Espinoza Ramirez v. Unknown Party et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
YOLLATO JOSE ESPINOZA RAMIREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1505
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated
this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF
No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current detention and asks the
Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering
Respondents to release Petitioner or to conduct a bond hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)1
In an order entered on May 8, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
1 Petitioner also filed a motion (ECF No. 2) seeking the same relief that Petitioner seeks in his
petition. As set forth herein, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, and the
resolution of the case moots Petitioner’s motion.
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not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on May 13, 2026, (ECF
No. 5).
II. 	Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Petitioner
entered the United States in 2022 and has remained in the United States since that time. (See id.)
On December 3, 2025, Department of Homeland Security agents encountered and arrested
Petitioner. (2025 Form I-213, ECF NO. 5-3, PageID.97.)
Respondents have not provided Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge as contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).2
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers upon the federal courts the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Based on the facts presented by the parties and the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Nos. 25-1965, 1969, 1978, 1982, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th
2 The materials submitted by the parties do not suggest that Petitioner is subject to a final order of
removal or that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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Cir. May 11, 2026), the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs Petitioner’s
detention.3
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Lopez-Campos, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained:
Noncitizens who have “passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed
in due process of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
212 (1953); see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). Thus,
noncitizens within the interior of the United States are entitled to the protections of
the Due Process Clause, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “It is well
established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in
[removal] proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Consequently, the government may not
deny “notice” or “an opportunity to be heard” to a noncitizen “who has entered the
country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its
population, although alleged to be illegally here.” Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–01.
Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at *11. The Sixth Circuit therefore upheld the lower courts’
determinations the government’s detention of the Lopez-Campos petitioners “without bond under
§ 1226(a) was a deprivation of liberty that violated [their] due process rights.” Id. at *13.
3 Additionally, for the same reasons set forth in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610,
2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), the Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that
Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225 due to his manner of entry into the United States.
Further, because Respondents paroled Petitioner into the United States (Parole Notice, ECF
No. 1-3, PageID.11), he is not properly subject to expedited removal, as set forth in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (providing that a noncitizen, “who has not been admitted or paroled into
the United States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration
officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year
period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility” may be subject to
expedited removal (emphasis added)). Moreover, the issuance of the December 16, 2025, Notice
to Appear (NTA) following Petitioner’s credible fear determination removed Petitioner from
expedited removal proceedings and placed him in standard, non-expedited removal proceedings
in Immigration Court. (See NTA, ECF No. 5-4.)
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Petitioner is likewise detained under § 1226(a) and has been denied an individualized bond
hearing. Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory
detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights. See id.; see also Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651,
at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL
3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025
WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
V. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action. The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper
Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). To ensure that this Court’s
orders regarding habeas relief will bind at least one Respondent with authority to act in the event
that Petitioner is transferred outside the area under the authority of the ICE Detroit Field Office,
the Court will retain all of the remaining Respondents.
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Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court will order
Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five
business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties as soon
as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.4 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: 	June 2, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
4 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
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