Arthur v. Krause et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DANIELLE ARTHUR,
Plaintiff,
v.
NOLAN VANDERWEELE, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:24-cv-105
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Danielle Arthur was a mental-health practitioner at the Oaks Correctional Facility, a prison
operated by the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). In April 2023, assistant deputy
warden Douglas Krause asked Arthur to participate in a hostage-rescue training in which she
played the hostage and he the hostage-taker. 	During their simulated rescue of Arthur, two
corrections officers participating in the exercise, Nolan VanderWeele1 and Nicholas Wemple,
rushed at Krause and knocked him into a filing cabinet. Arthur, who was standing next to Krause,
fell against an armchair and was momentarily pinned to it. 	Arthur left her job at the prison the
following month, and she eventually sued Krause, VanderWeele, Wemple, and other participants
in the exercise for allegedly using excessive force against her during the training. VanderWeele
and Wemple, the sole remaining defendants, now move for summary judgment. Because there is
no genuine dispute that Arthur was not the target of Defendants’ intentional conduct, Arthur was
1 The parties agree that VanderWeele’s name is misspelled in the case caption and on the docket. The Court will order
the clerk to correct the spelling of VanderWeele’s name in both records. See Waggoner v. City of Battle Creek,
No. 1:12-cv-827, 2013 WL 1591793, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 2013).
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not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and her excessive-force claim fails.
The Court will therefore enter summary judgment in Defendants’ favor.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	The Training Exercise
Danielle Arthur began working as a qualified mental-health professional at Oaks
Correctional Facility in June 2022. (Arthur Dep. 16, ECF No. 113-3.) Arthur secured the position
through a staffing agency, which was her formal employer. (Id. at 14.) On April 18, 2023, Krause
directed Arthur and her supervisor Brian Majerczyk to participate in a training exercise. Krause
told Arthur to report to Majerczyk’s office, where he would pretend to take her hostage. (Id. at
18.) When Arthur got to Majerczyk’s office, Krause instructed the two to depress the alert buttons
on their personal-protection devices, which prison staff carry so they can request assistance during
dangerous situations. (See Arthur Dep. 22; Investigative Record, ECF No. 113-2, PageID.893.)2
Krause, playing the role of the hostage-taker, then conducted “negotiations” with corrections
officer Jared Revolt and acting lieutenant Travis Hall for the release of Arthur and Majerczyk.
(Ison Dep. 16–17, ECF No. 113-8.)
Within 	approximately 	fifteen 	minutes 	of 	the 	negotiation 	portion 	of 	the 	exercise
commencing, the officers playing the rescue squad arrived outside Majerczyk’s office. 	(Revolt
Dep. 17–18, ECF No. 113-7.) During the negotiations, Krause picked a highlighter out of a pen
holder on Majerczyk’s desk and guided Arthur to stand in front of him. (See Krause Dep. 17, ECF
No. 113-4.) 	Krause then put the highlighter to Arthur’s throat and walked her to a window,
illustrating to the officers playing the rescuers that Arthur’s life was under threat. (Arthur Dep.
2 The reports on MDOC’s investigation into Arthur’s injury, discussed below, are admissible as public records under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(A)(iii). See Gregg v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 661 F. Supp. 2d 842, 850 (S.D.
Ohio 2009).
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24–25.) Shortly thereafter, Krause told the rescuers that Arthur was having a diabetic incident and
that he would let Majerczyk go. (Investigative Record, PageID.894, 908.) Just outside the door,
four of the corrections officers playing rescuers began forming up to rush into the room. Nolan
VanderWeele, armed with a shield, was the point man. 	Behind him were Nicholas Wemple,
Connor Ison, and John Farago. 	(Ison Dep. 18.) 	The four officers were wearing Department of
Corrections–issue cell extraction gear. (Ison Dep. 17; ECF No. 113-14, PageID.1220.)
