Hernandez Garcia v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JESUS HERNANDEZ GARCIA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1281
Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner Jesus Hernandez Garcia initiated this action on October 22, 2025, by filing a
counseled petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No.
1.) Petitioner is a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: accept jurisdiction over this matter; issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) within fourteen (14) days; and to award attorneys’ fees and costs for this action. (§ 2241
Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.13.)
In an order (ECF No. 3) entered on October 24, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to
show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
by Petitioner should not be granted. Respondents filed their response (ECF No. 4) on October 29,
2025. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
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Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Ellis Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.40.)
Respondents represent that Petitioner “entered the United States at an unknown date, time, and
place without being inspected and admitted or paroled by immigration officials.” (Id.) Petitioner
represents that he “has resided in the United States since he arrived in or around 1999 with his
family.” (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Petitioner “lives in Illinois with his wife and three
U.S. citizen children.” (Id., PageID.10.)
On October 3, 2025, a United States Border Patrol (USBP) agent encountered Petitioner in
or around Little Village, Illinois. (Ellis Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.40.) The agent arrested
Petitioner. (Id.) Petitioner represents that he was detained “after his U.S. citizen son was tackled
by ICE and wrongfully detained.” (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.) Petitioner was charged
with inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
because Petitioner was an “immigrant who was present in the United States without having been
admitted or paroled, or who arrived at a time or place not designated by the Attorney General.”
(Ellis Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.40–41.) Agents also charged Petitioner with inadmissibility
pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA
as an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession
of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other
valid entry document required by the Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other
suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality as required under
the regulations issued by the Attorney General under section 211(a) of the Act.
(Id. ¶ 5, PageID.41.) ICE detained Petitioner pursuant to § 235 of the INA because Petitioner was,
according to Respondents, “an applicant for admission to the United States seeking admission and
he is not clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission.” (Id. ¶ 6.)
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Petitioner is “currently in removal proceedings on the detained docket before the Detroit
Immigration Court.” (Id. ¶ 7.) On October 15, 2025, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for
a bond hearing with the immigration court. (Id. ¶ 8.) Respondents represent that the immigration
judge scheduled a master calendar hearing and custody redetermination hearing for October 28,
2025. (Id. ¶ 9, PageID.41–42.) On October 28, 2025, the immigration judge denied Petitioner’s
request for a change in custody status after concluding that he lacked jurisdiction to rule upon that
request. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.57.)
II. 	Exhaustion
Respondents first contend that this Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas
corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 4,
PageID.19.) Specifically, Respondents argue that “[s]hould the immigration court decline to grant
[Petitioner] bond, he would have the right to appeal any unfavorable decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA).” (Id.) In his reply, Petitioner contends that: (1) no statute or rule
mandates administrative exhaustion; (2) the Court should not require prudential exhaustion; and
(3) waiver of exhaustion is warranted. (ECF No. 5, PageID.44–46.)
Petitioner is correct that no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion
by Petitioner. Thus, whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial
discretion.” See Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). This discretion is referred to as “prudential” exhaustion,
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019), and such a court-made
exhaustion rule must comply with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d
at 593–94. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided
“whether courts should impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas
petition for unlawful mandatory detention.” See Pizzaro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025
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WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
No. 1:25-cv-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)). However, courts within
the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v. California Care
Corp., 709 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983),” to determine whether prudential exhaustion should be
required. See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 29, 2025). Thus,
[c]ourts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by and is not required to give deference to any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (noting
that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an
agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
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Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner here,
generally do not require exhaustion because the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of
Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that
conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that
§ 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all aliens who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest
and detention. Notably, the BIA recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the
United States unlawfully and was later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216,
229 (2025). It is simply unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA would lead to the
Government changing its position and precluding judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4. A
court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is fit for
resolution and delay means hardship.” See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529
U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of
administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
Here, there is no question that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. As set forth
above, Petitioner appeared before the immigration judge for a master calendar hearing and a
custody redetermination hearing on October 28, 2025, and the immigration judge denied the
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custody determination request based upon a lack of jurisdiction. Appeals of bond denials “typically
take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.” See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d
1239. 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025). However, the record is silent as to when Petitioner will be
scheduled for his final merits hearing. It is possible that a determination from the BIA as to whether
Petitioner is entitled to bond would come before any final decision regarding removal.
