Serkaian et al v. White Lake Fire Authority et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
STEPHEN SERKAIAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WHITE LAKE FIRE AUTHORITY, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1327
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs Home Builders Association of Michigan, Stephen
Serkaian, and Colleen Serkaian’s motion to amend their complaint (ECF No. 31). For the reasons
below, the Court will deny in part and grant in part the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The Serkaians were preparing to build a home in Fruitland Township. Defendant Fruitland
Township issued the Serkaians a zoning permit on the condition that they would sign an agreement
with Defendant the White Lake Fire Authority (WLFA) to install a fire-suppression system. The
fire-suppression system was to be installed as required under the 2015 International Fire Code,
which Fruitland Township had adopted by reference. The Serkaians filed this lawsuit, alleging
that Fruitland Township’s ordinance adopting the 2015 International Fire Code was preempted by
state law. They also alleged that Fruitland Township had violated their equal protection and
substantive due process rights under the Michigan Constitution.1
1 The Court provided a more thorough summary of the claims and parties in its prior opinion. (See 3/16/2026 Op. 1-
3, ECF No. 27.)
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On March 16, 2026, the Court dismissed the Serkaians’ claims under the Michigan
Constitution for failure to allege sufficient facts to support them. (See 3/16/2026 Op., ECF No. 27;
3/16/2026 Order, ECF No. 28.) On April 15, 2026, Defendants filed a motion to amend or correct
their complaint (ECF No. 31) along with a brief in support of their motion (ECF No. 32) and a
copy of their proposed amended complaint (ECF No. 31-1). Fruitland Township filed a response
in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 39), arguing that the proposed amended complaint was futile.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When more than twenty-one days have passed since a defendant responded to a complaint,
the plaintiff can only amend the complaint with consent of the defendant or leave of the Court.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. 15(a)(2).
“Denial may be appropriate, however, where there is ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on
the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the
amendment, etc.’” Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Futility of Amendment
Fruitland Township argues that the Court should deny leave because the proposed
amendment would be futile. “An amendment is futile when, after including the proposed changes,
the complaint still ‘could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.’” Skatemore, Inc. v.
Whitmer, 40 F.4th 727, 737 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of
Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff’s
complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “[t]he plausibility
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standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility”
that the alleged misconduct occurred. Id. When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), courts
“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Parrino v. Price, 869 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 2017). The Court need
not accept “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, or “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
1. Equal Protection
Article 1, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws.” Mich. Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. The Michigan Supreme Court has
interpreted this clause as a “deliberate effort to duplicate the protection secured by the federal
clause.” Gora v. City of Ferndale, 576 N.W.2d 141, 145 (Mich. 1998). The federal Equal
Protection Clause, like Michigan’s clause, “typically concern[s] . . . governmental classifications
that affect some groups of citizens differently than others.” United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637,
651 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). But a plaintiff may bring a claim as a “class of one” when
the plaintiff alleges that: (1) they have been “intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated”; and (2) “there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Id. (quoting Village
of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)); see also Shepherd Montessori Ctr. Milan v.
Ann Arbor Charter Township, 783 N.W.2d 695, 697–98 (Mich. 2010) (analyzing class-of-one
claims as part of the Michigan Constitution).
(a) Similarly Situated
The Serkaians plead sufficient facts in their proposed amended complaint to allege that
Fruitland Township intentionally treated them differently from others similarly situated. For
others to be similarly situated, they must be “prima facie identical in all relevant respects or
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directly comparable in all material respects.” Green, 654 F.3d at 651 (quoting United States v.
Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2008)) (citation modified). In their initial complaint, the
Serkaians merely alleged that other homeowners were “similarly situated.” (3/16/2026 Op. 11.)
