Thomas v. Graphic Packaging International, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
COURTNEY THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
GRAPHIC PACKAGING
INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
Defendant.
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
Case No. 1:25-cv-1875
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Background
On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Graphic Packaging International
and other parties purporting to assert federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
claims under various environmental laws, including the Clean Air Act (CAA). On January 2, 2024,
I issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) in the matter, captioned Thomas v. United States
of America et al., Case No. 1:23-cv-1309 (W.D. Mich.), recommending that the action be
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Case No. 1:23-cv-1309, ECF No. 6. Plaintiff failed to file a
timely objection. Therefore, the Court adopted the R&R on January 24, 2024, and entered a
judgment against Plaintiff. Id., ECF Nos. 7 and 8. Plaintiff did not file a post-judgment motion or
appeal the dismissal to the Sixth Circuit.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 22, 2025, against Graphic Packaging
International, LLC (GPI), asserting claims under the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. Plaintiff also refers
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1 at PageID.5), but his complaint lacks any factual allegation
establishing that GPI is a state actor for purposes of Section 1983. For relief, Plaintiff requests an
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award of damages in the amount of $50,000 and injunctive relief requiring GPI to abate pollution
and comply with environmental laws. (Id.) Having granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed as a
pauper (ECF No. 5) , I have conducted an initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) to determine whether it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Having conducted this initial review, I recommend that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction and/or because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. Discussion
A. 	Rule 60(b) Relief
As an initial matter, the Court will note that embedded within the complaint is a request
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from the judgment entered in Case No.
1:23-cv-1309. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.3, 5.) To the extent Plaintiff intended his present filing as a
motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) rather than a complaint in a new action, the Court may summarily
deny it as Plaintiff should have filed the motion in the prior action rather than as part of a new
action. But even assuming that Plaintiff properly raised his request for Rule 60(b) relief in the
present action, his request is both untimely and without merit.
Plaintiff argues that the prior dismissal constituted a “legal mistake” because the Court
improperly applied a heightened pleading standard rather than Rule 8(a)’s “short and plain
statement” standard. (Id. at PageID.2.) This ground arises under Rule 60(b)(1), which allows relief
for, among other things, “mistake.” Mistake includes “any type of mistake or error on the part of
the court.” Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231, 234 (6th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). Any request
under Rule 60(b)(1) would be untimely because a Rule 60(b)(1) motion must be filed within one
year of the challenged judgment, or January 24, 2025, for the prior judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
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60(c)(1). But because Plaintiff asserts that the Court committed legal error, the request “must be
brought within the normal time for taking an appeal,” Pierce v. United Mine Workers of Am.
Welfare & Ret. Fund, 770 F.2d 449, 451 (6th Cir. 1985), which is “30 days after entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); see also Barrier, 712 F.2d at 234
(“This Court is persuaded that the better view is to allow reconsideration of a point of law under
Rule 60(b)(1) when relief from judgment is sought within the normal time for taking an appeal.”).
Because Plaintiff initiated this action almost two years after entry of the judgment in the prior case,
his request is clearly untimely.
Plaintiff cites Rule 60(b)(6) in his complaint, which allows relief for “any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” “Rule 60(b)(6) should apply ‘only in
exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are not addressed by the first five numbered
clauses of the Rule.’” Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing
Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff fails to
cite any extraordinary circumstance, such as “an applicable change in decisional law, coupled with
some other special circumstance,” Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of UMWA Combined Benefit
Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001), and he has not otherwise demonstrated a basis for relief
under subsection (b)(6). Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely motion under subsection 60(b)(1) does
not give rise to exceptional circumstances under subsection (b)(6).
B. 	Present Claims
1. 	Lack of Jurisdiction
As noted, Plaintiff brings claims under the CAA and RCRA. Under both of these statutory
schemes, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the States have primary enforcement
authority to ensure compliance with applicable standards. Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461,
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467 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing CAA enforcement provisions); StarLink Logistics Inc. v. ACC,
LLC, 642 F. Supp. 3d 652, 685 (M.D. Tenn. 2022), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds
and remanded, 101 F.4th 431 (6th Cir. 2024) (noting that primary enforcement authority under
RCRA “lies with the government (the EPA and the states)—not with private citizens”) (citing
Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Grp., 973 F.2d 1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1992)).
