Haggerty #734817 v. Wakefield

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
CHRISTOPHER HAGGERTY,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN WAKEFIELD,
Defendant.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1351
Honorable Ray Kent
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all
matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 4.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a
putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros.,
Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under
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longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a
named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in
that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s
claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the
proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette
Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying
these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events
about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues Food Service Director Unknown
Wakefield in his official capacity only. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) However, as set forth
below, Plaintiff is only seeking damages. Accordingly, in light of that request, the Court will
generously construe Plaintiff’s complaint as bringing claims against Defendant Wakefield in his
respective personal capacity as well.
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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Plaintiff alleges that on October 1, 2025, he was working at his kitchen detail between 1:00
p.m. and 4:00 p.m. (Id., PageID.7.) Plaintiff was stationed in the baking department next to the
mixer. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wakefield walked up behind him, stopped, and
whispered “Bye bae” in Plaintiff’s right ear. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this was not the first time
that Defendant Wakefield had “made comments of a sexual nature.” (Id.) On September 20, 2025,
Plaintiff had told Defendant Wakefield that he did not appreciate him making comments “like
‘love, bae’ etc.” (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) complaint on October 6, 2025. (Id.)
He avers that he is “in fear of retaliation and [his] physical saf[e]ty.” (Id.) Non-party Grievance
Coordinator Brooke rejected the PREA complaint as untimely on October 8, 2025. (Id.) That
rejection was signed off on by non-party Assistant Deputy Warden Jones. (Id.) Plaintiff suggests
that the rejection of his complaint “is a violation of due process.” (Id.)
Plaintiff spoke to his qualified mental health professional on October 21, 2025, and “she
reported the issues [Plaintiff] was having.” (Id.) On October 22, 2025, Plaintiff “had issues with
another inmate because of the PREA [he] filed regarding [Defendant] Wakefield.” (Id.) Plaitniff
claims that he has been “suffering from PTSD and [anxiety because of] the situation,” and that it
has caused him to lose his job. (Id.) Plaintiff has trouble sleeping, and he experiences flashbacks
every time someone walks behind him. (Id., PageID.8.) Plaintiff also suffers night terrors. (Id.)
Plaintiff indicates that he was moved from the honor unit to segregation on October 24,
2025, and that he was moved to punish him for filing the PREA complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff is “forced
to eat in [his] cell and [he is] let out of [his] cell on a rotat[ing] basis for a period of two hours.”
(Id.) Plaintiff claims that he has “been separated from general popu[]lation because [he] . . . spoke
up against [Defendant] Wakefield.” (Id.)
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Based upon the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to assert claims under
the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff seeks
$50,000.00 for medical treatment and therapy, as well as $85,000.00 for “pain/suffering and[/]or
punitive damages.” (Id., PageID.10.)
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
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a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A. 	Fourteenth Amendment Claims Against Non-Parties
Plaintiff appears to assert his Fourteenth Amendment claims against non-parties Brooke
and Jones, suggesting that they violated his due process rights by rejecting his PREA complaint as
untimely. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) However, the Court notes that these individuals are not
identified in either the case caption of the complaint or the section of the complaint where Plaintiff
lists the defendants to this suit.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that a plaintiff “name all of the parties” in
“[t]he title of the complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Further, this Court has previously concluded
that “[o]nly those individuals and entities identified in the caption of the complaint are properly
considered defendants in an action, regardless of the complaint's other contents or allegations.”
Jones v. Smith, No. 1:10-cv-568, 2012 WL 726665, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 1, 2012), R & R
adopted, 2012 WL 726621 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2012); see also Brown v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,
No. 1:22-cv-16, 2022 WL 2900888, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Jul. 22, 2022) (concluding that
corrections officers identified as defendants in a particular count of the complaint, but not named
in the caption or in the form complaint “list of parties” were not parties to the action). Accordingly,
any intended Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against non-parties Brooke and Jones
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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B. 	Claims Against Defendant Wakefield
1. 	First Amendment Retaliation
The Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert First Amendment retaliation claims
against Defendant Wakefield.
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the
Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to
set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was
engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was
motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove
that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s
alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
It is well recognized that “retaliation” is easy to allege and that it can seldom be
demonstrated by direct evidence. See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005);
Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1987). “[A]lleging merely the ultimate fact of
retaliation is insufficient.” Murphy, 833 F.2d at 108. “[C]onclusory allegations of retaliatory
motive ‘unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state . . . a claim under § 1983.’”
