Beltinck et al v. McInerney et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
STEPHANIE BELTINCK, et al.,
Plaintiffs, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-1374
JENNY MCINERNEY, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se Plaintiffs Stephanie Beltinck and Shelly Lake commenced this action on November
5, 2025 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants
Jenny McInerney, an attorney with the Michigan Bureau of Elections (Bureau), Jonathan Brater,
the Bureau’s Director, and Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson in connection with an
administrative hearing currently set for November 18, 2025. In particular, Plaintiffs allege that
certain aspects of the administrative process and hearing, which concerns their Help America Vote
Act (HAVA) complaints, violate their right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.19–23.)
Along with their complaint, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 2.) On November 6, 2025, the
Court denied Plaintiff’s request for a TRO (ECF No. 6) and referred the case, along with the motion
for a preliminary injunction, to the undersigned. (ECF No. 7.) That same day, I entered an Order
directing Plaintiffs to personally serve a copy of their motion on Defendants and to file a proof of
service within 24 hours of service. (ECF No. 8.) Although Plaintiffs apparently failed to serve a
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copy of their motion on Defendants, and failed to file the required proof of service, Defendants
learned of the motion through review of the Court’s docket and filed their response on November
13, 2025. (ECF No. 9.)
For the following reasons, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that
Plaintiffs’ motion be DENIED.
I. 	Background
A. 	HAVA Background
Congress enacted HAVA, 52 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq., in the wake of voting controversies
that occurred in connection with the November 2000 presidential election. See Bay Cnty.
Democratic Party v. Land, 347 F. Supp. 2d 404, 412 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The Act is aimed at
promoting voting and election administration systems that will “be the most convenient, accessible
and easy to use for voters” and “will be nondiscriminatory and afford each registered and eligible
voter an equal opportunity to vote and have that vote counted.” 52 U.S.C. § 20981(a)(1) and (3).
Among other things, HAVA establishes an Election Assistance Commission that assists States
with the administration of Federal elections, conducts studies and issues reports, and assists with
the administration of certain Federal election laws and programs. Id., §§ 20921, 20981. HAVA
also requires States to create reliable registration rolls by implementing a uniform, regularly
updated computerized statewide voter registration list. Id. § 21083. In addition, HAVA
authorizes funding to States to help them meet the requirements of the Act. Id. § 21001.
Congress provided two express avenues to enforce HAVA’s provisions. First, the Attorney
General may bring actions for injunctive and declaratory relief “as may be necessary to carry out
the uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and administration requirements” under
various HAVA provisions. 52 U.S.C. § 21111. Second, “any person who believes that there is a
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violation of any provision of subchapter III (including a violation which has occurred, is occurring,
or is about to occur) may file a complaint” under “State-based administrative complaint
procedures.” Id. § 21112(a)(1), (a)(2)(B). A State that receives funding under a HAVA program is
obligated 	to 	“establish 	and 	maintain” 	such 	“administrative 	complaint 	procedures.” 	Id. 	§
21112(a)(1). HAVA specifies the following requirements and procedures:
(A) The procedures shall be uniform and nondiscriminatory.
(B) Under the procedures, any person who believes that there is a violation of any
provision of subchapter III (including a violation which has occurred, is occurring,
or is about to occur) may file a complaint.
(C) Any complaint filed under the procedures shall be in writing and notarized, and
signed and sworn by the person filing the complaint.
(D) The State may consolidate complaints filed under subparagraph (B).
(E) At the request of the complainant, there shall be a hearing on the record.
(F) If, under the procedures, the State determines that there is a violation of any
provision of subchapter III, the State shall provide the appropriate remedy.
(G) If, under the procedures, the State determines that there is no violation, the State
shall dismiss the complaint and publish the results of the procedures.
(H) The State shall make a final determination with respect to a complaint prior to
the expiration of the 90-day period which begins on the date the complaint is filed,
unless the complainant consents to a longer period for making such a determination.
