Hill #724440 v. Hubble et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SIDNEY DURELL HILL #724440, 	Case No. 2:23-cv-76
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Paul L. Maloney
U.S. District Judge
v.
PATTI HUBBLE, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses the following:
• 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	(ECF 	No. 	44), 	Plaintiff’s
response in opposition (ECF No. 52), and Defendants’ reply (ECF No. 55);
and
• 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	(ECF 	No. 	48), 	Defendants’
response in opposition (ECF No. 50), and Plaintiff’s reply (ECF No. 59).
Plaintiff – state prisoner Sidney Durell Hill – filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that multiple staff members at Alger Correctional Facility (AMF)
violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 	This Court issued a screening
opinion on April 15, 2024, dismissing all of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims
and multiple First Amendment claims. 	(ECF No. 12.) 	On January 2, 2025, the
Court issued an order adopting the undersigned’s R. & R. and dismissing two
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additional defendants for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 	(ECF No. 30.)
Now, only Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Resident Unit Manager (RUM) Jason
Hubble and Prison Counselor (PC) Loman remain.
In the opinion of the undersigned, there are no genuine disputes of material
fact as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. 	Thus, it is respectfully recommended that
the Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismiss the case.
II. 	Factual Allegations
Hill’s allegations against the Defendants were set forth in this Court’s April
15, 2024, screening opinion. 	There, the Court provides, in relevant part:
On July 20, 2022, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant Loman on the
censorship of his J-Pay message, but Defendant Loman stated, “I heard
about the grievance you wrote on RUM Hubble, I should say you
threatened me and send your ass to the hole, stop writing grievances
before we really turn up the heat.” (Id., PageID.12.) Defendant Loman
then told Plaintiff that he would investigate and send a response. (Id.)
On July 25, 2022, Plaintiff received a response stating that his J-Pay
had been censored because he was seeking personal information on a
prison employee. Plaintiff asserts that information regarding where a
Corrections Officer is employed is considered public and that the
censorship was merely retaliatory. (Id.) On August 3, 2022, Defendant
Loman told Plaintiff that his recent incoming mail would be rejected and
that the contents, materials related to a paralegal course offered by the
Blackstone Career Institute, would be destroyed because Plaintiff had
not 	gotten 	the 	facility’s 	permission 	prior 	to 	enrollment. 	Plaintiff
contends that the common practice is to store the materials while the
prisoner seeks permission. (Id.)
Plaintiff told Defendant Loman that since he reviewed Plaintiff on the
mail rejection, MDOC policy and rules prevented Defendant Loman
from serving as the hearing officer. Defendant Loman responded by
stating, “That’s how we do it at Alger.” (Id., PageID.12–13.) Defendant
Loman also stated, “When you write grievances on my boss and co-
workers I’m not giving you shit.” (Id., PageID.13.) Plaintiff wrote a
grievance on Defendant Loman. (Id.)
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On August 8, 2022, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant Jason
Hubble 	on 	the 	grievance 	he 	had 	written 	on 	Defendant 	Loman.
Defendant Jason Hubble told Plaintiff that he was lucky that Hubble
did not put Plaintiff in the hole for the grievance Plaintiff had written
on his wife. (Id.) During the interview, Defendant Jason Hubble allowed
Defendant 	Loman 	to 	enter 	the 	office, 	causing 	Plaintiff 	to 	feel
intimidated. Plaintiff told Defendant Jason Hubble to send him to step
II and went back to his cell and wrote a grievance on Defendant Jason
Hubble. (Id.)
(ECF No. 12, PageID.93.)
III. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). 	The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan,
421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251−52 (1986)). 	The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion. 	Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.
2005).
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IV. First Amendment Retaliation
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights
violates the Constitution. 	Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999)
(en banc). 	To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against
him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct;
and (3) the adverse action was motivated by the protected conduct. 	Id. 	To prevail
on a retaliation claim, retaliatory motive “must be a ‘but-for’ cause [of the injury],
meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken
absent the retaliatory motive.” 	Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1721 (2019).
