Rodriguez v. Pro Medical Hospital et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
RICARDO JESUS RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
PRO MEDICA HOSPITAL et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1440
Honorable Sally J. Berens
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a person presently confined in state prison under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate
order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff
consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States
Magistrate Judge. (ECF No.8.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to
the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th
Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining
a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a
defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a
court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S.
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344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is
fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a
party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or
other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and
defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the
summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate
in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by
requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a
circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district
court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir.
2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it
without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the
plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)
(PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Parnall Correctional Facility (SMT) in Jackson, Jackson County, Michigan. The events about
which he complains, however, occurred at the Branch County Jail.
Plaintiff alleges:
*Denied medical care while incarcerated in Branch County Jail. ‘See Medical
Records.’ [2]
*Overheard C[orrections ]O[fficer] Mr. Knack sa[y] he does not have to respect us
as Inmates or humans.
*As I was pr to Er [3] that Branch County still had wrongfully charged my Inmate
Account would like to proceed to have criminal matter as well in lawsuit.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
Plaintiff describes the medical condition at issue in his complaint as “mersa.” (Id.,
PageID.6.) Mersa is, apparently, Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), an
infection caused by a type of staph bacteria that has become resistant to many of the antibiotics
used to treat ordinary staph infections. See, e.g., Wooler v. Hickman Cnty, Kentucky, 377 F. App’x
502, 503 (6th Cir. 2010) (where the court addressed claims that corrections employees unlawfully
exposed the plaintiff to the bacteria and then mistreated the resulting infections). Plaintiff reports
that the “mersa situation” arose on May 2, 2021. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) Plaintiff states
that he “had surgeries for mersa” and “was almost par[aly]zed from the waist down.” (Id.,
2 Plaintiff does not provide any medical records with his complaint.
3 It appears that Plaintiff means to convey that he had been released on personal recognizance
either before or as part of his hospital stay. He explains that he was “pr bonded out” when the
hospital charges—charges that he contends should be borne by the county—were incurred.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.15.)
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PageID.8.) Prior to the surgeries Plaintiff “was denied treatment.” (Id.) Plaintiff notes that “the jail
nurse . . . push[ed] for me to go back to the hospital ‘after the hospital denied me treatment.’” (Id.,
PageID.11.)
Plaintiff seeks $15,000,000.00 in damages.
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
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a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because section 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under section 1983
is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
271 (1994).
Plaintiff does not specify the constitutional rights at issue in his complaint. His factual
allegations regarding the failure to properly treat his MRSA infection implicate Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment.4 Plaintiff allegations regarding
improper medical charges may implicate his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process before
the deprivation of property.
A. 	Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations applicable to actions under section 1983 is borrowed from state
law. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271–75 (1985). Specifically, the federal courts borrow the
forum state’s limitations period for personal injury actions related to a violation of civil rights.
Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986). In Michigan, therefore, section 1983 claims are
subject to the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(8). Id.,
at 44.
Although state law governs the length of the statute of limitations, federal law governs the
accrual date. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387–88 (2007). “[U]nder § 1983, the statute of
4 Plaintiff indicates that, at the time he filed the complaint, he was a pretrial detainee. (Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) It appears that he may have been a pretrial detainee during the events
described in his complaint, as well. For convicted prisoners, Plaintiff's claims would implicate the
protections of the Eighth Amendment; however, for pretrial detainees, Plaintiff's protection arises
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The analysis set forth below applies whether the source of
constitutional protection is the Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendment.
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limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the
basis of the action. ‘A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered
it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.’” Scott v. Ambani, 577 F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir.
2009) (quoting Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984)).
Sua sponte dismissal may be appropriate where a statute of limitations defect is obvious
from the face of the complaint. See, e.g., Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1273
n.3 (6th Cir. 1988); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 510-11 (6th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s
allegations support the inference that he knew of his injuries from (1) the alleged failure to treat
his medical condition during May of 2021, and (2) the alleged inappropriate hospital charges
during July of 2021. Plaintiff filed this action during August of 2025, more than four years after
his cause of action accrued. Plaintiff’s statute of limitations defect is apparent on the face of the
complaint.5 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
and his complaint is properly dismissed.
Nonetheless, even if Plaintiff had timely filed his complaint, he fails to state a claim.
B. 	Defendant Branch County Jail
The Branch County Jail is a building that houses inmates; it is not a person and it “is not a
legal entity susceptible to suit.” Watson v. Gill, 40 F. App’x 88, 89 (6th Cir. 2002); see also
Goldman v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Jail, No. 1:16-cv-359, 2016 WL 3180043, at *2 (W.D. Mich. June
5 State rules regarding tolling also apply. Heard v. Strange, 127 F.4th 630, 633 (6th Cir. 2025).
The running of the period of limitation is tolled while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies.
Id., at 635 (citing Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff describes the
extent of his exhaustion efforts in his complaint. He verbally raised these issues to jail staff during
the summer of 2021. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.6, 9–14.) Thus, even considering tolling,
Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed based on his own allegations.
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8, 2016) (collecting cases that hold a local jail is not a person subject to suit under section 1983).
For that reason alone, Plaintiff’s complaint against the Branch County Jail is properly dismissed.
