Schomaker v. Joblonski et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RICHARD SCHOMAKER,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-966
KATHRYN JOBLONSKI, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Richard Schomaker initiated this action pro se by filing a complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Ingham County Animal Control Officer Kathryn Joblonski and Ingham
County Animal Control (ICAC) (collectively the Animal Control Defendants), and the City of East
Lansing and City of East Lansing Building and Code Administrator E. Scott Weaver (collectively
the City Defendants). Pursuant to the Court’s October 17, 2025 Order (ECF No. 99), the action
against the City Defendants has been stayed pending the outcome of related state proceedings.1
Presently 	before 	me 	is 	the 	Animal 	Control 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	or,
Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 84), which is fully briefed and ready for decision.2
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the Court GRANT the motion and dismiss
with prejudice Schomaker’s claims against the Animal Control Defendants.
1 As a result of Schomaker’s subsequent amendments, the City Defendants now also include
Timothy Schultz, the City’s current Building and Code Administrator, and John Newman, the
City’s Fire Marshal.
2 I deny the Animal Control Defendants’ request for oral argument as the parties’ briefs and
attachments fully develop and address the issues. See W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(d).
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I. 	Background
A. 	Facts
The events giving rise to Schomaker’s claims against the Animal Control Defendants
occurred in the fall of 2021 at Schomaker’s residential property, located at 141 Orchard Street,
East Lansing, Michigan (the Property). (ECF No. 75 at PageID.1038.)
On September 14, 2021, ICAC received a complaint from East Lansing resident Heidi
Butler requesting a welfare check on multiple cats roaming free on the Property. Butler indicated
that she fostered cats for a local cat rescue and was familiar with illnesses in cats. She reported
that some of the cats were sneezing with signs of eye and nasal discharge. (ECF No. 85-3; ECF
No. 85-4 at PageID.1270.) Joblonski, an Animal Control Officer with ICAC, responded to the
Property the same day to investigate Butler’s complaint. Upon arrival, Joblonski saw multiple cats
roaming in the front yard that fled to the fenced-in backyard. Joblonski had no contact with
Schomaker during this visit, but she left a “blue note” on the front door of the residence requesting
that the cat owner contact ICAC. (Id.) Joblonski also took photographs of the Property due to signs
of hoarding in the backyard causing the retaining wall to start collapsing, which she passed along
to the City’s Parking and Code Enforcement Department (PACE). (Id.)
Joblonski subsequently confirmed through an online public records search that Schomaker
owned the Property. She was also able to confirm that the license plate on the vehicle in the
driveway was registered to Schomaker. (ECF No. 85-4 at PageID.1270.)
Joblonski returned to the Property the following day, September 15, and saw that the “blue
note” had been removed from the front door and that a PACE violation notice had been taped on
the front door. The violation notice informed Schomaker that “bags of soil, scaffolding, ladders,
and items protruding on the alleyway need to be removed/cleaned.” (Id. at PageID.1270–71.)
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Joblonski had no contact with Schomaker and left another “blue note” on the door. (Id. at
PageID.1271.) While still at the Property, Joblonski saw a grey tabby kitten, approximately three
months old, lying on a cardboard box on the front porch. The kitten’s eyes were covered with
hardened mucus, which prevented it from opening its eyes, and it appeared extremely underweight
and malnourished. Joblonski therefore impounded the kitten and transported it to ICAC for
immediate treatment, including saline fluids, antibiotics, eye drops, and flea and deworming
medication. (Id.)
On September 16, 2021, the shelter veterinarian examined the impounded grey tabby kitten
and determined that she was dehydrated, her eyes were glued shut with mucus, she had both ocular
and nasal discharge and congestion, was hard of swallowing and hypothermic, and had flea dirt on
her. The kitten was medically euthanized later that day after Schomaker provided Joblonski a
signed surrender form. (Id.)
When Joblonski returned to the Property on September 16, she observed three more cats
that appeared to have symptoms of upper respiratory infections such as eye discharge and sneezing,
but she was unable to catch them. Schomaker, who was at the Property, told Joblonski that he
began feeding two male outdoor cats several years earlier and the number of cats he was currently
feeding had grown to approximately 20. Schomaker admitted that he was aware of the grey tabby
kitten Joblonski had impounded and stated that its mother had shunned it and it had always
struggled with its health. (Id.; ECF No. 17-1 at PageID.189.)
Later in the evening on September 16, 2021, Joblonski advised Schomaker by phone that
ICAC could assist him in cat population control through spaying and neutering, but Schomaker
declined the offer, stating that he would obtain veterinary assistance himself and would put lysine
in the cats’ food to address upper respiratory infections. However, he asked to borrow a live trap
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from ICAC to capture the cats and said he would be willing to surrender to ICAC any sick cats
that he trapped. (ECF No. 85-4 at PageID.1271; ECF No. 17-1 at PageID.189.) Joblonski
subsequently provided Schomaker a live trap. (Id.)
During the September 16 in-person exchange earlier in the day, Schomaker told Jablonski
that he had taken two cats to the East Lansing Veterinary Clinic (ELVC) for cat care in the past.
