Contreras Alvarez v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JUAN ALBERTO CONTRERAS
ALVAREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1313
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner Juan Alberto Contreras Alvarez initiated this action on October 28, 2025, by
filing a counseled combined petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and
complaint for emergency injunctive relief. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake
Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: accept jurisdiction over this matter; order Respondents not to transfer Petitioner
out of the Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these proceedings; issue a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to immediately release
Petitioner or, in the alternative, to provide petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before
an immigration judge within seven days; declare that Respondents’ classification of Petitioner
under § 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is unlawful; and award attorneys’
fees and costs for this action. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.11.)
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In an Order (ECF No. 3) entered on October 29, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to
show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
by Petitioner should not be granted. Respondents filed their response (ECF No. 4) on November
3, 2025. Petitioner filed his reply (ECF No. 6) on November 6, 2025. For the following reasons,
the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Cooper Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.40.)
Respondents represent that Petitioner “last entered the United States at an unknown place, on an
unknown date without being inspected and admitted or paroled by immigration officials.” (Id.)
Petitioner represents that he “has been present in the United States for over sixteen (16) years.”
(§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.)
On September 25, 2025, ICE agents arrested Petitioner at or near Chicago, Illinois. (Cooper
Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.40.) Petitioner, however, represents that he was detained on
September 24, 2025, “outside his workplace.” (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Petitioner was
charged with inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)(I) of the INA because Petitioner is an
“immigrant who was present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, or who
arrived at a time or place not designated by the Attorney General.” (Cooper Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 4-
1, PageID.41.) Petitioner was also charged with inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of
the INA as an
immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a
valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid
entry document required by the Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other
suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality as required under
the regulations issued by the Attorney General under section 211(a) of the Act.
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(Id.) ICE detained Petitioner without bond under § 235 of the INA because Petitioner was,
according to Respondents, “an applicant for admission to the United States seeking admission and
he is not clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission.” (Id. ¶ 7.)
Petitioner is “currently in removal proceedings on the detained docket before the Detroit
Immigration Court.” (Id. ¶ 8.) He appeared for a master calendar hearing on October 27, 2025.
(Id., PageID.42.) Petitioner “admitted to all five allegations contained in the [Notice to Appear
[NTA)], and conceded that he is inadmissible under [§] 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA.” (Id.) The
immigration judge “designated Mexico as the country of return.” (Id.) Petitioner, however, denied
inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A(i)(I) of the INA, and indicated his “intent to file a Form EOIR-
42B, Application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent
Residents.” (Id.)
Petitioner is scheduled to appear before the immigration court on November 20, 2025, for
another master calendar hearing. (Id. ¶ 9.) Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing. (Id. ¶ 7,
PageID.41.) Petitioner represents that at the October 27, 2025 hearing, “counsel for [the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)] indicated that [DHS] opposed Petitioner’s position that
the Immigration Judge has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s bond proceedings.” (§ 2241 Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.4.)
II. 	Exhaustion
Respondents first contend that this Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas
corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 4,
PageID.18.) Specifically, Respondents argue that Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing, and
that if he were to do so, he would have the right to appeal “any unfavorable decision to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA).” (Id.) Petitioner avers that the Court should waive any prudential
exhaustion requirement. (ECF No. 6, PageID.46.)
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Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145
(1992)). This discretion is referred to as “prudential” exhaustion, Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan,
937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply with
statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should impose
administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful mandatory
detention.” See Pizzaro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1621, 2025 WL
2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)). However, courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied
the three-factor test, set forth in United States v. California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir.
1983),” to determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. See Lopez-Campos v.
Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). Thus,
[c]ourts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
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petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by and is not required to give deference to any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (noting
that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an
agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner here,
generally do not require exhaustion because the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of
Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that
conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that
§ 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all aliens who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest
and detention. Notably, the BIA recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the
United States unlawfully and was later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229
(BIA 2025). It is simply unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA would lead to the
Government changing its position and precluding judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4. A
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court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is fit for
resolution and delay means hardship.” See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529
U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of
administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
Here, there is no question that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. First, as noted
above, Petitioner would need to request a bond redetermination hearing before an immigration
judge. There is no evidence in the record as to how long Petitioner would have to wait until such
a hearing, if any, were scheduled. Petitioner’s request would likely be denied given the BIA’s
recent decision in Yajure Hurtado. Then, Petitioner would have the opportunity to appeal any
unfavorable decision to the BIA. Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be
resolved at the BIA.” See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239. 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025).
