Lee #582103 v. Spohn et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
KEVIN LEE,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN SPOHN et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1830
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner
action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will partially dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim as detailed below.
I. Relevant Procedural History and Factual Allegations
Plaintiff initiated this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan on April 22, 2025. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) On December 15, 2025, the Eastern District of
Michigan partially dismissed the action, dismissing Defendants Reiwbert, Mikat, and Schriver,
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and transferred the “claims and Defendants tied entirely to the alleged Carson City Correction[al]
Facility [(DRF)] events” to this Court. (ECF No. 5, PageID.61.) The following DRF Defendants
remain in the case: Sergeant Unknown Spohn, Prison Counselor (PC) Unknown Party #1, Resident
Unit Manager (RUM) Unknown Party #2, Assistant Residential Unit Supervisor (ARUS)
Unknown Party #3, Assistant Deputy Warden (ADW) Unknown Party #4, and Corrections
Officers Unknown Party #5, Unknown Party #6, Unknown Party #7, Unknown Party #8, Unknown
Party #9, Unknown Party #10, Unknown Party # 11, and Unknown Party #12. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.2–7, 11.) Defendants are all sued in their individual and official capacities. (Id.)
In the Eastern District of Michigan’s December 15, 2025, opinion and order, the Eastern
District of Michigan summarized Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the events at DRF as follows:
[O]n October 28, 2024, the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
transferred [Plaintiff] to [DRF]. ECF No. 1 at PageID.12. While undergoing
medical intake there, Plaintiff allegedly informed Defendant Sergeant Spohn that
he was “feeling suicidal.” Id. Against that backdrop, Plaintiff allegedly asked to be
placed in segregation on suicide watch. Id. at PageID.12. Defendant Spohn then
handcuffed Plaintiff and escorted him toward segregation. Id. At the same time,
Sergeant Shaw—who is not named as a defendant—became irritated and responded
with sarcasm, remarking that Plaintiff had chosen “the perfect time” to become
suicidal because Shaw’s shift ended in half an hour.[] Id.
To process Plaintiff for suicide watch, Shaw started a routine strip search. Id.
at PageID.12–13. But the sequence soon shifted. Defendant John Doe #1, another
corrections officer, approached and began speaking with Defendant Spohn. Id.
at PageID.13. Defendant Spohn indicated that placing Plaintiff on suicide watch
would require him to work past his shift. Id. In response, Defendant Doe #1
allegedly advised Defendant Spohn to simply return Plaintiff to his cell. Id.
Defendant Spohn complied and stopped the search. Id. Shortly after that, Defendant
John Doe #2 arrived. Id. Defendants Spohn and Doe #2 again handcuffed Plaintiff
and began escorting him back to his housing unit. Id. When Plaintiff stated that he
intended to kill himself, Defendant Spohn allegedly dismissed the comment,
responding, “[n]o you are not.” Id.
The encounter escalated as they approached the “1200 Building.” Id. According to
Plaintiff, he saw Defendants John Does #3, #4, #5, and #6—additional corrections
officers—and announced that he took multiple psychiatric medications and planned
to hang himself once returned to his cell. Id. Allegedly, Defendant Spohn urged
Plaintiff to “[h]ang [him]self in twenty minutes, on the next shift.” Id. When they
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reached the cell, he repeated that he would hang himself with his bedsheet. Id.
Defendant Spohn allegedly encouraged him, remarking that he was “a burden” on
the state. Id.