Upon subsequent inquiry of ELVC, Joblonski obtained records for a female domestic shorthaired
cat named Maori that ELVC found through Schomaker’s telephone number, but they were under
the name “Ferlie Yruma” at the Property’s address. Those records reflected a visit to the clinic on
July 10, 2020, for an abdominal wound recheck that was originally treated by the Michigan State
University Small Animal Clinic. MSU had a record under the name Ferlie Yruma for a cat named
Maori, but it was unable to provide the reason for the visit. ELVC also had a record under the
name Ferlie Yruma for a male domestic shorthaired cat named Foggy Bottom that was seen on
October 16, 2020 for sneezing and discharge and again on April 7, 2021, for limping and a wound.
(ECF No. 85-4 at PageID.1271.)
Joblonski subsequently spoke with the shelter veterinarian about providing cats lysine for
respiratory problems. The veterinarian said that lysine would help with upper respiratory infections
in cats that were not showing symptoms, but cats exhibiting nasal and/or eye discharge and
sneezing would require antibiotics from a veterinarian. (Id.)
Joblonski was unable speak with Schomaker either in person or by phone until September
29, 2021, when he told her that he would set the trap and call ICAC and surrender any sickly cats
that he captured. Schomaker said that he was familiar with setting live traps and had canned cat
food for bait. However, Schomaker made no efforts to trap the cats. On October 6 or 7, 2021,
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Joblonski went to the Property to retrieve the live trap as no cats had been captured.3 Joblonski
observed approximately eight cats on the Property that appeared to be healthy, without discharge
from their eyes or noses. (Id. at PageID.1272; ECF No. 17-1 at PageID.189.) Joblonski did not see
the trap and was unable to reach Schomaker by phone. She noticed that some of the cats on the
Property were wearing collars that they did not have before. (ECF No. 85-4 at PageID.1272.) Later
that day Schomaker contacted Joblonski and advised him she would be picking up the trap.
Schomaker agreed to leave it on the front porch. During that conversation, Joblonski told
Schomaker that, if he fed and sheltered the cats, he would be liable for them, and that if he wished
to avoid liability, he needed to quit feeding them. (ECF No. 17-1 at PageID.189.)
On October 19, 2021, ICAC received a second welfare complaint about the cats at the
Property from Stacey Blanden, who reported that she drove past the Property daily and had to use
caution to avoid hitting any cats that ran into the street and was concerned for their welfare. She
indicated that she had driven past the Property the same day she made her complaint and viewed
approximately 20 cats in the front yard. (Id. at PageID.1272; ECF No. 85-7.) Joblonski responded
to the Property the same day. She did not encounter Schomaker but left another “blue note” on the
front door requesting that he contact ICAC. (ECF No. 85-4 at PageID.1272.) While at the Property,
Joblonski observed multiple cats free-roaming and noticed three or four kittens lying in a cat bed
by the front porch with symptoms of upper respiratory infection, including mucus in their eyes that
prevented them from opening them. Joblonski was able to capture one of the kittens and
3 Joblonski’s warrant affidavit indicates that she went to the Property on October 6 to pick up the
live trap, while her notes indicate that she picked up the trap on October 7. (ECF No. 17-1 at
PageID.189; ECF No. 85-4 at PageID.1272.) Schomaker alleges that this entry occurred on
October 7.
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transported it to ICAC. The kitten was treated for flea dirt, upper respiratory infection, and
conjunctivitis. (Id.; ECF No. 85-11 at PageID.1317.)
Despite his prior promise to provide documentation evincing veterinary care for any of the
cats on the Property, Schomaker had failed to provide records. Accordingly, on October 20, 2021,
Joblonski prepared and executed an affidavit for a search warrant recounting the events
surrounding the complaints to ICAC and her visits to the Property and interactions with
Schomaker. In addition to those facts, Joblonski stated that based on her training and experience,
Schomaker showed signs of hoarding disorder, including hoarding of animals, which were likely
in the residence. (Id.) She concluded “based on [her] training and experience that there [wa]s
probable cause to believe that there are additional cats and/or kittens at 141 Orchard St that are in
need of medical treatment, contrary to MCL 750.50[(2)(a)].” (Id.) Joblonski also affirmed that
there were no veterinary records showing that Schomaker had provided veterinary care for any of
the cats under his care in April 2020. (Id.)
On October 21, 2021, a judge issued a search warrant authorizing a search of the Property,
including “residence, front yard, backyard, and any outbuildings,” for evidence of the crimes of
animal cruelty/neglect, including live or deceased domesticated animals and evidence of proof of
ownership, including food, veterinarian records, and medication. (ECF No. 85-10.) Schomaker
was not at the Property when Joblonski and others arrived to execute the warrant but eventually
appeared after Joblonski contacted him by phone. When Schomaker arrived, he was provided a
copy of the warrant.
Schomaker stated that he did not have any animals inside, did not own any cats outside,
and had stopped feeding the cats of as October 7, 2021. Nonetheless, he unlocked the door of the
residence to allow the officers inside, but hoarded belongings and debris prevented it from opening
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more than only two feet. Schomaker said that he entered the residence by climbing over the
hoarded belongings. Although the officers observed multiple bags of cat food inside, ICAC and
East Lansing Fire Department officials determined that conditions were too unsafe for entry. (ECF
No. 85-11 at PageID.1317.)
The Property’s backyard was enclosed with fencing made of chain link, wood, and cement
block. The enclosed fence surrounded the garage, which could not be accessed because the
doorways were blocked by hoarded items. However, the front and back doors were slightly open,
allowing for a visual inspection of the interior. Despite being filled by hoarded items and debris,
cats were able to enter and exit the garage. The officers observed a makeshift shelter with a cat
bed inside. The backyard included hoarded belongings as well as a gazebo-type structure that
contained cat beds, a bag of cat litter, an empty bag of cat food, and personal items. (Id. at
PageID.1317–18.)