(I) If the State fails to meet the deadline applicable under subparagraph (H), the
complaint shall be resolved within 60 days under alternative dispute resolution
procedures established for purposes of this section. The record and other materials
from any proceedings conducted under the complaint procedures established under
this section shall be made available for use under the alternative dispute resolution
procedures.
Id. § 21112(a)(2).
B. 	The Bureau’s Complaint Process
In accordance with Section 21112(a)(2), Michigan has adopted the required administrative
complaint procedures. (ECF No. 9-2.) The procedures provide that a person who believes an
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election authority has violated Title III of HAVA may file a complaint with the Bureau, which the
Bureau will forward to the election authority within five days for a response. The Bureau may
consolidate two or more complaints “if they contain substantially similar allegations against an
election authority” or are “filed by the same person.” (Id. at PageID.280.)
A complaint must: (1) identify the election authority that has violated HAVA Title III; (2)
cite the Title III provision allegedly violated; (3) explain how the named election authority violated
the provision; and (4) state that the complainant “either witnessed or possesses first-hand
knowledge of the conduct alleged in [the complaint].” (Id. at PageID.281.) In addition, a complaint
may request that the Bureau conduct a hearing on the record and include “[n]otarized affidavits
from a maximum of three (3) persons who witnessed the alleged violations.” (Id.) The election
authority’s response to the complaint, if any, must be made within 25 days after receipt of the
complaint and, like the complaint, may include up to three notarized affidavits of “persons who
have information that may assist the Bureau in determining whether the election authority violated
Title III.” (Id. at PageID.282.)
At a hearing, the complainant may call as witnesses only those persons who provided
affidavits with the complaint, and the election authority may call as witnesses only those persons
who provided affidavits in the response. The Bureau shall designate one or more persons to direct
the hearing. (Id. at PageID.283.) In resolving the complaint, the Bureau must weigh both written
testimony and oral testimony presented at the hearing. If the Bureau finds no reason to believe that
the election authority violated Title III, it shall dismiss the complaint. On the other hand, if the
Bureau finds reason to believe that a violation has occurred, it must provide an appropriate remedy
and publish the results of its final determination on its website. (Id. at PageID.282–83.)
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C. 	Plaintiffs’ HAVA Complaints
On September 10, 2025, Beltinck filed the first of her three complaints, which the Bureau
designated HAVA 2025-01. This complaint alleged that the platform supporting the statutorily-
required electronic return of military ballots violated HAVA’s audit requirements because it has
no paper trail or audit capacity. The Bureau notified the election authority of the complaint on
September 15, 2025. (ECF No. 9-3 at PageID.289.)
On September 11, 2025, Lake filed a HAVA complaint, which the Bureau designated
HAVA 2025-02. This complaint alleged that the deletion of information from electronic pollbooks
following an election eliminates the ability to audit results. The Bureau notified the election
authority of the complaint on September 16, 2025. (Id.) The same day, Beltinck filed her second
complaint, which the Bureau designated HAVA 2025-03. This complaint alleged that the
information contained in Michigan’s voter registration list is not auditable because it lacks time
stamps and assigns multiple user ID numbers to a single voter. The Bureau notified the election
authority of this complaint on September 15, 2025. (Id.at PageID.289–90.)
On September 17, 2025, the Department of State issued a notice of isolation wall to all
department staff listing the three complaints that had been received at that time. The notice
indicated that Defendants Brater and McInerny would serve on the “Bureau Adjudication Team,”
while Defendant Benson and the Department’s Legal Services Administration staff would serve
on the “Secretary of State Team.” All Department staff were notified that the two teams were
“isolated from any discussions concerning this matter outside their respective teams.” (Id. at
PageID.291.)
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Beltinck filed her last complaint, alleging that the deletion of information from electronic
pollbooks removes manual audit ability, on October 8, 2025. 1 The Bureau designated this
complaint HAVA 2025-05 and provided notice to the election authority on October 10, 2025. (Id.
at PageID.290.) Also on October 10, 2025, the Bureau notified Plaintiffs that their HAVA
complaints had been consolidated pursuant to the HAVA complaint process. (ECF No. 1 at
PageID.9; ECF No. 9-3 at PageID.291.)
