Greathouse v. Barry, County of et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
VAUGHN EDWARD GREATHOUSE, 	Case No. 	1:25-cv-01017
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Jane M. Beckering
U.S. District Judge
v.
BARRY COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses
 	Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 7;
 	Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 11;
 	Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file supplemental motion, ECF No. 17; and
 	Plaintiff’s motion to expedite ruling, ECF No. 28.
This case involves Plaintiff’s attempt to avoid paying child support because he
says that the state court orders requiring him to pay child support are invalid on
jurisdictional grounds. 	Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants
asserting constitutional violations. 	Plaintiff alleges that a state court deputy clerk
signed a summons instead of the court clerk, and that the summons did not have a
valid court seal, making it invalid. 	Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1691, which states
that “[a]ll writs and process issuing from a court of the United States shall be
under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk thereof.” 	(emphasis added).
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 1
of 23

2
Plaintiff has not set forth any authority establishing that this rule, which applies to
federal courts, applies to State of Michigan courts, such as the Barry County Circuit
Court. 	Plaintiff had presented this issue to the state circuit court judge, and the
judge found that the summons was valid for several reasons. 	Plaintiff argues that
the circuit court judge’s decision violates his constitutional rights.
The state circuit judge denied Plaintiff’s motion, stating in part as follows:
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 2
of 23

3
ECF No. 8-4, PageID.104.
Finally, the Court further explained:
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 3
of 23

4
Id., PageID.107-108.
Plaintiff disagrees with that decision. 	Therefore, he filed this federal court
lawsuit. 	Plaintiff says that all attempts by Defendants to collect child support
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 4
of 23

5
payments due from him are invalid and unconstitutional. 	Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss.
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this
case.
II. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Vaughn Edward Greathouse filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
asserting that Defendants violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 	ECF No. 1. 	Defendants are Barry County, Barry County Friend of Court,
Director of Barry County Friend of Court Jane Doe #1, Barry County Prosecutor Julie
Nakfoor Pratt, and Deputy Court Administrator Daisey Cherniawski.
Greathouse says that on October 7, 2009, a complaint for support was filed in
Barry County Circuit Court. 	Id., PageID.3. 	The summons was signed by a deputy
clerk. 	Id. 	Greathouse says that the Barry County Circuit Court never had
personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff under federal law, because the summons was not
signed by the clerk. 	Id. 	According to Greathouse, this has led to 16 years of
constitutional violations though unlawful child support orders, collections, and
enforcement. 	Id. 	Greathouse says that during a state court hearing to dismiss,
materially false statements were made by Defendants’ counsel that a deputy clerk’s
signature was valid. 	Id., PageID.4.
Greathouse 	asserts 	that 	Defendants 	have 	conspired 	to 	violate 	his
constitutional and substantive due process rights. 	Id., PageID.5. 	He further
asserts Monell liability against the County for maintaining policies, practices, and
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 5
of 23

6
customs 	that 	cause 	constitutional 	violations 	and 	for 	failing 	to 	properly 	train
employees “regarding federal jurisdictional requirements under 28 USC § 1691.”
Id., PageID.5-6.
Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages, costs, attorney fees,
declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.
III. Motion to Dismiss
The Federal Rules provide that a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Put differently, if
plaintiffs do “not nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,
their complaint must be dismissed.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a claim has facial plausibility, a court must construe
the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff, 	accept 	the 	factual
allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Those
factual allegations “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 	League
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 6
of 23

7
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted). “When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may
consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items
appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion so
long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained
therein.” 	Id.
IV. 	Analysis
1. 	Rooker-Feldman
As a starting point, Greathouse is essentially asking this Court to overturn
and reconsider the actions of the Barry County Circuit Court finding that jurisdiction
was proper in a child support proceeding. 	However, his sole recourse is to appeal
the 	state 	court 	decision 	in 	the 	state 	courts, 	not 	file 	a 	new 	federal 	lawsuit.
Greathouse cannot appeal the state court decision in this court no matter how he
characterizes his federal court case.
That is because the United States Supreme Court is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from final state-court judgments. 1 	Lance v. Dennis, 546
U.S. 459 (2006). 	The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which
grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the decisions of the highest state
courts for compliance with the Constitution. 	District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 467 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416
1 	Plaintiff must first appeal the state court action through the Michigan
appellate courts before he asks the United States Supreme Court to weigh-in on this
matter.
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 7
of 23

