Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

Page 1 of 19
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
YANIER HERNANDEZ
CAPOTE,
Plaintiff,
v.
SECRETARY OF U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-13128
Honorable Shalina D. Kumar
Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
AMENDED PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF NO. 6)
I. 	Introduction
Petitioner Yanier Hernandez Capote (“Hernandez Capote” or
“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, alleging that he is being unlawfully detained by the Respondents at
a detention center in Michigan in violation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Fourth and Fifth Amendment. See generally,
ECF No. 6.
Respondents, who include Secretary of the United States Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Kristi Noem (“Noem”), United States
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 1 of 19

Page 2 of 19
Attorney General, Pamela Bondi (“Bondi”), Director of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review, Sirce E. Owen (“Owen”), Acting Director of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Todd Lyons (“Lyons”), Chief
Immigration Judge of the Executive Office of Immigration Review, the
Honorable Anna C. Little (“Little”), along with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) Detroit Field Office Director, Kevin Raycraft
(“Raycraft”), argue that Petitioner’s detention is not unlawful under the INA,
specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and does not violate his Due Process
rights. Respondents also urge the Court to refrain from deciding the merits
of the petition until Hernandez Capote administratively exhausts his claims
and to dismiss all Respondents other than Raycraft. See generally, ECF
No. 8.
The Court has reviewed the parties’ filings and is satisfied that the
issues have been adequately briefed thereby making a hearing
unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants Hernandez Capote’s petition and orders
Respondents to provide him with a bond redetermination hearing within
seven (7) days of this Order or otherwise release him.
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 2 of 19

Page 3 of 19
II. 	Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Cuba who came to the United States on
January 16, 2022 “seeking refuge and protection from a communist
dictatorship.” ECF No. 6, PageID.51.1 After crossing the Mexican border
into the United States, Hernandez Capote presented himself to DHS. DHS
determined Hernandez Capote was not a “threat to national security or
public safety” and released him the following day on an Order of Release
on Recognizance so he could apply for asylum.
Petitioner timely filed his application for relief, but due to ICE’s failure
to update the immigration court in Detroit about petitioner’s change of
address, Petitioner missed his first hearing and was ordered deported.
Upon discovery of the deportation order, Hernandez Capote filed a motion
to reopen which was granted by the Immigration Judge. He then retained
counsel and has appeared at all Immigration Court hearings.
On November 18, 2024, Hernandez Capote married his wife Magela,
a U.S. citizen born in Cuba. Magela filed an I-130 Alien Relative Petition
with U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), and Hernandez
1 Except where otherwise noted, Hernandez Capote’s amended petition is
the source of these facts. See ECF No. 6.
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 3 of 19

Page 4 of 19
Capote notified the Immigration Court of the marriage. The Immigration
Judge granted a continuance of the case to allow USCIS to make a
determination on the I-130 petition and set a status conference for April 6,
2026.
USCIS scheduled Hernandez Capote and Magela for an interview on
their I-130 petition on August 12, 2025. The couple attended the interview
with counsel at which Hernandez Capote was subsequently arrested and
taken to the Detroit ICE field office for processing. Hernandez Capote was
allowed to call his wife, who was with counsel, but the Detroit ICE officer
did not allow Hernandez Capote to speak with his attorney. Counsel
attempted to contact the Detroit ICE office on numerous occasions to get
information on why his client was detained; however, supervisors told
counsel “that they had no information and they were just following orders.”
Hernandez Capote is currently detained in the North Lake
Correctional Facility in Michigan. He filed a motion for bond, and a hearing
was held on August 29, 2025 at which counsel for DHS argued that
Hernandez Capote was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and his
detention was mandatory.
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 4 of 19

