Niphong v. Stutzman

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
CHARLS PETER NIPHONG, 	Case No. 	1:25-cv-920
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
Chief U.S. District Judge
v.
UNKNOWN STUTZMAN,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses the following motions:
 	Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 10;
 	Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 14, and Defendant’s
response in opposition, ECF No. 17; and
 	Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 26, Plaintiff’s
response in opposition, ECF No. 30, and Defendant’s reply, ECF No. 31.
Plaintiff – Charls Peter Niphong – filed an unverified civil complaint under 42
U.S.C. 	§ 1983 	alleging 	that 	Defendant 	Deputy 	Stuzman 	violated 	his 	Eighth
Amendment rights by using excessive force against Plaintiff when the Deputy utilized
a taser against Plaintiff during a fight while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Kent
County Jail. 	ECF No. 1. 	More specifically, Niphong asserts that he “swung in the
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air once” at another inmate and Deputy Stutzman responded by running from across
the unit and firing his taser near the left part of Plaintiff’s chest. 	Id., PageID.3.
Niphong was a pre-trial detainee at the time of the factual allegations. 	For
pre-trail detainees, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to excessive force claims.
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 391-92 (2015). 	Accordingly, the undersigned
construes Plaintiff’s excessive force claim as a Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Deputy Stutzman asserts that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed
because the jail’s surveillance footage shows Deputy Stutzman used his taser to
maintain and restore discipline. 	ECF No. 11. 	Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to
summary judgment because the jail’s surveillance video footage shows Deputy
Stutzman’s use of the taser was excessive force and disregarded jail policy. 	ECF No.
14.
In the opinion of the undersigned, there are no genuine issues of material fact
regarding Defendant’s use of force against the Plaintiff while he was a pre-trial
detainee in Kent County Jail. 	A review of the video evidence shows that Plaintiff
started the fight and that Defendant reasonably used a taser during an on-going
altercation to stop a fight that Plaintiff had started, restore order, and protect the
other inmates. 	Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the
Court grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss Plaintiff’s case.
ECF No. 26.
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Furthermore, for the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that
the Court deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 10, and Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment, ECF No. 14.
II. 	Factual Allegations
In his Complaint, Niphong asserts the following factual allegations:
ECF No. 1, PageID.3.
III. 	Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10)
The Federal Rules provide that a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Put differently, if plaintiffs
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do “not nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their
complaint must be dismissed.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a claim has facial plausibility, a court must construe
the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff, 	accept 	the 	factual
allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Those
factual allegations “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 	League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted). “When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may
consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items
appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion so
long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained
therein.” 	Id.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. 	As such, his pleadings are subject to less
stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys. 	Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
Here, Deputy Stutzman argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim
because he does not plead the subjective component of an excessive force claim and
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the jail surveillance video footage demonstrates that Deputy Stutzman used his taser
to maintain and restore discipline. 	ECF No. 11, PageID.28. 	Plaintiff did not
respond to Deputy Stuzman’s motion.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Deputy Stuzman deployed and discharged
his taser without giving verbal commands. 	The surveillance video footage provided
to the Court does not include audio. 	Thus, there is no way for the undersigned to
analyze whether the video refutes Plaintiff’s Complaint that Deputy Stuzman did not
attempt to resolve the situation with verbal commands before deploying the taser.
Accordingly, in the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff’s Complaint is plausible on
its face. 	Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court deny
Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
IV. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). 	The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan,
421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251−52 (1986)). 	The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party
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opposing the motion. 	Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.
2005).
When, as here, the non-movant fails to respond to a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must “examine the movant’s motion for summary judgment to
ensure that he has discharged his initial burden.” Stough v. Mayville Cmty. Sch., 138
F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir.
1991)).
Furthermore, the materials a court may consider in evaluating a motion for
summary judgment are identified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Courts, however, allow a
plaintiff to rely on a “verified complaint,” which has “ ‘the same force and effect as an
affidavit’ for purposes of responding to a motion for summary judgment.” Lavado v.
Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d
901, 905 (6th Cir.1992)). 	To qualify as “verified,” a complaint must be executed in a
manner that meets the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1746. 	Id. 	In contrast,
complaints that are unverified are not considered Rule 56 evidence. 	Cooper v.
Parker, No. 2:17-CV-00155, 2019 WL 5273967, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2019)
(citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-CV-155, 2019 WL
4686423 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2019). 	Here, Plaintiff has not presented a verified
statement to the Court.
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V. 	Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26)
Deputy Stutzman argues that the record does not establish a Fourteenth
Amendment violation because Defendant acted in good faith to stop a violent fight.
ECF No. 27, PageID.264. 	In response, Niphong asserts that Deputy Stutzman failed
to utilize verbal commands or other de-escalation tactics before deploying his taser.
ECF No. 30, PageID.354.
“The Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive
force that amounts to punishment.” 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, n. 10
(1989). 	In Kingsley, the Supreme Court held that an excessive force claim, a
“detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against was
objectively unreasonable.” 	Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015).
Regarding reasonableness, the Court explained:
A 	court 	(judge 	or 	jury) 	cannot 	apply 	this 	standard 	mechanically.
