Ramirez Valadez v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ANA BERTA RAMIREZ VALADEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1312
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 1
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of her current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.7.)
1 Petitioner was one of thirteen petitioners named in the § 2241 petition. In an order entered on
April 22, 2026, the Court severed the claims of the petitioners into thirteen separate actions. (Order,
ECF No. 4.) Petitioner’s claims proceed in the present action. Counsel has subsequently entered
an appearance for Petitioner in this action.
Case 1:26-cv-01312-PLM-PJG ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 05/27/26 Page 1
of 3

2
In an order entered on April 24, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 6.) Respondents filed their response on April 29, 2026. (ECF
No. 7.)
II. 	Duplicative Petition
A court must promptly order an answer or grant the writ under § 2241, “unless it appears
from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
After undertaking the review required by § 2243, the Court concludes that the petition is properly
dismissed without prejudice because the present petition is duplicative of the petition that
Petitioner filed in Ramirez Valadez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-1238 (W.D. Mich.).
Federal courts “retain broad powers to prevent duplicative or unnecessary litigation.” Slack
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Parties generally have “no right to maintain two separate
actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same
defendants.” Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977). Accordingly, as part of its
inherent power to administer its docket, a district court may dismiss a suit that is duplicative of
another federal court suit. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976); Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Serv., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007); Missouri
v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 259 F.3d 949, 953-54 (8th Cir. 2001); Curtis v. Citibank,
N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2000); Smith v. S.E.C., 129 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1997).
The power to dismiss a duplicative lawsuit is meant to foster judicial economy and the
“comprehensive disposition of litigation,” Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342
U.S. 180, 183 (1952), and protect parties from “the vexation of concurrent litigation over the same
subject matter.” Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1991).
Case 1:26-cv-01312-PLM-PJG ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 05/27/26 Page 2
of 3

3
An action is duplicative and subject to dismissal if the claims, parties, and available relief
do not significantly differ from an earlier-filed action. See Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d
221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993). Although actions may not “significantly differ,” they need not be
identical. Courts focus on the substance of the complaint, or in this case the petition. See, e.g.,
Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a complaint was duplicative
although different defendants were named because it “repeat[ed] the same factual allegations”
asserted in the earlier case). Considering the substantial identity between the legal claims, factual
allegations, temporal circumstances and relief sought in the present petition and in Ramirez
Valadez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-1238 (W.D. Mich.), the Court concludes that the present action
is duplicative. Therefore, pursuant to the Court’s inherent power, upon the review required by 28
U.S.C. § 2243, this action will be dismissed without prejudice on the grounds that it is duplicative.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will enter a judgment dismissing the petition
without prejudice.
Dated: 	May 27, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
Case 1:26-cv-01312-PLM-PJG ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 05/27/26 Page 3
of 3