Gresham #272603 v. Taylor et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL GRESHAM #272603,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL TAYLOR, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________/
Hon. Robert J. Jonker
Case No. 1:23-cv-01053
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Taylor’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 49) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 55). For the reasons discussed herein, the
undersigned recommends that Defendant’s motion be granted and this case be
terminated.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Saginaw Correctional Facility (SRF) in Freeland,
Saginaw County, Michigan, but the events underlying this lawsuit allegedly occurred
at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan.
Plaintiff initially sued six ECF employees (ECF No. 1, PageID.2), and the Court
dismissed all but one Defendant (ECF Nos. 13, 14). At this juncture, the following
claims remain against Defendant Taylor: (1) Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page 1
of 14

2
claim and (2) Eighth Amendment claim regarding Defendant Taylor labeling Plaintiff
as a snitch and paying another inmate to attack Plaintiff. (ECF No. 13, PageID.217;
EF No. 14).
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following. (ECF No. 1). On July 28, 2023,
Defendant Taylor entered Plaintiff’s cell and “took books, legal books, [and] legal
documents,” “destroyed books, legal books, legal documents[, and] property,” and
“gave some of [Plaintiff’s] books and legal documents” to another inmate, Inmate
Tittle. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4). Inmate Tittle told Plaintiff that Defendant Taylor had
told him that Plaintiff “was a snitch.” (Id.). Inmate Tittle also told Plaintiff that
Defendant Taylor had paid Tittle with Plaintiff’s property to have either Tittle or
Tittle’s “fellow gang members[,] the gangster disciples[,]” assault Plaintiff. (Id.).
When Plaintiff tried to get his property back from Defendant Taylor, he stated, “shut
up snitch that’s payback for writing all those grievances and lawsuits.” (Id.).
Subsequently, on October 2, 2023, “a gangster disciple stabbed Plaintiff in his left
foot and threw feces and urine on Plaintiff,” stating, “that[’]s for Officer Taylor snitch
Gresham.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.4-5).
Defendant Taylor now moves for summary judgment. (ECF No. 49). Plaintiff
responded to the motion. (ECF No. 54). Defendant Taylor replied. (ECF No. 59).
The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See W.D. MICH. LCIVR 7.2(d).
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page 2
of 14

3
DEFENDANT TAYLOR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. Legal Standard
Summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Whether a fact is “material” depends on
“whether its resolution might affect the outcome of the case.” Harden v. Hillman,
993 F.3d 465, 474 (6th Cir. 2021).
A party moving for summary judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating
that the non-moving party, “having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no
evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints,
398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party makes this showing, the
non-moving party “must identify specific facts that can be established by admissible
evidence, which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 440
F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2006). The existence of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in
support of the non-moving party’s position, however, is insufficient. Daniels v.
Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, that party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The non-
moving party “may not rest upon [his] mere allegations,” but must instead present
“significant probative evidence,” establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, the non-moving
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page 3
of 14

4
party cannot merely “recite the incantation, ‘credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope
that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.” Fogerty v. MGM Group
Holdings Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353-54 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Daniels,
396 F.3d at 735. Stated differently, the “ultimate question is whether the evidence
presents a sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the
jury, or whether the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail
as a matter of law.” Harden, 993 F.3d at 474.
While a moving party without the burden of proof need only show that the
opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial, a moving party with the burden of proof
faces a “substantially higher hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir.
2002). Where the moving party has the burden, “his showing must be sufficient for
the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving
party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986). Accordingly,
summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of proof “is inappropriate
when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier
of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
II. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of
the states to punish those convicted of crimes. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Punishment
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page 4
of 14

5
may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of
decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The Amendment,
therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in
the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S.
at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1998).
Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in
the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Thus, prison
staff are obliged “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates”
in their care. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). In particular, because
officials have “stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of self-protection[,]”
“officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. But courts recognize that “not all injuries
suffered by an inmate at the hands of another prisoner result in constitutional
liability for prison officials under the Eighth Amendment.” Wilson, 148 F.3d at 600.
Plaintiff must show that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
risk of injury. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990); McGhee v. Foltz,
852 F.2d 876, 880-81 (6th Cir. 1988). The deliberate-indifference standard includes
both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35-37 (1993). To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must
show “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page 5
of 14