Page 5 of 19
In September 2025, Hernandez Capote filed his first petition for writ
of habeas corpus, believing he was being detained pursuant to § 1225(b),
as Respondents had represented during Hernandez Capote’s August 29,
2025 bond proceedings. See Hernandez Capote et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., et al., 25-cv-12782 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 3, 2025). However, a
declaration submitted by an ICE Officer for that proceeding stated that the
arrest warrant for Hernandez Capote was issued under 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
This new information led Hernandez Capote to voluntarily dismiss his
petition without prejudice on September 24, 2025, “as there was no longer
an issue about mandatory redetention.” Id. The next day, Hernandez
Capote filed a request for bond redetermination under § 1226(a) with the
Immigration Court, but, notwithstanding the arrest warrant, the Immigration
Judge denied the request without a hearing, holding that Hernandez
Capote remains detained under § 1225(b), subject to mandatory detention,
and therefore not entitled to bond. ECF No. 9-2. Hernandez Capote then
filed the instant petition, as amended. ECF No. 6.
III. 	Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 5 of 19

Page 6 of 19
Habeas relief may be granted when a person is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Federal district courts are limited in their relief under §
2241 when considering immigration cases. Morales Chavez v. Director of
Detroit Field Office, 2025 WL 2959617, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2025).
Although district courts may not grant habeas relief as to the underlying
immigration question, i.e., whether removal is proper, district courts may
review whether an alien is lawfully detained; the Attorney General and DHS
immigration authority does not abrogate § 2241’s authority to grant the writ
within these bounds. See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 117 (2020) (describing habeas corpus as the appropriate remedy
to determine the legality of a person’s custody). As noted above, Petitioner
asserts that his detention pending the resolution of his removal
proceedings violates the INA and the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.
B. Proper Respondents
First, Respondents contend that only Petitioner’s immediate
custodian, here Raycraft, is a proper respondent in this habeas case. See
Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003). Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit concluded in Roman that “the immediate custodian rule generally
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 6 of 19

Page 7 of 19
applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners.” 340 F.3d at 322. But it also
noted possible exceptions to this rule. Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem, 2025 WL
2942648, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025) (quoting Roman, 340 F.3d at
322).
Detained aliens may be transferred to detention facilities in other
districts, and such transfers may be used to deny aliens any meaningful
opportunity to seek habeas relief. Id. (quoting Roman, 340 F.3d at 326);
see also Giminez Gonzalez v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 3006185, at *2 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 27, 2025) (transfer of detained petitioners, which is under the
control of the Attorney General, can thwart a pending petition because
director for the ICE field office where petitioner is detained is the proper
respondent). Thus, courts have allowed an alien to “name a respondent
other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher
level official, such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without
interruption in the event of a transfer.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 326.
To ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this Court’s
grant of habeas relief and order that Petitioner receive a bond hearing or,
alternatively, be released even if Petitioner is transferred out of the district
under Raycraft’s control, the Court will not dismiss Attorney General Bondi
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 7 of 19

Page 8 of 19
as a Respondent to these proceedings. See Giminez Gonzalez, 2025 WL
3006185, at *5 (citing Sanchez Alvarez, 2025 WL 2942648, at *9).
C. Administrative Exhaustion
Next, Respondents argue that the Court should require Hernandez
Capote to exhaust his administrative remedies before he is permitted to
proceed with his habeas petition.
No applicable statute or rule requires administrative exhaustion here.
See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4, ___ F. Supp. 3d
___ (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). When Congress has not mandated
exhaustion, the decision to require it is within the sound discretion of the
court. See Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013). Known
as prudential exhaustion, the court-made doctrine “must comport with the
statutory scheme and congressional intent.” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Island Creek
Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 747 (6th Cir. 2019) and Shearson, 725
F.3d at 593-94).
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary
to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision;
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 8 of 19

Page 9 of 19
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the
deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct
its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4. But, even if prudential
exhaustion would otherwise apply, courts may waive such exhaustion if the
“pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture” or if the
petition presents a “legal question…fit for resolution and delay means
hardship.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594; Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term
Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000).
“The Sixth Circuit has not decided whether courts should impose
administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition
for unlawful mandatory detention.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3.
(citing Hernandez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2025 WL 2444114, at *8
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)). Consequently, courts within the circuit are split.
Compare id.; Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4-5; Sanchez Alvarez,
2025 WL 2942648, at *3; and Mejia v. Woosley, 2025 WL 2933852, at *2-3
(W.D. Ky. Oct. 15, 2025) (declining to enforce or excusing petitioners from
prudential exhaustion) to Laguna Espinoza v. Dir. of Detroit Field Off., U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 9,
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 9 of 19