During the search, multiple cats of various ages, some of which showed signs of illness,
were on the Property. Seven cats were removed but unsafe conditions precluded further attempts
to catch more cats. Schomaker declined to surrender the cats to ICAC. Medical examinations of
the cats revealed that each one had an upper respiratory infection. (Id. at PageID.1318.) On October
25, 2021, Joblonski taped two criminal impound letters to the door of the Property. The following
day, she sent copies of the letters, along with quotations for boarding and medical treatment costs,
to Schomaker by certified mail. (Id.)
On December 16, 2021, Schomaker was charged by felony complaint with violating Mich.
Comp. Laws §750.50(4), abandoning/cruelty to 4 to 10 animals. (ECF No. 85-12.) Schomaker was
bound over to circuit court on February 23, 2022, following a preliminary examination. (ECF No.
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85-13.) However, the charge was dismissed nolle prosequi in the interest of justice on August 3,
2023. (ECF No. 85-14.)
B. 	Procedural History
Schomaker filed his complaint in this action on September 16, 2024 (ECF No. 1), and
amended it on January 31, 2025. (ECF No. 17.) The first amended complaint set forth three claims
against the Animal Control Defendants. Count I alleged that Jablonski violated Schomaker’s
Fourth Amendment rights by conducting warrantless searches of the Property on September 14,
October 7, and October 19, 2021. (Id. at PageID.153–37.) Count II alleged that Joblonski and
ICAC violated the Fourth Amendment in connection with the October 21, 2021 search of the
Property because the warrant application was not supported by probable cause. (Id. at PageID.158–
64.) Finally, Count III, against both Joblonski and ICAC, alleged that the Ingham County Animal
Control Ordinance (ICAC Ordinance) was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at PageID.164–69.)
On February 11, 2025, I issued a Case Management Order setting September 2, 2025, and
October 1, 2025, as the respective discovery and dispositive motion deadlines. (ECF No. 22.) On
March 26, 2025, Schomaker filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction preventing the City’s Dangerous Building Hearing scheduled for March 27,
2025, from proceeding. (ECF No. 28.) The Court denied the motion for temporary restraining order
on March 26, 2025 (ECF No. 29), allowing the hearing to proceed. The remainder of the motion
was denied on August 14, 2025. (ECF No. 73.) Meanwhile, on July 15, 2025, Schomaker filed
another motion for temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction requesting that the
Court enjoin the Hearing Officer’s June 26, 2025 Order resulting from the prior Dangerous
Building Hearing. (ECF No. 53.) Schomaker also filed a motion for leave to file a second amended
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complaint the same day. (ECF No. 52.) On August 11, 2025, I granted the motion to amend in part
and denied it in part, denying it with regard to Schomaker’s requests to assert individual capacity
claims against Defendants Joblonski and Weaver and to substitute Ingham County for ICAC, and
granting it with regard to Schomaker’s requests to supplement his pleading to add new City
Defendants and claims based on events that occurred in 2025. (ECF No. 70.) The first three counts
in Schomaker’s supplemented first amended complaint (ECF No. 75) against Joblonski and ICAC
remained largely unchanged from those claims as alleged in the first amended complaint.
On August 11, 2025, I stayed all previous case management deadlines pending a final
decision on Schomaker’s second motion for an injunction, dismissed certain motions, and directed
the parties to file a report on the status of the Dangerous Building proceeding. (ECF No. 71.)
Despite the stay, the Animal Control Defendants filed the instant motion on August 29, 2025,
which the parties continued to brief. On September 9, 2025, I issued a Report and Recommendation
recommending that the Court deny Schomaker’s second motion for injunctive relief and stay this
matter as it relates to the claims against the City Defendants. (ECF No. 89.) The Court adopted the
Report and Recommendation on October 17, 2025. (ECF No. 99.)
II. Motion Standards
Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or,
alternatively, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(a). Because Defendants submit exhibits
that are not part of the pleadings in support of their motion, I find it proper to treat the motion as
one for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts
are facts that are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty
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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return
judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party but
may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).
III. Discussion
A. 	Rule 56(d) Declaration
Schomaker contends that he is entitled to discovery before the Court decides the instant
motion and attaches a Rule 56(d) declaration to his response. (ECF No. 95-3.) He contends that
summary judgment is improper because he has not been afforded sufficient opportunity to conduct
discovery. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has observed that “the plaintiff must receive ‘a full opportunity
to conduct discovery’ to be able to successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Short v.
Oaks Corr. Facility, 129 F. App’x 278, 281 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257).
Therefore, “[a] grant of summary judgment is improper if the non-movant is given an insufficient
opportunity for discovery.” White’s Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Buchholzer, 29 F.3d 229, 231–32
(6th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(d) provides the non-moving party a mechanism to obtain sufficient
discovery when faced with a motion for summary judgment.