With each complaint, Plaintiffs submitted a USB drive containing documents. After the
drives were scanned for security threats, the Bureau transmitted them to the election authority for
consideration. Upon review of the documents for HAVA 2025-05, the Bureau discovered that only
one item included on the USB drive was listed on the exhibit list for the complaint and another
item was only partially included on the exhibit list. The USB drive included four additional
documents that were not included on the exhibit list. (Id. at PageID.293.) On October 23, 2025,
the Bureau sent Beltinck an email notifying her of the situation and asking for clarification. (ECF
No. 1-5; ECF No. 9-3 at PageID.293.) Beltinck responded the same day, stating that she would be
including the additional documents in HAVA 2025-05 in addition to the exhibits already received.
The Bureau responded on October 29, 2025, notifying Beltinck that the HAVA complaint process
does not permit a complainant to supplement an existing complaint with new materials. (ECF No.
1-6; ECF No. 9-3 at PageID.293.)
Lake’s complaint and at least one of Beltinck’s complaints named both Defendants Brater
and Benson as respondents. By letters dated September 16, 2022, and October 10, 2025, Defendant
Brater notified Plaintiffs that because Defendant Benson, as the “chief election officer of the state”
1 Beltinck filed another complaint in between HAVA 2025-03 and HAVA 2025-05, but that
complaint was dismissed because it was not properly notarized. (ECF No. 9-3 at PageID.290.)
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pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.21, is the “election authority” subject to the administrative
complaint process, the complaints were dismissed insofar as they named Brater as a respondent,
but would proceed with Defendant Benson as the respondent. (ECF No. 1-1; ECF No. 1-13; ECF
No. 1-13.) In addition, in at least two of her complaints, Beltinck alleged violations of the National
Voter Registration Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Civil Rights Act, and the U.S. Constitution.
(ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.28–29; ECF No. 1-2 at PageID.31–32.) By letters dated October 1, 2025,
and October 10, 2025, Defendant Brater notified Beltinck that these portions of the complaints
were dismissed as they fall outside of Michigan’s HAVA complaint process, but that the matters
would proceed as to the alleged HAVA violations. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.28–29; ECF No. 1-2
at PageID.31–32.)
Defendant Benson filed her response to the first three complaints on October 10, 2025.
(ECF No. 1-14.) The response, titled “motion to dismiss,” included a portion arguing that
Plaintiffs’ HAVA complaints should be dismissed because they fail specifically to allege how the
Department’s actions violated the cited HAVA provisions. In support of this argument, the
response offers the pleading standards set forth in the United States Supreme Court case of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and the Michigan Court of Appeals case of Cape
v. Howell Board of Education, 145 Mich. App. 459 (1985), to assess the viability of the complaints.
(ECF No. 1-14 at PageID.68–69.) Defendant Benson filed her response to HAVA 2025-05 on
November 4, 2025. (ECF No. 9-3 at PageID.294–95.)
On October 17, 2025, Defendant McInerney notified Plaintiffs by email that the Bureau
had scheduled a hearing for each of the complaints via Microsoft Teams for November 18, 2025,
at 10:00 a.m. The email indicated that Beltinck and Lake would each be allowed 30 minutes of
argument for their complaints, and Defendant Benson would be allowed 30 minutes of argument
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to respond. (ECF No. 1-4 at PageID.36.) Because the HAVA Complaint process does not specify
time limits for hearings, the Bureau adopted the Michigan Court of Appeals limit for argument of
calendar cases of 30 minutes per side. (ECF No. 9-3 at PageID.292–93.)
