Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
IGNACIO CERVANTES RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1196
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner Ignacio Cervantes Rodriguez initiated this action on October 6, 2025, by filing
a counseled petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.)
Petitioner is presently detained by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
at the North Lake Processing Center (North Lake) in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: order Respondents not to transfer Petitioner out of the Western District of
Michigan during the pendency of the proceedings; declare that Respondents’ actions to detain
Petitioner violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and
Nationality Act; issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and order
Respondents to schedule a bond hearing for Petitioner’s removal proceedings within 5 days of the
order and accept jurisdiction to issue a bond order; and award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.)
In an order (ECF No. 3) entered on October 21, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to
show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
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by Petitioner should not be granted. Respondents filed their response (ECF No. 4) on October 23,
2025. Petitioner filed a reply (ECF No. 5) on October 23, 2025. For the following reasons, the
Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
“Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) He entered the
United States “without being inspected and admitted or paroled by immigration officials”
(Anderson Declaration, ECF No. 4-1, ¶4, PageID.46) in 1999 (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) The
United States Border Patrol (USBP) encountered Petitioner on four occasions since Petitioner
originally arrived in the United States and permitted Petitioner to voluntarily return to Mexico on
January 12, 2000, January 15, 2000, January 17, 2000, and April 5, 2005. (Anderson Declaration,
ECF No. 4-1, PageID.46, ¶5.) Petitioner represents that he has otherwise remained in the United
States. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) He lives in the United States with his partner and their four
children; he has no criminal history. (Id., PageID.1.)
On October 4, 2025, ICE encountered Petitioner in Waukegan, Illinois, and placed him into
removal proceedings by issuing and filing a Form I-862, Notice to Appear, charging Petitioner
with inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner
is an immigrant who at the time of application for admission was not in possession
of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other
valid entry document required by the act and a valid unexpired passport, or other
suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality as required under
the regulations issued by the Attorney General.
(Anderson Declaration, ECF No. 4-1, ¶7, PageID.47–48.) That same day, immigration officials
served Petitioner with a Warrant for Arrest of Alien and a Form I-286, Notice of Custody
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Determination. (Id., PageID.48.) Petitioner has not been given a bond hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.5.)
II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). The primary habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, confers upon the
federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” This includes challenges by non-citizens in
immigration related matters. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001)
III. 	Exhaustion
Respondents first contend that this Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas
corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 4,
PageID.24.) Specifically, Respondents argue that Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing. (Id.)
They claim that, “should he request and the court grant a hearing, he would have the right to appeal
any unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).” (Id.) Petitioner contends
that exhaustion is not required and “requesting a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge would
be futile at this juncture.” (Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.64.) The Court agrees with Petitioner.
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This discretion is referred to as “prudential”
exhaustion, Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019), and such a court-
made exhaustion rule must comply with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson,
725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet
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decided “whether courts should impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s
habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention.” See Pizzaro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-
12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)).
However, courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United
States v. California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983), to determine whether prudential
exhaustion should be required.” See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL
2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). Thus,
courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by and is not required to give deference to any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (noting
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that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an
agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner here,
generally do not require exhaustion because the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of
Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that
conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that
§ 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all aliens who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest
and detention. Notably, the BIA recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the
United States unlawfully and was later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216,
229 (2025). It is simply unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA would lead the
Government to change its position and thereby preclude judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241
petition. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion
is not required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4. A
court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is fit for
resolution and delay means hardship.” See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529
U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of
administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
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Here, there is no question that, given the government’s position and the BIA’s recent
decision in Yajure Hurtado, requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies and request
a bond hearing would be futile. Additionally, the question of whether Petitioner is entitled to a
bond hearing is a purely legal question fit for resolution before this Court. And finally, it is
unmistakable that “depriving [Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision
certainly equates to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid
. . . – detention.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that prudential exhaustion is warranted,
the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the
Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7–13.) According to Petitioner, noncitizens who previously entered the
United States and were residing there before being taken into detention are detained pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Id., PageID.8.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner “unambiguously
meets every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2),” and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2)
were ambiguous, its structure and history support the agency’s interpretation of the statute.” (ECF
No. 4, PageID.27.) To address the Parties’ arguments, the Court must examine the two primary
statutory provisions at play: 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and § 1226.