However, a party’s submission of an affidavit or declaration pursuant to that rule is not an
automatic guarantee of additional discovery. “‘A party invoking [the] protections [of Rule 56(d)]
must do so in good faith by affirmatively demonstrating . . . how postponement of a ruling on the
motion will enable him . . . to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of
fact.’” FTC v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Willmar
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Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1975)). The party seeking
discovery must “indicate to the district court its need for discovery, what material facts it hopes to
uncover, and why it has not previously discovered the information.” Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park,
226 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2000). In other words, the party offering the affidavit must, with
“details” and “specificity,” explain why additional discovery will enable the party to rebut the
movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874
F.2d 351, 357 (6th Cir. 1989).
Based on my review of Schomaker’s Rule 56(d) declaration, although he sets forth the
details of what discovery he believes he needs with some specificity in order to defeat the Animal
Control Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, I find that the discovery he seeks is not
material to the issues Defendants raise in support of their motion and therefore will not enable him
to avoid summary judgment. For example, despite Schomaker’s arguments, the existing record
suffices to determine whether exigent circumstances necessitated Joblonski’s warrantless entries
onto the Property, whether Joblonski’s affidavit established probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant, and whether any omissions were material to the existence of probable cause. Likewise,
because I conclude that Schomaker lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the ICAC
Ordinance, the existence of clear legal standards is not material to the claims at issue. Relatedly,
because Schomaker has no claim based on the ICAC Ordinance, ICAC’s relationship to the County
as a separate entity is irrelevant. Finally, although Schomaker contends that he was unable to
conduct discovery regarding his claims against the Animal Control Defendants between March
and July 2025 because his time was consumed by the litigation against the City Defendants
concerning the Dangerous Building proceeding (id. at PageID.1507), there is no reason why
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Schomaker could not have conducted some basic discovery on his claims against the Animal
Control Defendants during this time. Thus, Schomaker fails to meet his burden under Rule 56(d).
B. 	Official Capacity Claims/ICAC/Count III
Defendants contend that Schomaker’s claims against Joblonski in her official capacity are
subject to dismissal because they are redundant of his claims against ICAC. (ECF No. 85 at
PageID.143–44.) Defendants then contend that Plaintiff’s claims against ICAC are subject to
dismissal because ICAC is simply a department of Ingham County that is not an independent, legal
entity subject to suit. (Id. at PageID.1244–45.)
As an initial matter, having again reviewed both the original and first amended complaints,
as well as the Animal Control Defendants’ answers to those pleadings (ECF Nos. 1, 12, 17, and
23), and applying the Sixth Circuit’s “course of proceedings” test set forth in Moore v. City of
Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc), I find that the pleadings adequately notified
Joblonski that Schomaker was asserting individual capacity claims against her. The Sixth Circuit
applies this test when, as here, the complaint does not clearly allege the capacity in which a
defendant is sued. “This test considers whether the pleadings as a whole put the defendant on
notice that the plaintiff intended to hold him or her personally liable for damages.” Rashada v.
Flegel, No. 23-1674, 2024 WL 1367436, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2024) (citing Moore, 272 F.3d at
773). In making this determination, a court considers “the nature of the plaintiff’s claims, requests
for compensatory or punitive damages, and the nature of any defenses raised in response to the
complaint, particularly claims of qualified immunity, to determine whether the defendant had
actual knowledge of the potential for individual liability.” Moore, 272 F.3d at 772 n.1.
Schomaker’s only allegation regarding capacity is that “Joblonski appeared at [the Property] in her
capacity as an [ICAC] Officer[.]” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.4; ECF No. 17 at PageID.154.) This
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allegation says nothing about the capacity in which Schomaker intended to sue Joblonski, for a
state official performing her governmental duties may be sued in both an individual and/or official
capacity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27–28 (1991). Nonetheless, in his original complaint,
Schomaker requested compensatory damages of at least $100,000.00 against both Joblonski and
ICAC and an unspecified amount of punitive damages. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.7, 9, 23.) In his first
amended complaint, Schomaker not only maintained his request for compensatory and punitive
damages, but also alleged that the law was “clearly established” with regard to his claims (ECF
No. 17 at PageID.157, 163), suggesting that he was attempting to plead around qualified
immunity—a defense available only in response to an individual capacity claim. See Everson v.
Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 501 n.7 (6th Cir. 2009). In addition, in responding to both the original and first
amended complaints, the Animal Control Defendants raised qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense. (ECF No. 12 at PageID.120; ECF No. 23 at PageID.311.) Therefore, because the
pleadings indicate that Defendants had notice that Schomaker intended to sue Joblonski
individually, I will consider the claims against Joblonski in both capacities.
Returning to the official capacity claims, “[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent
only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). In other words, “individuals sued in their official capacities stand
in the shoes of the entity they represent.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003). In
general, when a plaintiff sues both an individual defendant in his or her official capacity and the
employing governmental entity in a Section 1983 action, the official capacity claim may be
dismissed as duplicative of the claim against the governmental entity. See D.H. v. Matti, No. 3:14-
CV-732, 2015 WL 4530419, at *4 (W.D. Ky. July 27, 2015) (dismissing official capacity claims
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against individuals as “unnecessarily duplicative” because the municipal defendants were
defendants, and the same claims were asserted against them); Swartz Ambulance Serv., Inc. v.
Genesee Cnty., 666 F. Supp. 2d 721, 726 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (dismissing official capacity claims
against the board of commissioners and individual commissioners as duplicative of claims brought
against the county); Burreson v. Barneveld Sch. Dist., 434 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593 (W.D. Wis. 2006)
(“Because Monell authorizes suits brought against local government units directly, ‘official
capacity’ suits against municipal decision makers are redundant when the municipality has been
named as another defendant.”). In contrast to these cases, however, there is no basis here to dismiss
the official capacity claims as duplicative because, as Defendants argue, ICAC is not an entity that
may be sued. Therefore, no duplicative claim is present.