Harbin-Bey, 420 F.3d at 580 (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (6th Cir.
1987)); see also Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) (in complaints
screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, “[c]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive with no
concrete and relevant particulars fail to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial”) (internal quotations
omitted); Lewis v. Jarvie, 20 F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]are allegations of malice on
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the defendants’ parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims” that will survive § 1915A
screening) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998)).
Plaintiff suggests that he was retaliated against for filing the PREA complaint against
Defendant Wakefield by being removed from his job. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) He also
alleges that he was punished for filing the PREA complaint by being moved to segregation. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s complaint, however, is entirely devoid of facts from which the Court could infer that
Defendant Wakefield was personally involved in those decisions. Likewise, Plaintiff’s complaint
is devoid of facts from which the Court could infer that Defendant Wakefield was even aware of
the PREA complaint that Plaintiff had filed. Plaintiff instead appears to ask this Court to fabricate
plausibility to his retaliation claims against Defendant Wakefield from mere ambiguity; however,
ambiguity does not support a claim. It is Plaintiff’s obligation at this stage in the proceedings to
plead enough factual content to permit the Court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendant
Wakefield acted with retaliatory intent. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Because Plaintiff has not met
that initial burden, the Court will dismiss his First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendant
Wakefield.
2. 	Eighth Amendment Sexual Harassment
The Court has also construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert Eighth Amendment sexual
harassment claims against Defendant Wakefield.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to
punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981). The
Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal
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civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148
F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations
of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison
confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant
experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. “Routine discomfort is ‘part
of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” 	Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). As a consequence, “extreme
deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id.
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he
faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th
Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying
deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims). The deliberate-indifference
standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling,
509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the
subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.” Id. at 837. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act
with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of
recklessly disregarding that risk.” Id. at 836. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial
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risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the
risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844.
“Federal courts have long held that sexual abuse is sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth
Amendment[;] [t]his is true whether the sexual abuse is perpetrated by other inmates or by guards.”
Rafferty v. Trumbull Cnty., 915 F.3d 1087, 1095 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted); Bishop v.
Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussing inmate abuse); Washington v. Hively, 695
F.3d 641, 642 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing abuse by guards). However, in the context of claims
against prison officials, the Sixth Circuit Court has repeatedly held that the use of harassing or
degrading language by a prison official, although unprofessional and deplorable, does not
necessarily rise to constitutional dimensions. See, e.g., Ivey, 832 F.2d 950, 954–55 (6th Cir. 1987);
see also Johnson v. Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (harassment and verbal abuse do
not constitute the type of infliction of pain that the Eighth Amendment prohibits); Violett v.
Reynolds, No. 02-6366, 2003 WL 22097827, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 2003) (verbal abuse and
harassment do not constitute punishment that would support an Eighth Amendment claim);
Thaddeus-X v. Langley, No. 96-1282, 1997 WL 205604, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 1997) (verbal
harassment is insufficient to state a claim). In contrast, the Sixth Circuit found an Eighth
Amendment violation when a male prison official sexually harassed a female prisoner by
demanding on multiple occasions that the prisoner expose herself and masturbate while the official
watched and intimidated her into complying. Rafferty, 915 F.3d at 1095–96. The Rafferty court
noted that, in light of the coercive dynamic of the relationship between prison staff and prisoners,
such demands amount to sexual abuse. Id. at 1096.
Rafferty, however, is distinguishable from Plaintiff’s claims. Here, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Wakefield made sexual comments to Plaintiff on two occasions. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
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PageID.7.) The Court does not minimize Plaintiff’s experience; however, nothing in the complaint
suggests that Defendant Wakefield physically touched Plaintiff, or that Plaintiff reasonably feared
sexual abuse. Moreover, Defendant Wakefield’s comments, while offensive and unprofessional,
do not evidence the sort of coercive sexual demand at issue in Rafferty. See Rafferty, 915 F.3d at
1095–96. Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant
Wakefield premised upon sexual harassment will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does
not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would
not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $605.00
appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1). See McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	November 13, 2025 	/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge
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