An adverse action is an action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness
from 	exercising 	his 	constitutional 	rights. 	Thaddeus-X, 	175 	F.3d 	at 	396.
Misconduct tickets are often recognized as adverse actions sufficient to support a
retaliation claim. 	See Brown v. Crowley, 312 F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that
the issuance of a major misconduct ticket, which subjected the prisoner to a risk of
segregation, loss of good time, and a longer term of incarceration, was sufficiently
adverse); Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 266-267 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding that the
issuance of a minor misconduct ticket was sufficiently adverse where the prisoner
lost privileges and could have been confined to his cell). 	Furthermore, “the threat of
adverse action can satisfy this element if the threat is capable of deterring a person
of ordinary firmness from engaging in the protected conduct.” 	Hill v. Lapin, 630
F.3d 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010).
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After a prisoner establishes the first two elements, the prisoner must be able
to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor
in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. 	Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032,
1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
The Sixth Circuit has employed a burden-shifting approach with respect to the
causation element:
Once the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing that his protected
conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant. If the defendant can show that he
would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected
activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment.
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399.
V. Analysis
A. Protected Conduct
The Sixth Circuit has explained that “protected conduct includes a prisoner’s
‘undisputed First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials on his
own behalf.’” 	Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Herron v.
Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000)). 	“If the grievances are frivolous,
however, this right is not protected.” 	Id. 	Prisoners “cannot exercise that right in a
manner that violates legitimate prison regulations or penological objectives.” 	Smith
v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037. 	“‘Abusive or manipulative use of a grievance
system [is] not ... protected conduct,’ and prison officials may take action in response
to the prisoner's improper use of the grievance process as long as the response aligns
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with a legitimate penological goal.” 	Griffin v. Berghuis, 563 F. App'x 411, 416 (6th
Cir. 2014) (quoting King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 699 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Beyond 	the 	general 	acknowledgment 	that 	grievances 	used 	to 	abuse 	or
manipulate the grievance system are frivolous, limited authority exists as to what
renders a grievance frivolous. 	As acknowledged by the Sixth Circuit in Maben v.
Thelen, “cases in this Circuit appear to suggest that a prisoner’s grievance is frivolous
when the underlying grievance itself is de minimis.” 	887 F.3d 252, 264–65 (6th Cir.
2018) (collecting cases).1 	This Court has also found grievances involving “verifiably
untrue” allegations to be frivolous. 	Chrzan v. Mackay, No. 1:19-cv-116, 2020 WL
7774741, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2020) (finding that the plaintiff’s grievance was
frivolous where a video recording of the underlying event contradicted the allegations
in the grievance), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-cv-116, 2020 WL
7773419 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2020). 	Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that a
prisoner’s grievance complaining about conduct that had no impact on the prisoner
was frivolous. 	Thaddeus-X v. Love, No. 98-2211, 2000 WL 712354, at *2–3 (6th Cir.
May 22, 2000) (finding that a grievance complaining about a prison employee eating
at his desk was “patently frivolous as the defendant's conduct had no adverse impact
on [the plaintiff]”).
On July 15, 2022, Hill filed the following grievance regarding access to his
JPay. 	As identified below, PC Loman was the respondent for this grievance.
1 	For example, in White–Bey v. Griggs, the Sixth Circuit found that a prisoner’s
grievance that he was provided a typewriter rather than a computer was frivolous.
43 Fed. App'x 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2002).
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(ECF No. 22-3, PageID.192.)
Then, on August 4, 2022, Hill filed the following grievance asserting that PC
Loman violated MDOC policy in retaliation when Loman served as respondent for
Hill’s prior grievance.
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(ECF No. 22-3, PageID.183.)
Later that week, on August 10, 2022, Hill filed the following grievance
against PC Loman and RUM Hubble.
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(Id., PageID.178.)
Defendants assert that Hill’s grievances do not rise to protected conduct
because the grievances were frivolous and lacked merit. 	(ECF No. 44, PageID. 273-
74.) 	More specifically, Defendants argue that Hill used the grievance system to seek
redress in court rather than to make legitimate efforts to resolve issues with prison
staff. 	(Id., PageID.274.)