Page 10 of 19
2025), Hernandez, 2025 WL244114, at *8-10, and Villata v. Greene, 2025
WL 2472886, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025) (imposing prudential
exhaustion requirements).
The Court agrees with the majority of the district courts in this circuit
and around the nation in deciding not to enforce an exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement for these petitions. See Casio-Mejia v.
Raycraft, 2025 WL 2976737, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2025) (collecting
cases). To start, all three of the factors the Court is to consider weigh
against imposing prudential exhaustion. First, the issues raised by the
habeas petition are purely legal questions and do not require the agency to
develop a record. See Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2952796,
at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025). Further, a bond appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is not required for Hernandez Capote’s Fourth
and Fifth Amendment claims because the BIA cannot review constitutional
challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006).
Finally, the BIA has conclusively rejected Petitioner’s argument,
precedentially deciding2 that a noncitizen who has been present in the
2 The BIA may designate a decision as precedential, meaning that it will
control in “all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.” 8 C.F.R.
1003.1(g)(2).
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 10 of 19

Page 11 of 19
United States for a period of years or decades without inspection or
authorization is an “applicant for admission” under § 1225(a)(1) and thus
subject to mandatory detention during removal proceedings under that
section. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (2025); see also
Casio-Mejia, 2025 WL 2976737, at *4 (noting that Yajure Hurtado is binding
on DHS and immigration courts, but not on district courts). Accordingly,
Hernandez Capote is unlikely to obtain the relief he seeks through the
administrative process, and any appeal of bond determination to the BIA
will not preclude but merely delay the need for judicial review. Because
administrative review in this instance would be futile, and because every
additional day in unlawful detention presents a hardship for Petitioner, the
Court declines to impose an exhaustion requirement upon Hernandez
Capote and will address the merits of his petition. See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
D. Applicable INA Provision
Under the general provisions of the INA, an “alien who arrives at a
‘port of entry,’ i.e., a place where an alien may lawfully enter, must apply for
admission.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 108. Aliens who are detained trying
to enter elsewhere are treated similarly. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(1),
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 11 of 19

Page 12 of 19
(3)). However, “several classes of aliens are ‘inadmissible’ and therefore
‘removable.’” Id. at 107-08 (2020)(quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182,
1229a(e)(2)(A)).
The removal process provides for an evidentiary hearing before an
immigration judge, where the alien may challenge their removal, including
applying for asylum. Id. (internal citations omitted). Should their challenge
be rejected, the alien may appeal the removal order to the BIA and may
also be entitled to review in a federal court of appeals. Id. While his
removal proceedings are being litigated, the alien will generally be
detained. Id. However, the classification of the alien determines whether
that detention is mandatory or discretionary. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§
1225(b)(2)(A) with 1226(a).
The interplay of these statutes, which both govern detention of
noncitizens pending removal proceedings, controls the outcome of the
petition before the Court. Section 1225 governs the expedited removal
process and requires mandatory detention under its provisions, while §
1226 permits discretionary release from detention for certain aliens.
Morales Chavez, 2025 WL 29596, at *3. Respondents contend that §
1225(b)(2) applies to Petitioner, thereby subjecting him to mandatory
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 12 of 19