6
harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the subjective prong, an official must
“know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.
“[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or
failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a
prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.” Id. at 836. “[P]rison
officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be
found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm
ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Taylor violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by labeling him as a snitch and giving Plaintiff’s property to another inmate as
payment to attack Plaintiff or have him attacked. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4). The Court
has held that “[l]abeling an inmate as [a rat] may constitute deliberate indifference
to the inmate’s safety.” Martin v. Randall, No. 1:22-CV-123, 2025 WL 2496096, at *3
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2025). But in order to prevail, Plaintiff must establish that “he
suffered physical harm as a result of being labeled a rat or a snitch.” Id. at *3. Here,
Plaintiff has failed to do so. Defendant Taylor has submitted Plaintiff’s six medical
kites from August 18, 2023, to November 28, 2023, but notably absent is any mention
of Plaintiff’s October 2, 2023, stabbing. (ECF No. 50-7, PageID.466-76). Defendant
Taylor also submits Plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which he testifies that his right
foot was stabbed (ECF No. 50-3, PageID.447, 452, 455) whereas in his complaint he
asserted that his left foot was stabbed (ECF No. 1, PageID.4). In response, Plaintiff
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page 6
of 14

7
generally asserts that medical kites regarding the October 2023 stabbing exist but
that Defendant Taylor “conspired with medical staff not to produce any records of the
stabbing” (ECF No. 54, PageID.490), instead providing a medical kite dated
March 28, 2025, in which he requests medical records from a doctor he saw in 2024
(ECF No. 54-1, PageID.508). Plaintiff fails to provide evidence contrary to the
evidence submitted by Defendant Taylor. 	Accordingly, Defendant Taylor
demonstrates that no issue of material fact exists regarding Plaintiff’s inability to
demonstrate that he was at substantial risk of serious harm.
III. First Amendment Retaliation
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Taylor unlawfully retaliated against him for
filing grievances and lawsuits by taking Plaintiff’s property and giving it to another
inmate as payment for attacking Plaintiff, and labeling Plaintiff as a snitch. (ECF
No. 1, PageID.4-5). To prevail on his retaliation claim, Plaintiff must satisfy three
elements: (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) Defendant
took adverse action against him, which would deter a person of ordinary firmness
from continuing to engage in protected conduct; and (3) the adverse action was
motivated by Plaintiff’s protected conduct. See Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d
512, 520 (6th Cir. 2010).
A. Protected Conduct
Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that he “engaged in the protected conduct of
filing grievances and lawsuits against MDOC staff and in particular grievances
against [Defendant] Taylor and lawsuit[,] Gresham v. Beauvais.” (ECF No. 1,
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page 7
of 14

8
PageID.4). At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that the action Defendant Taylor
retaliated against him for “could only be the grievance against [Defendant Taylor] for
denying [his] medication.” (ECF No. 50-3, PageID.441). Defendant Taylor provided
the grievance at issue, ECF-2023-06-1168-12F, which states that Defendant Taylor
“took [Plaintiff] to the shower” and that a non-party nurse refused to give Plaintiff
medication. (ECF No. 50-13, PageID.478). Defendant Taylor argues that the
grievance at issue does not constitute protected conduct because it named Defendant
Taylor but did not assert any wrongdoing by him and thus was frivolous. See Clark
v. Johnston, 413 F. App’x 804, 812 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n inmate’s pursuit of
grievances against prison officials can constitute protected conduct for purposes of a
retaliation claim, but ‘only to the extent that the underlying claims ha[ve] merit.’ ”
(second alteration in original) (quoting Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th
Cir. 2000))). The Court agrees. To the extent that Plaintiff’s filing of a civil action
constitutes protected conduct, the Court addresses the other elements below. See Bell
v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 607 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that protected conduct, for the
purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim, includes a prisoner’s efforts to
access the courts in civil rights claims).
B. Adverse Action
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Taylor subjected him to adverse action when
he called Plaintiff a “snitch,” “plac[ed] a hit on” him, allegedly destroyed his property,
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page 8
of 14

9
and took his personal and legal property to pay other prisoners. (ECF No. 1,
PageID.5).
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant Taylor provided
evidence through his affidavit and video footage. Defendant Taylor testified that he
searched Plaintiff’s cell the morning of July 28, 2023, because Inmate Tittle requested
that Defendant Taylor retrieve a book of his labeled with his name and MDOC
number from Plaintiff’s cell. (ECF No. 50-5, PageID.461). Defendant Taylor testified
that he removed a single book consistent with Inmate Tittle’s description from
Plaintiff’s cell. (Id.). The submitted security video footage is consistent with
Defendant Taylor’s testimony. (ECF No. 50, Exhibit E). Defendant Taylor testified
that he did not “rip, tear, alter, desecrate, or otherwise destroy in any way any of
Gresham’s personal or legal property within the cell.” (Id.). Defendant Taylor
testified that he did not call Plaintiff a snitch nor stated as such to other inmates
(ECF No. 50-5, PageID.462-63) and that he “never asked any prisoner to attack,
assault, or take any action against Gresham” (ECF No. 50-5, PageID.463).
In response, Plaintiff provides several affidavits from himself and other
inmates, but these affidavits are irrelevant to the present action, with one being dated
before the events at issue occurred (ECF No. 54-1, PageID.504), several being
undated and unsigned (ECF No. 54-1, PageID.500, 503, 505), and all of them
containing statements about nonparties and claims not at issue (ECF No. 54-1,
PageID.495-507).
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page 9
of 14