Once inside, Plaintiff tied a noose from his bedsheet, secured it to the bunk’s
crossbar, and placed it around his neck. Id. His cellmate attempted to summon help
by pressing an emergency button, but no one responded. Id. After roughly twenty
minutes, Defendant John Doe #7 allegedly walked by and saw Plaintiff hanging in
a semi-conscious state. Id. at PageID.14. Defendant Doe #7 called Defendant John
Doe #8 for assistance. Id. After ordering the cellmate out, Defendant Doe #7
allegedly slammed Plaintiff to the floor and struck him repeatedly in the chest and
stomach while Defendant Doe #8 removed the noose. Id. According to Plaintiff, the
two officers then handcuffed Plaintiff and “dragged” him from the cell. Id. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Doe #7 continued to lift and slam him, causing significant
pain to his shoulders and torso. Id. Once in the hallway, Defendants Doe #7 and #8
allegedly lifted him by his elbows, aggravating his pain. Id. They then began
walking Plaintiff to suicide watch. Id.
According to the Complaint, the situation deteriorated further on the return to
suicide watch. Although the noose remained around his neck, Defendant Doe #7
allegedly tightened it, stuffing additional fabric into the gap between the sheet and
Plaintiff’s throat and commenting, “[l]et’s tighten this up a little bit,” before noting,
“wow, it[’]s already pretty tight.” Id.
After Plaintiff reentered segregation, staff removed the noose, and medical
personnel evaluated him. Id. at PageID.15. He was then placed on suicide
observation for several days. Id. During that period, he claims he was denied
hygiene items, clean clothing, showers, and his prescribed medications. Id.
Plaintiff was eventually transferred to the Woodland Center Correctional Facility
in Whitmore Lake, Michigan.[1] Id. There, he discovered that several items of
necessary medical equipment—his orthopedic shoes, dentures, hearing aids, and
eyeglasses—had not accompanied him from Carson City. Id. When Plaintiff
attempted to report what had occurred, Defendant Gregory Mikat, the Woodland
Grievance Coordinator, allegedly returned Plaintiff’s grievance unprocessed and
without an identification number. Id. When Plaintiff resubmitted it, he was told to
direct it to Carson City instead. Id. at PageID.16. And his later attempts allegedly
met the same fate. Id. at PageID.16–17.
1 In Plaintiff’s complaint, he states that he was transferred to Woodland Center Correctional
Facility on October 25, 2024. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.15.) However, that date appears to be
incorrect because Plaintiff states that he was transferred from DRF to Woodland Center
Correctional Facility, meaning that he was at DRF before he was at Woodland Center Correctional
Facility, and Plaintiff indicates that he arrived at DRF on October 28, 2024. (Id., PageID.12.)
Therefore, it appears that Plaintiff was instead transferred to Woodland Center Correctional
Facility at some point shortly after his arrival at DRF on October 28, 2024.
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(ECF No. 5, PageID.61–63.) In addition to the above factual allegations that the Eastern District
of Michigan included in its opinion and order, in the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that while he was
on “suicide observation” for an unspecified short period of time at DRF before his transfer to
Woodland Center Correctional Facility, “Plaintiff reported the events to Plaintiff’s case
manager/therapist, the ARUS, assistant deputy warden, resident unit manager, and the chief of
therapy QMPH.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.15.) Further, although it is not clear if these events
occurred at DRF or at Woodland Center Correctional Facility, Plaintiff alleges that “ADW Doe,
RUM Doe, and PC Doe, all violated Plaintiff’s rights to redress when they refused to allow a reader
writer (an inmate who reads and writes kites, to help inmates who cannot), to write a grievance”
regarding the time that “Plaintiff was on suicide watch.” (Id., PageID.22.)
Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff raises First Amendment retaliation claims,
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims, which the Court construes as Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claims because Plaintiff is a state prisoner and Defendants are employed at a state
prison facility, and Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and excessive force claims. (See
id., PageID.21–28.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. (See id., PageID.32.)
II. Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
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plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
III. Discussion
A. Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff sues the DRF Defendants in their official and individual capacities. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.2–7, 11.)
A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the
governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments
are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has
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waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh,
438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has
not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court.
Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). And, regardless, the State of Michigan
(acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages.
See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66).
Here, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, as well as injunctive relief. However, as noted
above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See, e.g.,
id. Similarly, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official
capacities. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are “persons” under § 1983.”).