Inside the room, Krause told Majerczyk to get ready to leave. He then arranged himself and
Arthur within the confines of Majerczyk’s office. A short filing cabinet with armchairs on either
side stood along the wall opposite the door to the office. (Investigative Record, PageID.697; see
Wemple Dep. 83, ECF No. 113-9.) Krause stood in front of this filing cabinet and positioned Arthur
to his right, placing her near the armchair to the left of the cabinet. (Arthur Dep. 25.) The chair was
less than three feet from the edge of Majerczyk’s desk, which ran perpendicular to it. (Investigative
Record, PageID.697.) Krause then told Majerczyk to leave the room. (Id., PageID.550.)
When Majerczyk opened the door, VanderWeele, leading with his shield, marched into the
room at about half the speed he would have used in a real hostage incident. (VanderWeele Dep.
20–21, ECF No. 113-12; see Arthur Dep. 47.) Simultaneously with VanderWeele’s entry into the
room, Wemple stepped around VanderWeele’s left flank and crouched low to secure Krause’s
legs. (Wemple Dep. 84.) According to Krause, as VanderWeele barreled into the room toward
him, Krause nudged Arthur out of the trajectory of the shield. (Krause Dep. 19.) This resulted in
Arthur being pushed around two feet to the left, putting her right in front of the armchair (Krause
Dep. 19) and Wemple (Wemple Dep. 83). 	VanderWeele then rammed Krause. 	(Wemple Dep.
71–72, 81; VanderWeele Dep. 21–22.) 	VanderWeele testified that he pushed Krause “with the
entirety of the shield” (VanderWeele Dep. 23).
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What happened next is the core dispute in this case. According to Krause’s recounting of
events to the MDOC investigator, the momentum of the squad knocking into him resulted in Arthur
being pushed into the armchair. (Investigative Record, PageID.551.) At his deposition, Krause
testified that he walked about three feet backwards into the filing cabinet and “guided” Arthur into
the armchair next to him. 	(Krause Dep. 18–19.) 	At the same time, Wemple grabbed Krause’s
right knee with both hands (Wemple Dep. 83) and slid in around Krause’s legs (id. at 90).
Krause did not believe that VanderWeele’s shield impacted Arthur (id.), and VanderWeele
outright denied it in his deposition (VanderWeele Dep. 23–24). Wemple also denied ever coming
into contact with Arthur, notwithstanding his proximity to her and the cramped confines of
Majerczyk’s office. 	(Wemple Dep. 83–84.) 	Wemple told the MDOC investigator that once he
got hold of Krause’s right leg, Krause could not step back and was forced to lean into Arthur.
(Investigative Record, PageID.520.) 	Arthur was then forced in turn to lean onto the armchair.
(Id.) Wemple also described Arthur as appearing to “move or evade back from the contact over
the arm of a chair.” (Id., PageID.949.) Wemple testified that he could not “see any other way”
for Arthur to have gotten hurt than through direct contact with VanderWeele’s shield or being
jostled by Krause as he staggered back from VanderWeele’s charge. 	(Wemple Dep. 72.)
Wemple’s account is corroborated by Majerczyk, who told the MDOC investigator that Krause
“was still holding on to” Arthur when the rescuers barreled into him, tripping the two of them into
the chair and resulting in some of the squad members falling “slightly” on both of them.
(Investigative Record, PageID.419–420). This is also the version of events that made it into the
prison’s official report on the incident, which said that Krause was “push[ed] . . . back” into
Arthur. (Id., PageID.908.)
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For her part, Arthur testified that she could recall nothing between the hostage rescuers
bursting through the door and then finding her left leg pinned against the left armchair and in great
pain. (Arthur Dep. 39.) In the report Arthur filed on the day of the incident, Arthur said that her
“leg got pinned” when the officers rushed in and that the “weight of the officer” put “pressure” on
her leg. (Investigative Record, PageID.911.) And in response to a questionnaire by the MDOC
investigator, she said that “forceful pressure on [her] leg above [her] left knee” pinned her to the
armchair and caused her leg to twist. (Id., PageID.883.) But in no description of the incident does
Arthur provide a precise account of how she ended up against the chair.
