Villasmil Ojeda v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
LEOVANNY VILLASMIL OJEDA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-716
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.8.) In an order entered on March 6, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on March 11, 2026,
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on March 16, 2026, (ECF No. 5).
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II. Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3; Notice to
Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1, PageID.51.) Petitioner applied for admission into the United States
on August 25, 2024, at the Paso Del Norte Port of Entry in El Paso, Texas. (NTA, ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.51.) That same day, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner an
NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner was an immigrant “who, at the time of application for
admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (NTA,
ECF No. 4-1, PageID.51–54.) DHS then paroled Petitioner into the United States for a period of
two years pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; 2024 Form I-213,
ECF No. 4-2, PageID.58.) Petitioner subsequently obtained employment authorization and filed
an application for asylum, which remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4–5.)
On March 1, 2026, ICE agents arrested Petitioner. (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 7-4,
PageID.63.) Petitioner was not given notice of his parole revocation prior to his detention. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Ten days later, on March 11, 2026, DHS served Petitioner with a letter
entitled: “Termination of Parole Issued Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) and 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5(e)(2),” stating that Petitioner’s “parole ended on April 18, 2025.”1 (Mar. 11, 2026,
Correspondence, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.60.) The March 11, 2026, letter further provides:
ICE has thoroughly reviewed the specific facts of your case and determined that
discretionary parole is no longer warranted, and termination of parole is
appropriate. Parole is being terminated because detention during the pendency of
removal proceedings is appropriate pursuant to the Presidential Proclamation,
Declaring a National Emergency at the Southern Border of the United States (Jan.
20, 2025) and the Presidential Proclamation, Securing Our Borders (Jan. 20, 2025).
1 In April of 2025, DHS “issued a blanket termination of parole.” See Rodriguez Martinez v.
Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1504, 2025 WL 3511093, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025) (citation
omitted).
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Further, after assessing the specific facts and circumstances of your case, it does
not present compelling humanitarian reasons nor a public benefit to warrant your
continued discretionary release on parole.
(Id.) Petitioner was scheduled for a master calendar hearing for March 27, 2026, in the Detroit
Immigration Court. (EOIR Automated Case Information, ECF No. 4-6, PageID.69.)
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court declines to enforce
the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and even if the Court were to conclude
that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is
appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s exhaustion analysis in each of the following
cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich.
Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar.
4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL
570449, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.
1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *3–4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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V. Merits Discussion
A. Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Detention
Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled
into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; 2024 Form
I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.58.) Petitioner also applied for asylum, which remains pending. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.4–5.)
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further
governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply,
but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the
noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of persecution.” Id. at 1132 & n.8
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The government may place the noncitizen into expedited
removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into
regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
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significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then,
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable
regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the
“[t]ermination of parole,”
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[2] upon accomplishment of
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may
be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public
benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025
WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below,
the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts., 805 F.Supp.3d
38, 105 (D.D.C. 2025) (holding that the government failed to follow the applicable statutory and
2 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the
parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that either circumstance applies here.
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regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be subject to expedited removal
proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL 3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that, at the time of
Petitioner’s March 1, 2026, detention, the purpose of Petitioner’s parole had been accomplished.
Petitioner left Venezuela, seeking asylum in the United States, and Petitioner entered the United
States at a port of entry. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3–4.) At that time, Petitioner was granted parole
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which provides for parole into the United States “for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (See Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.4; 2024 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.58.) Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application
for Asylum and Withholding Removal, which remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4–5.)
Thus, when Petitioner was recently arrested and detained, Petitioner was still seeking asylum. (See
id.) Moreover, there is nothing before the Court to suggest that the humanitarian reason or public
benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applies. Indeed, Respondents make no argument
about whether the requirements for termination of parole in § 1182(d)(5)(A) and their regulations
have been satisfied.
Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires
a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F.
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Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and
ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4
(same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, 804 F. Supp. 3d 395, 417–23, (S.D.N.Y. 2025)
(same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7
(D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s request for a
preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release from custody); Orellana v. Francis,
No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the
issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents, and affirming the
court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s order to release the petitioner).3
Here, there is no indication in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case
determination regarding the revocation of Petitioner’s parole was made prior to Petitioner’s March
1, 2026, arrest and detention. Instead, Respondents issued a March 11, 2026, letter to Petitioner
notifying him that his parole had expired on April 18, 2025. (Mar. 11, 2026, Correspondence, ECF.
No. 4-3, PageID.60.) The April 2025 blanket termination of parole pursuant to the Presidential
Proclamations referenced does not constitute a case-by-case determination. See Rodriguez
3 But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025) (reversing district court’s grant
of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the termination notice for previously
granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in showing
that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these grants of parole under the [parole]
program[s] on an individual basis”). The Court finds that Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the
present case for the same reasons the Court found it distinguishable in Caceres Martinez v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *5 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado
Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *4 n.2 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL
547955, at *5 n.6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
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Martinez, 2025 WL 3511093, at *6. Moreover, Petitioner had already been detained for 10 days
at the time that the letter was created.
In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the
Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those
requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there
[wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022)
(discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own
regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends
to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))).
Respondents do not claim that they had any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than
his status as a noncitizen. Indeed, Respondents argue that any noncitizen, regardless of whether
they are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission” subject
to mandatory detention under § 1225. As set forth in Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-
547, 2026 WL 621359, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540,
2026 WL 607704, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr.
Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez
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v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026),
this Court and other courts throughout the country have rejected this argument.4
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole.
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may request hearings with an immigration judge,
may request bond, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for a relatively short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in
each of the following cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at
*7–8 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *7–8
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-
216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5–7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
4 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), which was recently issued
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At this time, these non-binding cases
do not change the Court’s analysis.
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VI. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents.
The Court concludes that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is not the only proper
Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the Detroit ICE Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Attorney General as a Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from
re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due
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process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within
three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this
opinion and the corresponding judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the United States
Attorney General as a Respondent.
Dated: April 17, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
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