Lisowski v. Abbott Laboratories

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RYAN LISOWSKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
ABBOTT LABORATORIES,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1616
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Plaintiff Ryan Lisowski brings this action against his former employer, Defendant Abbott
Laboratories. Lisowski claims that Abbott suspended and terminated him for discriminatory and
retaliatory reasons, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law. Before
the Court is Abbott’s motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). (Mot. to Transfer, ECF No. 8.)
Abbott contends that transfer is warranted because Lisowski signed an employment
agreement selecting the Northern District of Illinois as the exclusive forum for this type of dispute:
The parties agree to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts in
Illinois, in any action or proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement or
the transactions contemplated hereby, and further irrevocably agree that all claims
in any such action or proceeding shall be heard and determined in Lake County,
Illinois state court or the Northern District of Illinois federal court. 	Both parties
waive any objection to the laying of venue of any such action or proceeding in any
of the Lake County, Illinois state courts or Northern District of Illinois federal
courts, as well as any claim that a party may have that any such action or proceeding
has been brought in an inconvenient forum.
(Employment Agreement ¶ 16(a), ECF No. 8-1.)
Case 1:26-cv-01616-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 18, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/16/26 Page 1
of 9

2
I. STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) permits the Court to transfer the action to another district “where it
might have been brought,” “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses” and “in the interest
of justice.” Id. This provision is a “codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens,” and is
the proper “mechanism for enforcement of forum-selection clauses that point to a particular federal
district.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 59 (2013).
“In the typical case not involving a forum-selection clause,” the Court considers “both the
convenience of the parties and various public-interest considerations.” Id. at 62. But the “calculus
changes” when the parties have agreed upon a “valid forum-selection clause” because that clause
“‘represents the parties’ agreement as to the most proper forum.’” Id. at 63 (quoting Stewart Org.,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988)). In such circumstances, “the plaintiff’s choice of forum
merits no weight.” Id. And the Court “should not consider arguments about the parties’ private
interests.” 	Id. at 64. 	Instead, the Court “may consider arguments about public-interest factors
only.” Id. “The onus falls on the plaintiff to show that the public-interest factors defeat [transfer],
and they rarely will.” Lakeside Surfaces, Inc. v. Cambria Co., LLC, 16 F.4th 209, 215 (6th Cir.
2021); see Atl. Marine, 487 U.S. at 64 (“Because those factors will rarely defeat a transfer motion,
the practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control except in unusual cases.”).
The Court first asks “whether the forum-selection clause is applicable, mandatory, valid,
and enforceable.” Lakeside Surfaces, 16 F.4th at 216. “An answer of ‘yes’ to all those questions
means . . . the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the public interest factors weigh heavily
against [transfer].” Id.
Applicable. 	State law generally governs the interpretation and applicability of forum-
selection clauses. See Firexo, Inc. v. Firexo Grp. Ltd., 99 F.4th 304, 327 (6th Cir. 2024). Here,
the employment agreement contains a choice-of-law provision selecting Illinois law as the
Case 1:26-cv-01616-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 18, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/16/26 Page 2
of 9

3
appropriate law by which to interpret the agreement. 	(Employment Agreement ¶ 15.) 	But the
choice does not matter. Applying either Illinois or Michigan law leads to the same result. Both
jurisdictions interpret contracts according to their plain meaning. See Buenz v. Frontline Transp.
Co., 882 N.E.2d 525, 529 (Ill. 2008); DeFrain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 817 N.W.2d 504,
509 (Mich. 2012).
The forum-selection clause here is applicable to this case because Plaintiff’s claims
concern his employment, and the clause covers all actions “arising out of or relating to [the
employment agreement] or the transactions contemplated hereby.” Applying the plain meaning
of this provision, Plaintiff’s discrimination claims relate to “the transactions contemplated by” the
employment agreement because they concern the parties’ conduct in connection with Plaintiff’s
employment. The transactions contemplated by the employment agreement encompass Plaintiff’s
workplace conduct and Abbott’s decisions to suspend and terminate him. See Firexo, 99 F.4th at
307 (describing “relating to” as falling under a “broader category” than terms such as “arise out
of”); see also Campbell v. St. Jude’s Med. S.C., Inc., No. 16-12706, 2017 WL 11849480, at *5–6
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2017) (concluding that a forum-selection clause in an employment agreement
encompassing claims “relating to this Agreement” applied to the employee’s discrimination
claims, and noting that “courts generally hold that what constitutes an incident ‘relating to’ an
agreement must be construed broadly”).
Mandatory. The forum-selection clause is mandatory because it specifies that all claims
shall be heard in Illinois state court or the Northern District of Illinois federal court.
Enforceable. 	In order to “defeat the strong presumption in favor of enforceability,”
Lisowski must establish one of the following:
(1) the clause was obtained by fraud, duress, or other unconscionable means; (2) the
designated forum would ineffectively or unfairly handle the suit; (3) the designated
Case 1:26-cv-01616-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 18, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/16/26 Page 3
of 9

