Compton v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SARAH C., 	Case No. 	1:25-cv-00004
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Maarten Vermaat
U.S. Magistrate Judge
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
/
OPINION
This opinion addresses Plaintiff’s appeal of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
Burgtorf’s decision denying Plaintiff’s request for Supplemental Security Income
(SSI). 	This appeal is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The record before the Court demonstrates that Plaintiff suffers from a number
of 	severe 	medically 	determinable 	impairments, 	including 	obesity, 	respiratory
conditions, diabetes, sleep apnea, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, and hyponatremia
with 	Coronary 	Artery 	Disease 	and 	atherosclerosis 	with 	history 	of 	myocardial
infarctions with stent surgeries. 	Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly
consider listing 11.14 (peripheral neuropathy) and failed to comply with SSR 96-8p
by not considering Plaintiff’s inability to work due to sleep apnea, hiatal hernia,
depression and anxiety, and acute vaginitis. 	The Commissioner asserts that the
ALJ properly considered listing 11.14 and properly concluded that Plaintiff does not
meet the listing. 	Further, the Commissioner argues that the RFC findings were
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correct and that Plaintiff has failed to show further limitations were necessary.
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned affirms the ALJ’s decision.
I. 	Procedural History
A. 	Key Dates
The ALJ’s decision notes that Plaintiff applied for SSI on February 25, 2022,
alleging an onset of disability on that date. 	ECF No. 6-2, PageID.35. 	Plaintiff’s
claim was initially denied by the Social Security Administration (SSA) on October 5,
2022. 	Id. 	The claim was denied on reconsideration on February 17, 2023. 	Id.
Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ. 	ALJ Burgtorf conducted a hearing
on Plaintiff’s claim on August 31, 2023, and issued his decision on October 31, 2023.
Id. 	Plaintiff timely filed this lawsuit on January 2, 2025. 	ECF No. 1.
B. 	Summary of ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ’s decision correctly outlined the five-step sequential process for
determining whether an individual is disabled. 	ECF No. 6-2, PageID.36-37.
At Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity (SGA) from February 25, 2022. 	Id.
At Step Two, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: obesity; Tobacco Use Disorder with asthma, and Chronic Obstructive
Pulmonary Disease (COPD); hyperlipidemia, hypertension, and hyponatremia with
Coronary Artery Disease and atherosclerosis with history of myocardial infarctions
with two stent surgeries in January 2022; Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease with
multiple 	gastric 	ulcers; 	and 	insulin-dependent 	diabetes 	mellitus 	type 	II 	with
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peripheral neuropathy of the lower extremities. 	Id., PageID.37-38. 	The ALJ
discussed a number of non-severe impairments, including vision loss, hypertension,
diabetes, sleep apnea, acute vaginitis, hiatal hernia, ovarian cyst, dental abscess, and
depression and anxiety. 	Id., PageID.38.
At Step Three, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the
listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 	Id., PageID.39-
40. 	The ALJ specifically commented on the impairments listed in 3.02 (Chronic
Respiratory Disease), 3.03 (Asthma), 4.04 (Ischemic Heart Disease), and 11.14
(Peripheral Neuropathy). 	Id. 	As to peripheral neuropathy, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff failed to meet the listing by establishing disorganization of the motor
function in at least two extremities with extreme limitation in the ability to stand
from a seated position; balance while standing or walking; and/or use the upper
extremities to perform fine and gross motor movements. 	Id. 	Further, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff failed to meet the listing due to not having marked mental
limitations. 	Id. 	Finally, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s severe tobacco abuse did
limit her mental function. 	Id.
Before going on to Step Four, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff had the following
RFC:
To perform light work allowing for every 30 minutes sitting or standing,
claimant needs to need to change position, taking her off-task no more
than 10% of the day while changing positions. She can stand/walk for
four hours out of an eight hour workday. 	She can occasionally climb
ramps and stairs. Plaintiff can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and
crouch. 	She can never crawl. 	Plaintiff must not be required to reach
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overhead. She cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. 	She must
never 	work 	around 	unprotected 	heights 	or 	dangerous 	moving
machinery. 	She can never work in extreme temperatures, humidity,
nor have concentrated exposure to environmental irritants (i.e. fumes,
dusts, gases, odors, poorly ventilated areas, etc.).
Id., PageID.41.