The pain of having her upper leg pinned against an armchair caused Arthur to cry out.
According to Majerczyk, who was standing just outside of his office, Arthur yelled “Ow, fuck,
you’re on my leg!” (Id., PageID.927.) Krause testified that Arthur “hollered ouch.” (Krause Dep.
28.) 	After Arthur cried out, she recalled the pressure pinning her to the chair being relaxed.
(Arthur Dep. 41.) Krause testified that he called an end to the exercise when Arthur gave voice to
her distress. 	(Krause Dep. 28; see Investigative Record, PageID.908.) 	Arthur agreed that the
exercise ended after she was injured. (Arthur Dep. 48–49.)
B. 	The Aftermath
Arthur was left stunned and injured by the hostage training. She testified that when she
shook off her confusion, she found herself sitting in the chair with the other participants in the
exercise staring at her. (Arthur Dep. 26.) She felt humiliated by the experience and struggled to
contain her emotions. 	(Id.) 	Arthur left for the day after submitting a report detailing what
happened during the hostage exercise. (Id., PageID.769; Arthur Dep. 49.)
An MRI scan on May 5 revealed that Arthur sustained a mild knee sprain and an incomplete
impaction fracture on the inside bones of her left knee during the exercise. (Id., PageID.795.) On
May 10, while conducting her rounds, Arthur spoke with corrections officer Edmund Stone, who
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asked if her slow gait and limp were the result of “the common peroneal.” 	(Id., PageID.786.)
Arthur asked what the phrase meant, and Stone explained that it referred to a blow to the upper leg
whose purpose is to drop the target of the blow to the ground. (Id.) Stone recounted overhearing
other corrections officers attributing the injury Arthur sustained during the training exercise to a
misdirected strike aimed at another participant. (Id.; Stone Dep. 14) Stone admitted to the MDOC
investigator that he did not participate in the hostage training and did not personally witness anyone
strike Arthur. 	(Investigative Record, PageID.979.) 	Both Krause and Wemple testified that a
common peroneal strike could not have been inflicted on her because of the arrangement of
furniture and the limited space in the room. 	(Krause Dep. 22; Wemple Dep. 71.) 	Majerczyk
similarly denied seeing anyone strike Arthur when interviewed by the MDOC investigator, instead
reporting that he “observed people leaning on each other because they fell into a chair.”
(Investigative Record, PageID.887.)
Arthur did not return to work at Oaks after May 17. (ECF No. 113-11, PageID.1129.) On
August 21, with no date for Arthur’s return on the horizon, the prison decided to backfill her
position, leaving her without a job. 	(Id., PageID.778.) 	Before her termination, the prison
administration launched an internal investigation into whether any MDOC policy was violated
during the hostage exercise. (Id., PageID.882.) The investigation was assigned to Bill Rushford,
an inspector at another MDOC facility. (Id., PageID.880.) Rushford submitted the report of his
investigation into Arthur’s injury on October 11. The report found that because Arthur had not
reported receiving a strike or another form of intentional conduct that caused her injury, there was
“insufficient evidence . . . of any inappropriate physical contact.” 	(Id., PageID.906.) 	The
overheard conversation that Stone passed on to Arthur was dismissed as unverified hearsay.
Rushford concluded that the momentum of the entry of the squad playing hostage rescuers “caused
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any accidental contact that may have occurred.” (Id.) The investigation was reopened on March
11, 2024, to collect additional evidence. 	(Id., PageID.549.) 	But Rushford reached the same
conclusion he did originally: Arthur’s injury was an accident. (Id., PageID.556.)
