Shamma v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
NAEL SHAMMA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-492
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.21–22.)
In an Order entered on February 17, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on February 20, 2026
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on February 25, 2026 (ECF No. 5).
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II. 	Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner was born in Jerusalem and is Palestinian. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) Petitioner
reports that “[h]e does not hold citizenship to any country,” and Respondents state that they
consider Petitioner to be “a Palestinian native with Jordanian citizenship.” (Anderson Decl. ¶ 4,
ECF No. 4-1, PageID.52.) Petitioner entered the United States in 1976 as a Lawful Permanent
Resident. (Id.) In 1986, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated battery and armed violence, as well
as three counts of robbery and one count of theft, in the Cook County Circuit Court in Chicago,
Illinois. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6.)
Thereafter, on August 10, 1987, the Immigration and Naturalization Service “issued
[Petitioner] 	an 	Order 	to 	Show 	Cause, 	charging 	him 	with 	deportability 	under 	former
section 241(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [(INA)] for being convicted of two or
more crimes involving moral turpitude.” (Id. ¶ 7, PageID.52–53.) The Chicago Immigration Court
ordered Petitioner deported to Jordan on November 28, 1989. (Id. ¶ 8, PageID.53.) Petitioner did
not file an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Id.) On May 25, 1990, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service released Petitioner from custody “pursuant to an Order of Supervision
because a travel document was unable to be acquired to effectuate [Petitioner’s] deportation.” (Id.
¶ 9.) Thereafter, on February 3, 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service “issued a
detainer 	because 	[Petitioner] 	was 	taken 	into 	custody 	[by] 	the 	Michigan 	Department 	of
Corrections.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Petitioner was then taken into custody by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service on June 14, 2000, “after being released by the Michigan Department of
Corrections,” and the Immigration and Naturalization Service released him from custody “on an
Order of Supervision” on December 15, 2000, “because a travel document was unable to be
acquired to effectuate [Petitioner’s] deportation.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Subsequently, Petitioner was taken
into ICE custody from January 9, 2012, until April 9, 2012, “after he failed to appear for his Order
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of Supervision appointment.” (Id. ¶¶ 13–14, PageID.54.) Petitioner was released on April 9, 2012,
“because a travel document was unable to be acquired to effectuate [Petitioner’s] deportation.” (Id.
¶ 14.)
On August 7, 2025, ICE took Petitioner into custody based on his final order of deportation
from 1989. (Id. ¶ 15.) ICE requested travel documents for Israel and Jordan, “but the requests were
denied on August 8, 2025.” (Id. ¶ 16.) “On August 27, 2025, ICE requested authorization from the
consulate of Israel to remove [Petitioner] to the Palestinian Territories;” there is no indication in
the record presently before the Court that ICE has heard anything from the consulate of Israel
about this request. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.) On February 17, 2026, ICE conducted a “180-day panel review
. . . and the panel recommended continued detention,” noting that Petitioner “has no significant
ties to the community and no humanitarian grounds for release” and that “[t]here is a significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future because Israel will take stateless
subjects and transfer to Palestine via the West Bank.” (Id. ¶ 20, PageID.55.)
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Merits Discussion
The parties agree that because Petitioner has a final order of removal, Petitioner’s present
detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.14; Resp., ECF No. 4,
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PageID.46–47.) However, Petitioner contends that his detention is unlawful and violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16–21.) In response,
Respondents argue that Petitioner’s continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) remains lawful
and does not implicate the constitutional concerns identified in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
701 (2001).1 (See Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.46–48.)
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Here, as noted above, Petitioner’s order of
removal became final in 1989. The 90-day removal period following the order expired well before
Petitioner filed the present action. See id. § 1231(a)(1) (“The [90-day] removal period begins on
. . . [t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.”).
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that following the removal period, the
Government may continue to detain the noncitizen for a “presumptively reasonable period” of
time, which the Supreme Court concluded equaled a total of six months in detention. See Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 701. Following that six-month period, “once [a noncitizen] provides good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.2 “[O]nce [a
1 Although Respondents indicate that Petitioner has past criminal convictions, Respondents do not
assert that they are currently detaining Petitioner under any mandatory detention provisions due to
Petitioner’s past criminal convictions.
2 The Court notes that the Supreme Court recently held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the
“Government to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which
the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573,
576 (2022). The Court, however, did not reach Arteaga-Martinez’s constitutional or Zadvydas
claims, concluding that such claims were not properly before the Court. See id. at 583–84.
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noncitizen’s] removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer
authorized by statute.” Id. at 699.
In this case, Petitioner was most recently taken into custody by ICE on August 7, 2025,
and as of February 7, 2026, Petitioner had been in custody for six consecutive months. Petitioner
argues that there is a good reason to believe that no significant likelihood of removal exists because
he has had a final order of removal since 1989, and Respondents continue to be unable to remove
Petitioner, as demonstrated by Respondents’ repeated inability to acquire travel documents for
Petitioner. In response, Respondents assert only that “[t]here is a significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future because Israel will take stateless subjects and transfer to
Palestine via the West Bank.” (Anderson Decl. ¶ 20, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.55.) However, although
“[o]n August 27, 2025, ICE requested authorization from the consulate of Israel to remove
[Petitioner] to the Palestinian Territories,” there is no indication in the record presently before the
Court that ICE has heard anything from the consulate of Israel about this request in the intervening
six months. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19, PageID.54.) Indeed, nothing presented to this Court suggests that
Respondents are any closer to removing Petitioner than they were in August 2025.
Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that the fact that the government has been
unable to acquire a travel document to effect Petitioner’s removal for the past six months, as well
as on multiple occasions since 1989, provides “good reason” to believe that “there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Because
Petitioner has met his burden, Respondents must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing. Id. Respondents’ sole evidence is the assertion that “[t]here is a significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future because Israel will take stateless subjects and transfer
to Palestine via the West Bank.” (Anderson Decl. ¶ 20, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.55.) However,
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beyond this general, speculative statement, Respondents do not indicate that Israel has in fact
agreed to take this action for Petitioner, and even assuming that Israel had indicated a willingness
to do this for Petitioner, Respondents provide no information about any timeline for this
occurrence. Under these circumstances, Respondents have failed to respond with sufficient
evidence to rebut Petitioner’s showing that there is a “good reason to believe” that Petitioner will
not be removed in the “reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. The Court,
therefore, will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does
not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of the other named Respondents.3 The Court concludes
that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Raycraft, 	No. 	1:25-cv-1669, 	2025 	WL 	3562651, 	at *8–9 	(W.D. 	Mich. 	Dec. 	12, 	2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding release will bind at least one Respondent with
authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District of Michigan,
3 The Court previously dismissed the Warden of North Lake Processing Center as a Respondent.
(Order, ECF No. 3.)
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the Court will retain the Detroit ICE Field Office Director and the Secretary for the Department of
Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States Department of
Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, and the Executive Office for Immigration
Review as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from detention, subject to any conditions of release that
existed prior to Petitioner’s present detention. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within five days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify compliance
with this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the United
States Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, and the Executive
Office for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Dated: 	March 4, 2026 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
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