C.D. Momber Sales, LLC v. Sparta, Township of et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
C.D. MOMBER SALES, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
SPARTA TOWNSHIP, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1265
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
This case concerns a parcel of land caught between two municipal entities. The land sits
in Sparta Township, Michigan, and is owned by Plaintiff C.D. Momber Sales, LLC. C.D. Momber
wants the land to be part of the Village of Sparta (rather than the Township), but the Village’s
petition for annexation was denied by the Kent County Board of Commissioners. C.D. Momber
now sues Defendant Sparta Township and several of its officials for their alleged role in frustrating
the Village’s annexation attempt. C.D. Momber alleges that Defendants deprived it of procedural
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, violated its right to petition the government under
the First Amendment, engaged in an unconstitutional taking of its property under the Fifth
Amendment, and engaged in a civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants now move to
dismiss all of C.D. Momber’s claims (ECF No. 16). For the reasons explained below, the Court
will grant the motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
This lawsuit centers on a 58-acre property (“the Property”) located in Sparta Township,
just outside of the Village of Sparta. (Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1.) In 2009, the Township and the
Village entered into a contract that tangentially concerned the Property. (See Act 425 Agreement,
ECF No. 12-3, PageID.104.) A Michigan statute authorizes municipal entities to enter “Act 425”
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page 1
of 13

2
agreements to transfer property from one municipality to another. See Clam Lake Township v.
Dep’t of Licensing & Regul. Affs./State Boundary Comm’n, 902 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Mich. 2017);
Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 124.21–124.30. Under the 2009 Act 425 agreement, the Township
transferred an area of land to the Village; in exchange, the Village agreed to not annex any
Township land adjacent to the transferred land. (See Act 425 Agreement 2.) The Property is part
of the adjacent land that the Village was barred from annexing. C.D. Momber subsequently bought
the Property, unaware of the Act 425 agreement. (See Compl. ¶ 12.)
C.D. Momber wants the Village of Sparta to annex the Property because it believes
annexation will increase the Property’s value. (See id. ¶ 22.) Under Michigan law, a village can
alter its boundaries by petitioning the relevant county board of supervisors. See Mich. Comp.
Laws § 74.6. At C.D. Momber’s request, the Village submitted a petition to the Kent County
Board of Supervisors in February of 2025 requesting permission to annex the Property. (See
Annexation Petition, ECF No. 12-2, PageID.99.) The Township opposed the petition on the basis
that annexation was barred by the Act 425 agreement. (Compl. ¶ 17.) The Kent County
Administrator agreed with the Township, and did not forward the petition to the Board of
Commissioners. (See 3/5/2025 Email, ECF No. 12-4, PageID.115.) C.D. Momber then brought
this lawsuit against Sparta Township and seven township officials: Jason Bradford, Barb Johnson,
Bill Goodfellow, and Rob Steffens, all trustees of Sparta Township; Dale Bergman, the Township
Supervisor; Marcy Savage, the Township Clerk; and Ashley Johnson, the Township Treasurer.
(Compl. ¶ 9.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint may be dismissed
for failure to state a claim if it fails “to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page 2
of 13

3
the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration
in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and
conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”). The Court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “construe the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Parrino v. Price, 869 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 2017). The court “may consider the Complaint and
any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits
attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are
central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).
B. Rule 12(b)(1)
Article III of the Constitution grants federal courts the authority “to decide ‘Cases’ or
‘Controversies’ between litigants.” Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. FDA, 13 F.4th 531,
536 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). If a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, then a
case or controversy does not exist, and the court lacks jurisdiction. See Murray v. U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, 681 F.3d 744, 748 (6th Cir. 2012). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing” standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). To
establish standing, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Murray, 681 F.3d
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page 3
of 13