In response, Hill contends that he filed at least two grievances against
Defendants Loman and Hubble that constitute protected conduct. 	(ECF No. 52,
PageID.384.) 	Furthermore, Hill asserts he was also engaged in protected conduct
during the hearing with Defendant Loman. 	(Id., PageID.383.) 	Hill says that PC
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Loman violated Administrative Rule 791.3310 when he conducted the hearing
regarding Hill’s Notice of Package/Mail Rejection. (Id.)
In the opinion of the undersigned, Hill’s grievances against PC Loman and
RUM J. Hubble constitute protected conduct. 	Additionally, participation in the
grievance hearing, as an extension of the underlying grievance, rises to protected
conduct.
B. Adverse Action
As noted above, to establish the second element of a retaliation claim, a
prisoner-plaintiff must show an adverse action by a prison official that would be
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional
rights. 	Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396.
1. 	RUM J. Hubble
In his verified complaint, Hill alleges that RUM J. Hubble told him “[y]our [sic]
lucky I don’t put you in the hole for the grievance you wrote on my wife.” 	(ECF No.
1, PageID.23.) 	Hill also contends that RUM J. Hubble allowed PC Loman to be
present during an interview on a grievance Hill wrote against PC Loman. 	(ECF No.
52, PageID.390.)
In Thaddeus-X, the Sixth Circuit stressed that generally “[p]risoners may be
required to tolerate more than public employees, who may be required to tolerate
more than average citizens, before an action taken against them is considered
adverse.” 	175 F.3d at 398. 	Regarding verbal harassment specifically, the Court
concluded that harassment does not constitute adverse action. 	Smith v. Craven, 61
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F. App’x 159, 162 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Spearman v. Williams, No. 22-1309, 2023
WL 7000971, at *4 (6th Cir. Jul. 17, 2023) (stating “that verbal abuse, idle threats,
and nonphysical harassment of prisoners, standing alone, ... [does not] constitute an
adverse action of constitutional significance”). 	Indeed, the Court reasoned that
minor harassment is insufficient to constitute adverse action because recognition of
such a standard would “‘trivialize the First Amendment.’” 	Thaddeus 175 F.3d at
398−99 (citing Bart, 677 F.2d at 625).
Here, 	considering 	the 	evidence 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	Hill, 	the
undersigned concludes that RUM J. Hubble’s comment does not rise to adverse action
under Thaddeus-X. 	Hill does not assert that he suffered any consequences due to
RUM J. Hubble’s alleged statement. 	Moreover, Hill does not identify any adverse
action he experienced because of PC Loman being present during the grievance
interview. 	Accordingly, in the opinion of the undersigned, there is not an adverse
action attributable to RUM J. Hubble. 	The undersigned does not engage in further
analysis of this claim.
Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court dismiss
Hill’s retaliation claims against RUM J. Hubble’s.
2. 	PC Loman
Hill says PC Loman took two potentially adverse actions against him. 	First,
Hill asserts that, while reviewing an unrelated grievance, PC Loman said “I heard
about the grievance you wrote on RUM P. Hubble, I should say you threatened me
and send your ass to the hole, stop writing grievances before we really turn up the
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heat.” 	(ECF No. 1, PageID.12.) 	PC Loman denies that he made the alleged
statement or that he knew about Hill’s grievance on RUM Hubble. 	(ECF No. 44-3,
PageID.326.). 	Further, Defendants argue that PC Loman did not engage in an
adverse action against Hill because the alleged statement did not result in any loss
of privileges or sanctions. 	(ECF No. 44, PageID.280.)
Additionally, Hill says that Loman improperly conducted a mail rejection
hearing and denied him access to course books in retaliation for Hill’s grievances.
(ECF No. 52, PageID.386.) 	Defendants argue that PC Loman merely followed
MDOC mail policy. 	(ECF No. 44, PageID.280.) 	In response, Hill asserts that PC
Loman took an adverse action against Hill when he “confiscated and then attempted
to destroy Plaintiff Hill’s correspondence course materials” and when he “threatened
Plaintiff Hill with disciplinary sanction.” 	(ECF No. 52, PageID.386-87.)