In its opinion, the Court ignored that legal conclusion and held that the relevant criteria for
comparison involved, in part, the conditions cited by Fruitland Township and the WLFA for the
enforcement of the fire-suppression system requirement:
Here, the relevant criteria for comparison are the 2015 International Fire Code’s
requirements for fire apparatus access roads, which is a general term for a road
between the fire station and a given home or building. Int’l Fire Code § 201.3
(2015). If an access road does not meet certain minimum criteria, then the fire code
applies, and so may its requirements for a fire-protection system. Id. §§ 102.5,
901.4.4 (“Where the fire code official determines that access for fire apparatus is
unduly difficult, the fire code of official shall have authority to require additional
safeguards[, including] automatic fire-extinguishing systems.”). The minimum
criteria for a fire apparatus access road include the grade of the road as established
within limits by the fire code official, id. § 503.2.7, an unobstructed width of the
road not less than twenty feet, and an unobstructed vertical clearance of not less
than thirteen feet and six inches, id. § 503.2.1.
(Id. at 8–9 (footnote omitted).)
In their proposed amended complaint, the Serkaians add allegations about the owners of
six other homes, whom they argue were similarly situated and treated differently. Specifically,
they allege that the six homes “were not required to have fire suppression systems” despite each
home “being equally subject to the effects of Sheltering Way’s alleged failure to meet minimum
fire apparatus access requirements.” (Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 81.)
The Serkaians first allege that Fruitland Township failed to enforce a fire-suppression
system requirement on a home built in 2006 under an earlier version of the 2015 International Fire
Code. But for the purposes of a relevant comparator, courts must look to others who were subject
to enforcement around the same time as the plaintiffs. See Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 63
F.4th 521, 528 (6th Cir. 2023). The owners of this home presumably applied for and received a
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zoning permit almost twenty years before the Serkaians did. Given the difference in time, the
owner of this first home is not similarly situated to the Serkaians.
The Serkaians then allege that Fruitland Township failed to enforce its fire-suppression
system requirement on a home that was “relocated from elsewhere” in 2020. (Proposed Am.
Compl. ¶ 81(d).) They allege that this home was subject to the 2015 International Fire Code under
a Fruitland Township ordinance providing that “[a]ny structure or building to be repaired must be
in conformity or made to conform during the repair with the building, electrical, plumbing, and
fire codes, as provided in this Ordinance, or as amended.” Fruitland Twp., Mich., Regulatory
Ordinances § R 41.05, https://perma.cc/9A25-PN2G. The Serkaians do not allege that the
relocation of the home involved any repairs, and so they have failed to allege sufficient facts to
conclude that the ordinance (and, by extension, the 2015 International Fire Code) would apply
here. The Court must ignore any legal conclusions, like the applicability of an ordinance,
unsupported by facts at this stage. Thus, the owner of this second home is not similarly situated
to the Serkaians either.
The Serkaians also allege that Fruitland Township failed to enforce the fire-suppression
requirement on a home that was fully gutted and remodeled in 2022. They again argue that this
home was subject to the 2015 International Fire Code under § R 41.05. This time, the Court can
reasonably infer that the gutting and remodeling involved repairs as described in § R 41.05. But
the Serkaians still fail to allege that this home was similarly situated because this home was
renovated, not constructed, and the Serkaians do not allege that it went through the process of
applying for and receiving a zoning permit. It is also unclear from the proposed amended
complaint whether the 2015 International Fire Code’s fire-suppression requirement applies to
existing structures and, if so, what criteria the WLFA had used to enforce this requirement on other
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homes. Thus, the Serkaians fail to allege sufficient facts to show that the owner of the third home
is similarly situated.
The Serkaians finally allege that there are three other homes that were under construction
sometime after the Serkaians had sent a demand letter to Defendants. Because these homes were
under construction when the Serkaians sent their demand letter, it is reasonable to infer that these
homes applied for and received a zoning permit around the same time as the Serkaians did. Unlike
the Serkaians’ home, however, these homes “were not required to have fire suppression systems.”
(Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 81.) As a result, the owners of these three homes were treated differently
from the Serkaians despite being similarly situated, and the Serkaians have alleged sufficient facts
to support the first element of their equal protection claim.
(b) Rational Basis
There is no rational basis for enforcement against the Serkaians but not against others
similarly situated. “To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must
allege facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality that applies to government
classifications.” Bower v. Village of Mt. Sterling, 44 F. App’x 670, 677 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting
lower court decision citing Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1992)).