C. 	Procedural History
Arthur initiated this lawsuit on February 2, 2024, naming Krause and the corrections
officers involved in the hostage exercise as defendants. (ECF No. 1.) Subsequent amendments of
the complaint and orders by this Court have whittled the case down to its present dimensions:
Arthur alleges that VanderWeele and Wemple used excessive force against her in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 	Before the Court is VanderWeele and Wemple’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 112).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 	A material fact is genuinely disputed when there is “sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” 	Id. at 249
(citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz v. City Serve. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1961)). 	Summary
judgment is not an opportunity for the Court to resolve factual disputes. Id. The Court “must shy
away from weighing the evidence and instead view all the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in their favor.” Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.,
999 F.3d 400, 410 (6th Cir. 2021).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from conducting “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” 	The threshold issue for any Fourth Amendment claim, then, is whether the
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challenged government conduct can be characterized as a search or seizure. Since Arthur does not
contend that Defendants searched her, the analysis in this case can be confined to seizure.
A. 	Seizure
“A seizure can occur in one of two ways: (1) use of force with the intent to restrain; or (2) show
of authority with acquisition of control.” Campbell v. Cheatham Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 47 F.4th 468,
476 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 317 (2021)). Common to both forms of
seizure is the necessity of intent. 	The Fourth Amendment “addresses ‘misuse of power,’ not the
accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S.
593, 596 (1989) (citation omitted) (quoting Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927)). “[F]or
a seizure to occur, the detention or taking must be willful; seizure cannot be applied to an unknowing
act.” Stewart v. City of Middletown, 136 F. App’x 881, 883 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
That one who is not the target of an officer’s intentional conduct has not been seized within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is most evident with respect to seizures by control.
Acquisition of control, whether accomplished through “voluntary submission to a show of
authority or the termination of freedom of movement,” Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 322
(2021), is measured according to whether the officer’s conduct “conveyed to the person
confronted” that they were not “free to ignore the police presence and go about [their] business,”
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 261 (2007) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,
575 n.7 (1988)). 	The classic examples of a display of authority—a “threatening presence,” a
“display[ed] weapon,” a “physical touch[],” a peremptory “tone of voice,” see United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)—are all purposive; they aim to bring about compliance
with the officer’s directives by those to whom they are addressed. 	Although “‘an unintended
person may be the object of the detention’ caused by an intentional show of authority,” only one
who reasonably “perceive[s] that the show of authority was at least partly directed at him” can
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contend that they were seized. United States v. Cloud, 994 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254).
Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2002), is on point. At issue in Ewolski
was whether a Fourth Amendment claim would lie against officers who allegedly used excessive
force in attempting to subdue a mentally ill man who took his son and wife hostage and shot at
officers who attempted to rescue them. Id. at 498–99, 505. The Sixth Circuit held that the hostage-
taker, but not his family members, had been seized. Although the hostage-taker did not submit to
the police’s show of authority, because “the police surrounded the house and paraded an armored
vehicle in front” of it, the police’s “actions qualif[ied] as an intentional application of physical
force and show of authority made with the intent of acquiring physical control.” Id. One whose
liberty of movement is successfully restrained by officers’ intentional conduct is seized, even if
the police never take them into formal custody. By contrast, the hostage-taker’s wife and son were
not seized because the officers’ control over the family members’ environment did not constrain
their “freedom to walk away.” 	Id. at 507. 	The officers gave the family members no reason to
believe that they were barred from leaving the house, and their “clear objective” was to liberate
them from the man holding them hostage. 	Id. 	Absent an exercise of control “that somehow
restricts the subject’s physical liberty,” the court held, “[c]ontrol over one’s environment does not
establish a seizure.” Id.