Section 1225(b)(2)(a) provides that
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in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(a).
Section 1226(a), on the other hand, “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 289 (2018). It states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c)1 and pending such decision, the Attorney
General
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved
by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the
Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
In sum, both provisions govern the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings;
the critical difference is that § 1225 provides for mandatory detention, while § 1226 allows for the
release of the noncitizen on conditional parole or bond. For the following reasons, the Court finds
that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226.
Respondents contend that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1225 because he is an
applicant for admission, seeking admission, and who is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to
be admitted. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.137.) Respondents further argue that any “unadmitted”
1 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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noncitizen is an “‘applicant[] for admission’ regardless of their proximity to the border, the length
of time they have been present in the United States, or whether they ever had the subjective intent
to properly apply for admission.” (Id., PageID.138.) They explain that the INA defines
“admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection
and authorization by an immigration officer.” (Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)). Petitioner
claims that § 1226(a) “govern[s] deportation proceedings for all noncitizens arrested within the
United States” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8.)
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Corey v. United
States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009); see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022
(noting how courts “must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written”). When engaging
in statutory interpretation, the Court’s “inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as
well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Binno v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 346 (6th Cir. 2016)). However, ambiguity is not
determined by examining provisions in isolation. “[T]he ‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain
words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.’” Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). “The words of a statute must be read in
their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land
Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012). This Court must also “use every tool at [its] disposal to
determine the best reading of the statute.” Raimondo, 603 U.S. at 400. Examining the statute as a
whole, in line with the guiding principles of statutory construction, this Court agrees with the
numerous other courts in the country that have concluded that Respondents’ interpretation of the
statute is simply much too broad.
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The text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention of an “alien seeking admission” after
an “examining immigration officer” determines that the alien “is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted.” An “applicant for admission” is defined as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” See id. § 1225(a)(1).
The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13). At issue is whether “an alien present in the United States who has not been
admitted” includes individuals like Petitioner who have been present in the United States for years,
but who did not enter lawfully.
Although the terms of § 1225 may seem unambiguous when viewed in isolation, context
matters. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (emphasizing the importance of context
even when a statutory term is unambiguous). Section 1225 is titled, “Inspection by immigration
officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” A title, such as
this “is especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently
suggest.” Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). Congress’ decision to include
the word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival,
such as “stowaways” and as “crewmen” evidences an intent to address noncitizens coming to the
United States—whether on one side of the border or the other—and who are presently “seeking
admission” into the United States. Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL
2609425, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing to Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 118
(2023)).
But more importantly, Respondents’ interpretation urges this Court to turn a blind eye to
the remainder of the statutory scheme. Courts are instructed to “construe statutes, not isolated
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provisions.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2105). Whereas § 1225 governs the treatment of
“arriving aliens,” § 1226 is much broader, referring to all other aliens not lawfully present but not
arriving. To read § 1226 otherwise would ignore recent amendments to § 1226 and render
Congress’ recent actions entirely superfluous, a result that this Court has long been instructed to
avoid. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory
construction’ that a ‘statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented,
no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” (quoting Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).
Just this year, Congress enacted the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025),
which amended § 1226 to prescribe a subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary
bond analysis. Specifically, the Act added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those
noncitizens who are inadmissible under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who
have been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).
Notably, § 1182(a)(6)(A) refers to “[a]n alien present in the United States without being admitted
or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the
Attorney General . . .”, in other words, someone like Petitioner. If all individuals like Petitioner,
“present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,” were already subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225, then there would have been no need for Congress to amend the
INA to provide for mandatory detention of individuals who were “present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled” and who were arrested, charged with, or committed certain
crimes. Quite simply, were the Court to agree with Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and
1226, the Court would be nullifying Congress’s intent and rendering § 1226(c)(1)(E) entirely
superfluous.
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Considering the foregoing, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A),
governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already
present within the United States without being admitted or paroled at the time that they were
apprehended. 2 Therefore, the Court will examine the impact of the automatic stay on Petitioner’s
Fifth Amendment due process rights.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
The Supreme Court has held that “[o]nce an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance
changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including
aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 682. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Id.
at 690. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status.