Nevertheless, it is unmistakable that “depriving [Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA
appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner]
is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that prudential exhaustion is warranted,
the Court concludes in the alterative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the
Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
III. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.12.) According to Petitioner, noncitizens who “previously entered
the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in
removal proceedings” are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “and are eligible for release on
bond, “unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.” (Id.) Respondents, however,
contend that Petitioner “unambiguously meets every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2),”
and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were ambiguous, its structure and history support the
agency’s interpretation of the statute.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.22.)
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In order to address the parties’ arguments, this Court must engage in principles of statutory
interpretation. “A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Corey v.
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009); see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir.
2022 (noting how courts “must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written”). When
engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court’s “inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends
there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th
Cir. 2022) (quoting Binno v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 346 (6th Cir. 2016)). But, “the
‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
context.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)). “The words of a statute must be read in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012). This Court must also “use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the
best reading of the statute.” Raimondo, 603 U.S. at 400.
With these principles in mind, the Court begins with the language of the statutes in
question. Section 1225(b)(2)(a) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(a). An “applicant for admission” is
defined as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States.” See id. § 1225(a)(1). The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the
lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). Section 1226(a), on the other hand, states that “[o]n a warrant
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issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Respondents argue that Petitioner “unambiguously is an ‘applicant for admission’ under
the plain text of [§ 1225] because he is a noncitizen, he was not admitted to the United States, and
he was present in the United States when he was apprehended.” (ECF No. 6, PageID.23 (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020)).
Respondents further assert that because “Petitioner has not agreed immediately to depart, logically
he must be seeking to remain—a legal action that requires ‘admission,’ i.e., a lawful entry.” (Id.,
PageID.24.) Respondents also argue that “applicant for admission” presumptively “characterizes
all unlawfully present noncitizens as applying for admission until they are either removed or
successfully obtain a lawful entry, regardless of their subjective intent.” (Id.) Essentially,
Respondents assert that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention of any noncitizen who is “present”
in the United States and who has not been lawfully admitted. However, for the reasons discussed
below, this Court agrees with the numerous other courts in the country that have concluded that
Respondents’ interpretation of the statute is too broad.
As set forth supra, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention of an “alien seeking
admission” after an “examining immigration officer” determines that the alien “is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” In this Court’s opinion, the phrase “seeking admission”
refers to an action that is currently occurring and that would occur at the United States’ border
when the alien is being inspected. Here, under the facts and circumstances of Petitioner’s case, an
“examining immigration officer” did not make a determination as to whether Petitioner was not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted when Petitioner came into the United States at
some point in 1999. Petitioner was not crossing the border when he was arrested and detained.
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Instead, Petitioner was detained on October 3, 2025, near Little Village, Illinois. (Ellis Decl. ¶ 5,
ECF No. 4-1, PageID.40.) Furthermore, there is nothing in the record currently before the Court
to suggest that Petitioner has ever attempted to gain lawful status in the United States since entering
the country in 1999.
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to aliens
undergoing inspection, which generally occurs at the United States’ border, when they are seeking
lawful entry into the United States. Thus, because the record clearly shows that Petitioner resided
in the United States for over 25 years before being arrested and detained, there is simply no logical
reason to interpret § 1225(b)(2)(A) as applying to Petitioner given that Petitioner was not actively
“seeking admission” during those 25 years.
Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), section 1226(a) provides that, when dealing with “apprehension
and detention of aliens,” the Attorney General may issue a warrant and “arrest[] or detain[] [an
alien] pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a). Here, § 1226(a) clearly applies to Petitioner’s situation—Petitioner was
apprehended in Illinois, arrested, and detained. Petitioner has been detained pending removal
proceedings before an immigration judge; thus, under § 1226(a), the Attorney General has
discretion to either detain or release Petitioner on bond or conditional parole. This language clearly
allows the alien to request a bond redetermination by an immigration judge—which is exactly what
Petitioner did at his hearing before the immigration judge on October 28, 2025.
This Court’s conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s clarification that sections
1225 and 1226 apply in different circumstances. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018).
As the Jennings Court noted, § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at
the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien
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seeking to enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Section 1226, however,
applies to the process of “arresting and detaining” aliens who are already living within the United
States but are still subject to removal. See id. at 287. Thus, in Jennings, the Supreme Court
differentiated between noncitizens arriving to the United States, who are, therefore, governed by
§ 1225, and noncitizens already present in the country and who are, accordingly, governed by
§ 1226.
Moreover, the Court cannot ignore Congressional intent when conducting statutory
analysis. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe a
subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act
added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible
under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged
with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Quite simply, were the Court
to agree with Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered
entirely superfluous.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States for many years and were already within the
United States when apprehended and arrested. The reading of the pertinent statutes clearly supports
this conclusion. This Court has recently reached the same conclusion in several other habeas
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corpus matter filed by detainees at the North Lake Processing Center. 1 Moreover, this Court is far
from the first federal district court to reach this conclusion.2
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s case is governed by § 1226(a), and he
is subject to the discretionary bond determination set forth therein.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.12.) Petitioner avers that he “has a fundamental interest
in liberty and being free from official restraint.” (Id., PageID.13.) Petitioner contends further that
“[t]he [G]overnment’s detention of Petitioner without a bond redetermination hearing to determine
whether he is a flight risk or danger to others violates his right to due process.” (Id.) Respondents
1 See Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31,
2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct.
31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich.
Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271, 2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich.
Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222,
at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648,
at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025).
2 See, e.g., Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8; see also Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1256–
61; Singh v. Lewis, No. 4:25-cv-96-RGJ, 2025 WL 2699219, at *3–5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025);
Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7–12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22,
2025); Campos Leon v. Forestal, 1:25-cv-1774-SEB-MJD, 2025 WL 2694763, at *2–5 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 22, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 1:25-cv-1408 (LMB/IDD), 2025 WL 2682255, at *5–9
(E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-2677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at
*2–3 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025); Kostak v. Trump et al., No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL
2472136, at *2–4 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Romero v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11631-BEM, 2025 WL
2403827, at *8–13 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); Maldonado v. Olson, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE,
2025 WL 2374411, at *9–16 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); dos Santos v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-12052-
JEK, 2025 WL 2370988, at *6–9 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 1:25-
cv-05937-DEH, 2025 WL 2371588, at *3–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa, No.
2:25-cv-02157-DLR, 2025 WL 2337099, at *6–11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-
cv-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *6–8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025). This is just a representative
sampling of the various federal district courts that have reached the same conclusion as this Court.
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counter Petitioner’s arguments stating that Petitioner has received due process because he
“received notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings
with an immigration judge, has requested bond, has the right to appeal the denial of any request
for bond, and has been detained by ICE for less than four weeks.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.36.)
Respondents also contend that Petitioner is not due any further process because Petitioner “admits
that he entered the country without inspection and evaded detection for more than two decades.”
(Id.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends
to all persons, regardless of status. See A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025). Thus,
noncitizens such as Petitioner are entitled to its protections. See id.; see also Chavez-Acosta v.
Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 236837, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2023).
Granted, if this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the Government’s due process argument might hold true. However, as set forth
supra, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) clearly
sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision.