Intent is no less necessary for seizures accomplished through force. Only one who is the
“deliberate object” of an officer’s “exertion of force” has been seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 	Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2000)). Neither “[a]ccidental force” nor “force
intentionally applied for some other purpose” suffices. Torres, 592 U.S. at 317. The leading case
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in this circuit is Claybrook v. Birchwell, in which the force at issue was the shooting of an innocent
bystander sitting inside a vehicle caught in an exchange of fire between police officers and the
bystander’s father-in-law. 	199 F.3d 350, 354–55 (6th Cir. 2000). 	Drawing on Supreme Court
precedent, Claybrook held that the bystander’s claim was properly recognized under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment. 	Because
officers cannot “‘seize’ any person other than one who was a deliberate object of their exertion of
force,” harms “inadvertently inflicted upon an innocent third party” stemming from a privileged
use of force “are adjudged according to substantive due process norms,” which subject officers to
liability only if their conduct “shocks the conscience.” Id. at 359 (emphasis omitted) (first citing
Brower, 489 U.S. at 596; then citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).3
Nor is the Sixth Circuit alone in this respect: “the unanimous approach of the courts of appeals” is
to bar “bystanders harmed by state force” from contending that the use of force against them
effectuated their seizure. Napper v. Hankison, 617 F. Supp. 3d 703, 740 & n.20 (W.D. Ky. 2022);
see also Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 654 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2023)
(collecting cases).
To be sure, only objective expressions of an officer’s intent are relevant to characterizing
their conduct as a seizure. A misapprehension by the target of an unreasonable display of authority,
for example, about whether the person making the display was a law-enforcement officer will not
insulate the officer from liability if a reasonable observer would have recognized that the officer
was acting under color of law. See Campbell, 47 F.4th at 479 & n.5. It is also true that officers
can be held liable for the unwanted results of intentional conduct. An officer’s mistake about the
3 This Court previously dismissed Arthur’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. (ECF No. 80 at 9.) Because Arthur does
not seriously argue that either Defendant’s conduct amounted to a deprivation of due process (cf. Resp. 32), the Court
will not address the issue.
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identity of an arrestee does not render their arrest of that person any less intentional. See Brower,
489 U.S. at 596 (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–5 (1971)). Nor does the desire to
question only the driver of a vehicle negate the restriction on the passenger’s freedom of movement
when the vehicle is pulled over. See Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 261.
But although an officer’s liability is not based on their subjective motives, and despite the
fact that intent is inferred from the officer’s behavior, an officer cannot intend to seize a person at
whom the officer’s intentional conduct is not directed. 	The term “seizure” by definition
“connote[s] an intentional interference with a person’s liberty.” Peete v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville
& Davidson Cnty., 486 F.3d 217, 220 (6th Cir. 2007). An officer must “‘objectively manifest[] an
intent to restrain’ the liberty of an individual” for their conduct to constitute a seizure. 	United
States v. Wright, 57 F.4th 524, 530 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 998); see also
Quinn v. Zerkle, 111 F.4th 281, 297 (4th Cir. 2024) (explaining difference between analyzing
whether officer “at all intended to seize or use excessive force” and “consider[ing] an officer’s
underlying motive or intent”).4
That only an officer’s intended target is seized does not limit the Fourth Amendment’s
protections to situations in which a single individual is targeted. In Fisher, the defendant violated
the Fourth Amendment by unlawfully seizing the plaintiff, who was a passenger in a car that the
defendant shot at to bring it to a halt. The court held that the defendant could be held liable to the
passenger because the car “was the intended target of Defendant’s intentionally applied exertion
4 A Sixth Circuit panel held that Brower and Brendlin entail that “an unintentional victim is protected under the Fourth
Amendment.” Kilnapp v. City of Cleveland, No. 22-4059, 2023 WL 4678994, at *4 (6th Cir. July 21, 2023). Kilnapp
is not binding on the Court, which must adhere to circuit precedent unless overruled by the Sixth Circuit sitting en
banc or the Supreme Court. See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 476 (6th Cir. 2014). And Killnap’s
interpretation of Brower and Brendlin is contested. See Irish, 108 F.4th at 719–20 (denying that Brendlin and Torres
“end[ed] any ‘debate’ on subjective intent’s role in whether a seizure occurred); Singleton v. Casanova, No. 22-50327,
2024 WL 2891900, at *16 (5th Cir. June 10, 2024) (“Brower has not been construed to establish an all-purpose
‘transferred intent’ rule for § 1983 claims asserting Fourth Amendment violations.”).
