Ahrens v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PHILLIP AHRENS,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-1337
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the
Social Security Act. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative
record and provides that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, it shall be conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the
undersigned recommends that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to a review of the Commissioner’s decision
and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. Tucker v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 775 Fed. Appx. 220, 225 (6th Cir., June 10, 2019).
The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether
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the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and
whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. Id.
at 224-25. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance, and constitutes such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Livingston v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 776 Fed. Appx. 897, 898 (6th Cir., June 19, 2019).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. Biestek v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 880 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2017). The substantial evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly
rule either way, without judicial interference. Moruzzi v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 759 Fed. Appx. 396, 402 (6th Cir., Dec. 21, 2018). This standard affords to
the administrative decision maker considerable latitude and indicates that a decision
supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence
would have supported a contrary decision. Luukkonen v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 653 Fed. Appx. 393, 398 (6th Cir., June 22, 2016).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 53 years of age on his date last insured. (PageID.40). He
successfully completed high school and worked previously as a construction worker.
Id. Plaintiff applied for DIB benefits on February 1, 2022, alleging that he had been
disabled since January 22, 2020, due to multiple rib injuries, collar bone injury,
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punctured lungs, fractured back, concussion, depression, anxiety, arthritis, sleep
apnea, and “severe pain.” (PageID.32, 213).
Plaintiff’s applications were denied, after which time he requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following an administrative hearing,
ALJ Manh Nguyen, in an opinion dated August 29, 2024, determined that Plaintiff
did not qualify for disability benefits. (PageID.32-63). The Appeals Council
declined to review the ALJ’s determination, rendering it the Commissioner’s final
decision in the matter. Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
Plaintiff’s insured status expired on June 30, 2023. (PageID.34); see also, 42
U.S.C. § 423(c)(1). Accordingly, to be eligible for Disability Insurance Benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish that he became
disabled prior to the expiration of his insured status. See 42 U.S.C. § 423; Moon v.
Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1182 (6th Cir. 1990).
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for
evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the
Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further
finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also
provide that if a claimant suffers from a non-exertional impairment as well as an
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exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional
capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate he is entitled to disability benefits
and he satisfies his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that
he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education,
and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). While
the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential
evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the
procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined.
O’Neal v. Commissioner of Social Security, 799 Fed. Appx. 313, 315 (6th Cir., Jan. 7,
2020).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from status-post compression
fracture of the left thoracic vertebra, status-post fracture of the left clavicle, status-
post fracture of the ribs, neuropathy, and vertigo, severe impairments that whether
considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the
requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in
20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.34-35).
With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff, through his date last insured, retained the ability to perform light work
subject to the following limitations: (1) he can frequently climb ladders, ropes, and
scaffolds; (2) he can frequently stoop, crouch, and reach; (3) he cannot be exposed to
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concentrated occupational vibration; (4) he cannot perform commercial driving or
operate moving machinery; (5) he cannot work around environmental hazards such
as unprotected heights or uncovered/unguarded moving machinery. (PageID.35).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work at
which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by
substantial evidence that there exists in the national economy a significant number
of specific jobs which Plaintiff can perform, his limitations notwithstanding. O’Neal,
799 Fed. Appx. at 316. In satisfying this burden, the ALJ may rely on a vocational
expert’s testimony. Ibid.
In this case, a vocational expert testified that there existed approximately
362,000 jobs in the national economy which an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could
perform. (PageID.41). This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g.,
Taskila v. Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[s]ix
thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and others
have deemed ‘significant’”). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not
entitled to benefits.
I. 	Residual Functional Capacity
A claimant’s RFC represents the “most [a claimant] can still do despite [his]
limitations.” Sullivan v. Commissioner of Social Security, 595 Fed. Appx. 502, 505
(6th Cir., Dec. 12, 2014); see also, Social Security Ruling 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at
*1 (Social Security Administration, July 2, 1996) (a claimant’s RFC represents her
ability to perform “work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on
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a regular and continuing basis,” defined as “8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an
equivalent work schedule”).