Although damages claims against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed, an
official capacity action seeking prospective injunctive or declaratory relief is not treated as an
action against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (citing Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)). The Ex parte Young doctrine “rests on the premise—less
delicately called a ‘fiction’—that when a federal court commands a state official to do nothing
more than refrain from violating federal law, he is not the State for sovereign immunity purposes.”
Va. Ofc. for Prot. and Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011) (internal citation omitted.) The
Supreme Court has cautioned that, “Ex parte Young can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign
immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
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characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
Further, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that transfer to
another correctional facility typically moots a prisoner’s injunctive and declaratory claims. See
Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a prisoner-plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief became moot when the prisoner was transferred from the prison
about which he complained); Mowatt v. Brown, No. 89-1955, 1990 WL 59896 (6th Cir. May 9,
1990); Tate v. Brown, No. 89-1944, 1990 WL 58403 (6th Cir. May 3, 1990); Williams v. Ellington,
936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991). In the present action, Plaintiff’s allegations against the DRF
Defendants relate solely to past harm, not future risk of harm. And, Plaintiff is no longer confined
at DRF, which is where he avers that Defendants are employed. Thus, Plaintiff’s transfer moots
his request for injunctive relief.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
Defendants in their official capacities upon which relief may be granted, and his official capacity
claims against Defendants will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B. Defendants Unknown Parties #7, #8, #9, and #10 (Named as John Does #3, #4,
#5, and #6 in the Complaint)
With respect to Defendants Unknown Parties #7, #8, #9, and #10 (named as John Does #3,
#4, #5, and #6 in the complaint), Plaintiff’s sole allegation against these Defendants is that as
Defendants Spohn and Unknown Party #6 (named as John Doe #2 in the complaint) were escorting
Plaintiff “back to his housing unit,” Plaintiff saw Defendants Unknown Parties #7, #8, #9, and #10
(named as John Does #3, #4, #5, and #6 in the complaint) “standing by the base desk,” and “[u]pon
going down the stairs to the left lower wing, Plaintiff said as loud as he could, that Plaintiff took
multiple psych. [me]ds. and was going to hang himself.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.13.)
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“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. And, a claimed
constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight,
532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). Here,
Plaintiff alleges only that he saw Defendants Unknown Parties #7, #8, #9, and #10 on the main
floor of the unit as he walked by them while being escorted by Defendants Spohn and Unknown
Party #6, and at some point later, when Plaintiff was on the lower level of the unit, Plaintiff said
in a loud voice that he had taken multiple psychological medications and “was going to hang
himself.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.13.) Although Plaintiff alleges that he briefly walked by
Defendants Unknown Parties #7, #8, #9, and #10 before making the above statements, Plaintiff
does not allege that these Defendants actually heard Plaintiff’s statements. And, besides briefly
walking by these Defendants, Plaintiff does not allege that they had any direct involvement in the
events set forth in the complaint. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to show that
Defendants Unknown Parties #7, #8, #9, and #10 (named as John Does #3, #4, #5, and #6 in the
complaint) engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior. Therefore Defendants Unknown
Parties #7, #8, #9, and #10 (named as John Does #3, #4, #5, and #6 in the complaint) will be
dismissed.
C. Defendants Unknown Parties #1, #2, #3, and #4 (Named as PC John Doe, RUM
John Doe, ARUS John Doe, and ADW John Doe in the Complaint)
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Unknown Parties #1, #2, #3, and #4, named as
PC John Doe, RUM John Doe, ARUS John Doe, and ADW John Doe in the complaint, are as
follows: Plaintiff alleges that while he was on “suicide observation” for an unspecified short period
of time at DRF before his transfer to Woodland Center Correctional Facility, “Plaintiff reported
the events to Plaintiff’s case manager/therapist, the ARUS, assistant deputy warden, resident unit
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manager, and the chief of therapy QMPH.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.15.) Plaintiff also alleges
that at an unspecified time, “ADW Doe, RUM Doe, and PC Doe, all violated Plaintiff’s rights to
redress when they refused to allow a reader writer (an inmate who reads and writes kites, to help
inmates who cannot), to write a grievance” regarding the time that “Plaintiff was on suicide
watch.” (Id., PageID.22.)