4
at 748 (quoting Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 (2007)). Because
standing is a jurisdictional issue, it “must be addressed as a threshold matter.” Kanuszewski v.
Mich. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 405 (6th Cir. 2019).
Although Defendants’ motion to dismiss is styled as one under Rule 12(b)(6), they argue
in their reply brief that C.D. Momber lacks standing, so the Court will address this argument as if
it were contained in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 The
standard for evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion depends on the nature of the “attack” on subject
matter jurisdiction. A “facial attack” on subject matter jurisdiction “merely questions the
sufficiency of the [complaint].” Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th
Cir. 1990). The Court accepts the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true and asks whether
subject matter jurisdiction exists based on the complaint. Id. No presumption of truth applies in
a “factual attack” on subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Factual attacks challenge the existence of
jurisdiction based on facts outside the pleadings. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Here, because Defendants argue that the complaint is
insufficient to establish standing, the Court will construe their attack as facial.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standing
Defendants argue that C.D. Momber lacks standing to bring suit against them because they
did not cause its alleged injury and cannot redress it. Defendants note that it was Kent County,
not the Township, that refused to consider the Village’s annexation petition. They cite Turaani v.
Wray for the proposition that “[a] third party’s ‘legitimate discretion’ breaks the chain of
1 Because Defendants raised standing as a new issue in their reply brief, they note that they would not oppose C.D.
Momber filing a surreply. C.D. Momber has not moved for permission to file a surreply, so the Court will address the
standing issue without additional briefing.
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page 4
of 13

5
constitutional causation.” 988 F.3d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490
U.S. 605, 615 (1989)). In other words, Defendants did not cause C.D. Momber’s alleged injury if
they merely influenced Kent County—rather than “cajole[d], coerce[d], or command[ed]” it—to
deny the petition. Id. at 316. Similarly, a judgment against Defendants would not remedy C.D.
Momber’s injury because such a judgment would not necessarily cause Kent County to address
the annexation petition.
But this argument understates the role that the Township allegedly had in the deprivation
of C.D. Momber’s rights. The Kent County Administrator refused to forward the annexation
petition to the County Board based on the belief that the Act 425 agreement forecloses annexation.
(3/5/2025 Email, PageID.115.) In other words, the Administrator concluded that the County lacks
any discretion in deciding the petition as long as the Township intends to enforce the Act 425
agreement. Because the Township’s decision to execute and enforce the Act 425 agreement caused
the County to “react in predictable ways,” the County’s actions do not sever the causal chain; the
Township’s decision is ultimately the root of C.D. Momber’s alleged injury. Dep’t of Com. v. New
York, 588 U.S. 752, 768 (2019). Similarly, a judgment against the Township will likely redress
C.D. Momber’s alleged injuries because the Township declining to enforce the Act 425 agreement
would presumably cause the County to consider the annexation petition on the merits.2
However, the fact that C.D. Momber has standing to sue the Township itself does not entail
that it has standing to sue each individual defendant. See Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 61
(2024) (“[P]laintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press against each
defendant . . . .” (cleaned up)). Although the Act 425 agreement was signed by Defendant
2 Although the County is not guaranteed to approve the petition in the absence of an objection from the Township,
that fact does not foreclose redressability. Insofar as C.D. Momber asserts the denial of a procedural right—i.e., the
right to have the County consider the annexation petition—it can establish redressability without showing that the
procedure itself will produce a favorable outcome. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n.7 (1992).
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page 5
of 13

6
Bergman (see Act 425 Agreement 6), that does not establish that Bergman is presently enforcing
the agreement and thus that a judgment against Bergman would redress C.D. Momber’s injuries.
And the complaint contains almost no allegations regarding the other defendants—merely stating
their titles does not clarify their actual involvement in the allegedly injurious conduct. C.D.
Momber attempts to rectify this by attaching additional exhibits to its response brief, but the Court
may not consider such exhibits in resolving this motion.
In short, C.D. Momber has failed to allege standing regarding its claims against the
individual defendants, and those claims will be dismissed.
B. Procedural Due Process Claim
Turning to the merits, C.D. Momber first contends that the Township violated its due
process rights by entering the Act 425 agreement and thereby preventing Kent County from
considering the Village’s annexation request. “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause bars ‘any State’ from ‘depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.’” Lifestyle Cmtys., Ltd. v. City of Worthington, 165 F.4th 1013, 1026 (6th Cir.
2026) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). “To succeed on a procedural-
due-process claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) ‘deprivation by state action of a protected interest in
life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) ‘inadequate state process.’” Id. (quoting Reed v. Goertz, 598
U.S. 230, 236 (2023)). “Protected property interests are defined by ‘existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’” Id. at 1027 (quoting Bd.
of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
The Township contends that C.D. Momber was not deprived of any property interest. C.D.
Momber argues that it was deprived of two rights arising under state law: “the right to petition the
government for annexation of [its] property and the right to a hearing on the petition before the
Kent County Board of Commissioners.” (Pl.’s Resp. 10, ECF No. 24.) These rights cannot
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page 6
of 13