See A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025). This includes noncitizens, like Petitioner. See id.;
see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990); Chavez-Acosta v. Garland,
No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 236837, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Granted, if this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the Government’s due process argument might hold true. However, as set forth
supra, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) clearly
sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision.
The statute explicitly allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien, or release
2 This Court is far from the first federal district court to reach this conclusion. Petitioner cites
dozens of cases reaching the same conclusion. (See Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.69–70.)
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the alien with either “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions
prescribed by, the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), (2). This
discretionary 	framework 	“requires 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	make 	an 	individualized 	custody
determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020) (applying the Matthews v.
Eldridge test in the context of immigration). Matthews v. Eldridge requires a court to consider the
following three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
1. 	Private Interest
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most
elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. The Court
may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is held in
conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, No. 25-CV-
01151 (JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 1459154 at *7 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v.
Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)).
Respondents do not claim that the conditions of Petitioner’s confinement at North Lake differ in
any material way from criminal incarceration. Detained away from his family, Petitioner is
“experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends
and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of
freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 2025 WL 1459154 at *7. Petitioner, through counsel,
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represents that he is the father of four children and the primary financial support for his family.
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) His continued detention prohibits him from being able to financially
provide for his family. (Id., PageID.5.) Therefore, the “private interest” factor strongly weighs in
favor of Petitioner.
2. 	Risk of Error
Likewise, the second Mathews factor weigh in Petitioner’s favor, Clearly, there is a high
risk of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom should he not receive an individualized
bond hearing at which the immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk
and/or a danger to the community.
3. 	Respondents’ Competing Interests and Burdens of Additional or
Substitute Procedures
Lastly, the Court recognizes that the Government “does, indeed, have a legitimate interest
in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and preventing harms to the
community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924, at *12 (D. Mass.
Sept. 9, 2025). Respondents have not shown that it has a significant interest in Petitioner’s
continued detention. Notably, continuing to enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose
more costs upon the Government, as it would be required to continue funding and overseeing
Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Matthews v. Eldridge factors weighs in Petitioner’s
favor. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory
detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights As the Eastern District of Michigan recently stated, “[t]he recent shift to use the
mandatory detention framework under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not only wrong but also
fundamentally unfair. In a nation of laws vetted and implemented by Congress, we don’t get to
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arbitrarily choose which laws we feel like following when they best suit our interests.” Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *10.
V. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that a prohibition on Petitioner’s transfer is unnecessary and request
that the Court dismiss United States Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem as a Respondent
because she is not Petitioner’s custodian within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2243. (Resp., ECF No.
4, PageID.42–43.) “The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but
upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud.
Circuit Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of [§] 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has “concluded that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the INS District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the
respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003).
Here, Petitioner has named Field Office Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE Robert Lynch
as a Respondent and Petitioner’s immediate custodian. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Respondent
contends that Lynch is the only proper Respondent in this case. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.43.)
In Roman, the Sixth Circuit stated that while it “conclude[d] that the immediate custodian
rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, [there is] the possibility of exceptions to
this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court went on to note:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
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ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 374. Aliens
remaining in detention for extended periods are often transferred several times
during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp .2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y.2002)
(“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-to-day custodian, frequently
change when detainees are transferred among INS facilities, all of which are under
the control of the Attorney General.”); Rosenbloom, supra, at 549. In light of these
transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent other
than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official, such
as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event of
a transfer. Arias–Agramonte, 2000 WL 1617999, at *8 (explaining that a petition
naming only one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was
transferred to another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
In light of the foregoing, the Court declines to enter an order directing Respondents not to
transfer Petitioner out of the Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these
proceedings. However, in order to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s grant of habeas relief and directive that Petitioner receive a bond hearing or, alternatively,
be released in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District of Michigan, the
Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these proceedings.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter an order and judgment granting
Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and accompanying order and judgment
or, in the alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order
Respondents to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and
accompanying order and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion. The status report shall
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include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was
denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: 	October 29, 2025 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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