D. 	Plaintiffs’ Complaint
As noted, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in this action
on November 5, 2025. Plaintiffs allege one claim pursuant to Section 1983 for violation of their
rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants have deprived them of due process by: (1) improperly imposing judicially-created
standards (Defendant’s response citing Twombley and Cape) that have no basis in HAVA or
Michigan’s complaint process; (2) improperly consolidating their complaints; (3) affording them
inadequate hearing time to present evidence and examine and cross-examine witnesses; (4)
prohibiting Plaintiffs from supplementing the administrative record while allowing Defendant
Benson to file extensive responses with exhibits and affidavits; (5) allowing Defendant Brater, an
“implicated official,” to remove himself as a respondent and then oversee the allegations of HAVA
improprieties, creating a conflict of interest; and (6) allowing Defendant McInerney to serve as
both the administrative officer controlling the HAVA complaint process and respondents’ legal
counsel, which undermines neutrality and creates an appearance of bias. (ECF No. 1 at pageID.20–
21.)
II. 	Motion Standard
Whether to issue a preliminary injunction is in the discretion of the district court. Planet
Aid v. City of St. Johns, 782 F.3d 318, 323 (6th Cir. 2015). A court considers and balances four
factors: (1) whether the movant has established a substantial likelihood or probability of success
on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the preliminary
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injunction; (3) whether the issuance of the preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to
others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the preliminary
injunction. Kentucky v. Hagel, 759 F.3d 588, 600 (6th Cir. 2014). Each factor should “be balanced
against one another and should not be considered prerequisites to the grant of a preliminary
injunction.” Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682, 690 (6th Cir. 2014). However, the
existence of irreparable harm “is indispensable,” and district courts abuse their discretion if they
grant a preliminary injunction without finding irreparable harm. D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942
F.3d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 2019). Furthermore, “[w]hen one factor is dispositive, a district court need
not consider the others.” Id.
A “preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-
reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand
it.” Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). An injunction at this stage
should “only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (internal citation omitted).
“[A] hearing is only required when there are disputed factual issues, and not when the
issues are primarily questions of law.” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, LLC v. Tenke
Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 552 (6th Cir. 2007). “[W]here material facts are not in dispute . . . district
courts generally need not hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. (quoting McDonald’s Corp. v.
Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1998)).
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiffs seek an order staying the November 18, 2025 hearing and requiring: (1) a separate
proceeding for each HAVA complaint; (2) adequate hearing time; (3) equal record development;
(4) a neutral adjudicator; (5) restoration of Defendant Brator as a respondent in HAVA 2025-02
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and any other complaint where his policies or directives are challenged; and (6) perseveration of
separate timelines for each complaint. As set forth below, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a
substantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits.
Plaintiffs offer several reasons why they aver they are likely to succeed on the merits. First,
they argue that their HAVA Section 402 (52 U.S.C. § 21112) rights are enforceable through an
action under Section 1983 based on the Supreme Court’s test articulated in Blessing v. Freestone,
520 U.S. 329 (1997). Second, they contend that Defendants violated HAVA’s mandatory
procedural requirements in various ways. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the administrative process
provides them constitutionally insufficient process under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976). (ECF No. 2 at PageID.216–20.)
Defendants respond that Plaintiffs have no likelihood of success on the merits.2 First, they
contend that Plaintiffs’ action fails because they have no private right of action under HAVA, and
Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for Plaintiffs to enforce the procedural requirements to
which they claim entitlement in the HAVA administrative complaint process. Second, Defendants
contend that, even if Plaintiffs may bring a Section 1983 action regarding procedural requirements
for the administrative process, their due process claim fails because Plaintiffs have not identified
a liberty or property interest that would support a due process claim. Finally, Defendants contend
that, even if Plaintiffs could show that they may bring their HAVA-based claim under Section
1983 and that they have an identifiable liberty or property interest, they still cannot demonstrate
that the administrative hearing for their HAVA complaints will fail to provide constitutionally
sufficient procedures.
2 Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing.