Again, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hill, the undersigned
concludes that Hill’s assertion that PC Loman threatened him with disciplinary
sanctions does not rise to adverse action. 	See Spearman v. Williams, No. 22-1309,
2023 WL 7000971, at *4 (6th Cir. Jul. 17, 2023) (stating “that verbal abuse, idle
threats, and nonphysical harassment of prisoners, standing alone, ... [does not]
constitute 	an 	adverse 	action 	of 	constitutional 	significance”). 	Therefore, 	the
undersigned does not engage in further analysis regarding the alleged statement.
However, Hill also alleges that PC Loman confiscated and attempted to destroy
his course materials. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, a genuine issue of material
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fact remains as to the question of whether this alleged adverse action satisfies the
second prong of a retaliation claim.
Thus, the undersigned considers Defendants’ causal nexus argument that PC
Loman was following MDOC Policy below.
C. Causal Nexus
To prevail on a retaliation claim, retaliatory motive “must be a ‘but-for’ cause
[of the injury], meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have
been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” 	Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1721.
Here, Hill asserts that PC Loman “confiscated and attempted to destroy”
course materials mailed to Hill. 	(ECF No. 52, PageID.386.) 	Defendants explain
that PC Loman’s actions were in line with MDOC prison mail policy. 	(ECF No. 44,
PageID.280.) 	PC 	Loman 	provided 	his 	administrative 	hearing 	report 	of 	the
confiscation of Hill’s materials. That report is shown below.
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(ECF No. 44-4, PageID.329.)
As shown above, the hearing report explains that the MDOC’s Policy Directives
require that materials must be received directly from an approved source, or, if the
prisoner is approved to take a correspondence course, the materials must come
directly from the approved correspondence school. 	Materials that do not comply
with these requirements are prohibited. 	The report notes that Hill was not then
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approved to participate in any correspondence courses. 	However, destruction of the
property did not actually occur at that time. 	The report states the rejected items
would only be destroyed after Hill pursued his remedies through the grievance
process.
A review of the relevant MDOC policy further supports that PC Loman
followed 	procedure. 	MDOC 	Policy 	Directive 	05.03.118 	states 	the 	following
regarding books and other publications:
(ECF No. 55-2, PageID.415 (MDOC P.D. 05.03.118).) 	The policy also directs that a
hearing be conducted to determine the proper disposition of rejected mail. 	(Id.,
PageID.421.) 	After 	the 	hearing, 	the 	policy 	states 	the 	following 	regarding
destruction of rejected mail:
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(Id., PageID.421.)
Therefore, the above portions of MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.118 demonstrate
that PC Loman had to hold the rejected mail. 	Allowing Hill to have the course
materials would have been a violation of MDOC policy.
It should also be noted that during Hill’s deposition, he was questioned on
whether he ever received the materials at issue. 	Hill testified that he was
eventually approved for the course and received the course materials without having
to reorder them. 	(ECF No. 44-2, PageID.304.)
In the opinion of the undersigned, PC Loman has demonstrated that no
genuine issue of material fact remains as to the causation element of Hill’s retaliation
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claim; Loman has shown that he would have confiscated the correspondence course
materials regardless of Hill’s protected conduct. 	Hill has offered no evidence to
undercut or call into question this point. 	Further, as noted above, Hill’s own
deposition supports the narrative that the MDOC did not destroy the materials, but,
instead, held the materials until Hill was properly approved for the course. 	At that
time, Hill received his materials.
Therefore, the undersigned concludes that there is no genuine issue of material
fact regarding the causal nexus between Hill’s protected conduct and PC Loman’s
adverse 	action. 	Loman 	has 	provided 	unrebutted 	evidence 	showing 	that 	the
correspondence course materials were prohibited, based on MDOC policy, at the time
they were received. 	Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the
Court grant summary judgement for PC Loman.
VI. 	Qualified Immunity
Defendant argues that he is entitled to dismissal of the complaint against him
based 	upon 	qualified 	immunity. 	“Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	qualified 	immunity,
‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a defendant raises the qualified
immunity 	defense, 	the 	burden 	shifts 	to 	the 	plaintiff 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	the
defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable official
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would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’” 	Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)).