Whether asserted as an official capacity claim against Joblonski or a direct claim against
Ingham County, Schomaker must satisfy the requirements of Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under such a theory, a municipality may only be liable in a Section
1983 action when its policy or custom causes the injury, regardless of the form of relief sought by
the plaintiff. Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 35-37 (2010) (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 694 (1974)). In a municipal liability claim, the finding of a policy or custom is the initial
determination to be made. Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996). The policy
or custom must be the moving force behind the constitutional injury, and a plaintiff must identify
the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity, and show that the particular injury was
incurred because of the execution of that policy. Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th
Cir. 2005); Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe, 103 F.3d at 508-09.
Schomaker contends that the ICAC Ordinance that is the subject of his vagueness claim in
Count III of his operative pleading constitutes a municipal policy that satisfies Monell. (ECF No.
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95 at PageID.1491.) This argument lacks merit because Schomaker was not charged under the
ICAC Ordinance, and nothing in the record indicates that Joblonski acted pursuant to that
ordinance. Rather, Schomaker was charged under Michigan’s animal cruelty statute, Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.50 (ECF Nos. 85-9, 85-11, 85-12, and 85-13), and Joblonski cited this statute in her
affidavit for a search warrant. (ECF No. 85-4 at PageID.1272.) Schomaker contends that Joblonski
must have acted pursuant to the ICAC Ordinance because the animal cruelty statute contains no
enforcement provisions or authority to conduct searches. (ECF No. 95 at PageID.1490.) This
argument is unpersuasive, as the statute contains criminal penalties, including imprisonment, fines,
and community service. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.50(4). The statute’s lack of any provision
authorizing searches is a non-starter, as the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and its
exceptions provide independent authority for searches. Moreover, Defendants do not rely on the
ICAC Ordinance in their brief to justify Joblonski’s entries onto the Property. Because the ICAC
Ordinance was not applied to Schomaker and is not at issue here, he cannot rely on it as the basis
for his Monell claim because it could not have caused any constitutional injury. Therefore,
Schomaker’s official capacity claim against Joblonski (and all claims against ICAC) should be
dismissed.4
The vagueness claim alleged in Count III—whether brought as an individual capacity claim
against Jablonski or a Monell claim—also fails for a more fundamental reason. That is, Schomaker
lacks Article III standing to assert the claim. This Court has no authority to render advisory
4 Schomaker’s response suggests that he is also asserting that Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.50 is
unconstitutionally vague. Any such claim need not be addressed because Schomaker alleges only
that he was “damaged as a result of an unconstitutionally vague ordinance[.]” (ECF No. 75 at
PageID.1061.) He does not allege that Michigan’s animal cruelty statute is unconstitutionally
vague. Moreover, the statute cannot support a Monell claim as it is not a county custom, policy, or
practice.
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opinions, issue opinions on abstract principles, or hear generalized grievances. See Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975); North Carolina v. Rice,
404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). A plaintiff seeking relief must show that he has standing to assert a
claim. The test for Article III standing is well known. To be entitled to sue in federal court, a
plaintiff must have suffered some actual or threatened injury due to the alleged illegal conduct of
the defendant; the injury must be “fairly traceable” to the challenged action; and there must be a
substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress or prevent the plaintiff's injury. Valley
Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
472 (1982). The Supreme Court has observed that in situations such as this, where a particular
statute or ordinance was never applied to a plaintiff, the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge its
constitutionality. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 189 n.7 (1984) (“As the current state statute
was never applied to appellee, he lacks standing to question its constitutionality.”); New York Civil
Serv. Comm’n v. Snead, 425 U.S. 457, 458 (1976) (holding that because the “appellee’s claim . . .
amount[ed] to a request for a determination of the constitutionality of a statute which, while
administered by the Commission has never in fact been properly applied . . . to her[,] . . . she has
no standing to assert such a challenge”); see also Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 485 F.3d
343, 353–54 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff advertising company lacked standing to
challenge provisions of a city’s sign ordinance that were not applied to the plaintiff). Accordingly,
because Schomaker lacks standing to assert his vagueness challenge to the ICAC Ordinance, Count
III should be dismissed.
C. 	Individual Capacity Claims
Schomaker’s 	individual 	capacity 	claims 	against 	Joblonski, 	which 	allege 	Fourth
Amendment violations, are set forth in Counts I and II. Understandably, Defendants did not raise
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qualified immunity in their opening brief due to some uncertainty about the presence of individual
capacity claims against Joblonski. They first raised the defense in their reply. (ECF No. 100 at
PageID.1569–70.) Regardless, consideration of the defense will not prejudice Schomaker because
his response assumed the presence of individual capacity claims and expressly argued that
Joblonski is not entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 95 at PageID.1476–78, 1494–95.)
“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, ‘government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”’ Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Once a defendant raises the qualified immunity defense,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant officer violated a right so clearly
established “that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing
violate[d] that right.”’ Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. Martin v. City of
Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). First, the court must “determine if the facts
alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 232 (2009)). Second, the court asks if the right at issue was “‘clearly established’ when the
event occurred such that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated it.” Id.
(citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). A court may address these steps in any order. Id. (citing Pearson,
555 U.S. at 236). A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if either step of the
analysis is not satisfied. See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2016).
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1. 	Count I (September 14, October 7, and October 19 Searches)
In Count I, Schomaker alleges that Joblonski violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment by conducting warrantless searches of the Property on September 14, October 7, and
October 19, 2021. The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. Am. IV. “Reasonableness is the key, the existence of a warrant often its measure. A
warrantless search of a home or business is presumptively unreasonable.” Benjamin as Tr. of
Rebekah C. Benjamin Tr. v. Stemple, 915 F.3d 1066, 1069 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Kentucky v. King,
563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011)). Put differently, “‘searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967)); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[B]ecause the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to
certain exceptions.”). In the context of searches, the Supreme Court regards the curtilage, or area
“‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home,’” as “‘part of the home itself for Fourth
Amendment purposes.’” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). Still, police officers lacking a warrant, like ordinary citizens,
retain a limited license to approach a home, knock, state their business, and then, “absent invitation
to linger longer,” leave. Id. at 7.
The Supreme Court has recognized that warrantless searches may be reasonable if “the
exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.
(internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether sufficient exigent circumstances exist
to justify a warrantless search, a court must “consider the totality of the circumstances and the
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‘inherent necessities of the situation at the time.’” United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1511 (6th
Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 508 (6th Cir. 1993)). Exigent
circumstances exist when there is a “need for prompt action by government personnel,” such that
the delay in securing a warrant “would be unacceptable under the circumstances.” United States v.
Plavcak, 411 F.3d 655, 663 (6th Cir. 2005).
The Sixth Circuit has applied the exigent circumstances exception to welfare checks
involving animals. In United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 768 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2014),
employees of an entity that contracted with the City of Chattanooga to provide animal-welfare
services responded to a pet store after receiving complaints of neglect and unsanitary conditions.
Upon arrival, the employees discovered that the animals were dehydrated in high heat without
water, that one hamster had a large untreated cut, and another hamster had died in its cage. Based
on these circumstances, the employees removed the animals from the store. Id. at 471, 490. The
court found that, faced with these circumstances, the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity because a reasonable official could believe that the exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless seizure of the animals. Id. at 490. Subsequently, in King v. Montgomery County, 797
F. App’x 949 (6th Cir. 2020), the Sixth Circuit held that exigent circumstances supported a
warrantless entry into the plaintiff’s home and seizure of dogs that were exposed to the home’s
dangerous conditions. While out of town, the plaintiff in King asked a friend, Davids, to stop by
her house to care for several dogs. Ultimately, Davids was unable to tend to the dogs, so another
friend, Will, agreed to do so. When Will arrived at the home, she found the dogs living in “squalid
conditions,” including dog urine and feces covering the floor, strong ammonia fumes that made
seeing and breathing difficult, and a dog in a cage without access to food or water. After Will
called 911, a police officer responded to scene, and Will described the conditions she had observed.
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The officer then opened the door, observed the described conditions, and entered the house and
took pictures. The officer then contacted an animal control officer and described the information
he had received from Will, as well as his own observations. When the animal control officer arrived
at the home, Will let her inside to perform a welfare check. The officer took pictures of the
conditions and took the dogs into custody. The court held that exigent circumstances justified both
officers’ warrantless entries into the home because the information they received “would have led
a reasonable officer to believe the dogs inside the home were in danger.” Id. at 955–56. The court
held that the exception applied even if “[t]he circumstances . . . ultimately prove[d] less dire than
imagined.” Id. at 955.
a. 	September 14 and October 19, 2021 Entries
Based on the information Jablonski received through animal cruelty complaints from Heidi
Butler on September 14, 2021, and Stacey Blanden on October 19, 2021, Joblonski’s entry onto
the Property on those dates did not violate Schomaker’s Fourth Amendment rights because, as in
United Pet Supply and King, a reasonable officer could have believed that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless entry onto the Property. Similar to the circumstances in United Pet Supply
and King, Jablonski received animal abuse complaints about numerous free-roaming cats on the
Property suggesting that they were being neglected and not receiving needed care.
When Joblonski arrived on September 14, 2021, she had information from a neighbor with
experience dealing with cat illness that at least some of the cats were ill and needed veterinary
care. Because the cats were not confined to one location but instead free roaming, it was reasonable
for Joblonski to go onto the Property to confirm whether any cats, in fact, required immediate
veterinary care. The fact that Joblonski later reported that all of the cats she saw that day “appeared
healthy with no welfare concerns at the time” (ECF No. 17-1 at PageID.190), is of no moment
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because she could not have made that determination without entering the Property to observe the
cats.
Schomaker’s attempt to distinguish United Pet Supply on the basis that it involved a
commercial pet store with a diminished privacy interest falls flat, as nothing in the Court’s opinion
suggests that the commercial nature of the premises was germane to the court’s exigent
circumstances analysis, and it ignores that the King court applied the exigent circumstances
exception to an animal welfare check conducted inside a private residence. See Clark v. Memphis
Animal Servs., No. 2:22-cv-2641, 2024 WL 4906509, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 27, 2024) (holding
that the defendants’ observations regarding the conditions of dogs in the plaintiff’s backyard
supported their conclusion that exigent circumstances justified immediate entry into the backyard).