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of force”: although the defendant was “shooting at the driver of the moving car” rather than the
passenger, the defendant “intended to stop the car,” so he necessarily intended to stop the passenger
too. 	Fisher, 234 F.3d at 319. 	Fisher makes clear that anyone whose freedom of movement is
necessarily restrained when an officer uses force against a deliberate target is also a target and
cannot be seized unreasonably.
The same principle is illustrated by cases allowing Fourth Amendment claims when a
police canine is released to hunt down a fleeing suspect but ends up attacking a different person.
See Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 654 F. Supp. 3d at 1047 (collecting cases). 	Courts
adhering to this rule impute to the dog’s handler the intent that it “seize anyone in the space where
the dog was deployed,” since the officer is charged with knowing that he cannot control who the
dog will apprehend once it is unleashed. See id. (quoting Rodriguez v. City of Fresno, 819 F. Supp.
2d 937, 947 (E.D. Cal. 2011)). 	Although this reasoning is open to criticism, see Looper v. Las
Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 23-cv-1436, 2025 WL 2530909, at *9 (D. Nev. Sep. 2, 2025), the
important point here is that the cases that rely on it do not negate the intent requirement; instead,
they construe the officer as intentionally targeting all who are at risk of having their freedom of
movement terminated by an uncontrolled instrumentality.5
The canine cases can be contrasted with those cases rejecting Fourth Amendment liability
when a hostage is injured in the course of an attempt to subdue their captor. That accidental harm
to a hostage does not implicate the Fourth Amendment was recognized in Fisher itself, which
emphasized how “different” the case before it was from those in which “an officer is attempting
to shoot one individual (the fleeing felon) and avoid another (the hostage).” Id. at 318 n.2; see
5 Sixth Circuit precedent suggests that one attacked by a police canine that was not directed to do so by its handler
“ha[s] no cognizable Fourth Amendment claim.” Whitworth v. Kling, 90 F.4th 1215, 1218 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486, 493 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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also Rodriguez v. Passinault, 637 F.3d 675, 686–87, 686 n.5 (6th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases).
Many of the cases cited in Napper v. Hankison, 617 F. Supp. 3d 703, 740 (W.D. Ky. 2022), in
support of the proposition that an innocent bystander cannot raise a cognizable Fourth Amendment
claim are hostage cases. 	See Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1990);
Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1156–57 (10th Cir. 2000); Pearce v. Doe, 849 F.
App’x 472, 475 (5th Cir. 2021). Taken together, these two lines of cases teach that determination
of whether an individual has been seized depends on a careful assessment of whether restraining
an individual’s freedom of movement or using force against them was within the scope of an
officer’s (objectively ascertained) intentional conduct.
B. 	Application
In light of these principles, Arthur can survive summary judgment only if she can point to
a genuine dispute over whether she was the target of intentional conduct by VanderWeele or
Wemple. Her inability to do so is dispositive.
First, the very nature of the hostage exercise attests that Arthur was not the intended target
of Defendants’ force. 	The undisputed facts establish that the officer in charge of the hostage-
rescue team ordered the rescue team, including Defendants, to subdue Krause. 	(Investigative
Record, PageID.904.) The rescue was initiated because Krause told the negotiator that Arthur was
“experiencing a simulated diabetic episode.” (Id.) 	Jared Revolt, the officer who conducted the
negotiations, testified that all participants in the exercise knew that it was a training. (Revolt Dep.
18–19, ECF No. 109-7.) Wemple told the MDOC investigator that when he arrived at the building
in which Majerczyk’s office was located, he was directed to gear up because of a “hostage
situation” and that he would be responsible for restraining the hostage-taker’s lower body.