The ALJ devoted three pages to discussing Plaintiff’s RFC. 	This discussion
included the following:
 	an explanation why the findings from the March 2020 ALJ opinion were
adopted because the medically severe impairments continue to be severe,
but indicating that new evidence of additional impairments involving
cardiovascular, 	digestive 	and 	neurological 	symptoms 	required 	further
analysis, id., PageID.41,
 	a summary of the medical records relating to weight, respiratory system,
cardiovascular 	system, 	digestive 	system, 	and 	endocrine 	system, 	id.
PageID.42-43, and
 	a summary of opinions by Dr. Tom Dees, M.D. and Dr. Natalie Gray M.D.,
id. PageID.43-44.
At Step Four, the ALJ concluded that, through the DLI, the Plaintiff was
unable to perform Past Relevant Work (PRW). 	Id., PageID.44.
At 	Step 	Five, 	the 	ALJ 	considered 	the 	Plaintiff’s 	age, 	education, 	work
experience, and RFC and concluded that Plaintiff could perform unskilled light
occupations such as a router, office helper, or collator operator. Id., PageID.45-46.
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II. 	Standard of Review
Review of an ALJ’s decision is limited to two issues: (1) “whether the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards,” and (2) “whether the findings of the ALJ are
supported by substantial evidence.” 	Winslow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 566 F. App’x
418, 420 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405
(6th Cir. 2009)); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 	The Court may not conduct a de novo review of
the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. 	Garner v.
Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 	It is the Commissioner who is charged
with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and the
Commissioner’s findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial
evidence. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is defined as more than a mere scintilla of evidence but
“such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” 	Jones v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 945 F.2d 1365, 1369 (6th
Cir. 1991). 	In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must
consider the evidence on the record as a whole and whatever evidence in the record
fairly detracts from its weight. 	Richardson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 735
F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). 	The substantial evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly
rule either way, without judicial interference. 	Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545
(6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 	This standard affords the administrative decision
maker 	considerable 	latitude 	and 	acknowledges 	that 	a 	decision 	supported 	by
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substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have
supported a contrary decision. 	Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993).
III. 	Analysis
First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider all the necessary evidence
when he evaluated Plaintiff’s peripheral neuropathy under the criteria in listing
11.14. 	A claimant is per se disabled if his or her impairments meet or medically
equal one of the specific requirements of a listing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 	A claimant must satisfy all of the criteria
to “meet” the listing. 	Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir.
2009). 	An ALJ must compare the medical evidence with the requirements for listed
impairments in considering whether the condition is equivalent in severity to the
medical findings for any Listed Impairment. Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 F.
App'x 411, 416 (6th Cir. 2011). In short, at Step Three, the ALJ must actually
evaluate the evidence, compare it to the Listing, and give an explanation for their
conclusion. Id.
The Listing states:
11.14 Peripheral neuropathy, characterized by A or B:
A. Disorganization of motor function in two extremities (see 11.00D1),
resulting in an extreme limitation (see 11.00D2) in the ability to stand
up from a seated position, balance while standing or walking, or use the
upper extremities.
OR
B. 	Marked 	limitation 	(see 	11.00G2) 	in 	physical 	functioning 	(see
11.00G3a), and in one of the following:
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1. 	Understanding, 	remembering, 	or 	applying 	information 	(see
11.00G3b(i)); or
2. 	Interacting with others (see 11.00G3b(ii)); or
3. 	Concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace (see 11.00G3b(iii));
or
4. 	Adapting or managing oneself (see 11.00G3b(iv)).
The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that she met listing 11.14 explaining:
ECF No. 6-2, PageID.40.
Plaintiff focuses on § 11.14A and argues that she satisfies the Listing because
she has peripheral neuropathy of her feet and legs due to diabetes. 	ECF No. 9,
PageID.1381. 	Plaintiff stated that she experiences leg pain at night, difficulty going
up and down stairs, and she experiences pain after sitting 30 minutes requiring her
to walk until she must sit down again after about 15 minutes. 	ECF No. 6-2,
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PageID.58, 	61-62, 	68, 	71. 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	ALJ 	made 	an 	improper
determination that she could not meet the listing by concluding that she was able to
walk without assistive devices. 	Plaintiff argues that whether she uses assistive
devices is not relevant to whether she could meet the listing. 	Id., PageID.1382.
Rather, Plaintiff points to examinations by Dr. Cynthia Abacan, M.D., which
showed bilateral pre ulcerative callus on her heels and an abnormal monofilament
wire test showing no feeling. 	She was diagnosed with disorder of the nervous system
due to type 2 diabetes mellitus. 	ECF No. 6-10, PageID.610-611; ECF No. 6-15, 1350-
1351.