Joblonski made her second entry onto the Property about a month later on October 19,
2021, after receiving a second welfare complaint about cats at the Property being neglected and
running into the road. Joblonski responded to the Property and saw multiple cats free roaming on
the Property. Joblonski went to the front door to attempt contact with Schomaker but left a “blue
note” asking him to call ICAC after determining that he was not home. Joblonski observed three
to four kittens lying in a cat bed by the front porch, all of which had signs of an upper respiratory
infection and were unable to open their eyes due to mucus. She was able to capture and impound
one of the kittens. (ECF No. 17-3 at PageID.198; 85-4 at PageID.1272; ECF No. 85-11 at
PageID.1317.) Based on the information Joblonski had received from Blanton, as well as her own
observation of numerous cats on the Property, Joblonski had a reasonable basis to conclude that
exigent circumstances justified an immediate entry onto the Property for a welfare check.
Contrary to Schomaker’s argument, Joblonski’s advice to him on October 7, 2021, about
discontinuing his feeding of the cats did not create the exigent circumstances on October 19, as
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many of the cats were already ill and neglected, and some cats were running into the road.
Moreover, apart from exigent circumstances, the record indicates that Joblonski acted within the
scope of her implied license recognized in Jardines by limiting her entry to approaching the front
door to speak with Schomaker and noticing the sick kittens in plain view as she walked to, or
departed from, the front porch.5
b. 	October 7, 2021 Entry
It is undisputed that Joblonski entered the Property on October 7 when exigent
circumstances did not exist. Nonetheless, she went to the Property to pick up the live trap, which
Schomaker had left for her on the front porch. (ECF No. 17-1 at PageID.189; 85-4 at
PageID.1272.) Consent is another well-known exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). A person may freely and voluntarily waive his or her
Fourth Amendment rights by consenting to a search. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,
593–94 (1946). Consent must be freely and voluntarily given, and it “‘may be in the form of words,
gesture, or conduct.”’ United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United
States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1976)). Here, by placing the live trap on his front
porch for Joblonski to retrieve, Schomaker impliedly consented to her entry on the Property. Thus,
Joblonski did not violate the Fourth Amendment on this occasion.
In sum, I recommend that the Court conclude that Jablonski is entitled to qualified
immunity as to Count I because her three entries onto the Property did not violate the Fourth
Amendment or clearly established law.
5 The photographs in the record indicate that Joblonski would have walked within, at most, a foot
or two of the cat bed containing the kittens on her way to the front door. (ECF No. 38-4 at
PageID.492; ECF No. 85-6 at PageID.1296–97.) In other words, the kittens and their sickly
condition would have been clearly visible from the front walk.
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2. 	Count II (October 21, 2021 Search)
Schomaker contends that the search warrant was defective because Joblonski’s affidavit
failed to establish probable cause to search the residence and the garage. He further contends that
the affidavit contained contradictory statements and omitted material information that would have
negated probable cause.
An affidavit establishes probable cause for a search warrant if “‘given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)); see also United States v. Lattner, 385 F.3d 947, 951
(6th Cir. 2004) (noting that probable cause involves “reasonable grounds for belief, supported by
less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
affidavit need not be “perfect” or “provide every specific piece of information to be upheld.” Hale
v. Kart, 396 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2005). However, there must be a “substantial basis” for
concluding that evidence of a crime will be found at the location to be searched. See id. (citing
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238).
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure
that the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause
existed.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. “When reviewing a magistrate judge’s probable cause determination, a
reviewing court should give great deference to a magistrate judge's probable cause determination
and reverse that decision only if it was arbitrarily made.” United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374,
379 (6th Cir. 2009).
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Joblonski’s affidavit sought a warrant to search for evidence that Schomaker had violated,
or was violating, Michigan’s animal cruelty law, which prohibits “[a]n owner, possessor . . . or
person having the charge or custody of an animal” from “[f]ail[ing] to provide an animal with
adequate care.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.50(2)(a). Here, the information set forth in Joblonski’s
affidavit meets the relatively lenient standard for probable cause as it established a fair probability
that evidence of animal neglect or cruelty would be found in the places to be searched, including
the residence and garage. In particular, the affidavit set forth facts establishing the presence of
numerous cats roaming on the Property, some of which were sick and required veterinary care and
one of which had to be medically euthanized; Schomaker’s admission that he was aware of the
impounded kitten’s need for veterinary care and failed to obtain such care; Schomaker’s statements
that he would put lysine in the cats’ food to help with their upper respiratory infections and would
seek veterinary care for the cats; the presence of one or more cat beds on the Property and
Schomaker’s apparent placement of collars on some of the cats; and Schomaker’s admission that
he had been feeding the cats for years. (ECF No. 85-4.)
Schomaker argues that the warrant was defective because Joblonski’s affidavit failed to
provide facts establishing the required nexus to search the residence and the garage, as it contained
no facts connecting any cats to those areas. (ECF No. 95 at PageID.1472–73.) Although the facts
set forth in the affidavit establish that Joblonski viewed and/or encountered all cats outside of the
residence and the garage, the affidavit contains a sufficient basis to conclude that additional cats,
including sick cats, would be found inside those areas. For example, Joblonski described
conditions on the Property indicating that Schomaker showed signs of hoarding disorder, including
hoarding of animals, and noted that based on her training and experience, animal hoarders tend to
harbor animals both inside and outside their residences. (ECF No. 85-4 at PageID.1270, 1272.) It
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is well established that an officer’s “training and experience” may be used to draw conclusions in
establishing probable cause. See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 582, 589 (6th Cir. 2008).
