Gonzalez Silva v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JHONDYS A. GONZALEZ SILVA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1403
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.24–25.)
In an order entered on April 30, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on May 5, 2026. (ECF No. 4.)
Petitioner filed a reply on May 5, 2026. (ECF No. 5.)
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II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.68.) Petitioner entered the United States on May 8, 2023, at an unidentified location
without inspection. (Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.77.) On or about May 9, 2023, Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered and arrested Petitioner. (Id.) On May 19, 2023,
Petitioner was removed from the United States to Mexico pursuant to an expedited order or
removal. (Id., PageID.75, 77.)
On or about July 26, 2023, DHS agents encountered and arrested Petitioner at the Paso Del
Norte Port of Entry in El Paso, Texas. (Id., PageID.77.) Petitioner was released from DHS custody
on October 17, 2023. (Id.) On January 12, 2024, an Immigration Judge in the El Paso Immigration
Court ordered that Petitioner be removed to Venezuela in absentia. (Jan. 2024 Order Immigration
Judge, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.79–80.) Because the hearing was held in absentia, Petitioner did not
reserve the right to appeal, and the removal order became final that day.1
On February 26, 2026, DHS mailed Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with
inadmissibility under §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the United States without being admitted
or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the
Attorney General,” and “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a
valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.68, 69.) On
April 21, 2026, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner. (Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3,
1 For the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of
(i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming such an order; or (ii) the
expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board
of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).
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PageID.75–76.) On April 29, 2026, an Immigration Judge in the Detroit Immigration Court granted
DHS’s motion to dismiss the pending removal proceedings because Petitioner already had a final
order of removal. (Apr. 2026 Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-4, PageID.83.)
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Merits Discussion
Respondents present evidence that indicates Petitioner received an order of removal to
Venezuela on January 12, 2024, which is administratively final. (Jan. 2024 Order Immigration
Judge, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.79–80; Apr. 2026 Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-4,
PageID.83.) Given that Petitioner has a final order of removal, Petitioner’s present detention is
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). “The removal period begins on the latest of
the following: (i) the date the order of removal becomes administratively final. (ii) If the removal
order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the
court’s final order. (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process),
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the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iii). An order
of removal “shall become final upon the earlier of . . . a determination by the Board of Immigration
Appeals affirming such order; or . . . the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to
seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i)–(ii).
After the 90-day removal period has expired, a noncitizen may continue to be detained. See
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). The Supreme Court has held that after expiration of the 90-day removal
period, the Government may continue to detain the noncitizen “for a presumptively reasonable
period” of time, which the Supreme Court concluded equaled six months. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
701. “Although the Supreme Court established a six-month period of presumptively reasonable
detention,” courts have found that Zadvydas does “not preclude a detainee from challenging the
reasonableness of his detention before such time.” See, e.g., Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F.
Supp. 3d 387, 395–96 (D.N.J. 2025) (citing, inter alia, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–701; Hoang
Trinh v. Homan, 333 F. Supp. 3d 984, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2018)); Ali v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 451
F. Supp. 3d 703, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2020). That is, during the six-month period of detention, “[t]he
presumption of reasonableness is the default,” and “the government bears no burden to justify
detention,” “but if a person ‘can prove’ that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, then he can
overcome that presumption.” Munoz-Saucedo, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 397 (citations omitted).
Here, as noted above, Petitioner received an order of removal on January 12, 2024, which
became final at that time. (Jan. 2024 Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.79–80.)
Therefore, the 90-day removal period following the order expired before Petitioner filed the
present action. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) (“The [90-day] removal period begins on . . . [t]he date
the order of removal becomes administratively final.”).
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Petitioner has been detained less than six months. Petitioner has not offered any evidence
or argument to prove that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment denying Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: June 2, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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