The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff has peripheral neuropathy but found that
she did not meet the listing because she did not have an extreme limitation. 	An
extreme limitation involving the lower extremities is defined as:
2. 	Extreme Limitation means the inability to stand up from a seated
position, maintain balance in a standing position and while walking, or
use your upper extremities to independently initiate, sustain, and
complete work-related activities. The assessment of motor function
depends on the degree of interference with standing up; balancing while
standing or walking; or using the upper extremities (including fingers,
hands, arms, and shoulders).
a. 	Inability to stand up from a seated position means that once
seated you are unable to stand and maintain an upright position without
the assistance of another person or the use of an assistive device, such
as a walker, two crutches, or two canes.
b. 	Inability to maintain balance in a standing position means that
you are unable to maintain an upright position while standing or
walking without the assistance of another person or an assistive device,
such as a walker, two crutches, or two canes.
§ 11.00D(2).
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The ALJ properly assessed § 11.14A and explained his reasoning. 	Further,
medical evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s reasoning that Plaintiff did not
have an extreme limitation such as the inability to stand up from a seated position
or to maintain balance in a standing position. 	Medical examiners reported that
Plaintiff had normal strength and movement in all extremities, and normal gait.
ECF No. 6-10, PageID.617; ECF No. 6-14, PageID.1115. 1121; ECF No. 6-15,
PageID.1337.
Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 96-8p when
accessing Plaintiff’s RFC by not considering the effects of sleep apnea, hiatal hernia,
depression, anxiety, and acute vaginitis on her ability to work. 	Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ failed to undertake a function-by-function assessment of all the relevant
evidence necessary to determine Plaintiff’s ability to perform work activities and
because the ALJ selectively considered the portions of the medical evidence that
support Plaintiff’s ability to perform light work, the RFC is not accurate and failed to
fully reflect her pain symptoms. 	RFC is an administrative finding of fact reserved
for the Commissioner. 	20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2); Deaton v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 315 F. App’x 595, 598 (6th Cir. 2009). 	While the RFC determination is
made by the ALJ, an ALJ’s RFC determination must be supported by substantial
evidence. 	Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 490 F. App’x 748, 754 (6th Cir. 2012). 	If the
record contains “conflicting evidence that would suggest further limitations, under
the substantial evidence standard, administrative findings are not subject to reversal
merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different
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conclusion.” 	Id. 	Ultimately, the ALJ may consider all relevant evidence on record,
including an individual’s medical history, reports of daily activity, and recorded
observations. 	SSR 	96-8p. 	The 	“ALJ 	is 	charged 	with 	the 	responsibility 	of
determining the RFC based on her evaluation of the medical and nonmedical
evidence.” 	Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013).
Here, the ALJ assessed each of Plaintiff’s individual symptoms and medical
conditions. 	The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s respiratory and cardiovascular conditions
and imposed restrictions in her RFC based upon those conditions. 	ECF 6-2,
PageID.42-43. 	Finally, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s sleep apnea, acute
vaginitis, hiatal hernia surgery, and depression and anxiety although not severe were
covered by the RFC determination. 	Id., PageID.38-39. 	The ALJ explained:
* * * *
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Id.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ did not ignore Plaintiff’s pain
symptoms; instead he included sitting, standing, and extremity restrictions in her
RFC which allowed her to change positions throughout the day, and limited her
ability to reach overhead. 	In making this finding, the ALJ relied upon the consulting
opinions of Dr. Dees and Dr. Gray and determined that even further restrictions were
necessary based upon Plaintiff’s symptoms of pain:
Id., PageID.44.
Plaintiff has failed to show that the ALJ erred by not including more
restrictions in the RFC. 	Finally, Plaintiff argued in her reply that she would miss
work twice a month for medical appointments and would miss at least 24 days per
year for medical appointments to address her severe impairments. 	ECF No. 13,
PageID.1410. 	She asserts, based upon the VE’s testimony, this would prohibit her
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from work and the ALJ failed by not making findings regarding her absenteeism from
work. 	Plaintiff’s last-minute argument is speculative, conclusory, and unsupported.
In sum, the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff’s argument is essentially that the ALJ should have weighed and evaluated
the evidence differently. 	But that is not ground for relief. 	Brown v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL 1259726, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 7, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL 1251232 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 25,
2024), and report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL 1258380
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2024).
IV. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court affirms the ALJ decision because the ALJ properly
applied the regulations and because substantial evidence supports his decision.
Dated: 	January 30, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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