Tran v. Blanche et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ANH NGOC TRAN,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD BLANCHE et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1646
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from
detention. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.)
In an order entered on June 2, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
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not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 5.) Respondents filed their response on June 5, 2026, (ECF No. 6).
Petitioner filed his reply on June 16, 2026.1 (Reply, ECF No. 9.)
II. 	Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Vietnam. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.) Petitioner
entered the United States on December 17, 1985, as a Lawful Permanent Resident. (Acree-Manuel
Decl., ¶ 4, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.53.) On August 8, 1999, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) charged Petitioner with removability pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner “had been charged with two crimes involving moral
turpitude at any time after admission, and pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(C) in that [Petitioner] had
been convicted of a firearms offense” (Acree-Manuel Decl., ¶ 11, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.54.)
On June 5, 2001, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed to Vietnam. (Acree-
Manuel Decl., ¶ 12, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.55.) Both parties waived appeal, resulting in a final
order of removal. (Id.)
On July 28, 2011, Petitioner was released on an Order of Supervision. (Acree-Manuel
Decl., ¶ 16, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.55.)
On February 10, 2026, DHS agents arrested and detained Petitioner when he reported for
an immigration check-in. (Acree-Manuel Decl., ¶ 17, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.55–56.) Agents also
served Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release advising Petitioner that his release was
revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). (Id.) DHS is actively seeking travel documents to effect
Petitioner’s removal to Vietnam. (Id., ¶¶ 17, 19–20.)
1 Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file his reply to Respondents’ response to his
§ 2241 petition, (ECF No. 8.) The Court grants Petitioner’s motion for extension of time and deems
Petitioner’s reply (ECF No. 9) timely filed.
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III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Analysis
Given that Petitioner has a final order of deportation, which orders his removal, Petitioner’s
present detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Petitioner, however, contends that his detention
is unlawful. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) In response, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s
continued “detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) remains lawful and does not implicate the
constitutional concerns identified in Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).” (Resp., ECF
No. 6, PageID.43–48.)
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Here, as noted above, Petitioner’s order of
deportation became final on June 5, 2001. (Acree-Manuel Decl., ¶ 12, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.55.)
The 90-day removal period following the order expired well before Petitioner filed the present
action. See id. § 1231(a)(1) (“The [90-day] removal period begins on . . . [t]he date the order of
removal becomes administratively final.”).
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In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that after expiration of the 90-day removal
period, the Government may continue to detain the noncitizen for a “presumptively reasonable
period” of time, which the Supreme Court concluded equaled six months. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 701. Following that six-month period, “once [a noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government
must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.2 “[O]nce [a noncitizen’s] removal
is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id.
at 699.
“Although the Supreme Court established a six-month period of presumptively reasonable
detention,” courts have found that Zadvydas does “not preclude a detainee from challenging the
reasonableness of his detention before such time.” See, e.g., Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F.
Supp. 3d 387, 395–96 (D.N.J. 2025) (citing, inter alia, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–701; Ali v. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 706–07 (S.D. Tex. 2020); Hoang Trinh v. Homan, 333 F.
Supp. 3d 984, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2018)); Ali v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 707
(S.D. Tex. 2020) (“This six-month presumption is not a bright line, however, and Zadvydas did
not automatically authorize all detention until it reaches constitutional limits.” (citations omitted)).
That is, during the six-month period of detention, “[t]he presumption of reasonableness is the
default,” and “the government bears no burden to justify detention,” “but if a person ‘can prove’
2 The Court notes that the Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the “Government
to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which the Government
bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen poses a flight risk
or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 576 (2022). The
Court, however, did not reach Arteaga-Martinez’s constitutional or Zadvydas claims, concluding
that such claims were not properly before the Court. See id. at 583–84.
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that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, then he can overcome that presumption.” Id. at 397
(citations omitted).
Here, Petitioner was taken into custody by DHS on February 10, 2026. (Acree-Manuel
Decl., ¶ 17, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.55–56.) Respondents argue that at the time that Petitioner filed
his § 2241 petition on May 19, 2026, he had not been detained for six months. Respondents contend
that a petitioner must have been in DHS custody for six months on the date the petition is filed,
citing to Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700-01; Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002)
(affirming dismissal where petitioner had only been detained four months and stating that “in order
to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien . . . must show post-removal order detention in excess of
six months”); Kalasho v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-CV-556, 2007 WL 431023, at *4
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2007) (“[T]he court concludes that the six month presumption of
reasonableness . . . should apply to petitioner’s current detention, which resulted from his violation
of the order of supervision.”); Olajide v. Wrona, No. 03-10204-BC, 2004 WL 63967, at *2 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 8, 2004) (“[T]he petitioner is not entitled to judicial review of his detention until the
six-month period passes.”).
In this case, the record reflects that DHS intends to effect Petitioner’s removal to Vietnam.
(Acree-Manuel Decl., ¶¶ 17, 19–20, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.55–56.) Petitioner has not offered any
evidence or argument to prove that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
V. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because Petitioner’s § 2241 petition is not ripe, the Court does not address the other claims
and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment denying Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, without prejudice. (ECF No. 1.)
Dated: 	June 25, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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