7
themselves serve as property interests because “[a] person cannot have a property interest in a
procedure itself.” Taylor Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. City of Taylor, 313 F. App’x 826, 832 (6th Cir.
2009) (citing Richardson v. Township of Brady, 218 F.3d 508, 518 (6th Cir. 2000)) (plaintiff had
no property interest in “the City Council’s approval of the zoning ordinance, the amendment to the
City’s Master Land Use Plan, or approval of the final site plans”). Thus, denying C.D. Momber
access to the petition procedure would only constitute a procedural due process violation if the
petition procedure protected some underlying property interest.3
No such violation occurred here because C.D. Momber’s asserted underlying interest in
being annexed by the Township is not a valid property interest. For due process purposes, “[a]
party cannot possess a property interest in the receipt of a benefit when the state’s decision to
award or withhold the benefit is wholly discretionary.” EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698
F.3d 845, 856 (6th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Michigan law provides that when a village seeks to
annex territory, “it shall be the duty of the [county] board of supervisors to order and determine as
to whether the prayer contained in the petition or any part thereof shall be granted.” Mich. Comp.
Laws § 74.6. This statute does not appear to entitle property owners to any particular result
regarding the petition. Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that “[n]o city, village,
township or person has any vested right or legally protected interest in the boundaries of such
governmental units.” Midland Township v. Mich. State Boundary Comm’n, 259 N.W.2d 326, 337
(Mich. 1977). In Midland Township, the Court relied on a U.S. Supreme Court case holding that
a state’s decisions regarding the territorial boundaries of municipalities (and the concomitant tax
consequences) cannot give rise to a procedural due process claim because such decisions “rest[]
3 If C.D. Momber is understood as asserting that the Township deprived it (without due process) of its First
Amendment right to petition the government, that argument fails because there was no underlying violation of the
Petition Clause. See infra Part III.D.
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page 7
of 13

8
in the absolute discretion of the state.” Id. (quoting Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161,
178 (1907)). Thus, because decisions regarding annexation are entirely discretionary, C.D.
Momber has no property interest in the approval of the annexation petition.
C.D. Momber attempts to distinguish Midland Township by noting that it was an appeal of
a decision by the State Boundary Commission; by contrast, “[t]he Annexation Petition in this case
is not within the jurisdiction of the State Boundary Commission,” and C.D. Momber “is entitled
to due process under another statute,” i.e., Mich. Comp. Laws § 74.6. (Pl.’s Resp. 15.) However,
this argument is unavailing. The Court’s holding in Midland Township is not explicitly or
implicitly limited to the context of State Boundary Commission appeals; rather, the Court was
expressing a general principle of state law to support the constitutionality of the statute at issue
there. And C.D. Momber’s assertion that a specific statute provides procedural protections in this
situation is immaterial.4 The fact that state law provides for a given procedure does not entail that
some property right is at stake for due process purposes. See Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091,
1101 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Constitutionalizing every state procedural right would stand any due
process analysis on its head.”)
Insofar as C.D. Momber means to contend that the underlying property right is the right to
access a particular process—i.e., the petition process in § 74.6—this contention suffers from the
problem identified above: the right to access a process is not itself a property right. Taylor
Acquisitions, 313 F. App’x at 832. In other words, C.D. Momber’s due process claim must bottom
out at some concrete property interest; it cannot be processes all the way down. See Shango, 681
F.2d at 1091 (“If a right to a hearing is a liberty [or property] interest, and if due process accords
4 The Township also points out that while § 74.6 provides the Village the right to file annexation petitions, the statute
does not clearly provide any procedural rights to individuals who wish for their property to be annexed. But resolving
this issue is unnecessary because even if § 74.6 provided such a right to individuals (or here, limited liability
companies), that fact would not create an associated due process right.
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page 8
of 13