8
(1923). 	Under the doctrine, “lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review
a case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to correct state court judgments.” Gottfried v. Medical Planning Servs.,
142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1998). 	Thus, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents
the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court
losers’ 	challenging 	‘state-court 	judgments 	rendered 	before 	the 	district 	court
proceedings commenced.’” 	Lance, 546 U.S. at 460 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).
Plaintiff argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because his § 1983 federal
case is different from his state case. 	However, “[t]he test is whether the plaintiff's
injury stems from the state-court judgment, not whether the claims are identical.”
RLR Invs., LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge, Tennessee, 4 F.4th 380, 388 (6th Cir. 2021).
Here, Plaintiff is asking the Court to overturn the Barry County Circuit Court
decision involving his child support payments. 	Plaintiff’s alleged injury, that the
Court found that it had jurisdiction to order child support payments, stems from the
state-court 	judgment. 	In 	the 	opinion 	of 	the 	undersigned, 	this 	Court 	lacks
jurisdiction to overrule or reverse the decisions of the Barry County Circuit Court
involving child support decisions.
2. 	Collateral Estoppel
Defendants argue that Plaintiff is estopped or precluded from relitigating
whether he was properly served and whether the state court had jurisdiction over
him. 	Defendants argue that collateral estoppel bars this court from allowing
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 8
of 23

9
Plaintiff to relitigate his claims. 	The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion, 	“relieve[s] 	parties 	of 	the 	cost 	and 	vexation 	of 	multiple 	lawsuits,
conserve[s] judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s]
reliance on adjudication.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
To establish issue preclusion, Defendant must show: (1) an issue was raised
and actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue’s determination was
necessary to the outcome; (3) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the
merits; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is sought had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Georgia-Pacific Consumer
Prods. v. Four-U-Packaging, Inc., 701 F.3d 1093, 1098 (6th Cir. 2012). 	In the opinion
of the undersigned, each of these factors are met in this case. 	Plaintiff raised the
issue of whether the summons and jurisdiction was proper in the state court
proceedings. 	The question of jurisdiction was necessary to the final judgment in the
state court proceedings, and Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
jurisdictional issue and whether the summons was proper in the state court.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court find that Plaintiff may not relitigate
this issue in this Court.
3. 	Immunity
Greathouse named Defendant Barry County Prosecutor Nakfoor Pratt as a
Defendant. 	Plaintiff made no allegations against Defendant Nakfoor Pratt in his
complaint 	other 	than 	that 	she 	“participated 	in 	and 	authorized 	the 	continued
prosecution and void orders against Plaintiff.” 	ECF No. 1, PageID.2. 	It appears
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 9
of 23

10
that Plaintiff is suing Defendant Nakfoor Pratt because her office issued a child
support complaint against him.
Prosecutors 	enjoy 	absolute 	immunity 	from 	damages 	when 	engaging 	in
activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase.” 	Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 430-431 (1976). 	Immunity extends to alleged misconduct such as “the
knowing use of false testimony and the suppression of material evidence.” 	Spurlock
v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2003). 	Immunity shields against liability
for actions “undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial
proceedings for trial.” 	Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-273 (1993). 	See
Johnson v. Granholm, 662 F.2d 449, 450 (6th Cir. 1981) (prosecutor is entitled to
absolute immunity for litigation involving the payment of child support). 	In the
opinion of the undersigned, Defendant Nakfoor Pratt is entitled to absolute immunity
for any asserted involvement in Plaintiff’s child support litigation taken during the
course of her employment as a prosecutor.
Greathouse names deputy court administrator for Barry County friend of the
court Cherniawski and director of Barry County friend of the court Jane Doe #1 as
Defendants.
As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that judges are entitled to absolute
judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the judge's
judicial capacity, unless those actions are taken without jurisdiction. Johns v.
Bonnyman, 109 F. App’x 19, 21 (6th Cir. 2004) (first citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
19 (1991); and then citing Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir.1988)).
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 10
of 23