To allege a lack of a rational basis, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts by either “negativing
every conceivable basis which might support the government action,” or “showing that the
challenged action was motivated by animus or ill-will.” TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 430
F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005).
There are no allegations in the proposed complaint to support that the WLFA or Fruitland
Township acted with animus or ill-will toward the Serkaians. So to meet their burden, the
Serkaians must negative every conceivable basis that might support the enforcement of the fire-
suppression system requirement against them. Fruitland Township argues that fire safety is one
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conceivable basis for its enforcement. Specifically, it argues that it is rational to enforce the fire-
suppression system requirement when homes are difficult to access. That may be true, but what
matters for an equal protection claim is whether Fruitland Township had a rational basis for
enforcing the fire-suppression requirement against the Serkaians as a condition of their zoning
permit while not enforcing the same requirements against other similarly situated homeowners.
See Boone v. Spurgess, 385 F.3d 923, 932 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a party needs to allege
that a government actor lacked a rational basis to enforce law against one party eligible for
enforcement but not another). In other words, it is the difference in enforcement—not just the
reason behind enforcement in general—that must be rational.
Fruitland Township does not identify any reason for the difference in enforcement between
the Serkaians and the three other houses similarly situated. The Court is unable to identify any
conceivable, rational reason for this different treatment in enforcement. Accordingly, the
Serkaians have satisfied the second prong of their class-of-one claim, and the Court will grant their
motion to amend with respect to this claim.
2. Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Michigan Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall . . .
be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17.
Michigan’s due process clause “is coextensive with its federal counterpart.” Mays v. Gov’r of
Mich., 954 N.W.2d 139, 225 (Mich. 2020) (Viviano, J., concurring). Thus, the Court interprets
the Serkaians’ claim under the Michigan Constitution alongside opinions expounding the Due
Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The Due Process Clause provides “heightened protection against government interference
with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720 (1997). When the government interferes with a fundamental right, that government action is
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subject to strict scrutiny, and “will be upheld only when [the government actions] are narrowly
tailored to a compelling governmental interest.” Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir.
2000). “Substantive due process protects a narrow class of interests, including those enumerated
in the Constitution, those so rooted in the traditions of the people as to be ranked fundamental, and
the interest in freedom from government actions that ‘shock the conscience.’” Snyder v. Village
of Luckey, No. 24-3530, 2025 WL 3269361, at *9 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 2025) (quoting Bell v. Ohio
State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 249-50 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Government actions that “shock the conscience” mean actions that are “so arbitrary and
capricious as to shock the conscience.” Mettler Walloon, LLC v. Melrose Township, 761 N.W.2d
293, 304 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). For a government’s actions related to building permits, “only the
most egregious official conduct can be considered arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” Cummins
v. Robinson Township, 770 N.W.2d 421, 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
In its opinion, the Court dismissed the Serkaians’ substantive due process claim in part
because even if Fruitland Township’s ordinance were preempted by state law, that still would not
be sufficient to shock the conscience. (3/16/2026 Op. 11 (citing Mettler Walloon, 761 N.W.2d at
304).) The Court also held that the Serkaians had failed to allege any facts to conclude that
Fruitland Township’s actions were arbitrary or capricious. (Id.)
Now, the Serkaians argue in their motion to amend that Fruitland Township’s enforcement
shocked the conscience through “the wholly haphazard way these requirements were imposed”
and “apparently retaliatory red tagging.” (Mot. to Am. Br. 3, ECF No. 32.) But there are no new
allegations in the Serkaians’ proposed amended complaint to support this argument. Thus, the
allegations in the proposed amended complaint are still insufficient to state a claim for the violation
of the Serkaians’ substantive due process rights under the Michigan Constitution.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint
with respect to their equal protection claims under the Michigan Constitution. The Court will deny
the motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims. For clarity, the surviving
claims in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint are their declaratory judgment claims (Counts I-IV), their
equal protection claims against Fruitland Township (Count V), their equal protection and due
process claims against the WLFA (Count V), and their § 1983 claims against Defendant McCarthy
(Count VI).
An order will enter consistent with this Opinion.
Dated: June 5, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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