9
the right to a hearing, then one has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to mean that the state
may not deprive a person of a hearing without providing him with a hearing.”).
In sum, because C.D. Momber fails to identify any valid property interest, it fails to state a
due process claim.
C. Petition Clause Claim
Next, C.D. Momber brings a claim for a violation of its right to petition the government.
“The Petition Clause of the First Amendment forbids Congress from ‘abridging the . . . right of the
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.’” Martin v. O’Brien, 207 F.
App’x 587, 590 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I). C.D. Momber argues that the
Township’s execution and enforcement of the Act 425 agreement prevented Kent County from
considering the annexation petition and thereby denied C.D. Momber the right to petition the
County. The Court assumes that the petition to annex the Property receives protection under the
Petition Clause. See EJS Props., 698 F.3d at 863 (“We have . . . held more generally that seeking
redress from a government official qualifies as petitioning, and a zoning request certainly qualifies
under this standard.”). But C.D. Momber cites no case law supporting the notion that the Township
could violate the Petition Clause by merely entering into the Act 425 agreement or opposing the
annexation attempt. It is true that the creation and enforcement of the Act 425 agreement indirectly
limited Kent County’s consideration of the annexation request. But the Township’s actions did
not prevent C.D. Momber from voicing its concerns to Kent County, and “[a] citizen’s right to
petition the government does not guarantee a response to the petition or the right to compel
government officials to act on or adopt a citizen’s views.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th
Cir. 1999); see also EJS Props., 698 F.3d at 864 (finding “no support for the proposition that the
right to meaningful access is the same as the right to meaningful process”). Thus, C.D. Momber
has not stated a Petition Clause claim.
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page 9
of 13

10
D. Takings Claim
C.D. Momber’s final constitutional claim is for the uncompensated taking of its property.
“The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides: ‘nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.’” Lifestyle Cmtys., 165 F.4th at 1021 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). A claim
under the Takings Clause may be based on a “physical taking”—i.e., when the government takes
physical ownership of the property—or a “regulatory taking”—i.e., when the government
regulates the property in a way that significantly reduces its value. Id. at 1021–22. Regardless of
the type of taking, “no takings claim can proceed without a valid property interest.” Andrews, Tr.
of Gloria M. Andrews Tr. Dated Apr. 23, 1998 v. City of Mentor, 11 F.4th 462, 469 (6th Cir. 2021).
Defendants argue that C.D. Momber has no valid property interest that was impaired by
the County’s failure to grant the annexation petition. It is important to note that “property rights
protected by takings law are broader (or at least not coextensive with) the property rights protected
by due process.” Id. at 469. Thus, when a state uses its discretion to deny a benefit to a plaintiff,
the plaintiff lacks a property interest for due process purposes but may have a property interest for
purposes of a takings claim. See id. at 469–70. For example, “courts routinely consider takings
claims . . . that arise from a local authority’s denial of rezoning, variances, or land-use permits,”
id. at 469, even though the discretionary nature of such decisions forecloses any due process
claims. Accordingly, the fact that C.D. Momber fails to state a due process claim based on the
lack of a property interest does not necessarily entail that it fails to state a takings claim.5
5 It is also not dispositive that the Act 425 agreement predates C.D. Momber’s acquisition of the Property. See Lifestyle
Cmtys., 165 F.4th at 1022 (“‘[A] valid takings claim will not evaporate just because a purchaser took title after’ a land-
use restriction ‘was enacted.’” (quoting Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. 383, 398 (2017)).
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page
10 of 13