See Lewis, 	supra, at 	850, 	118 	S.Ct. 	1708. 	Rather, 	objective
reasonableness turns on the “facts and circumstances of each particular
case.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d
443 (1989). A court must make this determination from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at
the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. See ibid. A court must
also 	account 	for 	the 	“legitimate 	interests 	that 	stem 	from 	[the
government's] need to manage the facility in which the individual is
detained,” appropriately deferring to “policies and practices that in th[e]
judgment” of jail officials “are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 540, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
Considerations such as the following may bear on the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the force used: the relationship between the need
for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the
plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the
amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat
reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was
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actively resisting. See, e.g., Graham, supra, at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. We
do not consider this list to be exclusive. We mention these factors only
to illustrate the types of objective circumstances potentially relevant to
a determination of excessive force.
Id. at 397.
Here, the jail surveillance video shows Niphong approaching another inmate
in the dining area and throwing multiple punches. 	ECF No. 11, Exhibit 1 at 00:37.
The other inmate takes a defensive stance with his hands in fists in front of his face.
Id. at 00:37-00:46. 	Niphong continues to throw jabs until Deputy Stutzman
approaches and pulls out his taser. 	Id. at 00:46. 	Deputy Stutzman deploys his
taser into Niphong’s back and he falls to the ground. 	Id. 	Deputy Stutzman then
points his finger at the other inmate, who drops to the ground and places his hands
behind his back. 	Id. at 00:47-00:53. 	Deputy Stutzman remains over Niphong until
additional deputies arrive. 	Id. at 00:53-01:50.
In the opinion of the undersigned, the record before the Court supports that
Deputy Stutzman’s actions were objectively reasonable. 	Niphong’s contentions that
there was not a physical altercation are blatantly contradicted by the video footage.
Niphong was actively engaged in a physical altercation with another inmate in the
dining area. 	The following snip from the video surveillance shows Niphong throwing
the first punch.
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ECF No. 11, Exhibit 2 at 00:38. 	The surveillance video shows Niphong throwing
several more punches at the other inmate. 	Then, the video shows Deputy Stutzman
approaching the scene from the other side of the dining hall and quickly deploying
his taser to stop the fight.
Thus, in the opinion of the undersigned, there are no genuine issues of material
fact regarding Deputy Stutzman’s use of force against Niphong. 	Accordingly, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. 	ECF No. 26.
Furthermore, 	Deputy 	Stuzman 	asserts 	that 	he 	is 	entitled 	to 	qualified
immunity on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. “Under the doctrine of qualified
immunity, ‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
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would have known.’” 	Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a defendant raises
the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable
official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987)). 	Analyzing claims of qualified immunity involves a two-pronged
test. 	Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First,
the court must “determine if the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional
right.” 	Id. 	(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the
court asks if the right at issue was “‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such
that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. 	(citing
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A court may address these prongs in either order. 	Id.
(citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). 	A government official is entitled to qualified
immunity if the court finds that there is no constitutional violation, or that the right
at issue was not clearly established. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d
437, 440 (6th Cir. 2016).
In applying the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second prong. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
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be clearly established, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)
(cleaned up) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 	305, 308 (2015)). 	In other words:
To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear
foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be “settled law,”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589
(1991) (per curiam), which means it is dictated by “controlling authority”
or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’ ” al–Kidd,
supra, at 741–742, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149
(quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d
818 (1999)). It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing
precedent. The precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable
official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff
seeks to apply. See Reichle, 566 U.S. at 666, 132 S.Ct. 2088. Otherwise,
the rule is not one that “every reasonable official” would know. Id., at
664, 132 S.Ct. 2088 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer's conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule's contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018).
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For the reasons stated above, in the opinion of the undersigned, Deputy
Stutzman is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment
claim. 	Because 	there 	are 	no 	genuine 	issues 	of 	material 	fact 	and 	it 	is 	the
undersigned’s opinion that Deputy Stutzman did not violate Plaintiff’s rights, it is
also 	the 	undersigned’s 	opinion 	that 	Deputy 	Stutzman 	is 	entitled 	to 	qualified
immunity in his individual capacity. 	See Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538
(6th Cir. 2008) (“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, ‘government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))).
VI. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14)
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because the video
footage shows that “no actual ‘physical altercation’” occurred and Deputy Stutzman
violated policy when he discharged the taser. 	ECF No. 14, PageID.81-82. 	In
response, Deputy Stutzman asserts that the video shows a physical altercation
between Niphong and another inmate and Deputy Stutzman used de minimis force
to maintain and restore discipline.
For the reasons stated above, in the opinion of the undersigned, there are no
genuine issues of material fact regarding Deputy Stutzman’s use of force against
Niphong. 	It is recommended that the Court grant Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. 	Accordingly, in the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff is not entitled to
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summary judgment. 	Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny
Plaintiff’s motion. 	ECF No. 14.
V. 	Recommendation
In the opinion of the undersigned, there are no genuine issues of material fact
regarding Defendant’s use of force against the Plaintiff while he was a pre-trial
detainee 	in 	Kent 	County 	Jail. 	Accordingly, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
recommends that the Court grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
dismiss Plaintiff’s case. 	ECF No. 26.
Furthermore, for the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that
the Court deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss ECF No. 10, and Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment ECF No. 14.
Dated: 	May 28, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served on opposing parties
and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of any further
right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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