Moreover, even assuming that a nexus did not exist to search the interior portions of the property
for live/sick/deceased cats, the warrant was not limited to cats. Rather, it authorized a search for
“[a]ny and all evidence for proof of domestic animal ownership, including but not limited to animal
food, veterinarian records, medication, etc.” (ECF No. 85-10.) Given the facts set forth in the
affidavit, there was a fair probability that some evidence, be it food, veterinary records, or some
other indicia of ownership, would be found in the residence and/or the garage.6
Schomaker next argues that the warrant lacked probable cause because Joblonski’s
affidavit omitted material facts and contradicted itself regarding veterinarian records.7 (ECF No.
95 at PageID.1474–75.) As for veterinary records, the affidavit does not contain contradictory
statements; it notes that Joblonski obtained records from ELVC under the name “Ferlie Yruma”
but that Schomaker never gave Joblonski any records showing that he was providing the cats
and/or kittens veterinary care. (ECF No. 85-4 at PageID.1271–72.)
Regarding omissions, under Sixth Circuit law, a plaintiff must show “by a preponderance
of the evidence that in order to procure the warrant [the defendant] ‘knowingly and deliberately,
or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create[d] a
6 It bears noting that neither Jablonski nor the other officers present during the search entered the
garage due to the presence of hoarded items or materials blocking the doors. Instead, they viewed
the interior through the existing partial openings in the doorways from an area as to which
Schomaker does not contend lacked a nexus to facts set forth in the affidavit. (ECF No. 85-11 at
PageID.1317–18.) Thus, it is difficult to conceive how the alleged lack of a nexus to the garage
resulted in an actual Fourth Amendment violation.
7 Schomaker also argues that the warrant relied on stale information because the earliest
observations were from mid-September, while the warrant was issued on October 21, 2021. (ECF
No. 95 at PageID.1474.) This argument ignores that Joblonski observed approximately three or
four kittens with symptoms of upper respiratory infections two days before the warrant issued.
(ECF No. 85-4 at PageID.1272.)
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falsehood’ and ‘such statements or omissions [we]re material, or necessary, to the finding of
probable cause.’” Trakhtenberg v. Cnty. of Oakland, 661 F. App’x 413, 419 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original)). “If the
affidavit contains false statements or material omissions, [the court] set[s] aside the statements and
include[s] the information omitted in order to determine whether the affidavit is still sufficient to
establish probable cause.” Id. (quoting Sykes, 625 F.3d at 305). Schomaker contends that Joblonski
omitted the following from her affidavit: (1) her observations from her reports that all cats
appeared healthy with no welfare concerns when she went to the Property on September 14, 2021,
and October 7, 2021; (2) whether she considered the cats feral or belonging to Schomaker; (3) that
neither she nor the complainants had ever seen the cats restrained or caged; (4) that an East Lansing
ordinance allows residents to feed stray cats; (5) that Schomaker signed the surrender form for the
impounded kitten at Joblonski’s request to secure veterinary care for the kitten; and (6) Jablonski
did not observe animals inside the home or garage. (ECF No. 75 at PageID.1051–52; ECF No. 95
at PageID.1474–75.)
None of this information would have been material to the probable cause determination.
First, Jablonski’s observations on two occasions that all cats appeared healthy would not have
undercut the facts she provided about her observations of sick cats on several other occasions,
including cats with upper respiratory symptoms that were impounded on two occasions. Second,
Jablonski’s view on whether the cats were feral or owned by Schomaker was irrelevant to the issue
of ownership that was to be addressed by the search warrant. Third, whether the cats were
restrained or free-roaming and the reason Schomaker surrendered the impounded kitten were not
relevant to whether there were sick cats/kittens on the Property in need of veterinary care. Fourth,
the ordinance permitting feeding of stray cats was not material to probable cause as it was not
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applied to Schomaker. Last, the fact that Joblonski did not see cats in the residence or the garage
would have been evident from the lack of such allegations in the affidavit. Therefore, Schomaker
fails to show that Joblonski omitted material information from her affidavit.
Finally, although the argument appears in the portion of his brief discussing the vagueness
claim in Count III, Schomaker argues that the warrant was flawed because the predicate element
of ownership did not exist. In other words, he contends that, before a warrant may issue to search
for evidence pertaining to a violation of Section 750.50(2), the affiant must establish that the
individual whose residence is to be searched is in fact an owner/possessor/custodian, as a “warrant
cannot be used to discover whether [this] element . . . exists.” (Id. at PageID.1484–85.) This
argument lacks merit because it misconstrues the statute. Whether an individual qualifies as an
owner, possessor, or custodian of animals for purposes of Section 750.50(2) is one of several
elements of the offense susceptible to proof at trial. See People v. Parkinson, 348 Mich. App. 565,
577–78 (2023). A warrant therefore may issue to search for evidence of ownership or possession
of animals even though that status has not been definitively established. And as set forth above,
Joblonski’s affidavit contained sufficient allegations to establish a fair probability that evidence
pertaining to ownership or possession would be found in the places to be searched described in the
warrant.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that the Court grant the Animal Control
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 84) and dismiss with prejudice Counts I
through III of the supplemented first amended complaint.
Dated: January 5, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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