Huaman-Rodriguez v. Lynch et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JORGE STEFANO ALEXANDER
HUAMAN-RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT LYNCH et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1330
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on October 30, 2025, by filing a counseled petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake
Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: to assume jurisdiction over this matter; to issue an order to show cause ordering
Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted within three (3) days; declare
that Petitioner’s warrantless arrest and detention without an individualized determination violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; declare that the application of the July 8, 2025,
ICE Guidance to Petitioner violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; issue a writ
of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner from custody immediately, or, in the
alternative, to promptly provide him with a bond hearing before an immigration judge; issue an
order prohibiting Respondents from transferring Petitioner out of the Western District of Michigan
without the Court’s approval; and to award attorneys’ fees and costs for this action. (Pet., ECF No.
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1, PageID.22.)1 For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court will further deny Petitioner’s motion for
discovery (ECF No. 7).
Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Peru. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 17.) He entered the
United States in 2022 (id., PageID.7) near Nogales, Arizona (Cooper Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.77). United States Border Patrol (USBP) encountered and detained Petitioner on April 8,
2022, near Patagonia Arizona, and issued Petitioner a Form I-862 Notice to Appear, “charging him
with inadmissibility under 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for being
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” (Id. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.77–
78; Notice to Appear, ECF No. 1-6, PageID.35.) Petitioner was not classified as an “arriving alien.”
(Notice to Appear, ECF No. 1-6, PageID.35
On April 17, 2023, Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum, and, on April 26,
2022, Petitioner was released from custody on his own recognizance. (Id., ¶¶ 8, 9, ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.78.) Petitioner filed an amended Form I-589 application through counsel on July 25, 2025
(id., ¶ 11, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.79). At the time of his detention, Petitioner possessed a valid
employment authorization. (ECF No. 1-3, PageID.28–29.)
On October 15, 2025, USBP arrested Petitioner at or near Chesterton, Indiana, and issued
Petitioner a Form I-200 warrant for his arrest, which was served on him that day. (Cooper Decl.
1 In an order entered on November 4, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on November 6, 2025, (ECF
No. 4), and, on November 12, 2025, Petitioner filed his reply (ECF No. 5).
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ECF No. 4-1, ¶12, PageID.79.) On October 16, 2025, ICE issued Petitioner a second Form I-200
warrant for arrest, served on Petitioner in Chicago, Illinois. (Id., ¶13, PageID.79.) Petitioner has
not been given a bond hearing. (Id., ¶14, PageID.79.)
Prior to his detention, Petitioner had been working and living with his family in Virginia.
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.19.)
II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
III. 	Exhaustion
Respondents first contend that this Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas
corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 4,
PageID.48–51.) Specifically, Respondents argue that Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing.
(Id., PageID.49.) They claim that “[s]hould he request and the court grant a hearing, he would have
the right to appeal any unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).” (Id.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
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738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to
determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination is
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principally a legal question of statutory interpretation. The existing factual record appears
sufficient for making the determination. The Court does not see the need for any additional facts
that might be developed if the Court were to require exhaustion. Moreover, this Court is not bound
by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright
Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024) (discussing that “courts need not and under the
[Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply
because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner, which
are not premised on “correctable procedural errors,” generally do not require exhaustion because
the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require
exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable procedural errors,” such as a claim
“that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an ‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to
review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody
would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact
that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all noncitizens
who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest and detention. Notably, the BIA
recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was
later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is simply
unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA of that denial would lead the Government to
change its position, and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies and request a bond hearing would likely
be futile. Moreover, it is clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. First, as noted
above, Petitioner would need to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge. There is no
evidence in the record as to how long Petitioner would have to wait until such a hearing, if any,
were scheduled. Petitioner’s request would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in
Yajure Hurtado. Then, Petitioner would have the opportunity to appeal any unfavorable decision
to the BIA. Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.”
Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citation omitted). It is
“unmistakable that . . . depriving [Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision
certainly equates to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid
. . . – detention.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
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concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner is an “applicant
for admission” and, therefore, subject to detention under § 1225. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.54–
56.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “. . . in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And, § 1226(a) states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c)[2] and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
2 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The parties do not contend that Petitioner has been convicted of any crime
listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).
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Id. § 1226(a). The plain language of these provisions indicates that both § 1225 and § 1226 govern
the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. The difference is that § 1225 provides
for mandatory detention and § 1226 allows for the release of the noncitizen on conditional parole
or bond. As explained below, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs
Petitioner’s detention.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted); see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009);
see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “must give effect
to the clear meaning of statutes as written” (citation omitted)). “When interpreting a statute, the
inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In
re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted)). But, “the
‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
context.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (citation omitted). And, “the words of a
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”
Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (citation omitted). The Court must also
“use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enters.,
144 S. Ct. at 2266.
As set forth above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention “of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” See id.
§ 1225(a)(1). The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien
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into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See id.
§ 1101(a)(13). The word “entry,” is not defined in the INA, but the dictionary definition of “entry”
is “the right or privilege of entering” or “the act of entering.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entry (last visited Nov. 17, 2025). “Entry” has long
been understood to mean “a crossing into the territorial limits of the United States.” Hing Sum v.
Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Matter of Pierre, 14 I&N Dec. 467, 468
(BIA 1973)). Further, the phrase “seeking admission” also is undefined in the statute. See generally
id. Looking to the plain, ordinary meaning of “seeking,” this word is defined as “ask[ing] for,”
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seeking (last visited
Nov. 17, 2025), and, the word “seeking” “necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.”
Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 218 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citations omitted).
In comparison to § 1225, “[s]ection 1226(a) is less specific,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025), and states that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision
on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). “[T]he
statutory text does not provide a definitive answer as to what it means to be present without
admittance where, as here, the individual has already entered and spent [a significant amount of
time] living in the United States.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5. And, even if the
statutory text appears unambiguous when viewed in isolation, “courts are to interpret the words of
a statute in context.” Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted); see Yates v. United States, 574 U.S.
528, 537 (2015) (“Whether a statutory term is unambiguous, however, does not turn solely on
dictionary definitions of its component words. Rather, ‘[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory
language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the specific
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context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’”
(alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
Section 1225 is titled, “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A title, such as this “is
especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.”
Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring). Additionally, Congress’s decision to include the
word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such
as “stowaways” and “crewmen,” in § 1225 evidences an intent to address noncitizens arriving “at
a border or port of entry.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2)(3). In
contrast, § 1226 is titled, “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. “That Congress
separated removal of arriving aliens[, as set forth in § 1225,] from its more general section for
‘Apprehension and detention of aliens,’ [as set forth in] § 1226, implies that Congress enacted
§ 1225 for a specific, limited purpose.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing Dubin v.
United States, 143 S. Ct. 1557, 1567–68 (2023)).
Further, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court
discussed that § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s
borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to
enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. The United States Supreme Court
stated that, in contrast, “[s]ection 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining
. . . aliens [already living within the United States] pending their removal.” Id. at 288. Thus, in
Jennings, the United States Supreme Court differentiated between noncitizens initially arriving to
the United States who are governed by § 1225, and noncitizens already present in the country who
are governed by § 1226. See id. at 288–89.
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Finally, the Court cannot ignore Congressional intent when conducting statutory analysis.
Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe a subset of
noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act added a
subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible under §§
1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged with, or
convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Quite simply, were the Court to agree
with Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered entirely
superfluous.
It is Respondents’ position that applicants for admission detained under § 1225(b)(2) are
subject to mandatory detention and are ineligible for any subsequent release on bond. (Resp., ECF
No. 4, PageID.56 (citation omitted).) Respondents argue that any noncitizen who has not been
lawfully admitted, regardless of whether they are already present and residing in the United States,
is “an alien seeking admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. (Id. at PageID.64).
However, that reading of § 1225 would render the qualifier “seeking admission” in the statute
entirely unnecessary. “It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought,
upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall
be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citations
omitted). Given Congress’s decision to use different terms in § 1225—i.e., “applicant for
admission” and “alien seeking admission”—the Court will presume that Congress intended these
phrases to mean different things. See Pulsifer v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2024) (“In a
given statute, . . . different terms usually have different meanings.” (citation omitted)).
Here, Petitioner is not actively seeking to lawfully cross into the territorial limits of the
United States because he already entered the United States more than three years ago. 	(Resp.,
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ECF No. 4, PageID.47). As the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
explained when addressing this issue:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then
proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be
described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be
described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered
to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
(or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered
unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the
United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [the petitioner],
because he has already been residing in the United States for several years.
Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2025); see Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (“[S]eeking admission’ . . . implies action –
something that is currently occurring, and in this instance, would most logically occur at the border
upon inspection.”).
This much applies to any undocumented alien living within the United States for a time
before arrest. But here, there is much more in favor of Petitioner. In this case, the government did
not detain Petitioner pursuant to § 1225(b) at the time of his initial encounter with USBP; instead,
Petitioner was released on recognizance, which according to Respondents’ position, would have
been unavailable to Petitioner if, as Respondents now contend, he was detained under § 1225(b)(2).
(See Cooper Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.78.) The government’s own actions, in other
words, demonstrate that section 1225(b)(2) cannot apply.
“[I]ndividuals detained following examination under section 1225 can only be paroled into
the United States ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.’” Martinez v.
Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 215 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 300). “Release on
recognizance is not ‘humanitarian’ or ‘public benefit’ ‘parole into the United States’ under
section 1182(d)(5)(A) but rather a form of ‘conditional parole’ from detention upon a charge of
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removability, authorized under section 1226.” Id. (citing Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d
1111, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2007)). In other words, § 1226 is the only basis for the type of release that
Petitioner received. Indeed, ICE’s Order of Release on Recognizance Form I-220A specifically
states that the detainee is being released “in accordance with Section 236 [§ 1226] of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.” See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Order of Release on Recognizance, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention/
checkin/I_220A_OREC.pdf.