As to Plaintiff’s allegation about “report[ing] the events [that occurred at DRF] to
Plaintiff’s case manager/therapist, the ARUS, assistant deputy warden, resident unit manager, and
the chief of therapy QMPH,” this allegation is insufficient to state a claim against these Defendants
because Plaintiff does not allege that they engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior. See
Grinter, 532 F.3d at 575–76; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899. Indeed, besides this allegation about the
action taken by Plaintiff, Plaintiff does not allege any facts about any actions, or lack thereof, by
these Defendants.
Further, as to Plaintiff’s allegation that at an unspecified time, “ADW Doe, RUM Doe, and
PC Doe, all violated Plaintiff’s rights to redress when they refused to allow a reader writer,”
Plaintiff’s allegations are also insufficient to state any claim against these Defendants upon which
relief may be granted. As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not allege that he needs a “reader writer.”
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he indicates that he later filed grievances at Woodland Center Correctional
Facility, and he does not allege that he needed a “reader writer” to file them. Moreover, Plaintiff
fails to allege any facts about when he requested access to a “reader writer,” let alone any facts
about when he asked these specific Defendants for such access and they denied it. In short, Plaintiff
asks the Court to fabricate plausibility to his claims from mere ambiguity; however, ambiguity
does not support a claim.
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Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Unknown
Parties #1, #2, #3, and #4, named as PC John Doe, RUM John Doe, ARUS John Doe, and ADW
John Doe in the complaint, and these Defendants will be dismissed.
D. Defendants Spohn, Unknown Party #5 (named as Corrections Officer John
Doe #1), Unknown Party #6 (named as Corrections Officer John Doe #2),
Unknown Party #11 (named as Corrections Officer John Doe #7), and
Unknown Party #12 (named as Corrections Officer John Doe #8)
1. First Amendment Retaliation Claims
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the
Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to
set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the
plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff
that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse
action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be
able to show that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the
defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir.
2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges generally that Defendants retaliated against him at DRF by taking
the actions that are set forth above when Plaintiff indicated that he was experiencing a mental
health crisis. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.25.) Plaintiff also claims that certain medical items
were not transferred with him to Woodland Center Correctional Facility, which he alleges was a
retaliatory action. (See id.)
However, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are entirely conclusory. It is clear that Plaintiff
believes there is a connection between all of the events set forth in the complaint; however,
Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to suggest that the named Defendants took the above
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discussed actions because Plaintiff had engaged in prior protected conduct. See Lewis v. Jarvie, 20
F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]are allegations of malice on the defendants’ parts are not
enough to establish retaliation claims [that will survive § 1915A screening].” (citing Crawford-El
v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998))). Indeed, when setting out his retaliation claims, Plaintiff
does not identify any specific Defendants who took the alleged retaliatory actions. For these
reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “discriminated against Plaintiff by destroying or losing all
of Plaintiff’s medical equipment,” and Plaintiff alleges generally that all of Defendants’ actions at
DRF violated Plaintiff’s equal protection rights.2 (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.24–25.)
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state an equal protection claim,
Plaintiff must show “intentional and arbitrary discrimination” by the state; that is, he must show
that he “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is
no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000).
The threshold element of an equal protection claim is disparate treatment. Scarbrough v.
Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, “‘[s]imilarly situated’ is a
2 When setting out his equal protection claims, Plaintiff also references the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA). (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.24.) However, because Plaintiff specifically
identifies the claims that he intends to raise in this suit, and he does not indicate that he intended
to bring any ADA claims, the Court does not construe Plaintiff’s complaint to raise any ADA
claims.
