Anderson v. Berrien, County of et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ELAINE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 1:24-cv-1244
v.
HON. ROBERT J. JONKER
COUNTY OF BERRIEN et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART THE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
The Court has reviewed Magistrate Judge Vermaat’s Report and Recommendation (ECF
No. 62) and the Objections to the Report and Recommendation that were filed by one set of
defendants (ECF No. 64). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where, as here, a party has
objected to portions of a Report and Recommendation, “[t]he district judge . . . has a duty to reject
the magistrate judge’s recommendation unless, on de novo reconsideration, he or she finds it
justified.” 	12 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure § 3070.2 (3d ed. 2025).
Specifically, the Rules provide that:
The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s
disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject,
or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). An objection is made “properly” if it is specific enough to allow the Court
“to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.”
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985).
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DISCUSSION
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting in part and denying in part the defendants’
various motions to dismiss. 	(ECF Nos. 44, 46, and 48). 	In particular, the Magistrate Judge
recommends dismissing the following: Count III in its entirety; Count IV against Sheriff Bailey
and Captain Herbert only; and the official capacity claims against Sheriff Bailey and Captain
Herbert that appear in any counts. 	(ECF No. 62, PageID.742). 	The Magistrate Judge also
recommends that the Court order Plaintiff to amend Count IV in her complaint to clarify which
legal standard applies to which allegations. (Id. at PageID.742).
One set of defendants—those associated with Wellpath, L.L.C.—have objected to the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. 	(ECF No. 64). 	In the objections, those
defendants primarily reiterate and expand upon arguments presented in their earlier Motion to
Dismiss (ECF Nos. 49 and 57). These defendants’ objections fail to deal in a meaningful way with
the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. Therefore, they do not alter the Court's decision regarding the
Report and Recommendation.
The Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations regarding Count III. The
Court will also adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation regarding Count IV, but with the
caveat that claims asserted in Count IV against Defendant Morrisey will also be dismissed. The
Court will reject the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to order Plaintiff to clarify which legal
standard applies to which allegation in Count IV. And finally, the Court will decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
I. 	Official Capacity Claims
In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge notes that Berrien County
Sherriff Bailey and Jail Administrator Captain Herbert are both being sued in their official
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capacities. (ECF No. 62, PageID.734). Because “actions against parties in their official capacities
are, essentially, actions against the entities for which the officers are agents,” Littlejohn v. Rose,
768 F.2d 765, 772 (6th Cir. 1985), it is redundant to sue both the agent in an official capacity and
the entity for whom the agent works. The Magistrate Judge correctly recommends dismissing the
official capacity claims against those two defendants, and the Court adopts that portion of the
Report and Recommendation.
Additionally, the Court notes that Defendants Morrissey and Thomas are also being sued
in their official capacities even though the entity for whom they work, Wellpath, L.L.C., is also
being sued. For the same reasons that Defendants Bailey and Herbert Should not be sued in their
official capacities, Defendants Morrissey and Thomas should also be sued only in their individual
capacities. Therefore, the Court dismisses the official capacity claims against those two defendants
as well.
Finally, the Court notes that the Amended Complaint could be read as asserting claims
under Count I and Count II against Defendants Bailey, Herbert, Morrisey, and Thomas in their
individual capacities. 	(See ECF. No. 62, PageID.742). 	To clarify, though, the only theories of
liability asserted in Counts I and II are based on either (1) an official policy or custom or (2) a
failure to train or supervise. 	These theories of liability rely on the Supreme Court’s holding in
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but Monell does not apply to
individuals being sued in their individual capacities. See Lunneen v. Vill. of Berrien Springs, No.
1:20-CV-1007, 2022 WL 16569574, at *12 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2022), aff’d in part, appeal
dismissed in part sub nom. Lunneen v. Vill. of Berrien Springs, Michigan, No. 22-2044, 2023 WL
6162876 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2023). Therefore, dismissal of those claims is appropriate as well.
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II. 	Individual Capacity Claims in Count IV
One of the recommendations made in the Report and Recommendation is to dismiss the
claims in Count IV that are being asserted against Defendants Bailey and Herbert. (ECF No. 62,
PageID.731). The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing those claims because the Complaint
does not allege any specific factual allegations against those two defendants. (Id.)
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that dismissal of the Count IV claims against
Defendants Bailey and Herbert is appropriate. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, it is insufficient
for a plaintiff to allege that a generic group of defendants have collectively caused a constitutional
violation without explaining how each individual defendant was involved in the purportedly
wrongful conduct. 	See Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 626 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Plaintiff must
state a plausible constitutional violation against each individual defendant—the collective acts of
defendants cannot be ascribed to each individual defendant.”). Therefore, the Court will dismiss
those claims.