Even assuming that Plaintiff intended to sue Branch County—an entity subject to suit under
section 1983—he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Branch County may not
be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees under section 1983. See Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989); Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, a county is liable only when its official
policy or custom causes the injury. Connick, 563 U.S. at 60. This policy or custom must be the
moving force behind the alleged constitutional injury, and the plaintiff must identify the policy or
custom, connect it to the governmental entity, and show that his injury was incurred because of
the policy or custom. See Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005); Alkire v.
Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003). “Governmental entities cannot be held responsible for
a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or
custom and the alleged violation of constitutional rights.” Watson, 40 F. App’x at 89 (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 692).
A policy includes a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated” by the sheriff's department. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Moreover, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained that “[a] ‘custom’ for purposes of
Monell liability must ‘be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the
force of law.’” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996). “In short, a ‘custom’ is
a ‘legal institution’ not memorialized by written law.” Id. at 508.
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege the existence of a custom or policy, let alone that any policy
or custom was the moving force behind his alleged constitutional injuries. Cf. Rayford v. City of
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Toledo, No. 86-3260, 1987 WL 36283, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1987); see also Bilder v. City of
Akron, No. 92-4310, 1993 WL 394595, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 1993) (affirming dismissal of section
1983 action when plaintiff allegation of policy or custom was conclusory, and plaintiff failed to
allege facts tending to support the allegation). Plaintiff, therefore, fails to state a claim against
Branch County.
C. 	Defendant Pro Medica Hospital
Plaintiff names Pro Medica Hospital, a “Coldwater Hospital,” as a Defendant. (Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) There is presently no such hospital in Coldwater, Michigan. In the years
that have passed since Plaintiff’s claims accrued, Pro Medica Hospital was purchased by Insight
Health System of Flint, Michigan. See, e.g., Ron Southwick, Michigan Hospital gets a new owner,
and 	a 	new 	name, 	Chief 	Healthcare 	Executive 	(Dec. 	6, 	2024), 	https://www.
chiefhealthcareexecutive.com/view/michigan-hospital-gets-a-new-owner-and-a-new-name 	(last
visited Mar. 29, 2026). Whether Plaintiff intends to proceed against Pro Medica Hospital or Insight
Hospital and Medical Center, however, he has failed to state a claim.
1. 	Acting Under Color of State Law
It is not at all clear that Plaintiff visited Pro Medica Hospital as a prisoner/detainee of
Branch County or as an accused person who had been released on personal recognizance. Even if
he visited as a prisoner/detainee, however, the Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Pro Medica
Hospital was a private entity. “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the states from
denying federal constitutional rights and which guarantees due process, applies to acts of the states,
not to acts of private persons or entities.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982).
For a private party’s conduct to be under color of state law, it must be fairly attributable to
the State. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). There must be a sufficiently
close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the defendant so that the action of the
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latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102
(6th Cir. 1991) (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). The fact that Pro
Medica Hospital may have received public funding and may have been licensed by the state does
not render the hospital a state actor for purposes of section 1983. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (nonprofit, privately operated schools receipt of public funds did not make
its employee discharge decisions acts of state subject to suit under federal statute governing civil
action for deprivation of rights); Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006) (allegation
that hospital and social worker were subject to state licensing was insufficient to support finding
that defendants were acting under color of state law); Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312, 315–
16 (6th Cir. 1988) (fact that nonprofit corporation was funded almost entirely by public sources,
and was subject to state regulation, without more, is insufficient to make private entity’s decision
to discharge employees attributable to state for purpose of section 1983 action).
Plaintiff has asserted no factual allegations that would establish the requisite nexus to
support a claim that Pro Medica Hospital is a state actor.
2. 	Policy or Custom
Even if Plaintiff was a prisoner or detainee when he received care at Pro Medica Hospital,
and even if there was a sufficiently close nexus between Pro Medica Hospital and Branch County,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. It is possible that an entity contracting with a governmental
entity to perform a traditional governmental function like providing healthcare to inmates can “be
sued under § 1983 as one acting ‘under color of state law.’” Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458
(6th Cir. 1993) (quoting West, 487 U.S. at 54). But the requirements for a valid section 1983 claim
against a municipality apply equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for
purposes of section 1983. See Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App'x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that the holding in Monell has been extended to private corporations); Street, 102
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F.3d at 817–18 (same); Rojas v. Alexander's Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1990)
(same); Cox v. Jackson, 579 F. Supp. 2d 831, 851–52 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (same).
For the same reasons that Branch County cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of
its employees, Pro Medica Hospital cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s complaint does not set forth sufficient allegations suggesting that his
alleged constitutional injuries were the result of official policies or customs employed by Pro
Medica Hospital. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege any facts from which the Court could infer that
any custom or policy led to his alleged constitutional injuries. For this reason as well, Plaintiff fails
to state a claim against Pro Medica Hospital.
D. 	Corrections Officer Knack
Regarding Defendant Knack, Plaintiff alleges only that the officer was overheard stating
that he did not have to respect the residents of the jail as inmates or humans. Plaintiff does not
allege that Defendant Knack played any role in the medical care that Plaintiff received (or failed
to receive) for his MRSA infection or in the charge imposed on Plaintiff for the medical care that
Plaintiff received. Plaintiff’s scant allegations against Defendant Knack fail to state any claim
under section 1983. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant Knack is properly
dismissed.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an
appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court
concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue
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Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
An order and judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	March 30, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
United States Magistrate Judge
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