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A. 	Private Right of Action
Most, if not all, federal courts that have considered the issue, including the Sixth Circuit,
have held that there is no private right of action under HAVA. See, e.g., Bellitto v. Snipes, 935
F.3d 1192, 1202 (11th Cir. 2019) (observing that “HAVA creates no private cause of action”
because “Congress established only two HAVA enforcement mechanisms: (1) a civil action
brought by the Attorney General, and (2) a state-based administrative complaint procedure”);
American Civil Rights Union v. Philadelphia City Comm’rs, 872 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2017)
(“HAVA does not include a private right of action that allows aggrieved parties to sue
nonconforming states.”); Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 735 (9th
Cir. 2012) (implicitly recognizing no private right of action under HAVA); Morales-Garza v.
Lorenzo-Giguere, 277 F. App’x 444, 446 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that HAVA does not provide a
private right of action); Sandusky Cnty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 572 (6th
Cir. 2004) (“HAVA does not itself create a private right of action.”); Wisconsin Voter Alliance v.
Millis, 720 F. Supp. 3d 703, 710 (E.D. Wis. 2024). Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. Instead, they
contend that HAVA provides rights they may enforce under Section 1983. 3
As Plaintiffs note, the Sixth Circuit in Sandusky County and the First Circuit in Colon-
Marrero v. Velez, 813 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016), recognized Section 1983 actions to enforce provisions
of HAVA. 4 But Plaintiffs incorrectly characterize the issues and holdings in these cases. Neither
3 Although Defendants contend that Plaintiffs did not raise this issue in their complaint, they
specifically alleged that violations of HAVA rights are enforceable under Section 1983. (ECF No.
1 at PageID.18–19 (citing Colon-Marrero and Sandusky County).)
4 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the Ninth Circuit in Crowley did not hold that the plaintiff was
entitled to enforce the HAVA provision at issue through Section 1983. Rather, the court
specifically observed that “we need not and do not ultimately address whether HAVA § 301 could
ever be enforced via a § 1983 cause of action brought to challenge the recount procedures in an
election for federal office” because HAVA’s requirements did not apply to the election at issue.
See Crowley, 678 F.3d at 735.
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case addressed HAVA’s state administrative process. The issue in Sandusky County was whether
the Ohio Secretary of State’s directive regarding provisional ballets conflicted with HAVA’s
provisional ballot requirements in Section 302(a)(2).5 In determining whether HAVA provided
the plaintiffs enforceable rights under Section 1983, the Sixth Circuit applied the test articulated
in Blessing, which is whether the statute: (1) is intended to benefit a class of individuals of which
the plaintiff is a member; (2) sets forth a standard, clarifying the nature of the right, that makes the
right capable of enforcement by the judiciary; and (3) is mandatory, rather than precatory in nature.
Sandusky Cnty., 387 F.3d at 572 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 539, 340–41 (1997),
abrogation recognized by Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 145 S. Ct. 2219 (2025)). First,
the court determined that the rights-creating language, “an individual shall be permitted to cast a
provisional ballot,” was unambiguous. Id. (quoting 42 U.SC. § 15482(a)(2)) (italics in original).6
The court observed that this language mirrors Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, both of which create individual rights and are
enforceable under Section 1983. Id. at 572–73 (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284
(2002)). The court further observed that HAVA requires states to post information about this right
at polling places along with information regarding how to contact appropriate officials about
violations. Id. at 573. Second, the court found that “[t]he right to cast a provisional ballot is neither
vague nor amorphous, and is no less amenable to judicial interpretation and enforcement than any
other federal civil right.” Id. Finally, the court found the provision’s language mandatory in nature.
Id.
5 The issue in Colon-Marrero was whether the text of Section 303(a)(4)(A), 52 U.S.C. §
21083(a)(4)(A), pertaining to removal of individual registrants from a state’s active voter roles
created an individually enforceable right. 813 F.3d at 17–18.