11
In Andrews, the Sixth Circuit did not determine precisely what kind of property interest is
necessary to state a takings claim. See id. at 473. But it provided some guidance on the issue. In
essence, a plaintiff can only state a takings claim when the defendants’ conduct deprives the
plaintiff of an interest that was inherent in its right to own the underlying property at issue. See
id. at 472. In other words, the rights protected by the Takings Clause are those contained within
the proverbial “bundle of rights” that a property owner holds. Id. at 470 (quoting Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)). Thus, a court must examine “background
principles of the State’s law of property” to determine whether the plaintiff had a right to the
benefit that the state has denied it. Id. (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029). If the plaintiff lacked
such a right, it “cannot complain that the State has taken a use interest that was not a part of the
[plaintiff]’s title to begin with.” Id.
Here, C.D. Momber provides no reason to think that Michigan property owners have
traditionally possessed the right to be annexed by a municipality of their choosing. As discussed
above, Midland Township entails the opposite—if the legislature has plenary power to determine
municipal boundaries, it can hardly be said that property owners have a right to any specific
configuration of those boundaries. Thus, the County’s refusal to annex the Property did not
deprive C.D. Momber of any property interest.
And even if C.D. Momber asserted a valid property interest, it has not established that a
taking occurred. Because the Township has not physically acquired the Property, C.D. Momber’s
claim must be considered one for a regulatory taking. “[I]f a regulation does not deprive a property
owner of all economically beneficial use of the property”—and C.D. Momber does not allege that
the lack of annexation eliminates all beneficial uses—“a taking still may be found based on a
complex of factors” known as the Penn Central factors. Lifestyle Cmtys., 165 F.4th at 1022
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page
11 of 13

12
(quoting Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. 383, 393 (2017)). “These factors include: (1) ‘the economic
impact of the regulation,’ (2) ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations,’ and (3) ‘the character of the governmental action.’” Id. (quoting
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). C.D. Momber alleges
that Kent County’s denial of the annexation petition “significantly reduc[ed] the value of [the]
Property,” caused it to “los[e] profits which could be earned through development,” and prevented
it from accessing the Village’s “water and sewer service and development opportunities under [the
Village’s] Code of Ordinances.” (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 22, 24.) These allegations are too vague to
establish any economic impact or interference with investment-backed expectations. C.D.
Momber also claims damages “exceed[ing] $3,800,000” (Compl. ¶ 4), but it provides no
explanation for this number. Thus, C.D. Momber has essentially made no showing as to the first
two Penn Central factors. The third factor also does not weigh in C.D. Momber’s favor because
the government action here (i.e., the lack of annexation) cannot “be characterized as a physical
invasion.” Lifestyle Cmtys., 165 F.4th at 1024 (quoting Penn. Cent., 438 U.S. at 124). In sum,
C.D. Momber fails to allege a regulatory taking.
E. Conspiracy Claim
C.D. Momber also asserts a claim for civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “A claim
for civil conspiracy under § 1983 exists only where the plaintiff has established a separate and
actionable constitutional injury.” Rapp v. Dutcher, 557 F. App’x 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2014).
Because C.D. Momber has not stated an underlying constitutional claim, it also fails to state a civil
conspiracy claim.
F. Leave to Amend
In its response to the motion to dismiss, C.D. Momber states that if “the Court finds that
any of the relevant factual allegations stated above must be included [in] the First Amended
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page
12 of 13

13
Complaint . . . Plaintiff requests leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to add any required
material.” (Pl.’s Resp. 22.) However, “[a] request for leave to amend almost as an aside, to the
district court in a memorandum,” does not qualify as a motion to amend. Kuyat v. BioMimetic
Therapeutics, Inc., 747 F.3d 435, 444 (6th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). The Court’s local rules also
require C.D. Momber to file a proposed amended pleading, see W.D. Mich. LCivR 5.7(f), which
it has not done. If C.D. Momber wishes to amend its complaint, it can file a proper motion to do
so. See Lothamer Tax Resol., Inc. v. Kimmel, No. 1:25-CV-579, 2025 WL 3481868, at *8 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 2, 2025).
IV. CONCLUSION
C.D. Momber has sufficiently alleged standing for its claims against the Township, but not
for its claims against any individual defendant. Additionally, C.D. Momber fails to state a claim
under the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause, the Petition Clause, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss C.D. Momber’s complaint. An
order and judgment will issue consistent with this Opinion.
Dated: March 16, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-01265-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 37, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/16/26 Page
13 of 13