Page 13 of 19
detention. ECF No. 8. Hernandez Capote, however, maintains that §
1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), governs his removal proceedings and he is thus
entitled to a bond determination hearing. ECF No. 6.
Section 1225, titled “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited
removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing,” provides that,
upon arrival, all applicants for admission must undergo screening by an
examining immigration officer, and if it is determined that the applicant for
admission “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” the
applicant “shall be detained for” standard removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Section 1226, titled: “Apprehension and
detention of aliens,” provides for a discretionary detention framework, and
states, in relevant part: an alien may be arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the
arrested alien may remain detained or may be released on bond. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). Subsection (c) of § 1226 prohibits noncitizens who have been
charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or have admitted to committing
acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny,
shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 13 of 19

Page 14 of 19
that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person from being
released on bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Relevant here, noncitizens arrested
and detained under Section 1226 have a right to request a custody
redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) before an Immigration Judge. Santos
Franco v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2977118, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2025)
(citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)).
Hernandez Capote contends that his continued detention is unlawful
because he was not released or provided with a bond hearing as required
by § 1226(a). Respondents argue that § 1226(a) does not apply, and that
he is lawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2). As more than 30 district courts
have decided in “reviewing the statutory text, statutory history,
congressional intent, and statutory application for the last three decades,”
Hernandez Capote’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Jimenez Garcia v.
Raybon, 2025 WL 2976950, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2025) (cleaned up)
(collecting cases).
This multitude of district courts has explained that § 1225(b)(2)
applies to arriving aliens undergoing inspection, which generally occurs at
the United States’ border or ports of entry, when they are seeking lawful
entry into the United States.” Sanchez Alvarez, 2025 WL 2942648, at *5. In
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 14 of 19

Page 15 of 19
contrast, § 1226(a) applies to a noncitizen already residing within the
United States when apprehended and arrested. Jiminez Sanchez, 2025 WL
2976950, at *4 (quoting Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8).
This Court agrees with the majority viewpoint in finding that
§ 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), applies to noncitizens in Hernandez Capote’s
situation. Neither DHS’s decision to upend 30 years of reasoned statutory
interpretation, the BIA’s precedential decision sustaining the DHS about-
face, nor the fractional minority of district court cases3 finding § 1225(b)(2)
applicable to noncitizens like Petitioner persuade the Court otherwise. See
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216; Chavez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2730228, ___
F. Supp. 3d ___(S.D. Cal. Sep. 24, 2025) (adopting Yajure Hurtado’s
statutory interpretation to find § 1225(b)(2) applicable to noncitizens long
present in the United States) and Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 2025 WL
2780351 (D. Neb. Sep. 20, 2025) (concluding that aliens may be subject to
both § 1225(b)(2) and § 1226(a) and that DHS may choose which statute to
rely upon in detaining an alien subject to removal).
3 Only two of at least 36 district courts to have addressed this issue have
held that § 1225(b)(2) applies to those in the same circumstances as
Petitioner. See infra, n. 4.
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 15 of 19

Page 16 of 19
As previously noted, BIA decisions are not binding on the Court. Nor
is the Court bound by the aberrant holdings of the two outlying cases
concluding that § 1225(b)(2) applies rather that § 1226(a). These cases,
from out-of-circuit district courts, not only contradict cases from the same
district, compare Chavez, 2025 WL 2730228 to Martinez Lopez v. LaRose,
2025 WL 3030457 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025), and compare Vargas Lopez,
2025 WL 2780351 to Garcia Jiminez v. Kramer, 2025 WL 2374223 (D. Neb.
Aug. 14, 2025) and Jacinto v. Trump, 2025 WL 2402271 (D. Neb. Aug. 19,
2025), but also conflict with the growing number of decisions from district
courts nationwide.4
4 See, e.g., Echevarria v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025);
Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, 2025 WL 2977650 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025);
Lopez v. Hardin, 2025 WL 2732717 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 25, 2025); Puga v.
Ass’t Field Office Director, 2025 WL 2938369 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025);
Mariano Miguel v. Noem, 2025 WL 2976480 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2025);
Alejandro v. Olson, 2025 WL 2896348 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025); Giron
Reyes v. Lyons, 2025 WL 2712427, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (N.D. Iowa Sep.
23, 2025); Helbrum v. Olson, 2025 WL 2840273 (S.D. Iowa Sep. 30, 2025);
Barerra v. Tindall, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sep. 19, 2025); Kostak v.
Trump, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Chogllo Chafla v.
Scott, 2025 WL 2688541 (D. Me. Sep. 22, 2025); Maldonado de Leon v.
Baker, 2025 WL 2968042 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 2025); Sampiao v. Hyde, 2025
WL 2607924, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025); Maldonado v.
Olson, 2025 WL 2374411, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025);
Vazquez v. Feeley, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sep. 17, 2025); Jimenez v.
FCI Berlin, 2025 WL 2639390, ___ F. Supp. 3d. ___ (D.N.H. Sep. 8, 2025);
Zumba v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2753496 (D.N.J. Sep. 26, 2025); Salazar v.
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 16 of 19