The statute explicitly allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien, or release
the alien with either “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions
prescribed by, the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), (2). This
discretionary 	framework 	“requires 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	make 	an 	individualized 	custody
determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
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The Sixth Circuit has held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, under Mathews,
this Court must consider the following three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures
entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is
held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, No. 25-
CV-01151 (JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 1459154 at *7 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (citing Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d
Cir. 2020)). Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he is “the father of three U.S. citizen
children, ages 7, 16, and 22, who depend on him for emotional and financial support.” (§ 2241
Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.) Petitioner avers that he “has built a stable family and meaningful ties
within his community.” (Id.) Petitioner has also “maintained consistent employment.” (Id.) In his
reply, Petitioner states that his “youngest son requires 24/7 care due to severe developmental
disability.” (ECF No. 5, PageID.49.) Petitioner “is the sole breadwinner for the family, allowing
his wife to provide their youngest son with necessary care.” (Id.) Here, Petitioner is now detained
at a processing center that is in a different state than his home and support system, and there can
be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of
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contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most
fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 2025 WL 1459154 at *7.
Likewise, the second Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Clearly, there is a high
risk of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom should he not receive an individualized
bond hearing at which the immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk
and/or a danger to the community.
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025). However, on the record before the Court, Respondents
have not shown that they have a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably,
continuing to enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government,
as it would be required to continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
IV. 	Proper Respondents
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Circuit Ct.
of Ky., 410 U.S. 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of [§] 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.
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Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has “conclude[d] that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the INS District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the
respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003).
Here, Petitioner has named Acting Field Office Director of the ICE Detroit Field Office Kevin
Raycraft; United States Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem; the United States
Department of Homeland Security; United States Attorney General Pamela Bondi; the Executive
Office for Immigration Review; The GEO Group, Inc.; and Unknown Party, referred to as the
Warden of the North Lake Processing Center, as Respondents. Respondents argue that Acting
Field Office Director Raycraft is the only proper Respondent to this action. (ECF No. 4,
PageID.37.)
In Roman, the Sixth Circuit stated that while it “conclude[d] that the immediate custodian
rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, [there is] the possibility of exceptions to
this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court went on to note:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 374. Aliens
remaining in detention for extended periods are often transferred several times
during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-to-day custodian, frequently
change when detainees are transferred among INS facilities, all of which are under
the control of the Attorney General.”); Rosenbloom, supra, at 549. In light of these
transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent other
than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official, such
as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event of
a transfer. Arias–Agramonte, 2000 WL 1617999, at *8 (explaining that a petition
naming only one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was
transferred to another local district).
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Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
In light of the foregoing, the Court recognizes the need to ensure that Respondents maintain
authority to enforce this Court’s grant of habeas relief and directive that Petitioner receive a bond
hearing or, alternatively, be released in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan. The Court, therefore, will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to
these proceedings. The Court will, however, dismiss the United States Department of Homeland
Security; United States Attorney General Pamela Bondi; the Executive Office for Immigration
Review; The GEO Group, Inc.; and Unknown Party, referred to as the Warden of the North Lake
Processing Center, as Respondents.
V. 	Summary
For the reasons set forth above, the Court disagrees with Respondents that Petitioner’s
detention is governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A) and, therefore, that Petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention. Instead, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a) and,
therefore, that Petitioner is entitled to a discretionary and individualized bond determination as set
forth in that statute. Likewise, the Court finds that because Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1226(a), his current detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights. While Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, the Court notes that the immigration
judge is in a better position to evaluate whether Petitioner poses a flight risk and a danger to the
community. Accordingly, the Court leaves to the immigration judge’s sound discretion a
determination on that issue.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
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Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and accompanying judgment or, in
the 	alternative, 	immediately 	release 	Petitioner 	from 	custody. 	The 	Court 	will 	also 	order
Respondents to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and
accompanying judgment to certify compliance with this opinion. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial. The Court will also dismiss the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Pamela Bondi, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, The GEO Group, Inc., and Unknown
Party as Respondents in this matter.
Dated: November 7, 2025 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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