11
Courts have extended absolute judicial immunity to non-judicial officers, such
as Defendants who perform “quasi-judicial” functions. 	Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842,
847 (6th Cir. 1994). 	“Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those persons performing
tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are
considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” 	Id. 	In determining
whether an individual is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, courts employ a
“functional” approach, looking to “the nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed it.” 	Id. (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 269 (1993)). 	A court employee who acts as a judge’s designee or carries out
a function for which the judge is immune is also immune from suit. 	Johnson v.
Turner, 125 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 1997); See Johnson v. Granholm, 662 F.2d at 450
(Friend of Court employees are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for actions taken
within the scope of their official duties in child support dispute). 	In the opinion of
the undersigned, Defendants Cherniawski and Doe are entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity.
Additionally, Defendants Jane Doe #1, Nakfoor Pratt, and Cherniawski are
entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity. 	“Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	qualified 	immunity,
‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a defendant raises the qualified
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 11
of 23

12
immunity 	defense, 	the 	burden 	shifts 	to 	the 	plaintiff 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	the
defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable official
would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’” 	Ashcroft v.
Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)). 	The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. 	Martin v. City of Broadview
Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First, the court must “determine if the
facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 	Id. 	(citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the court asks if the right at issue was
“‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such that a reasonable officer would
have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A
court may address these steps in any order. 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if either step of the analysis
is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir.
2016).
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 12
of 23

13
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear
foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be “settled law,”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589
(1991) (per curiam), which means it is dictated by “controlling authority”
or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’ ” al–Kidd,
supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It is not enough that
the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be
clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish
the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply. See Reichle, 566 U.S., at
666, 	132 	S.Ct. 	2088. 	Otherwise, 	the 	rule 	is 	not 	one 	that 	“every
reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63-64 (2018).
First, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts that could establish that Defendants
Doe #1, Nakfoor Pratt, and Cherniawski violated his rights. 	Plaintiff filed a motion
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 13
of 23

14
and argued during a hearing that the state court lacked jurisdiction in the state court
child support action. 	The circuit court judge ruled that the state court had
jurisdiction. 	Plaintiff’s complaint fails to set forth a plausible cause of action against
Doe #1, Nakfoor Pratt, and Cherniawski that could show that they violate clearly
established law. 	Plaintiff failure to assert a plausible claim for relief, entitles
Defendants Doe #1, Nakfoor Pratt, and Cherniawski to qualified immunity.
In addition to naming the individual Defendants in their individual capacities,
Plaintiff has named them in their official capacities and he also named Barry County
Friend of the Court as a Defendant. 	A suit against an individual in his official
capacity is equivalent to a suit brought against the governmental entity. 	See Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046,
1049 (6th Cir. 1994). 	An official capacity lawsuit against a state official for monetary
damages is treated as a lawsuit against the State. 	Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,
471 (1985). 	The states and their departments, such as the Barry County Friend of
the Court, are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal
courts unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated
Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. 	See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978);
O'Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993); Williams-Richardson v.
Calhoun Cnty. Friend of the Ct., No. 1:10-CV-540, 2010 WL 3516083, at *2 (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 8, 2010) (Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to claims asserted
against Calhoun County Friend of the Court for actions involving plaintiff’s failure to
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 14
of 23

15
pay child support). 	Section 1983 did not expressly abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has
not consented to civil rights suits in federal court, Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874,
877 (6th Cir. 1986). 	Accordingly, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Plaintiff’s
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacity,
and the Barry County Friend of the Court for monetary damages, 2 are properly
dismissed in accordance with the Eleventh Amendment.
4. 	Failure to State a Claim
Greathouse says that he was required to pay child support payments of
approximately $167 per month between 2009-2025 in violation of his Fourth, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 1, pageID.3. 	He claims that the Barry
County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to require him to pay child support because
the service of the complaint for support was defective due to the fact that the deputy
clerk signed the summons and not the clerk of the court. 	Id. The Barry County
Circuit judge determined that the summons was proper under state law and that
Plaintiff had also waived jurisdictional concerns by appearing and litigating during
the case. 	ECF No. 8-4. Therefore, the Barry County Circuit judge found that the
court had jurisdiction for several different reasons. 	Id.
Plaintiff fully litigated this issue in the Barry County Circuit Court. 	His Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
2 	Plaintiff’s response brief says that he is not seeking money damages from the
State of Michigan, but only prospective injunctive relief. 	ECF No. 12, PageID.129.
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 15
of 23