The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. 	Martin v. City of Broadview Heights,
712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First, the court must “determine if the facts
alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 	Id. 	(citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the court asks if the right at issue was
“‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such that a reasonable officer would
have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A
court may address these steps in any order. 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if either step of the analysis
is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir.
2016).
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78 (2017)
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
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To 	be 	clearly 	established, 	a 	legal 	principle 	must 	have 	a
sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must
be “settled law,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116
L.Ed.2d 	589 	(1991) 	(per 	curiam), 	which 	means 	it 	is 	dictated 	by
“controlling authority” or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive
authority,’ ” al–Kidd, supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It
is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The
precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would
interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.
See Reichle, 566 U.S., at 666, 132 S.Ct. 2088. Otherwise, the rule is not
one that “every reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct.
2088 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63−64 (2018).
In the qualified immunity context, if the facts alleged and evidence produced,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to
find that the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right, dismissal by
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summary judgment is inappropriate. 	Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 947 (6th Cir.
2020) (citing Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009)).
The Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because
they did not violate Hill’s clearly established constitutional rights. 	(ECF No. 44,
PageID.282.) The undersigned agrees; because there are no genuine issues of
material fact, it is the undersigned’s opinion that the Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity in their individual capacity. 	See Phillips, 534 F.3d at 538
(“Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	qualified 	immunity, 	‘government 	officials 	performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 	(quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at
818)).
VII. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Hill filed a motion for summary judgment on June 27, 2025. 	(ECF No. 48.)
As 	noted 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully 	recommends 	granting
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing Hill’s case. 	However, if
the Court rejects this conclusion, the undersigned respectfully recommends denying
Hill’s motion for summary judgment for the reasons set forth below.
First, Hill alleges that RUM J. Hubble retaliated against him by threatening
him during a grievance interview. 	As noted above, Hill asserts that RUM J. Hubble
stated “[y]our [sic] lucky I don’t put you in the hole for the grievance you wrote on my
wife.” 	In his declaration, RUM J. Hubble denies making this statement to Hill.
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(ECF No. 44-5, PageID.332.) 	Thus, in the context of Plaintiff Hill’s motion for
summary judgment, Hubble’s declaration alone is sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to the adverse action element. 	Hill’s motion for summary
judgment on Hubble’s alleged threats fails for this reason.
In addition, Hill argues that RUM J. Hubble retaliated against him by allowing
PC Loman to be present during an interview for a grievance Hill wrote on PC Loman.
(ECF No. 48, PageID.348.) 	Defendants respond that PC Loman was silent during
the hearing and his presence would not “deter an inmate of ordinary firmness from
continuing to file grievances, if the goal of a grievance is to resolve issues.” 	(ECF
No. 50, PageID.372 (citing Hill’s Dep. Tr., ECF No. 44-2, PageID.310).) 	Accordingly,
in the context of Hill’s motion for summary judgment, there remains a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether RUM J. Hubble took an adverse action against Hill
during the grievance hearing. 	Thus, the undersigned recommends denying Hill’s
motion as it relates to PC Hubble.
Regarding PC Loman, Hill asserts that PC Loman destroyed paralegal studies
correspondence 	class 	books 	in 	retaliation 	for 	past 	grievances. 	(ECF 	No. 	48,
PageID.344.) 	However, Hill conceded in his own deposition that the books were
never destroyed. 	Thus, Hill’s own statements support the conclusion that PC Loman
did not take an adverse action against Hill.
More generally, with respect to Hill’s motion, the Defendants have denied his
claims, thereby creating multiple genuine issues of material fact. 	Accordingly, if the
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Court reaches Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
VIII. 	Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Court GRANT Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and dismiss Hill’s retaliation claims against PC Loman and RUM
J. Hubble. 	If the Court adopts the report and recommendation, none of Hill’s claims
will remain.
Dated: 	October 31, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within
fourteen days of service of this notice on you. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b). 	All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any
further right of appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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