As set forth above, Petitioner is scheduled to appear before the immigration court for a
master calendar hearing on November 20, 2025. However, the record is silent as to when Petitioner
will be scheduled for his final merits hearing. It is possible that a determination from the BIA as
to whether Petitioner is entitled to bond would come before any final decision regarding removal.
Nevertheless, it is unmistakable that “depriving [Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA
appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner]
is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that prudential exhaustion is warranted,
the Court concludes in the alterative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the
Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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III. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) According to Petitioner, “[t]he statutory structure
distinguishes between those arriving at the border (§ 1225) and those already admitted to or
residing in the [United States] (§ 1226).” (Id., PageID.8.) Respondents, however, contend that
Petitioner “unambiguously meets every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2),” and that “even
if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were ambiguous, its structure and history support the agency’s
interpretation of the statute.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.21.)
In order to address the parties’ arguments, this Court must engage in principles of statutory
interpretation. “A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Corey v.
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009); see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir.
2022 (noting how courts “must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written”). When
engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court’s “inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends
there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th
Cir. 2022) (quoting Binno v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 346 (6th Cir. 2016)). But, “the
‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
context.’” See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)). “The words of a statute must be read in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012). This Court must also “use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the
best reading of the statute.” Raimondo, 603 U.S. at 400.
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With these principles in mind, the Court begins with the language of the statutes in
question. Section 1225(b)(2)(a) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(a). An “applicant for admission” is
defined as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States.” See id. § 1225(a)(1). The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the
lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). Section 1226(a), on the other hand, states that “[o]n a warrant
issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Respondents argue that Petitioner “unambiguously is an ‘applicant for admission’ under
the plain text of [§ 1225] because he is a noncitizen, he was not admitted to the United States, and
he was present in the United States when he was apprehended.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.22 (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020)).
Respondents further assert that because “Petitioner has not agreed immediately to depart, logically
he must be seeking to remain—a legal action that requires ‘admission,’ i.e., a lawful entry.” (Id.,
PageID.23.) Respondents also argue that “applicant for admission” presumptively “characterizes
all unlawfully present noncitizens as applying for admission until they are either removed or
successfully obtain a lawful entry, regardless of their subjective intent.” (Id.) Essentially,
Respondents assert that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention of any noncitizen who is “present”
in the United States and who has not been lawfully admitted. However, for the reasons discussed
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below, this Court agrees with the numerous other courts in the country that have concluded that
Respondents’ interpretation of the statute is too broad.
As set forth supra, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention of an “alien seeking
admission” after an “examining immigration officer” determines that the alien “is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” In this Court’s opinion, the phrase “seeking admission”
refers to an action that is currently occurring and that would occur at the United States’ border
when the alien is being inspected. Here, under the facts and circumstances of Petitioner’s case, an
“examining immigration officer” did not make a determination as to whether Petitioner was not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted when Petitioner came into the United States
over 16 years ago. Petitioner was not crossing the border when he was arrested and detained.
Instead, Petitioner was detained on September 24 or 25, 2025, near Chicago, Illinois. (§ 2241 Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.4; Cooper Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.40.) Furthermore, while Petitioner
has indicated an intent to seek cancellation of removal and adjustment of status, there is nothing
in the record currently before the Court to suggest that Petitioner has ever attempted to gain lawful
status since entering the United States over 16 years ago.
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to aliens
undergoing inspection, which generally occurs at the United States’ border, when they are seeking
lawful entry into the United States. Thus, because the record shows that Petitioner resided in the
United States for over 16 years before being arrested and detained, there is simply no logical reason
to interpret § 1225(b)(2)(A) as applying to Petitioner given that Petitioner was not actively
“seeking admission” during those 16 years.
Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), section 1226(a) provides that, when dealing with “apprehension
and detention of aliens,” the Attorney General may issue a warrant and “arrest[] or detain[] [an
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alien] pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a). Here, § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s situation—Petitioner was apprehended in
Illinois, arrested, and detained. Petitioner has been detained pending removal proceedings before
an immigration judge; thus, under § 1226(a), the Attorney General has discretion to either detain
or release Petitioner on bond or conditional parole. This language clearly allows the alien to request
a bond redetermination by an immigration judge.
This Court’s conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s clarification that sections
1225 and 1226 apply in different circumstances. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018).
As the Jennings Court noted, § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at
the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien
seeking to enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Section 1226, however,
applies to the process of “arresting and detaining” aliens who are already living within the United
States but are still subject to removal. See id. at 287. Thus, in Jennings, the Supreme Court
differentiated between noncitizens arriving to the United States, who are, therefore, governed by
§ 1225, and noncitizens already present in the country and who are, accordingly, governed by
§ 1226.