In January 2020, Plaintiff fell from a ladder suffering left rib fractures, a left
clavicle fracture, and a T-11 compression fracture. (PageID.1114). Plaintiff
argues that he is entitled to relief because the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not
supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that as a result of
the aforementioned injuries he cannot frequently perform reaching activities as the
ALJ concluded.
In support of his RFC assessment, the ALJ noted the following. Imaging tests
revealed that Plaintiff’s clavicle and rib injuries healed. (PageID.361, 363-65, 401,
403, 490, 719). Likewise, examinations revealed that Plaintiff exhibited (1) normal
gait and station; (2) normal strength and range of motion; (3) normal muscle bulk
without evidence of atrophy or edema; (4) no spinal abnormalities; (5) intact reflexes
and senses; (6) intact grip strength; and (7) unimpaired dexterity. (PageID.338, 341,
343, 358, 466, 474, 488, 495, 513, 527, 532, 713, 729, 769, 796, 810, 818, 827, 832, 887,
910-13, 1152).
The ALJ recognized that Plaintiff experienced certain physical limitations and
accordingly restricted Plaintiff to a limited range of light work. The ALJ examined
the evidence in detail and his RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff has not articulated any error in the ALJ’s RFC assessment but instead
merely urges this Court to re-weigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion.
The ALJ is tasked with determining a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c),
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416.946(c). While the ALJ may not “play doctor” and substitute her own opinion for
that of a medical professional, the ALJ is not required to tailor her RFC assessment
to any particular opinion or item of medical evidence. See, e.g., Poe v. Commissioner
of Social Security, 342 Fed. Appx. 149, 157 (6th Cir., Aug. 18, 2009). Instead, the
ALJ is “charged with the responsibility of evaluating the medical evidence and the
claimant’s testimony to form an assessment of her residual functional capacity.”
Webb v. Commissioner of Social Security, 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004).
This is precisely what the ALJ did and the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported
by substantial evidence. Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ should have weighed
and evaluated the evidence differently is not grounds for relief, however.
Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
II. 	Medical Source Opinion
As part of his disability application, Plaintiff submitted two statements from
Dr. Albert Brown who reported that Plaintiff experienced far greater functional
limitations than the ALJ recognized. (PageID.914-19, 1158). The ALJ, however,
found that the doctor’s observations were “not persuasive.” (PageID.39-40).
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief because the ALJ’s assessment of Dr.
Brown’s statements is not supported by substantial evidence.
Because Plaintiff filed his application after March 27, 2017, the ALJ evaluated
the opinions in question pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. This regulation provides
that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including
controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
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finding(s),” even an opinion from a treating source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a).
Instead, the ALJ is required to articulate his determination of the persuasiveness of
a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1)
through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” Id. § 416.920c(b)(1).
These factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with
the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to support or
contradict the opinion. Id. § 416.920c(1)-(5). The ALJ must explain his
consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, but absent circumstances
not present here, is not required to explain how the remaining factors were
considered. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2), (3). The regulations define “supportability” and
“consistency” as follows:
(1) 	Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support
his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),
the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative
medical finding(s) will be.
(2) 	Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
Id. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
With respect to Plaintiff’s functional limitations, Dr. Brown reported the
following. Plaintiff can sit or stand continuously for 1-2 hours and during an 8-hour
workday can sit and stand/walk for “about 4 hours” each. (PageID.915). Plaintiff
can walk 5 city blocks “without rest or severe pain” but requires a sit-stand option.
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Id. Plaintiff can occasionally lift/carry 10 pounds but can never lift/carry 20 pounds.
(PageID.917). Plaintiff can “never” twist, bend, crouch/squat, or climb stairs.
Plaintiff can reach “in front of [his] body” 50 percent of the time with his left upper
extremity but can reach overhead only 25 percent with his right upper extremity and
never with his left upper extremity. The doctor declined to “explain the reason” for
the limitations he assessed with respect to Plaintiff’s ability to reach. Id.
