if Plaintiff fails to identify them within the R. & R. fourteen-day objection
period. 	Rule 4(m) provides that the Court must, after providing plaintiff with notice,
either dismiss or order service within a specified time frame against a Defendant who
has not been served within 90 days after the complaint was filed.
Case 2:24-cv-00145-RJJ-MV ECF No. 63, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/12/26 Page 26
of 26