The broader language of the statute, as recently amended, further supports the Court’s
conclusion. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to classify a
subset of noncitizens as exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act added
a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible under
§§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged with,
or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). If the Court accepted Respondents’
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interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered entirely superfluous. See
Corey, 556 U.S. at 314 (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.”).
In sum, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens,
such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States for many years and were already within
the United States when apprehended and arrested. The reading of the pertinent statutes clearly
supports this conclusion. This Court has recently reached the same conclusion in several other
habeas corpus matter filed by detainees at the North Lake Processing Center. 1 Moreover, this Court
is far from the first federal district court to reach this conclusion. 2
1 See Hernandez Garcia v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1281, 2025 WL 3122800, at *5 (W.D. Mich.
Nov. 7, 2025); Rodriguez Serrano v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1320, 2025 WL 3122825, at *5–6 (W.D.
Mich. Nov. 7, 2025); Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL 3077589, at *6
(W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at *5–6
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL 3039266, at
*5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025 WL 3039255,
at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271, 2025 WL 3017200,
at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196, 2025 WL
3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025
WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131,
2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025).
2 See, e.g., Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8; see also Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1256–
61; Singh v. Lewis, No. 4:25-cv-96-RGJ, 2025 WL 2699219, at *3–5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025);
Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7–12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22,
2025); Campos Leon v. Forestal, 1:25-cv-1774-SEB-MJD, 2025 WL 2694763, at *2–5 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 22, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 1:25-cv-1408 (LMB/IDD), 2025 WL 2682255, at *5–9
(E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-2677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at
*2–3 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025); Kostak v. Trump et al., No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL
2472136, at *2–4 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Romero v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11631-BEM, 2025 WL
2403827, at *8–13 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); Maldonado v. Olson, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE,
2025 WL 2374411, at *9–16 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); dos Santos v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-12052-
JEK, 2025 WL 2370988, at *6–9 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 1:25-
cv-05937-DEH, 2025 WL 2371588, at *3–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa, No.
2:25-cv-02157-DLR, 2025 WL 2337099, at *6–11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-
cv-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *6–8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025). This is just a representative
sampling of the various federal district courts that have reached the same conclusion as this Court.
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s case is governed by § 1226(a), and he
is subject to the discretionary bond determination set forth therein.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9.) Petitioner avers that his “detention, now over one
month and potentially indefinite, has become excessive, punitive, and unconstitutional.” (Id.,
PageID.9–10.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received
due process because he “received notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may
attend hearings with an immigration judge, can request bond at that time, has the right to appeal
the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for only two weeks.” (ECF No. 4,
PageID.35.) Respondents also contend that Petitioner is not due any further process because
Petitioner “admits that he entered the country without inspection in 2008 and evaded detection for
nearly 17 years.” (Id.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends
to all persons, regardless of status. See A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025). Thus,
noncitizens such as Petitioner are entitled to its protections. See id.; see also Chavez-Acosta v.
Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2023).
As an initial matter, Respondents’ contention that Petitioner has been detained by ICE for
only two weeks is contradicted by their own supporting evidence. As set forth above, Petitioner
was arrested and detained on September 24 or 25, 2025. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; Cooper
Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.40.) Accordingly, Petitioner properly represents that he has been
detained for over one month.
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Granted, if this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the Government’s due process argument might hold true. However, as set forth
supra, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) clearly
sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision.
The statute explicitly allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien, or release
the alien with either “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions
prescribed by, the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), (2). This
discretionary 	framework 	“requires 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	make 	an 	individualized 	custody
determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, under Mathews,
this Court must consider the following three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures
entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is
held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, No. 25-
CV-01151 (JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 1459154 at *7 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (citing Hernandez-
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Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d
Cir. 2020)). Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he “is married, has two U.S. citizen
children, and provides sole financial support for his family.” (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.)
Petitioner represents further that he “has established deep family and community ties, living in
Chicago, Illinois.” (Id., PageID.4.) Here, Petitioner is now detained at a processing center that is
in a different state than his home and support system, and there can be no doubt that he is
“experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends
and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of
freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 2025 WL 1459154 at *7.
The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. An individualized bond
hearing ensures that an immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk or a
danger to the community, reducing the risk that Petitioner will suffer an “erroneous deprivation”of
his rights. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
Under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does, indeed,
have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025). However, given the record available to the Court,
Respondents have not established a significant interest in potentially “detaining someone who
[could convince] a neutral adjudicator, following a hearing and assessment of the evidence, that
his ongoing detention is not warranted.” See id. Furthermore, Respondents have not established
that an individualized hearing would pose “administrative or financial costs” in this case—“[t]o
the contrary,” Respondents’ position “requires the government to continue funding and overseeing
[Petitioner’s] detention[.]” See id.