(Investigative Record, PageID.888.) Wemple testified that either Revolt or VanderWeele shouted
that there was a “third occupant” in the office other than Krause and Majerczyk himself, and that
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the third person was a “psych.” (Wemple Dep. 47.) From these facts, it is evident that Defendants
understood that Arthur was not the hostage-taker they were to subdue but one of the people they
were to liberate. Arthur admits that Defendants understood these features of the simulation. (Pl.’s
MSJ Resp. 4–5, ECF No. 119.)
Second, Defendants’ physical behavior indicates their target was Krause. 	VanderWeele
testified that when he entered into Majerczyk’s office, he marched into Krause with his shield at
about half the speed he would use during a real hostage extraction, then took hold of Krause’s
shoulders. (VanderWeele Dep. 21.) Similarly, Wemple testified that as VanderWeele marched
into the room, Wemple came around VanderWeele’s side and crouched so that he could grab
Krause’s knee. (Wemple Dep. 82.) Had Arthur been the officers’ intended target, they could have
directed these actions against Arthur, but Arthur presented no evidence that VanderWeele ever
contacted her with his shield (something VanderWeele expressly denied, see VanderWeele Dep.
23–24), or that Wemple grabbed her leg, even though Wemple was “directly in front of” her
(Wemple Dep. 83). Krause testified that when the hostage-rescue team entered the room, Krause
started moving Arthur out of the team’s way and then continued “guiding her into the chair” next
to them as he received the impact of VanderWeele’s shield (Krause Dep. 18–19), but there is no
evidence that either Defendant altered his trajectory to track Arthur’s. All Arthur could remember
was seeing the squad “rush in,” not who they were rushing at. (Arthur Dep. 26.) These facts are
sufficient to establish that Arthur was not the intended target of Defendants’ force.
Further, there is no admissible evidence that either Defendant actually used force against
Arthur’s person. Arthur’s clearest account of how she ended up pinned against the chair suggests
that when VanderWeele collided with Krause, Krause was knocked into Arthur, and that the two
fell against the armchair. 	Arthur was then pinned in that position because VanderWeele and
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Wemple restrained Krause by grabbing hold of his shoulders and legs. (Resp. 20.) But nothing
about this scenario entails that VanderWeele or Wemple ever touched Arthur, let alone that they
used force to pin her to the chair. 	As previously noted, Krause testified that he began moving
Arthur out of VanderWeele’s path before VanderWeele’s shield hit them. (See Krause Dep. 19.)
Arthur points out that because VanderWeele’s shield was transparent, Defendants were aware of
Arthur’s proximity to Krause when they charged up to him (Resp. 6). But this cuts both ways; the
transparency of the shield also enabled VanderWeele to see exactly who his shield impacted. (See
VanderWeele Dep. 21.) VanderWeele’s unrebutted testimony that the did not come into contact
with Arthur forecloses the inference that Arthur was propelled into the armchair by the shield.
Similarly, the deliberateness involved in grabbing hold of a person’s leg reinforces Wemple’s
unambiguous denial that he struck Arthur when he gripped Krause’s knee. (Wemple Dep. 82–83.)
The only evidence Arthur can point to of any force being directed at her is the rumor she
heard from corrections officer Edmund Stone that she had been the accidental target of a peroneal
strike. But Stone did not report that VanderWeele or Wemple were rumored to have dealt Arthur
the alleged blow. 	Hence, the rumor is not “evidence supporting each individual defendant’s
personal involvement in the alleged violation,” a prerequisite for any suit brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Pineda v. Hamilton County, 977 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jutrowski v.
Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 291 (3d Cir. 2018)). That the rumor appears to be hearsay
that Arthur cannot present in admissible form, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), forecloses Arthur’s
seizure-by-force argument.