6 This provision has been re-codified as 52 U.S.C. § 21082.
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Plaintiffs contend that Sandusky County’s reasoning controls here because HAVA Section
402(a)(2) contains rights-creating language that is also mandatory, including that “any person who
believes that there is a violation of subchapter III . . . may file a complaint.” 52 U.S.C. §
21112(a)(2)(B). Plaintiffs further note that Section 402(a)(2) requires a state to provide the
complainant “a hearing on the record” if the complainant so requests and to either “dismiss the
complaint” if it determines that no violation occurred or “provide the appropriate remedy” if it
finds that subchapter III was violated. (ECF No. 2 at PageID.217.) Plaintiffs’ argument might be
persuasive if, for example, they alleged that they sought to file a complaint in proper form, but
Defendants refused to accept it or that Defendants denied their request for a hearing. However,
Plaintiffs’ own allegations show that neither of these things happened; the Bureau accepted
Plaintiffs’ complaints and has granted them a hearing.
Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants violated multiple HAVA mandatory procedural
requirements is not only unpersuasive but also is not the basis for Plaintiffs’ procedural due process
claim. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.20–21.) First, Defendants did not violate Section 21112(a)(1)(A)’s
requirement that “[t]he procedures shall be uniform and nondiscriminatory” by consolidating
complaints from different complainants, as Section 21112(a)(1)(D) expressly allows states to
“consolidate complaints filed under subparagraph (B).” Relatedly, Defendants did not violate
HAVA’s “nondiscriminatory” requirement by refusing to allow Plaintiffs to supplement the
record. Nothing in the statute requires supplementation, and Plaintiffs had the same opportunity as
the respondent to support their complaints with exhibits and witness affidavits. Second, the 30-
minute time limit does not run afoul of any provision in Section 21112(a)(1); a 30-minute recorded
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hearing (one hour for both sides) is still a “hearing on the record.”7 In addition, Plaintiffs’ citation
to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), as exemplars for HAVA administrative hearings is unpersuasive, as
neither source pertains to HAVA-created state administrative hearings. In fact, hearings under
Michigan’s HAVA complaint process are conducted as “informal, non-contested case hearings[.]”
(ECF No. 9-2 at PageID.283.) Finally, Defendants did not violate any records requirements, as
nothing in Section 21112(a)(2)(D) “requires the state ‘to keep a record of each complaint’ filed,”
as 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	(ECF 	No. 	2 	at 	PageID.219); 	rather 	subsection 	(a)(2)(D) 	pertains 	to
consolidation of complaints. Nonetheless, as recounted above, the Bureau logged each complaint
and assigned each of them a separate complaint identifier.
At bottom, Plaintiffs’ claim is not about the express provisions of Section 21112(a)(2), but
about what is not included therein. In adopting HAVA, Congress provided a general framework
for state administrative complaint procedures with minimum requirements and left the finer
details—number of witnesses, length of hearings, the proper respondent, etc.—to the states. In
other words, those details were not mandated by statute but were left to the states’ discretion.
Plaintiffs fail to cite any rights-creating language on these issues in Section 21112(a) or elsewhere
in HAVA. Therefore, I conclude that Plaintiffs fail to show that they assert a right created by
HAVA that is enforceable under Section 1983.
B. 	Due Process Interest
7 Plaintiffs argue that the hearing notice refers only to “argument” rather than “testimony,”
suggesting that the Bureau does not intend to permit witness examination at all. However, the
notice specifically states that “the complainants may call as witnesses any individual described in
Section III(C)(2)” of the Department’s HAVA Complaint Process. (ECF No. 1-4 at PageID.36.)
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“The Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
To establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must show that
one of these interests is at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Analysis of a
procedural due process claim involves two steps: “[T]he first asks whether there exists a liberty or
property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the
procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. . . .” Kentucky Dep’t
of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs do not identify a property or liberty interest underlying their due process claim
and do not specifically address this issue in their motion. “‘A liberty interest may arise from the
Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word “liberty,” or it may arise from an
expectation or interest created by state [or federal] laws or policies.’” United States v. Selvestre-
Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221) (citations
omitted). While Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that a state’s creation of “an adjudicative
proceeding that can result in the dismissal of claims or the denial of requested relief” triggers due
process protections (ECF No. 1 at PageID.19), they cite no case specifically recognizing a liberty
interest in the HAVA administrative complaint process or, more generally, in the mere
establishment of an informal administrative process in other contexts. And as Defendants note,
nothing in HAVA itself or Michigan’s HAVA complaint process mandates a particular outcome
or creates a substantive expectation by the complainant. See Henderson v. City of Roanoke, No.