4
forum would be so seriously inconvenient that requiring the plaintiff to bring suit
there would be unjust; or (4) enforcing the forum selection clause would contravene
a strong public policy of the forum state.
Lakeside Surfaces, 16 F.4th at 219–20.
Lisowski makes no argument that the forum-selection clause was obtained by fraud, duress,
or other unconscionable means. 	Nor does he argue that an Illinois court would ineffectively or
unfairly handle the lawsuit, or that litigating in Illinois would be so seriously inconvenient as to be
unjust. 	Indeed, the Northern District of Illinois is almost adjacent to the Western District of
Michigan. It is not unjust for Lisowski to litigate in that forum. Finally, Lisowski does not argue
that enforcing the forum-selection clause would contravene a strong public policy of Michigan.
Instead, Lisowski argues that the forum-selection clause is unenforceable because it
improperly limits the forums in which an individual can bring a Title VII claim. Title VII’s venue
provision provides as follows:
Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the
unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial
district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained
and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would
have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the
respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought
within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. For
purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of Title 28, the judicial district in which the
respondent has his principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in which
the action might have been brought.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). In other words, it allows claimants to bring suit in one of several places,
including the state where the unlawful employment action occurred. Here, Lisowski alleges that
he was employed in Michigan and that Abbott unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against him
in Michigan. But the forum-selection clause precludes him from bringing suit here. It requires
Lisowski to bring his claims in Illinois, which is where Abbott has its principal office.
Case 1:26-cv-01616-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 18, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/16/26 Page 4
of 9

5
“Courts that have considered the question of whether [Title VII’s] venue provision renders
forum-selection clauses unenforceable in ADA and Title VII actions have reached divergent
conclusions.” Campinell v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-72, 2026 WL 323157, at *6 (D. Me.
Feb. 6, 2026). 	A few courts, relying principally on Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co.,
338 U.S. 263 (1949), have held that a contract cannot waive a party’s right to bring suit in the
venues provided by Title VII. See, e.g., Smith v. Kyphon, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 2d 954, 960 (M.D.
Tenn. 2008); Thomas v. Rehab. Servs. of Columbus, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1381 (M.D. Ga.
1999).
In Boyd, the plaintiff brought an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),
which contains a venue provision providing that suit “may be brought in a district court of the
United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose,
or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action.” Boyd,
U.S. at 264 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 56). The FELA also provides that any contract, “the purpose or
intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created
by this chapter, shall to that extent be void.” 	45 U.S.C. § 55. 	Applying these provisions, the
Supreme Court determined that a contractual forum-selection clause that limited the plaintiff’s
choice of forum for bringing an FELA claim was invalid because it limited a “substantial right”
provided by the FELA, i.e., the “right to select the forum.” Boyd, 338 U.S. at 266.
More recently, the Sixth Circuit held that a contract cannot reduce the limitations period
for bringing a Title VII claim because Title VII contains its own statute of limitations, Logan v.
MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 829 (6th Cir. 2019), and as a general matter, a
substantive statutory right “granted in the public interest to effectuate public policy” cannot be
prospectively released or waived when doing so would thwart that policy, Brooklyn Sav. Bank v.
Case 1:26-cv-01616-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 18, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/16/26 Page 5
of 9

6
O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1954). Because Title VII’s limitations period “is a substantive, rather
than procedural, rule” that supports Title VII’s objective in promoting “uniform national” policies
for achieving equal employment opportunities, it cannot be limited by contract. Logan, 939 F.3d
at 829, 832.
Drawing upon Boyd and Logan, Lisowski argues that Title VII’s venue provision creates a
substantive right that cannot be prospectively waived or limited through a forum-selection clause.
The Court disagrees, for several reasons.
First, Logan is distinguishable because that case involved a statute of limitations. Logan
does not provide any guidance on whether a venue provision like the one in Title VII creates a
substantive right. Logan relied on earlier precedent treating statutes of limitations “as part of the
substantive law of the cause of action.” 	See Logan, 939 F.3d at 829 (quoting Myers v. Alvey-
Ferguson Co., 331 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1964)). 	There is no similar precedent for a venue
provision like the one in Title VII, other than Boyd.
However, Boyd is distinguishable because the FELA contains a specific prohibition on
contracts whose “purpose or intent” is to allow common carriers to evade liability. Title VII does
not contain such a prohibition. See In re Mathias, 867 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2017) (distinguishing
Boyd when interpreting the venue provision in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) because, unlike the FELA, ERISA’s text contains nothing that “precludes the parties
from channeling litigation to a particular federal district”). Moreover, “Boyd is a bit of a relic . . . .
Boyd was decided in an era of marked judicial suspicion of contractual forum selection. The Court
has since adopted ‘a more hospitable attitude toward forum-selection clauses.’” Id. (quoting M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972)). Under Atlantic Marine, “a contractual
Case 1:26-cv-01616-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 18, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/16/26 Page 6
of 9