10
As is well recognized, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of
which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe
it, a court should not adopt that version of facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Rather, the Court
should “view[ ] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Id. at 380-81; see
also, Whittaker v. Leonard, No. 1:23-cv-284, 2025 WL 2924594, at *2 (W.D. Mich.,
Aug. 14, 2025). As noted above, Plaintiff must present “significant probative
evidence” establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pack, 434 F.3d at 813-
14. Other than assertions, which are refuted by affidavit and video evidence, Plaintiff
has failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue for trial. Thus, Defendant
Taylor has satisfied his burden to demonstrate the absence of genuine factual
dispute.
C. Causation
Even if Plaintiff satisfied the first two elements, Defendant Taylor argues that
Plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between the protected conduct and the
alleged adverse actions. “A plaintiff successfully demonstrates a causal connection
between the adverse action and the protected conduct by offering direct or
circumstantial evidence indicating that the protected conduct was a substantial or
motivating factor behind the adverse action against plaintiff.” Eckerman v. Tenn.
Dep’t of Safety, 636 F.3d 202, 208 (6th Cir. 2010). Defendant Taylor testified in his
affidavit that he “believed the book belonged” to Inmate Tittle and would have
removed the book even if Plaintiff had filed grievances or lawsuits against him. (ECF
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page
10 of 14

11
No. 50-5, PageID.462). Plaintiff’s unsupported conclusions in opposition of
Defendants’ motion do not advance his position. Ultimately, Plaintiff has failed to
present evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual dispute on the
question of causation. Thus, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
IV. Qualified Immunity
Defendant Taylor also raises the defense of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim.1 In light of the recommendation as to the Eighth
Amendment claim, the undersigned need not address qualified immunity as to that
claim. See Rose v. Cope, No. 1:22-CV-891, 2025 WL 566319, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Jan.
22, 2025) (declining to address qualified immunity defense when recommending
granting summary judgment on same Eighth Amendment claim).
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TRO AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
In his motion, Plaintiff requests the Court to issue a preliminary injunction
“against Defendant Taylor and MDOC to stop forcibly medicating Plaintiff” as he was
“unable to accurately remember events that occurred in this case at his deposition.”
(ECF No. 55, PageID.509).
A federal court may not grant preliminary relief “lightly.” S. Glazer’s
Distributors of Ohio v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017).
The movant must establish that “it is necessary to preserve the status quo until trial.”
1 Because Defendant only raises qualified immunity as to the Eighth Amendment
claims, the Court will address only that claim here.
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page
11 of 14

12
Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532, 535 (6th
Cir. 2020). Whether the requisite showing has been made is assessed “in terms of
four well-settled factors,” City of Grand Rapids v. Richardson, 429 F. Supp. 1087,
1092-93 (W.D. Mich. 1977): “immediate, irreparable harm”; “the likelihood that the
movant will succeed on the merits”; “the balance of the equities”; and “the public
interest.” D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Schs., 942 F.3d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 2019). No one
factor is determinative, but the absence of irreparable injury is dispositive. EOG Res.,
Inc. v. Lucky Land Mgmt., LLC, 134 F.4th 868, 885 (6th Cir. 2025).
The need for caution is all the more pressing when relief is sought without
notice to the party to be bound by the court’s order. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd.
of Teamsters Loc. No. 70 of Alameda Cnty., 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure therefore require an ex parte motion to be accompanied by a
certification by the movant or their attorney that they have attempted to notify the
nonmovant or that notice is unnecessary, as well as sworn statements “clearly
show[ing]” that irreparable harm will be visited upon the movant before the court can
register the nonmovant’s objections. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1); see Muffler Man Supply
Co., Inc. v. TSE Auto Serv., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 3d 598, 602 (E.D. Mich. 2024). Absence
of either prerequisite dooms a motion for a TRO. Plaintiff has provided neither.
Plaintiff’s motion also fails because he has not sufficiently established a
relationship between his claimed injury and the allegations of his complaint, which
do not involve his medication or that Defendant Taylor is involved with Plaintiff’s
medication in any way. “A party moving for a preliminary injunction must
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page
12 of 14

13
necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion
and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 299-300
(6th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Thus, generally, the Court
cannot enjoin non-parties from taking action based on allegations and claims not
presented in the pleadings.” Thomas-El v. Smith, No. 20-10128, 2021 WL 3271537
(E.D. Mich. July 15, 2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the
undersigned judicial officer recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 49) be granted, and that Plaintiff’s Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 55) be denied.
For the same reasons the undersigned makes these recommendations, the
undersigned further recommends that an appeal of this matter by Plaintiff would not
be in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the
Clerk of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page
13 of 14

14
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: February 23, 2026
/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:23-cv-01053-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 73, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/23/26 Page
14 of 14