However, the same logic also requires dismissal of the claims in Count IV that are directed
against Defendant Morrisey. At no point does the Complaint ever allege that Morrisey engaged
in any individualized action that contributed to the constitutional violation.1 Rather, the Complaint
treats Defendant Morrissey the same way it treats Defendants Bailey and Herbert—it alleges that
they failed to properly supervise or train their employees, but outside of that, it does not say how
they were specifically involved in the allegedly wrongful acts that led to the wrongful death giving
rise to this cause of action. Because more is needed to bring claims against individuals under 42
1 In this regard, the Complaint treats Defendant Morrisey differently than Defendant Thomas. While the Complaint
makes no specific factual allegations about Defendant Morrisey’s actions relating to the wrongful, the Complaint does
make numerous specific factual allegations about Defendant Thomas. 	(See, e.g., ECF No. 42, PageID.447
(“Defendant THOMAS went as far as to admit that she ‘knew’ her subordinate, Defendant ANDERSON, ‘didn’t do
anything for David after seeing him for hours on his knees next to his hospital bed,’ and that ‘David deserved better
than he got.’”). 	Although there are not many specific allegations about Defendant Thomas’s actions, there are
enough—given this stage of litigation—to warrant allowing the Count IV claims against her to proceed.
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U.S.C. § 1983, dismissal of the Count IV claims brought against Defendant Morrisey is also
appropriate.
III. 	Distinguishing Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Standards
In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court order
Plaintiff to amend Count IV in her complaint to clarify which legal standards apply to which
allegations. (ECF No. 62, PageID.742). This recommendation flows from the fact that the legal
standards for medical treatment of incarcerated individuals are different depending on their
custodial status. 	Eighth Amendment standards apply post-conviction; Fourteenth Amendment
standards apply pre-conviction. See Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir. 2021).
In most cases, the question of whether a detainee is being held pre-conviction or
post-conviction is straightforward. 	However, in this case, the defendant pled guilty to a felony
offense on the afternoon of November 19, 2021, and died in the early hours of November 20, 2021.
Given the close timing between the death and the guilty plea, there are bound to be some nuanced
questions of fact that will influence a decision on which legal standards apply to which allegations.
Because nuanced questions of fact are best resolved during discovery, it is the Court’s opinion that
it would be premature at this time to instruct the Plaintiff to clarify which legal standards apply to
which claims. Therefore, the Court rejects the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on this point.
IV. 	The State Law Claims
Of the four counts remaining, three assert claims brought under § 1983. A fourth count—
Count V, negligence causing wrongful death—asserts only state law claims. In the motion to
dismiss, the Wellpath defendants argue that Anderson’s state law claims should be dismissed
because they are medical malpractice claims barred by the statute of limitations. (See ECF No.
49, PageID.591). The Magistrate Judge correctly rejected this argument because, under Michigan
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law, the representative of an estate has two years to bring a claim after being appointed personal
representative. 	(ECF No. 62, PageID.741–41 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5852)).
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court deny the motion to dismiss the
state law claims.
The Court agrees that the motion to dismiss the state law claims should be denied for the
reasons articulated by the Magistrate Judge. That does not mean, however, that the state law claims
should necessarily continue to proceed in federal court. 	Whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims is a determination within the Court’s discretion. Mitchell v. City
of Benton Harbor, 137 F.4th 420, 443 (6th Cir. 2025). 	In determining whether to retain
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims, the Court “should consider the interests
of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests
against needlessly deciding state law issues.” 	Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d
1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993).
Here, it makes little sense for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Many of the defendants in this case are either municipalities or individuals who are being sued in
their official capacities. State law claims against municipal defendants are best handled in the state
system. Standards of liability and questions of governmental immunity are different on the state
law claims. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law
claims.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, the Court is dismissing Count III in its entirety; dismissing any claims being
brought against Defendants Bailey, Herbert, Morrisey, or Thomas in their official capacities;
dismissing Count IV claims brought against Defendants Bailey, Herbert, and Morrisey; and
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declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Additionally, because
no claims remain against Defendants Bailey, Herbert, or Morrissey, the Court is dismissing them
from the case. Thus, the claims that remain are as follows:
Count 	Claim 	Defendants
I 	42 U.S.C. § 1983: Violation of
Plaintiff-Decedent’s Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights by Official Policy or
Custom and Failure to Train or Supervise.
Berrien County
II 	42 U.S.C. § 1983: Violation of
Plaintiff-Decedent’s Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights by Official Policy or
Custom and Failure to Train or Supervise.
Wellpath, L.L.C.
IV 	42 U.S.C. § 1983: Deliberate Indifference
in Violation of Plaintiff-Decedent’s Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.
Berrien County; Sergeant
Will; Deputy Cipriano;
Deputy Boelcke; Deputy
Zabel; Deputy Warman;
Deputy Jewell; Deputy
Kehoe; Deputy Scienski;
Wellpath, L.L.C.; Karen
Thomas; Kelly Anderson; and
Rianca Washington
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 62) is ADOPTED IN PART as the opinion of the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the state law claims are DISMISSED without
prejudice because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims. The case will proceed on the federal claims only.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 6, 2026 	/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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