Resisting this conclusion, Arthur quotes Fisher for the proposition that “the intent in
question is the intent to commit the act, not the intent that a certain result be achieved”: even if the
Defendants did not intend to restrain her, her argument goes, they obviously intended to barrel into
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Krause and hold him in place. (Resp. 19–20 (citing Fisher, 234 F.3d at 317).) Fisher’s indifference
to the “intent that a certain result be achieved” covers situations in which an unexpected injury
befalls the target of an intentional use of force, such as the gunshot inflicted on the Fisher plaintiff
by an officer who targeted the car the plaintiff was riding in. It does not render officers liable for all
consequences of their volitional movements, a point that Fisher explicitly made when it distinguished
hostage-rescue cases from the one before it: a hostage, unlike the passenger of a car that a police
officer aims to stop, is not the intended target of the rescuer’s force. Fisher, 234 F.3d at 317 n.3.
Arthur ignores Fisher’s recognition that only intended targets can raise Fourth Amendment claims.
Her reliance on language detached from the opinion’s broader sweep is unavailing.
Nor does Arthur’s case comport with the canine cases, in which the intent to seize anyone
restrained 	by 	an 	uncontrollable 	instrumentality 	is 	imputed 	to 	the 	officers 	who 	set 	that
instrumentality into motion. VanderWeele and Wemple controlled their own bodily movements,
and when they became aware that the force they exerted on Krause was in some way being
transmitted to Arthur, they immediately ceased applying it. That makes this case much more like
Dunigan v. Noble, in which the momentarily uncontrolled behavior of a police canine did not
subject the dog’s handler to liability, 390 F.3d 486, 492–93 (6th Cir. 2004), than the cases holding
that officers intend to seize anyone a police canine bites because officers know that canines are
inherently uncontrollable.
Arthur’s last-ditch argument suggests that Defendants’ “show of authority” of bursting into
Majerczyk’s room and marching toward Krause “restrained” her “liberty” because she was unable
to leave the room and avoid contact with Defendants. (Resp. 22.) Arthur’s argument is foreclosed
by Ewolski, which squarely held that restrictions on the freedom of movement of a hostage-taker
that amount to their seizure do not result in the seizure of the hostages who also perceive the
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officers’ display of authority. Ewolski turns on the idea that a reasonable person in the hostages’
position would recognize that the officers intended to liberate them, not seize them. Nothing about
the officers’ conduct would have led a rational hostage to believe that their freedom of movement
was restricted or that their escape, should they have been able to accomplish it on their own, would
have been contrary to police directives.
The same is true in this case. 	Arthur was only pretending to be a hostage. 	She had no
reason to think that Defendants’ forceful entry into Majerczyk’s office was intended to overawe
her into submitting to their authority, because she knew that the authority they were exercising
was make-believe. Arthur can point to no word, look, or gesture by Defendants that would have
led a reasonable person in her shoes to conclude that she was not free to evade Defendants’ charge.
To the extent that Defendants limited the space within which Arthur could maneuver, they did so
solely by occupying that space themselves, not by taking any physical steps to keep Arthur inside
the room or prevent her from leaving. Again, the strongest evidence of this fact is that the moment
Arthur expressed pain from pressure pinning her against the chair, that pressure was immediately
lifted. 	(Arthur Dep. 40–41.) 	The only support for the contention that she was without room to
maneuver is a generic reference to the memoranda of Rushford’s internal investigation that
Defendants submitted in an exhibit to their summary judgment motion—an exhibit nearly five
hundred pages long. (See Resp. 7.) That is insufficient for Arthur to meet her burden. Without
evidence that Defendants intentionally restricted Arthur’s freedom of movement or made it
impossible for her to avoid the force they directed against Krause, Arthur cannot argue that she
was seized by acquiring control over her person. Consequently, there is no basis in fact or law for
the conclusion that Defendants intentionally targeted Arthur for seizure.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Arthur’s claim fails because there is no genuine dispute that she was not seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 	Accordingly, Defendants have established that they are
entitled to summary judgment. 	Because the Court determines that no constitutional right of
Arthur’s has been violated, the Court need not address Defendants’ argument that they are immune
from suit because their conduct was not prohibited by clearly established law.
The Court will enter an order consistent with this Opinion.
Dated: November 25, 2025 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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