Aghabekyan et al v. Knight et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GOR AGHABEKYAN and
ARMTRUCK TRANSPORT, LLC,
Plaintiffs, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-497
v. 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
CHRISTOPHER KNIGHT and
US MOTORS CORP,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs 	Gor 	Aghabekyan 	and 	Armtruck 	Transport, 	LLC 	(referred 	to 	as
“Armtruck” and “ARMTruck”), have filed this action, through counsel, against defendants
Christopher Knight and US Motors Corp (sometimes referred to as “USMC”). Neither defendant
is represented by counsel. This matter is now before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion for default
judgment against the corporate defendant USMC (ECF No. 18).
I. 	Plaintiffs’ verified complaint
Plaintiffs set forth the following allegations in their verified1 amended complaint:
8. On or about October 31, 2024, Plaintiff Gor Aghabekyan and Defendant Knight
entered into a Vehicle Leasing Agreement for a 2021 Kenworth T880 semi-truck
(VIN 1XKZD40X2MJ440550), with lease payments of $3,395.25 per month for 48
months. A true and correct copy of this lease is attached as Exhibit 1.
1 The Court notes that the verification in plaintiffs’ complaint is not in the form required by statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1746(2), i.e., (“I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on (date). (Signature)”). Rather, plaintiff qualified his statements, i.e., “I, Gor Aghabekyan, hereby declare
under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing Complaint is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.” Amend. Compl. at PageID.54 (emphasis added).
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9. The vehicle is financed through MHC Financial. Knight agreed to make
payments corresponding exactly to the finance schedule and to return the vehicle
in good condition upon termination.
10. 	Knight took possession of the truck for the purpose of driving for Plaintiffs,
but has admittedly failed to continue working for Plaintiffs, failed to make certain
required payments, disconnected tracking devices, and ultimately, refused to return
the vehicle.
11. Concurrently, Armtruck entered into a lease agreement with Defendant US
Motors Corp (U.S.M.C.) to operate under its authority with specific rights and
obligations for control, compensation, and operation of the same vehicle. A true
and correct copy of that agreement is attached as Exhibit 2. The lease was executed
by 	Gor 	Aghabekyan 	in 	his 	capacity 	as 	the 	sole 	member 	and 	authorized
representative of Armtruck.
12. On April 14, 2025, Plaintiffs issued a formal written demand for return of the
truck and payment of outstanding sums. A true and correct copy of the April 14,
2025 demand letter is attached as Exhibit 3.
13. Defendants failed to respond adequately to the April 14, 2025, demand and did
not return the vehicle or resolve the outstanding balance.
14. Defendants, acting jointly or in concert, retained possession of the truck without
authorization, refused to return it after demand, and denied Plaintiffs access to
property and funds rightly theirs.
15. Defendants Knight and USMC communicated with Plaintiffs, acknowledged
receiving demands, and nonetheless failed to comply or resolve the matter.
Amend. Compl. (ECF No. 5, PageID.47-49) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs filed a seven count complaint against defendants related to the vehicle:
Count I (conversion); Count II (fraudulent misrepresentation); Count III (breach of contract –
Knight Agreement); Count IV (breach of contract – USMC agreement); Count V (unjust
enrichment); Count VI (declaratory relief & replevin); and, Count VII (conspiracy). 	Id. at
PageID49-52. Plaintiffs seek compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages, a declaratory
judgment confirming plaintiffs’ right to possession, and “[g]rant replevin and order the immediate
return of the truck.” Id. at PageID.52-53.
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II. 	Entry of default
The corporate defendant, USMC, failed to plead or otherwise defend this lawsuit
as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which resulted in an entry of default against
this corporate defendant on June 18, 2025 (ECF No. 15).2
III. 	Standard
The rule governing default judgment is Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b):
(b) Entering a Default Judgment.
(1) By the Clerk. If the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or a sum
that can be made certain by computation, the clerk--on the plaintiff’s
request, with an affidavit showing the amount due--must enter
judgment for that amount and costs against a defendant who has
been defaulted for not appearing and who is neither a minor nor an
incompetent person.
(2) By the Court. In all other cases, the party must apply to the court
for a default judgment. A default judgment may be entered against
a minor or incompetent person only if represented by a general
guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary who has appeared. If
the party against whom a default judgment is sought has appeared
personally or by a representative, that party or its representative
must be served with written notice of the application at least 7 days
before the hearing. The court may conduct hearings or make
referrals--preserving any federal statutory right to a jury trial--when,
to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to:
(A) conduct an accounting;
(B) determine the amount of damages;
(C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence;
or
(D) investigate any other matter.
Here, because the default judgment is not for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by
computation, the matter is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
2 Defendant Knight seeks dismiss the claims against him See amended motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14).
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IV. 	Defendant Knight’s Response
Pro se defendant Knight filed a response to the motion for default judgment
directed against the unrepresented corporate defendant USMC (ECF No. 19). 	Knight cannot
represent the corporation. 	See Doherty v. American Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334, 340 (6th
Cir.1984) (“The rule of this circuit is that a corporation cannot appear in federal court except
through an attorney”). However, Knight’s filing included a document which indicates that
defendant USMC no longer exists, i.e., filing information from the State of Wyoming shows that
the corporation was dissolved on August 9, 2024. 	See Secretary of State Filing Information re:
U.S. Motors Corp. (ECF No. 19-2).