Citizens such as Plaintiff are, so to speak, the last line of defense under these statutes. Both the
CAA and RCRA contain so-called “citizen suit” provisions that allow a citizen to step in for
governmental entities to enforce these environmental laws in certain circumstances. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972 (RCRA citizen suit provision); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (CAA citizen suit provision). Citizen suits
“serve only as backup, permitting citizens to abate pollution when the government cannot or will
not command compliance.” South Side Quary, LLC v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Sewer
Dist., 28 F.4th 684, 690 (6th Cir. 2022) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Askins v. Ohio Dep’t of Agric., 809 F.3d 868, 875 (6th Cir. 2016)). Because citizen suits are
intended to prevent ongoing harm to “society as a whole,” rather than to redress individual harms
suffered by private persons, Ellis, 390 F.3d at 477, they may only be used to obtain prospective
relief: “the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the present or the future, not in
the past.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987).
To ensure that government remains primarily responsible for enforcement of standards
enacted under RCRA and the CAA, the citizen suit provisions under those statutes require a citizen
to provide at least 60 days’ notice to the EPA, the relevant state, and the defendant before the
citizen may file suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(A) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1) (CAA). After
providing the required notice and waiting 60 days, the citizen may file suit only if the government
is not “diligently prosecuting” an action in federal or state court by the end of the 60-day period.
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The contents of the required notices are set forth in the statutes’ implementing regulations, 40
C.F.R. § 54.3(b) (CAA) and 40 C.F.R. § 254.3(a) (RCRA). The Sixth Circuit has indicated that a
citizen’s failure to comply with the notice provisions deprives the court of subject matter
jurisdiction over the suit. See StarLink Logistics, Inc. v. ACC, LLC, 101 F.4th 431, 449–50 (6th
Cir. 2024) (describing the notice requirement as a “jurisdictional bar to citizen suits”); Board of
Trs. of Painesville Twp. v. City of Painesville, 200 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 1999) (observing that
the Sixth Circuit “has long recognized [the citizen suit notice requirement] as a jurisdictional
prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action under the [Clean Water Act]”); Walls v. Waste
Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that “compliance with the sixty day
notice requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing suit against private defendants under
the citizen suit provisions of RCRA and [the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ]”).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that he complied with the mandatory notice requirements of
the citizen suit provisions of both the CAA and RCRA. He not only fails to allege such compliance
with the notice requirement but also fails to attach the required notices to his complaint. In light
of Plaintiff’s failure to allege that he satisfied the notice requirements for his CAA and RCRA
claims, those claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Tennessee
Riverkeeper v. Tweden, No. 3:24-cv-886, 2025 WL 725741, at *6–7 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2025).
2. 	Failure to State a Claim
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s
allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citations
and footnote omitted).
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As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged— but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678–79 (internal citations omitted).
Apart from lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s request for damages under the
CAA and RCRA would be subject to dismissal because damages are not available under those
statutes. Plaintiff’s present complaint ignores the prior R&R’s observation that “‘private parties
cannot “seek damages or other remedies based on alleged violations of the CAA.”’” Case No.
1:23-cv-1309, ECF No. 6 at PageID.17 (quoting Counts v. General Motors LLC, No. 1:16-cv-
12541, 2021 WL 8014317, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2021) (quoting Beshear v. Volkswagen Grp.
of Am., Inc., NO. 16-cv-27, 2016 WL 3040492, at *4 (E.D. Ky. May 25, 2016))). Likewise,
compensatory damages are unavailable under RCRA. Ailor v. City of Maynardville, 368 F.3d 587,
601 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996)).
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Last, as mentioned above, Plaintiff cites Section 1983 in his complaint but fails to allege
any fact indicating that GPI is a state actor. Section 1983 claims can be made only against
governmental bodies, agencies, or officials. Section 1983 does not permit claims against private
persons who are not acting under the color of state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th
Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff may not proceed under § 1983 against a private party ‘no matter how
discriminatory or wrongful’ the party’s conduct.”) (quoting American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)). Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is subject to dismissal with
prejudice because GPI is a private company, not a state actor. See Larson v. Unknown Party, No.
2:17-CV-112, 2018 WL 316492, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2018) (“Defendant in this case is not a
state actor against whom claims can be asserted under § 1983.”).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s CAA and RCRA
claims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction and dismiss his Section 1983 claim with prejudice.
The Court must also decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). Good faith is judged objectively, Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962), and
an appeal is not taken in good faith if the issue presented is frivolous, defined as lacking an
arguable basis either in fact or law. See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.
2001). For the same reasons that I recommend dismissal of the action, I discern no good faith basis
for an appeal and recommend that, should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court assess the
$605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to Section 1915(b)(1). See McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11.
Date: January 6, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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