16
granted. 	First, 	Plaintiff’s 	Fifth 	Amendment 	claims 	fails, 	because 	the 	Fifth
Amendment does not apply to state actors. 	The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause restricts the activities of the states and their instrumentalities, but
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause circumscribes only the actions of the
federal government. 	Scott v. Clay County, Tennessee, 205 F.3d 867, 873 n. 8 (6th
Cir. 2000). 	Therefore, because the named defendants are state actors, Greathouse’s
Fifth Amendment claims are without merit.
Plaintiff generally asserts that his procedural due process rights were violated
during the child support proceedings. 	The elements of a procedural due process
claim are: (1) a life, liberty, or property interest requiring protection under the Due
Process Clause, and (2) a deprivation of that interest (3) without adequate process.
Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006). 	Therefore, in
all cases where a person stands to be deprived of his life, liberty or property, he is
entitled to due process of law. 	However, the Due Process Clause does not guarantee
that the procedure will produce a correct decision. 	“It must be remembered that
even if a state decision does deprive an individual of life, [liberty], or property, and
even if that decision is erroneous, it does not necessarily follow that the decision
violated that individual’s right to due process.” 	Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,
284, n.9 (1980). 	“[T]he deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected
interest 	in 	‘life, 	liberty 	or 	property’ 	is 	not 	in 	itself 	unconstitutional; 	what 	is
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.”
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (emphasis in original). 	Here, Plaintiff
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 16
of 23

17
has failed to assert a plausible due process violation. 	Plaintiff had a full and fair
opportunity to address his jurisdictional argument in the Barry County Circuit Court.
The fact that Plaintiff was unsuccessful in contesting jurisdiction is not a basis for
asserting that his procedural due process rights were violated by the state court
action.
Plaintiff also asserts a violation of substantive due process. 	“Substantive due
process is the doctrine that governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property are
subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed.”
Johnson v. City of Saginaw, Michigan, 980 F.3d 497, 513 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
Substantive 	due 	process 	claims 	are 	“loosely 	divided 	into 	two 	categories: 	(1)
deprivations of a particular constitutional guarantee; and (2) actions that shock the
conscience.” 	Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 597 (6th Cir. 2018). 	Plaintiff has
failed to assert conduct on behalf of any Defendant that could satisfy this standard.
Initially, it is recognized that the Sixth Circuit has made it clear that substantive due
process is not violated when a state court orders a father to pay child support. 	N.E.
v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 2004). 	For the reasons explained in this
recommendation, Plaintiff has failed to set forth plausible allegations of a violation
of a constitutional right. 	Further, the Barry County Circuit decision concluding that
jurisdiction existed to make a child support decision does not come close to shocking
the conscience.
Plaintiff 	also 	asserts 	that 	his 	equal 	protection 	rights 	were 	violated 	by
Defendants. 	The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 17
of 23

18
that a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws,” which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike. 	City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
The 	threshold 	element 	of 	an 	equal 	protection 	claim 	is 	disparate 	treatment.
Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006). 	“To
state 	an 	equal 	protection 	claim, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	adequately 	plead 	that 	the
government treated the plaintiff ‘disparately as compared to similarly situated
persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental right,
targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.’” 	Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc.
v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “‘Similarly
situated’ is a term of art—a comparator ... must be similar in ‘all relevant respects.’”
Paterek v. Vill. of Armada, 801 F.3d 630, 650 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States
v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 651 (6th Cir. 2011)); see also Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City
of Upper Arlington, 905 F.3d 357, 368 (6th Cir. 2018). 	Plaintiff has failed to assert
allegations that could support an equal protection violation.
Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	his 	Fourth 	Amendment 	right 	to 	be 	free 	from
unreasonable 	search 	and 	seizure 	was 	violated 	by 	Defendants. 	The 	Fourth
Amendment protects persons from unreasonable searches and seizures by providing
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.” 	U.S. Const. amend. IV. 	Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to
pay child support for 16 years in violation of his right to be free from unlawful search
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 18
of 23