20-2386, 2022 WL 704351, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 2022) (per curiam) (“State law or policy must
provide a substantive expectation or interest to create a liberty interest -- the ‘expectation of
receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.’”
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(quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 n.12 (1983) (italics in original))). The process at
issue merely allows for the complaint to be dismissed if no violation is found or, if a violation is
found, for an “appropriate remedy” to issue, including, but not limited to, sending a written finding
of a Title III violation to the election authority, requiring the authority to explain how it will remedy
a violation, and requiring that the authority receive additional election training. Therefore,
Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on their claim for this reason as well.
C. 	Required Process
Even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate a liberty interest in the HAVA complaint process, I
conclude that they cannot show that the process they are afforded is constitutionally inadequate.
The general test for determining what process is due and when is stated in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews identified three factors to be balanced: first, the private interest at
stake; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value, if any, of additional procedural
safeguards; and third, the government’s countervailing interests. Id. at 335. Consideration of these
factors 	demonstrates 	that 	Michigan’s 	HAVA 	complaint 	procedures 	satisfy 	due 	process
requirements.
First, Plaintiffs’ interests at issue in their complaints are not substantial, as they are not
private or personal in nature. Rather, as Defendants note, Plaintiffs’ interests, and any injury they
might suffer as a result of the alleged HAVA violations, are the same as those of all citizens who
desire the proper application of the constitution or laws. See Wisconsin Voters All. v. Pence, 514
F. Supp. 3d 117, 120 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding that plaintiff voter groups from Wisconsin,
Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Arizona, whose votes were counted and electors certified
pursuant to state-authorized procedure, lacked a “concrete and particularized injury,” as the claims
they raised amounted to nothing more than “a ‘generalized grievance’ stemming from an attempt
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to have the Government act in accordance with their view of the law”) (citing Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013)). In other words, their complaints, while authorized by HAVA,
simply present a generalized grievance brought on behalf of the public at large. See Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216–17 (1974) (abstract injury shared by all
citizens fails to establish standing to sue). Second, there is no risk of an erroneous deprivation here
because Plaintiffs face no demonstrable personal loss or injury if their complaints are denied.
As for the value of the additional safeguards Plaintiffs propose, it is minimal at best. To
begin, the Bureau has not imposed federal motion practice or pleading standards on Plaintiffs as
they claim. Rather, the respondent, Defendant Benson, included that argument in her response.
This was proper, as nothing in the HAVA complaint process precludes such arguments.
Second, Plaintiffs’ contention that the Bureau improperly consolidated their complaints is
meritless. As noted above, HAVA specifically authorizes states to consolidate complaints.
Michigan’s HAVA complaint process authorizes consolidation of complaints in two situations: (1)
“if they contain substantially similar allegations against an election authority;” or (2) “two or more
complaints [are] filed by the same person.” (ECF No. 9-2 at PageID.281.) Both circumstances are
present here: Beltinck filed two or more complaints, and Lake’s complaint and Beltinck’s final
complaint, HAVA 2025-05, contained “substantially similar allegations” regarding deletion of
electronic pollbook data. (ECF No. 9-3 at PageID.291–92.)
Third, Plaintiffs fail to show that the 30 minutes each that the Bureau intends to allow is
insufficient for Plaintiffs to present the substance of their complaints. As noted, this is the same
time limit allowed for Michigan Court of Appeals calendar cases. In addition, although Plaintiffs
state that they intend to present expert testimony, the complaint process provides that the
complainant must have first-hand knowledge of the violation, so Plaintiffs should be able to testify
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about their knowledge of the alleged violations.8 Moreover, because Plaintiffs failed to provide
affidavits with their complaints, they have no witnesses to call at the hearing. (ECF No. 9-2 at
PageID.281–82.) Finally, Plaintiffs’ argument that they will have insufficient time to cross-
examine the respondent’s witnesses is speculative because there is no indication whether the
respondent intends to call witnesses at the hearing or simply rely on the witness affidavits attached
to the response.