7
choice of forum is now considered controlling ‘except in unusual cases.’” Id. (quoting Atlantic
Marine, 571 U.S. at 64).
Notably, the district court cases extending Boyd’s rationale to Title VII’s venue provision
were decided before Atlantic Marine. 	In contrast, after Atlantic Marine, courts have generally
enforced forum-selection clauses in Title VII cases. See, e.g., DeBello v. VolumeCocomo Apparel,
Inc., 720 F. App’x 37, 41 (2d Cir. 2017); Haywood v. ComTec Info. Sys., No. 25 CV 7883, 2025
WL 2930752, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2025); Kessler v. Direct Consulting Assocs., No. 17-11943,
2018 WL 7890862, at *5–9 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 2018); see also Campbell, 2017 WL 11849480, at
*5 (citing cases); Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 228–30 (2d Cir. 2014) (enforcing a
forum-selection clause in a case brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a
statute that incorporates Title VII’s venue provision); Campinell, 2026 WL 323157, at *7 (same).
Because Boyd discussed the FELA and did not account for Atlantic Marine, Lisowski’s reliance
on Boyd and the cases citing it is not persuasive.
In addition, as other courts have noted, the Sixth Circuit has enforced a forum-selection
clause in an action brought under ERISA, and that statute contains a venue provision similar to the
one in Title VII because it permits a plaintiff to bring suit in one of several venues. See Smith v.
Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 932 (6th Cir. 2014). 	The rationale of that case is
instructive. Among other things, the Sixth Circuit noted that it had previously enforced mandatory
arbitration clauses in ERISA cases, and that such clauses “are, ‘in effect, a specialized kind of
forum-selection clause.’” Id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto–Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)).
Indeed, “an arbitration clause may prescribe the geographic location of the proceedings as well as
the forum.” Id. “It is illogical to say that, under ERISA, a plan may preclude venue in federal
court entirely, but a plan may not channel venue to one particular federal court.” 	Id.; see also
Case 1:26-cv-01616-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 18, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/16/26 Page 7
of 9

8
Firexo, 99 F.4th at 321–22 (applying arbitration clause principles to the enforceability of a forum-
selection clause). Also, the court was unpersuaded that a forum-selection clause conflicted with
ERISA’s venue provision because the court had previously recognized that “forum selection
clauses do not waive substantive rights.” Aegon, 769 F.3d at 933 n.9.
The same reasoning applies here because the Sixth Circuit has previously enforced
mandatory arbitration clauses in Title VII cases as well. See Memmer v. United Wholesale Mortg.,
LLC, 135 F.4th 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2025) (“We and the Michigan courts have previously recognized
that . . . statutory claims [under Title VII and the ADA] can be sent to arbitration.”). It would be
odd to conclude that a contract can require an employee to arbitrate a Title VII claim outside of
federal court, but it cannot require an employee to litigate such a claim in a particular federal court.
Accordingly, the Court agrees with other courts that have concluded that Title VII does not render
forum-selection clauses unenforceable.
Valid. 	Abbott has provided a copy of the employment agreement and evidence that
Lisowski signed it. 	(See Kehr Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 8-4 (verifying Lisowski’s electronic
acknowledgement of the employment agreement).) 	Thus, the agreement appears to be valid.
Lisowski makes no argument to the contrary.
Public-Interest Factors. Finally, the Court considers public-interest factors. Those factors
include:
administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home; the interest in having the trial of a
diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action;
the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of
foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with
jury duty.
Lakeside Surfaces, 16 F.4th at 215 n.2 (quoting Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d
488, 500 (6th Cir. 2016)). Lisowski offers no argument about any of these factors. Accordingly,
Case 1:26-cv-01616-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 18, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/16/26 Page 8
of 9

9
he has not shown that they weigh heavily against transfer. 	Lisowski argues that it will be
inconvenient for the parties to litigate the case in Illinois because the witnesses and evidence are
located in Michigan, but those arguments relate to private interests, which the Court cannot
consider.
II. CONCLUSION
In summary, Lisowski signed an agreement containing a mandatory, valid, and enforceable
forum-selection clause that requires him to litigate his claims in the Northern District of Illinois.
He has not given the Court sufficient reason to deny Abbott’s request to enforce that clause and
transfer the case. Accordingly, the Court will grant Abbott’s motion and transfer the case to the
Northern District of Illinois.
An order will enter that is consistent with this Opinion.
Dated: October 16, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:26-cv-01616-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 18, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/16/26 Page 9
of 9