“Thus, the Government [having] affirmatively decided to treat [Petitioner] as being
detained under Section 1226(a) . . . cannot now be heard to change its position to claim that he is
detained under Section 1225(b).” Patel v. Crowley, No. 25 C 11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2025) (citing Kennedy v. Kijakazi, No. 22-2258, 2023 WL 1990303, at *3 (7th
Cir. Feb. 14, 2023)); see also Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *7 (“It was not until
Lopez-Campos requested a custody redetermination hearing (bond hearing) that Respondents
claimed his detention was under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). The Court cannot credit this new position
that was adopted post-h[o]c . . . .”).
Accordingly, for the above-discussed reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States
and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested.3 This is especially true
3 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in a number of other habeas corpus actions
filed by immigration detainees. See, e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL
3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL
3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025
WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232,
2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271,
2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v.
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in cases such as this one, where the government’s own treatment of Petitioner demonstrates that
section 1225(b)(2) cannot apply.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.19–20.) Petitioner contends that “Respondents have made
no finding that Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk,” and that “Respondents
have already considered Petitioner’s facts and circumstances and determined that Petitioner was
not a flight risk or danger to the community when they initially released him into the United
States.” (Id., PageID.21.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner
has received due process because: “Petitioner received notice of the charges against him, has
access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration judge, can request bond at that time,
has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a short
time.” (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.73.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Respondents contend that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time. (See Resp.
ECF No. 4, PageID.73.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own supporting
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez
v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025). And, this Court
is far from the first federal District Court to reach this conclusion.
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evidence—there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing has been
scheduled.
Granted, if this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the Government’s due process argument might hold true. However, as set forth
above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) clearly
sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision.
The statute allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien, or release the alien
on “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by,
the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). This discretionary
framework “requires a bond hearing to make an individualized custody determination.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has discussed that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration
detention. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If
this court has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the
claim is an issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme
Court set out in Mathews v. Eldridge. . . .”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following
three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
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The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)
(citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e.,
“whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See
Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here,
prior to his detention, Petitioner had been working and living with his family in Virginia. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.19.) There can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations
of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack
of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F.
Supp. 3d at 1187.
Likewise, the second Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Clearly, there is a high
risk of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom should he not receive an individualized
bond hearing at which the immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk
and/or a danger to the community.
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, Respondents have not
shown that they have a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably, continuing
to enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government, as it would
be required to continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
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In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.4
V. 	Castañon Nava
Petitioner also argues that he was originally arrested without a warrant in violation of the
consent judgment in Castañon Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:18-cv-3757 (N.D. Ill.). (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) He seeks discovery related to the nature of his arrest. (ECF No. 7.) As
explained below, the Court will not resolve this issue in the context of the present § 2241 action.
Castañon Nava is a class action lawsuit filed in 2018 against the Department of Homeland
Security and ICE seeking “to ensure that ICE complies with its statutory obligations” regarding
the warrantless arrest of noncitizens. Castañon Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-cv-3757,
2025 WL 2842146, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2025).5 In 2022, the Castañon Nava parties reached a
consent judgment that precluded ICE from making warrantless arrests unless such arrests were in
compliance with the law. Id. According to the consent judgment, “[c]lass members who are
arrested contrary to the terms of the Agreement and are in ICE custody shall be released from
custody on their own recognizance without posting bond as soon as practicable subject to certain
exceptions (such as where the class member is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to the
4 In his § 2241 petition, Petitioner also claims that his detention violates the APA. (See Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.21–22.) However, the APA only provides for review of agency action “for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also Trump v. J. G. G., 145
S. Ct. 1003, 1006–07 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Here, the Court has concluded that the
writ of habeas corpus provides an adequate remedy for Petitioner’s claims that his detention
violates both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the INA. Accordingly, “habeas
corpus, not the APA, is the proper vehicle here,” see J. G. G., 145 S. Ct. at 1007 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring), and the Court declines to consider Petitioner’s APA claims.
5 The plaintiffs in Castañon Nava are defined as “a settlement class consisting of all current and
future persons arrested without a warrant for a civil violation of U.S. immigration laws within the
ICE Chicago Field Office’s Area of Responsibility.” Castañon Nava, 2025 WL 2842146, at *4.
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INA).” Id. at *5. Further, the consent judgment provides that “class members who were arrested
contrary to the terms of the Agreement and who were released on conditions including that they
post bond shall have their bond payments reimbursed and any conditions of release lifted subject
to listed exceptions.” Id.
In October 2025, the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the plaintiffs had shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that ICE had arrested class members without a warrant in violation
of the consent judgment and the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). Id. at *2. The parties to
Castañon Nava are in the process of identifying plaintiffs eligible for relief under the consent
judgment. See Order, Castañon Nava, No. 18-cv-3757 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2025), (ECF No. 247).
Based on the decision in Castañon Nava, release from custody without bond may be an
appropriate form of relief in an action outside of habeas for violation of the consent judgment.
Petitioner’s § 2241 action before this Court is not the proper avenue for Petitioner to seek such
relief and, therefore, this Court will not resolve the issue. Accordingly, the Court will also deny
Petitioner’s motion for discovery (ECF No. 7).
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
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and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will deny Petitioner’s motion for discovery (ECF No. 7).
Dated: 	November 24, 2025 	/s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
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