V. 	Discussion
“Once the Clerk has entered a default against a defendant, the Court must treat all
well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true.” AF Holdings LLC v. Bossard, 976 F. Supp. 2d
927, 929 (W.D. Mich. 2013). 	“No formula exists to determine with precision compensatory
damages. The amount is left to the sound discretion of the fact finder” and “its determination need
only be supported by some competent, credible evidence.” Heard v. Finco, 930 F.3d 772, 774-75
(6th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, a court is not required to enter a
default judgment merely because a party is in default. Whether a default judgment is appropriate
is a matter within the sound discretion of the court.” Sinclair v. United States, No. 5:06-cv-179,
2007 WL 9777950 at *1 (W.D. Mich. March 2, 2007).
The amended complaint established that plaintiff Aghabekyan “owns the Vehicle
that is the subject of this Lease” and leased the vehicle to the individual defendant Knight. See
Amend. Compl. at PageID.55-56; Vehicle Leasing Agreement (dated October 31, 2024) (listing
Aghabekyan as the lessor of the vehicle and Knight as the lessee) (ECF No. 5-1).
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The exhibits establish that other transactions occurred involving the vehicle. The
amended complaint includes an undated agreement entitled “ARMTruck Transport LLC & Lessor
Lease Agreement” (ECF No. 5-2). This agreement is between defendant USMC (identified as the
lessor) and plaintiff Armtruck (identified as the lessee) (ECF No. 5-2). The agreement is undated;
however, signatures appear on Appendices with dates from November 2024. 	Id. 	While the
amended complaint identifies plaintiff Aghabekyan as the owner and lessor of the vehicle, in this
agreement, defendant USMC is referenced as the owner or controlling party and lessor of the
vehicle and plaintiff Armtruck acknowledged receipt of the vehicle as the lessee. Id. at PageID.69;
Appendix A (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.77).
The amended complaint also includes a copy of a demand letter from plaintiff
Aghabekyan’s counsel to defendants dated April 14, 2025 (ECF No. 5-3, PageID.83). Plaintiffs’
claim appears based on this particular demand letter3 which states in pertinent part:
At this time, we are seeking the immediate return of the vehicle and all monies
owed within seven (7) days from the date of this correspondence.
Presently, there is an outstanding balance of $6,200.00 from a personal loan that is
accumulating interest at a rate of roughly $50 a month, a $1,890.00 a month
insurance premium (currently owed for 1 month), $7,500.00 in lost wages due to
not having access to the vehicle, and an additional $1,548.78 for a cash advance,
fuel, and other costs (see attached Driver Pay Report). At this time, we are seeking
$17,138.78 and the immediate return of the truck.
Demand Letter.
Plaintiff Gor Aghabekyan’s Affidavit (ECF No. 18-1) adds no facts to clarify
plaintiffs’ claim against defendant USMC. 	Rather, the affidavit outlines a dispute between
3 The Court notes that the copy of the April 14, 2025 demand letter (ECF No. 5-3) attached to the amended complaint
is not the same demand letter attached to the original complaint (ECF No. 1-3). This discrepancy raises a question as
to which demand letter is the operative document. The demand letter attached to the original complaint is dated April
9, 2025, was not addressed to the US Motor Corp’s Registered Agent, did not appear sent to defendant Knight via
email, did not include the explicit demand for the immediate return of the truck in the third paragraph, contained a
different demand for damages, and had some typographical errors.
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plaintiff Aghabekyan and defendant Knight and relies on the assertions set forth in the April 14,
2025 demand letter, stating in part:
4. Prior to March 9, 2025, Knight individually and/or on behalf of or in conjunction
with USMC began to communicate that the original global agreement would not
proceed as planned and purpose of Plaintiffs’ leasing of the truck would be entirely
frustrated.
5. On March 9, 2025, Knight turned off the tracker on the truck.
6. On April 14, 2025, a demand letter was sent to Defendants indicating $7,500 in
damages per month that the Plaintiffs would incur due to the failure to return the
subject truck, as it is not being used for the Plaintiff's business purposes and
Defendants are doing with it what they wish.
7. The demand letter is attached to the operative complaint. (ECF 5-3, PageID.83-
84).
8. The truck was not returned, and the harm to the Plaintiffs in this matter remains
ongoing.
9. Plaintiffs seek the immediate return of the truck, and all available monetary
damages.
Aghabekyan Affidavit at PageID.169-170.
Upon review, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have not provided competent,
credible evidence to support their motion for entry of a default judgment against defendant USMC.
As discussed, the amended complaint, vehicle leasing agreement, and affidavit point to damages
arising from defendant Knight’s October 31, 2024, agreement to lease the vehicle from plaintiff
Aghabekyan for 48 months. However, the subsequent ARMTruck Agreement identifies defendant
USMC as “the Owner or Controlling Party” of the vehicle which it is leasing to plaintiff Armtruck.
In addition, the court record includes a document showing that the defaulted corporate defendant
USMC was dissolved on August 9, 2024, months before plaintiffs entered the agreements (October
and November 2024). 	In this regard, defendant USMC did not exist when plaintiffs filed this
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lawsuit on May 1, 2025.4 	Finally, the record includes two different demand letters, with no
competent or credible evidence to support the damages claimed in the letters. Based on the present
record, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to establish that they
are entitled to entry of a default judgment against the corporate defendant USMC.
VI. 	RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment
(ECF No. 18) be DENIED without prejudice.
Entered: January 30, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
U.S. Magistrate Judge
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
4 See generally, Aurora Shores Homeowners Association, Inc. v. FDIC, 2 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (“A
complaint filed against a non-existent entity is a nullity and must be dismissed because any judgment rendered against
such an entity must be void.”) (citing Patterson v. V&M Auto Body, 589 N.E.2d 1306, 1308 (1992); Cropp v Golden
Arch Realty Corp., No. 2:08-cv-96, 2009 WL 10710585 at *2 (D.S.C. March 31, 2009) (If there is no such entity as a
captioned defendant, all claims against that non-existent entity must be dismissed.”).
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