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In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
IV. 	Prohibition on Transfer and Proper Respondents
Petitioner requests that the Court order Respondents “not to transfer Petitioner out of the
Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these proceedings to preserve jurisdiction
and access to counsel.” (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.11.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Circuit Ct.
of Ky., 410 U.S. 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has “conclude[d] that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the INS District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the
respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003).
Here, Petitioner has named United States Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem; ICE
Detroit Field Office Director Robert Lynch; and ICE Detroit Enforcement and Removal
Operations Director Kevin Raycraft. Respondents request that Secretary Noem and Director Lynch
be dismissed because Respondent Raycraft, “the Acting Detroit ICE Field Office Director[,] is the
only proper respondent in this habeas suit.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.37.)
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In Roman, the Sixth Circuit stated that while it “conclude[d] that the immediate custodian
rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, [there is] the possibility of exceptions to
this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court went on to note:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas[v. Olsen], 194 F. Supp. 2d [368,] 374
[(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often
transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp.
2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-
to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS
facilities, 	all 	of 	which 	are 	under 	the 	control 	of 	the 	Attorney 	General.”).
Rosenbloom, supra, at 549. In light of these transfers, one court reasoned that an
alien may properly name a respondent other than his immediate custodian because
a petition naming a higher level official, such as the Attorney General, could be
adjudicated without interruption in the event of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte[v.
Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL 1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct.
30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only one’s immediate custodian
would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS were to exercise its transfer
power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
In light of the foregoing, the Court declines to enter an order directing Respondents not to
transfer Petitioner out of the Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these
proceedings, especially given that these proceedings will conclude with the entry of this opinion
and accompanying judgment. The Court, however, recognizes the need to ensure that Respondents
maintain authority to enforce this Court’s grant of habeas relief and directive that Petitioner receive
a bond hearing or, alternatively, be released. The Court, therefore, will not dismiss Secretary Noem
as a Respondent to these proceedings. Moreover, the Court notes that Director Lynch has remained
as a Respondent after the Court’s adjudication of several § 2241 petitions filed by detainees at the
North Lake Processing Center. See, e.g., Ruiz Mejia, 2025 WL 3041827; De Jesus Ramirez, 2025
WL 3039266; Marin Garcia, 2025 WL 3017200; Cervantes Rodriguez, 2025 WL 3022212;
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Puerto-Hernandez, 2025 WL 3012033; Rodriguez Carmona, 2025 WL 2992222; Sanchez Alvarez,
2026 WL 2942648. The Court, therefore, will also not dismiss Director Lynch as a Respondent to
these proceedings.
V. 	Summary
The Court rejects Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and, therefore, that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention. Instead, the Court
concludes that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a) and, therefore, that Petitioner is
entitled to a discretionary and individualized bond determination as set forth in that statute.
Likewise, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	because 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	is 	governed 	by
§ 1226(a), his current detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights. 3
As a court in the Eastern District of Michigan recently stated, “[t]he recent shift to use the
mandatory detention framework under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not only wrong but also
fundamentally unfair. In a nation of laws vetted and implemented by Congress, we don’t get to
arbitrarily choose which laws we feel like following when they best suit our interests.” Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *10. Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, bit the Court notes
that the immigration judge is in a better position to evaluate whether Petitioner poses a flight risk
3 In his § 2241 petition, Petitioner also raises a claim that the BIA’s July 8, 2025, memorandum
that “abrupt[ly] reclassify[ed] . . . long-term residents as ‘arriving aliens’ is arbitrary and
capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9.)
However, the APA only provides for review of agency action “for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court.” See 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 674 (2025)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Here, the Court has concluded that the writ of habeas corpus provides
an adequate remedy for Petitioner’s claims that his detention violates both the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause and the INA. Accordingly, “habeas corpus, not the APA, is the proper vehicle
here,” see Trump, 604 U.S. at 674, and the Court declines to consider Petitioner’s APA claim.
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and a danger to the community. Accordingly, the Court leaves to the immigration judge’s sound
discretion a determination on that issue.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will order
Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five
business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and accompanying Judgment or, in the
alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents
to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and accompanying
Judgment to certify compliance with this opinion. The status report shall include if and when the
bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the reasons for the
denial.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
November 12, 2025 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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