Fourth, regarding supplementation, as noted, nothing in the complaint process allows either
party to supplement the complaint or the response. The complaint process authorizes a complaint
and a response. Plaintiffs’ contention that the process is “one-sided and unfair” (ECF No. 1 at
PageID.21) misconstrues what occurred in the case. Defendant Benson filed one response to the
first three complaints on October 10, 2025, and a separate response to Beltinck’s last complaint
that Defendant Benson received the same day she filed the initial response. Defendant Benson did
not seek to supplement her filing, as Plaintiffs did. Thus, rather than playing by the rules, Plaintiffs’
proposed procedural safeguard would unfairly give them another bite at the apple.
Fifth, Defendant Brater’s letters provided Plaintiffs an adequate explanation as to why he
is not the “election authority” for purposes of Michigan’s HAVA complaint process and, therefore,
not a proper respondent. Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate any injury resulting from his dismissal from
their complaints.
Last, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that Defendant McInerney had a conflict arising from
“a dual role as both legal counsel representing respondents (the Secretary of State) and
8 Nothing in the complaint process itself indicates that expert testimony is permitted in hearings.
Moreover, allowing experts would complicate the complaint process as the Bureau would need to
assess not only the expert’s qualifications, but also the relevance and reliability of the expert’s
testimony. And the Bureau would need some standard, such as that set forth in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to perform this assessment.
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administrative controller of the HAVA complaint process.” (ECF. No. 2 at PageID.223.) Nothing
in Plaintiffs’ complaint Exhibit E indicates that Defendant McInerney is representing Defendant
Benson as the respondent, or the State, regarding Plaintiffs’ complaints. Defendant McInerney
signed her email, “Jenny McInerney, Regulatory Attorney, Bureau of Elections, Michigan
Department of State.” (ECF No. 1-5 at PageID.38.) This does not indicate that she is representing
Defendant Benson on the HAVA complaints. Furthermore, as discussed above, after receiving
Plaintiffs’ complaints, the Department implemented an isolation wall designed to separate
Defendants Brater and McInerney from the Secretary of State’s team. (ECF No. 9-3 at
PageID.291.)
Consideration 	of 	the 	final 	factor—the 	government’s 	countervailing 	interests—also
supports that the procedures Plaintiffs are afforded under Michigan’s HAVA complaint process
are 	constitutionally 	sufficient. 	Defendant 	Brater 	notes 	that 	allowing 	Plaintiffs’ 	proposed
changes—requiring each case to proceed with a separate hearing and holding hearings of
indeterminate length—would not only burden the Bureau with additional costs but would also
divert staff from performing other required and ongoing election-related work. (ECF No. 9-3 at
PageID.295–96.) In light of these potential burdens and costs, the current procedures, including
consolidation of complaints, limited hearing time, and requiring the parties to include all support
for their complaints and responses in those filings, adequately protects Plaintiffs’ interests without
unduly burdening the Department of State or the Bureau. Finally, while Plaintiffs propose a
“neutral adjudicator” not “supervised by any respondent” (ECF No. 2 at PageID.227), they fail to
identify who might perform this function. As Defendants note, Plaintiffs’ request would essentially
disqualify the entire Department of State and exclude most, if not all, officials with expertise in
elections systems and understanding of HAVA requirements.
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Having concluded that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate likelihood of success on the
merits of their claim, I find it unnecessary to address the remaining preliminary injunction factors.
See Gonzales v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[A] finding
that there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal.”).
III. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 2.)
Dated: November 17, 2025 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of
Court within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to
file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.
1981).
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