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term of art—a comparator . . . must be similar in ‘all relevant respects.’” Paterek v. Vill. of Armada,
801 F.3d 630, 650 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 651 (6th Cir.
2011)).
Here, although Plaintiff uses the phrase “discrimination” when setting forth his claims,
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support his conclusory assertions. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to allege
any facts to suggest that he was treated differently than others who were similarly situated. Instead,
any allegations of discriminatory treatment are wholly conclusory. Conclusory allegations of
unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Furthermore, even viewing Plaintiff’s equal
protection claim as a class-of-one claim, the Court would reach the same conclusion because
Plaintiff’s equal protection claims are wholly conclusory, and he has alleged no facts that plausibly
suggest that his equal protection rights were violated.
Accordingly, any intended Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims will be
dismissed.
3. Eighth Amendment Claims
a. Deliberate Indifference Claims: Defendants Spohn, Unknown
Party #5 (named as Corrections Officer John Doe #1), and
Unknown Party #6 (named as Corrections Officer John Doe #2)
Plaintiff alleges that on October 28, 2024, Plaintiff advised Defendants Spohn, Unknown
Party #5 (Corrections Officer John Doe #1), and Unknown Party #6 (Corrections Officer John
Doe #2) that he was suicidal, and that despite knowing this, these Defendants returned Plaintiff to
his housing unit rather than place him on suicide watch. Although Plaintiff has by no means proven
his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against these Defendants, the Court will not
dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Spohn,
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Unknown Party #5 (Corrections Officer John Doe #1), and Unknown Party #6 (Corrections Officer
John Doe #2) at this early stage of the case.
b. Excessive Force Claims: Defendants Unknown Party #11
(named as Corrections Officer John Doe #7) and Unknown
Party #12 (named as Corrections Officer John Doe #8)
Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that after Defendant Unknown Party #11 (Corrections Officer
John Doe #7) reported to Plaintiff’s cell after Plaintiff acted on his suicidal thoughts, this
Defendant struck him repeatedly in the chest and stomach and slammed Plaintiff to the floor.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.14.) Plaintiff also alleges that once they were outside of Plaintiff’s
cell, Defendants Unknown Party #11 (Corrections Officer John Doe #7) and Unknown Party #12
(Corrections Officer John Doe #8) lifted him by his elbows, aggravating his pain. (Id.) Further,
Plaintiff alleges that at a later point, Defendant Unknown Party #11 (Corrections Officer John
Doe #7) tightened the noose that Plaintiff had put around his neck. (Id.)
At this point in the proceedings, the Court must take Plaintiff’s allegations as true and in
the light most favorable to him. Under these circumstances, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Unknown Parties #11 and #12
(Corrections Officers John Does #7 and #8).
IV. Conclusion
The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Having conducted the
review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendants Unknown Parties #7, #8, #9,
and #10 (named as John Does #3, #4, #5, and #6 in the complaint) and Defendants Unknown
Parties #1, #2, #3, and #4 (named as PC John Doe, RUM John Doe, ARUS John Doe, and ADW
John Doe in the complaint) will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to
state a claim, the following claims against remaining Defendants Spohn, Unknown Party #5
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(named as Corrections Officer John Doe #1 in the complaint), Unknown Party #6 (named as
Corrections Officer John Doe #2 in the complaint), Unknown Party #11 (named as Corrections
Officer John Doe #7 in the complaint), and Unknown Party #12 (named as Corrections Officer
John Doe #8 in the complaint): (i) official capacity claims, (ii) First Amendment retaliation claims,
and (iii) Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. Plaintiff’s individual capacity Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Spohn, Unknown Party #5
(Corrections Officer John Doe #1), and Unknown Party #6 (Corrections Officer John Doe #2), and
Plaintiff’s individual capacity Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants
Unknown Party #11 (Corrections Officer John Doe #7) and Unknown Party #12 (Corrections
Officer John Doe #8) remain in the case.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: March 30, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-01830-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/30/26 Page
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