In support of his assessment of Dr. Brown’s statements, the ALJ cited the
evidence above which simply fails to support Dr. Brown’s statements. (PageID.39-
40). The ALJ also noted that the doctor’s statements, authored less than one month
apart, were inconsistent. For example, on November 16, 2022, Dr. Brown reported
that Plaintiff “is unable to do. . .any weightbearing indefinitely.” (PageID.1158).
On December 14, 2022, however, the doctor reported that Plaintiff could lift/carry
ten pounds and stand or walk for “about 4 hours” during an 8-hour workday.
(PageID.914-19).
As noted above, the ALJ, in his RFC assessment, restricted Plaintiff to a
limited range of light work. These limitations are supported by the record. To the
extent Dr. Brown’s statements are interpreted as articulating even greater non-
exertional limitations, the ALJ reasonably discounted such and his rationale for
doing so is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this argument is
rejected.
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III. Plaintiff’s Subjective Allegations
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff reported that as a result of his
collarbone fracture, he is unable to perform reaching activities with his left upper
extremity. (PageID.54-55). Plaintiff also reported that he experiences pain when
moving and struggles with repetitive movements. (PageID.54-56, 59). The ALJ
discounted Plaintiff’s testimony as “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence
and other evidence in the record. (PageID.36-38). Plaintiff argues that he is
entitled to relief because the ALJ improperly discounted his subjective allegations.
While “pain alone, if the result of a medical impairment, may be severe enough
to constitute disability,” King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th Cir. 1984), a
claimant’s “statements about [her] pain or other symptoms will not alone establish
that [she is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see also, Hash v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 309 Fed. Appx. 981, 989 (6th Cir., Feb. 10, 2009).
Instead, a claimant’s assertions of disabling pain and limitation are evaluated
pursuant to the following standard. First, it must be determined whether the
claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be
expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms. See Titles II and XVI:
Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, Social Security Ruling 16-3p, 2016
WL 1119029 at *3-4 (S.S.A., Mar. 16, 2016). Next, the intensity and persistence of
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the claimant’s symptoms are evaluated to determine the extent to which such limit
her ability to perform work-related activities. Id. at *4-9.1
As is also well recognized, “subjective complaints may support a finding of
disability only where objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged
symptoms.” Workman v. Commissioner of Social Security, 105 Fed. Appx. 794, 801
(6th Cir., July 29, 2004). However, where the objective medical evidence fails to
confirm the severity of a claimant’s subjective allegations, the ALJ “has the power
and discretion to weigh all of the evidence and to resolve the significant conflicts in
the administrative record.” In this respect, it is recognized that the ALJ’s
credibility assessment “must be accorded great weight and deference.” Ibid. It is
not for this Court to reevaluate such evidence anew, and so long as the ALJ’s
determination is supported by substantial evidence, it must stand. See, e.g., Ritchie
v. Commissioner of Social Security, 540 Fed. Appx. 508, 511 (6th Cir., Oct. 4, 2013)
(“[w]e have held that an administrative law judge’s credibility findings are virtually
unchallengeable”).
1 Social Security Ruling 16-3p rescinded Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Id. at *1.
However, the adoption of this new Social Security Ruling did not alter the analysis
for evaluating a claimant’s subjective statements. Instead, as the Social Security
Administration stated, it was simply “eliminating the use of the term ‘credibility’ [so
as to] clarify that that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an
individual’s character.” Ibid. As courts recognize, aside from this linguistic
clarification, “[t]he analysis under SSR 16-3p otherwise is identical to that
performed under SSR 96-7p.” Young v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1914732 at *6 (W.D.
Ky., Apr. 23, 2018).
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There is no dispute that Plaintiff experiences significant limitations resulting
from his various impairments. As discussed above, however, the evidence does not
support Plaintiff’s testimony that he is limited to the extent alleged. The Court is
not permitted to re-weigh the evidence. The ALJ articulated a clear rationale in
support of his decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and the ALJ’s
conclusions and rationale are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this
argument is rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within such time waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: December 30, 2025 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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