Gant v. Michigan Department of Transportation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ERIC GANT,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
Case No. 1:26-cv-1671
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Eric Gant, otherwise known to himself as “King Eric the 1st” (ECF No. 1 at
PageID.1), filed his pro se complaint on May 22, 2026, against the Michigan Department of
Transportation (MDOT). On May 26, 2026, I granted Gant’s motion to proceed as a pauper. (ECF
No. 4.) Therefore, I have conducted an initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) to determine whether it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Having conducted this review, I conclude Gant’s complaint meets all three prongs of Section
1915(e)(2)(B). In addition, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint because
its allegations “are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, [and] devoid of merit
. . . .” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479–80 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the complaint is subject
to dismissal.
Gant alleges that under the State of Michigan’s 1835 Constitution, Michigan citizens have
the right to abolish the government, and he has done so by making himself “the King of the [S]tate
of Michigan, the United States, and the world.” (Id. at PageID.1.) As King, he has issued decrees
and laws, including the Standard policies of the Kingdom of Euphoria. (Id.) Gant alleges that he
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“may sue for a violation of the King’s law.” (Id. at PageID.2.) Specially, he alleges that MDOT
has violated Section 27 of the King’s law by failing to provide free local or city bus transportation.
For relief, he requests that the Court impose a $10,000 fine against MDOT.
Much need not be said about whether the complaint falls within 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).
It clearly fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, is frivolous under any definition
of the term, and seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See Foster v.
State of Michigan, 573 F. App’x 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment
bars suits against MDOT in federal court). The Court also lacks jurisdiction under the Apple
standard set forth above. Finally, Gant fails to allege any claim within the Court’s federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) does not
exist.
The real issues here are whether the Court should impose a filing restriction on Gant going
forward and, if so, the appropriate restriction. As Chief Judge Jarbou observed in one of Gant’s
prior filings, Eric Deangelo-Juan Gant v. State of Michigan, No. 1:25-cv-1080, 2025 WL 2697169
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2025), Gant is a frequent filer of meritless suits in this Court:
Gant is no stranger to this Court. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis in several previous cases, all of which resulted in pre-service dismissals
on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. See Gant v. Standard
Consumer, No. 1:25-cv-398 (W.D. Mich.); Gant v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., No. 1:25-cv-
397 (W.D. Mich.); Gant v. Orbit Leasing, No. 1:25-cv-340 (W.D. Mich.); Gant v.
Nelnet, 1:25-cv-339 (W.D. Mich.); Gant v. United States, No. 1:24-cv-754 (W.D.
Mich.). Two of his cases filed earlier this year, Case Nos. 1:25-cv-339 and 1:25-
cv- 340, while not found to be frivolous, asserted the meritless theory that he had
the right to discharge his own debt under the Uniform Commercial Code. The
instant case is at a completely different level; it lacks even a half-hearted attempt
to assert any claim.
Id. at *1. Gant’s allegations in that case were similar to those here: he was King of the State of
Michigan and the United States and had “abolish[ed] the old law” and enacted his own King’s law.
Id. Gant sought a declaratory ruling confirming these fantastical allegations. Id. Judge Jarbou
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dismissed the action as frivolous and warned Gant that his filing of further frivolous actions may
result in revocation of the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis in this Court. Id.
Gant’s present filing—which continues the same theme—demonstrates a willful disregard
of, and lack of respect for, Chief Judge Jarbou’s prior warning. His impudent persistence merits
an appropriate judicial response, as his frivolous filings create an unwarranted drain on this Court’s
already overtaxed resources. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right, that a court
may grant to indigent litigants. Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 1998). That privilege
may be limited, or even completely revoked, when a litigant abuses it by repeatedly filing frivolous
lawsuits. Mathis v. U.S. Marshal Serv., No. 1:20-cv-711, 2020 WL 5943010, *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct.
7, 2020); see Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 197 (10th Cir. 1996) (observing that “[l]eave to proceed
without prepayment of fees and costs is a privilege, not a right,” and courts have discretion to
revoke that privilege when it no longer serves its goals). Mathis addressed a similar situation:
Having considered the submissions in these cases, the Court concludes that
continuing to allow Plaintiff the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis in future
lawsuits does not promote the use of Court resources in the interest of justice. See
generally In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989); Maxberry v. S.E.C., 879 F.2d 222,
224 (6th Cir. 1989). The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly recognized that a district court
may properly deny a vexatious litigant permission to proceed in forma pauperis
where a litigant has demonstrated a “history of unsubstantial and vexatious
litigation [amounting to] an abuse of the permission granted to him to proceed as a
pauper in good faith under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).” Atchison v. Farrell, 230 F.3d
1357, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 15, 2000) (quoting Maxberry, 879 F.2d at 224). See, e.g.,
Boles v. Matthews, 173 F.3d 854, at *3 (6th Cir. 1999); Robinson v. Giavasis, 110
F.3d 64 (6th Cir. 1997); Reneer v. Sewell, 975 F.2d 258, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1992). As
set 	forth 	more 	fully 	in 	the 	Report 	and 	Recommendation, 	Plaintiff 	has 	a
demonstrated history of filing unsubstantial and vexatious litigation, justifying this
prospective restriction. Accordingly, in the future, Plaintiff will not be permitted to
file another action without payment of the full filing fee.
Id.
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court prohibit Gant from proceeding in
forma pauperis in any future action unless he obtains a certification from a licensed attorney
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admitted to practice in the Western District of Michigan that his proposed complaint is not
frivolous, malicious, or brought for an improper purpose.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court dismiss Gant’s complaint as
frivolous and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Apple. I further recommend that the
Court prohibit Gant from proceeding in forma pauperis in any future action unless he obtains a
certification from a licensed attorney admitted to practice in the Western District of Michigan that
his proposed complaint is not frivolous, malicious, or brought for an improper purpose.
The Court must also decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). Good faith is judged objectively, Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962), and
an appeal is not taken in good faith if the issue presented is frivolous, defined as lacking an
arguable basis either in fact or law. See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.
2001). For the same reasons that I recommend dismissal of the action, I discern no good faith basis
for an appeal and recommend that, should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court assess the
$605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to Section 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11.
Date: June 1, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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