Page 17 of 19
Hernandez Capote has resided in the United States for over three
years and was apprehended at his scheduled I-130 interview, not upon
arrival at the border or a port of entry.5 Thus, under § 1226(a), Petitioner is
entitled to a discretionary bond determination hearing. And because
Hernandez Capote has been detained without having received a hearing
for bond redetermination,6 he is in federal custody in violation of federal
Dedos, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sep. 17, 2025); Hyppolite v. Noem,
2025 WL 2829511 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 2025
WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer,
2025 WL 1953796 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2025); S.D.B.B. v. Johnson, 2025
WL 2845170 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2025); Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara,
2025 WL 2950097 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025); Gonzalez Martinez v. Noem,
2025 WL 2965859 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025); Quispe v. Crawford, 2025
WL 2783799 (E.D. Va. Sep. 29, 2025); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 2025 WL
278499, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (W.D. Wash. Sep. 30, 2025).
5 Hernandez Capote was arrested at the border upon first arriving in the
U.S. in 2022. See ECF No. 6-4. He was released on his own recognizance
pending removal proceedings. Id. Hernandez Capote asserts that he
applied for asylum relief and has complied with Immigration Court
requirements and attended all noticed hearings related to those
proceedings. ECF No. 6, PageID.51-52. After marrying in November 2024,
he applied for a change of status, seeking permanent residence as the
spouse of a U.S. citizen. Id.; ECF No. 6-5.
6 Hernandez Capote filed a renewed bond motion with the warrant
reflecting that he had been detained under § 1226(a), but on October 9,
2025, the Immigration Judge denied it, without a hearing, indicating that
Hernandez Capote was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)
and he was thus without jurisdiction to hold a bond redetermination
hearing. ECF No. 9; ECF No. 9-2.
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 17 of 19

Page 18 of 19
law. Thus, his habeas petition will be granted, and Respondents will be
directed to provide Hernandez Capote with a bond redetermination hearing
under § 1226(a) on or before November 10, 2025, or otherwise release
him.
E. Constitutional Claims
Given that this Court is granting the relief Petitioner requests based
on its interpretation of the applicability of § 1226(a), the Court will decline to
decide the merits of Hernandez Capote’s constitutional claims. See Pizarro
Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *8. If Respondents do not provide Hernandez
Capote with a bond determination hearing or release him by November 12,
2025, he may renew his claims under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS Hernandez Capote’s
petition for habeas relief. ECF No. 6. To that end, the Court ORDERS:
1. Respondent Raycraft to provide Hernandez Capote with a bond
hearing under § 1226(a) on or before November 12, 2025, or
otherwise release him; and
2. Respondent Raycraft to file a status report to certify compliance
with this order on or before November 14, 2025. The status report
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 18 of 19

Page 19 of 19
shall detail when Hernandez Capote was released or when his bond
hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and—if bond was
denied—the reasons for the denial.
The Court further ORDERS that Respondents Raycraft and Bondi will
remain respondents in this action, but all other Respondents are
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Shalina D. Kumar
SHALINA D. KUMAR
Dated: November 5, 2025 	United States District Judge
Case 4:25-cv-13128-SDK-APP ECF No. 10, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 19 of 19