19
and seizure. 	Plaintiff concedes, however, that the Court required him to pay child
support, but alleges that the child support order was based upon “jurisdictional
defects.” 	ECF No. 1, Page5. 	The Barry County Circuit Court rejected Plaintiff’s
argument 	that 	the 	court 	lacked 	jurisdiction 	to 	order 	child 	custody 	payments.
Under these circumstances, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights could not be
violated, and the allegations asserted in his complaint fail to state a plausible claim
for relief.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants conspired to violate his rights by enforcing
court orders for 16 years. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.5. 	A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is
“an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action.”
Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771
F.2d 935, 943 44 (6th Cir. 1985)). 	The plaintiff must show the existence of a single
plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective to
deprive the plaintiff of a federal right, and that an overt action committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy caused an injury to the plaintiff. 	Hensley, 693 F.3d at
695; Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011). 	Moreover, a
plaintiff must plead a conspiracy with particularity, as vague and conclusory
allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565
(recognizing that allegations of conspiracy must be supported by allegations of fact
that support a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy,” not merely a “possible” one);
Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008). 	First, as previously addressed,
Plaintiff has failed to plead a plausible violation of his constitutional rights. 	Second,
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 19
of 23

20
Plaintiff has failed to plead a plausible claim of conspiracy. 	Plaintiff pleads only
conclusory allegations of conspiracy with no particular facts showing a conspiratorial
objective that was designed to deprive him of a federal right.
Plaintiff named Barry County as a Defendant. 	A municipality, such as Barry
County, may be liable for alleged constitutional violations in only a narrow set of
circumstances. 	Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 	“A
municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory –
in other words, ‘solely because it employs a tortfeasor.’” 	D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747
F.3d 378, 388-89 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in
original)). 	A municipal policy or custom must be the moving force behind the
constitutional injury, and a plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the
governmental entity and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the
execution of that policy. 	Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005);
Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003). 	Although Greathouse alleges that
a Barry County policy, custom, or procedure violated his rights, he failed to identify
in his complaint any policy, custom, or procedure that allegedly caused him injury.
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Barry County must review a judge’s order for
jurisdiction before undertaking enforcement is insufficient to state a plausible claim
for relief. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, Barry County is entitled to dismissal
from this action.
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 20
of 23

21
5. 	Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement of child
support orders. 	As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges that the state court did not have
jurisdiction because a federal statute that does not apply in state court requires a
court clerk to sign a summons. 	Plaintiff argues that since the deputy clerk signed
the summons, the court did not have jurisdiction to make a ruling that he needed to
pay child support. 	As previously stated, the Barry County Circuit Court rejected
Plaintiff’s arguments and explained the reasons why jurisdiction was appropriate.
Preliminary injunctions are “one of the most drastic tools in the arsenal of
judicial remedies.” 	Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 808 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986)).
The issuance of preliminary injunctive relief is committed to the discretion of the
district court. 	Ne. Ohio Coal. v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006); Nader
v. Blackwell, 230 F.3d 833, 834 (6th Cir. 2000). 	In exercising that discretion, a court
must consider whether plaintiff has established the following elements: (1) a strong
or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the likelihood of irreparable
injury if the preliminary injunction does not issue; (3) the absence of harm to other
parties; and (4) the protection of the public interest by issuance of the injunction. Id.
These factors are not prerequisites to the grant or denial of injunctive relief, but
factors that must be “carefully balanced” by the district court in exercising its
equitable powers. 	Frisch’s Rest., Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1263 (6th Cir.
1985); Ne. Ohio Coal., 467 F.3d at 1009.
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 21
of 23

22
Plaintiff’s 	“initial 	burden” 	in 	demonstrating 	entitlement 	to 	preliminary
injunctive relief is a showing of a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the
merits of his Section 1983 action. 	NAACP v. City of Mansfield, Ohio, 866 F.2d 162,
167 (6th Cir. 1989). 	In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff has failed to show a
likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. 	Moreover, he has failed to show
irreparable injury. 	A plaintiff’s harm from the denial of a preliminary injunction is
irreparable only if it is not fully compensable by monetary damages. 	Overstreet v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002). 	In the
opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing that
the Court should issue preliminary injunctive relief.
V. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendant’s
motion to dismiss. 	It is further recommended that the Court grant Plaintiff’s motion
for leave to supplement and deny Plaintiff’s motions for a preliminary injunction and
to expedite a ruling in this case.
If the Court accepts this recommendation, the case will be dismissed.
Dated: 	April 24, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 22
of 23

23
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Case 1:25-cv-01017-JMB-MV ECF No. 29, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 23
of 23