United States of America v. Holley et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Larry Holley, a former pastor in Flint, Michigan, used his position of trust to
defraud 140 victims out of their retirement funds and other savings by convincing
them to invest in purported real estate deals in the Flint area. In reality, he was
operating a Ponzi scheme. Many elderly investors lost their life savings and their
means to provide for themselves and their families. Following a civil action by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Holley was indicted on charges of fraud and
money laundering. (ECF No. 1.) He pled guilty on July 8, 2019, to one count of
conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud. (ECF No. 39.) His guidelines range was
151–188 months. (See ECF No. No. 89, PageID.828 (Sealed).)
While a guidelines sentence would have been sufficient but not greater than
necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing, the Court ultimately granted a
substantial downward variance to 100 months’ imprisonment. (ECF No. 85.) This was
due in large measure to Holley’s serious medical issues, including his end-stage renal
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
LARRY A. HOLLEY,
Defendant.
Case No. 18-20224
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE [111]
Case 4:18-cr-20224-LJM-SDD ECF No. 117, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 1 of 11

2
disease and need for dialysis. The Court also extended Holley’s report date to the
Bureau of Prison’s Federal Medical Center Devens by four months to enable him to
receive additional care for these medical issues. (See ECF No. 110.) In other words,
the Court was aware that Holley would serve significant time while battling health
concerns.
Having served a little more than three-and-a-half years of his below-guidelines
sentence, Holley, proceeding pro se, asks the Court to end his prison term now and
grant him compassionate release. (ECF No. 111.) But his motion provides no
information to suggest that he is unable to care for himself in prison or that the
federal medical center where he is housed is unable to adequately address his medical
issues. Equally fatal, Holley makes no showing that the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
support his release. And the government has made a compelling showing that
compassionate release is not warranted. (ECF No. 113.) Thus, Holley’s motion is
DENIED.
I.
A district court generally “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has
been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One exception to this rule is compassionate
release. The compassionate release statute allows the Court to reduce a defendant’s
sentence if it finds, after a defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies or
30 	days 	after 	the 	warden 	receives 	a 	request 	for 	compassionate 	release, 	that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction; that a reduction is
“consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”;
Case 4:18-cr-20224-LJM-SDD ECF No. 117, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 2 of 11

3
and that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they apply,
support a reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Sentencing Commission has
recently amended its policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to cover compassionate-
release motions filed directly by defendants (as well as those brought by the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons).
A.
The First Step Act’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory. United States v.
Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 2020). The government does not dispute that
Holley’s unsuccessful efforts to seek compassionate release from the warden (ECF
No. 111, PageID.966) satisfy this requirement (ECF No. 113, PageID.1033).
B.
Congress assigned to the Sentencing Commission “the task of describing what
could be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction.”
United States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427, 433 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)).
The Sentencing Commission obliged through its policy statement, U.S.S.G § 1B1.13,
which was amended in November 2023 to modify and add categories. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b); see also United States v. Washington, 122 F.4th 264, 267 (6th Cir. 2024).
Holley’s 	motion 	(a 	filled-out 	version 	of 	the 	Court’s 	“Pro 	Se 	Motion 	for
Compassionate Release” form) contains check boxes that correspond with each of
these provisions. (ECF No. 111, PageID.967–968.) He selects the ones that deal with
a defendant’s age, medical conditions, and facility disease outbreak, as well as the
“other reasons” catch all. (Id.) But he develops no meaningful argument as to any of
Case 4:18-cr-20224-LJM-SDD ECF No. 117, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 3 of 11

4
them. For this reason alone, the motion could be denied for failing to establish an
extraordinary or compelling reason for a sentence reduction. See El-Moussa v. Holder,
569 F.3d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner,
unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is
not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in [a] skeletal way, leaving
the court to put flesh on its bones.” (alteration in original) (quoting McPherson v.
Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997))); United States v. Onamuti, No. 22-2984,
2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 7844, at *3 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2023) (“[I]f the defendant does not
meet his burden of establishing ‘extraordinary and compelling circumstances’ for
release, the judge may deny the motion regardless of any government response.”).
But given Holley’s pro se status, the Court will briefly address the statutory
provisions he identifies.
1.
First, “extraordinary and compelling reasons exist” where “[t]he defendant (A)
is at least 65 years old; (B) is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or
mental health because of the aging process; and (C) has served at least 10 years or
75 	percent 	of 	his 	or 	her 	term 	of 	imprisonment, 	whichever 	is 	less.” 	U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(2). The 68-year-old Holley began serving his 100-month sentence in mid-
April 2022. Thus, he has not served 10 years or 75 percent of his sentence. So this
provision does not apply.
Case 4:18-cr-20224-LJM-SDD ECF No. 117, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 4 of 11

5
2.
Next, the Court can find extraordinary and compelling circumstances where
“[t]he defendant is . . . suffering from a serious physical or medical condition . . . that
substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the
environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to
recover.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B).
There is no dispute that Holley is suffering from a serious medical condition.
As summarized by the warden in his denial of Holley’s request for compassionate
release, 	Holley 	suffers 	from 	“right 	partial 	nephrectomy, 	anemia, 	secondary
hyperparathyroidism, myopia, impacted cerumen, hypertension, acute embolism and
thrombosis of vein with femoral catheter, and end stage renal disease on peritoneal
dialysis.” (ECF No. 111, PageID.984 (citation modified); see id. at PageID.980.) Since
the filing of his motion, it also appears that Holley is receiving treatment at Beth
Israel Hospital in Massachusetts for laryngeal cancer. (ECF No. 115, PageID.1069.)
At this time, however, nothing suggests that Holley’s medical conditions are
preventing him from self-care. “Courts have traditionally interpreted ‘the ability of
the defendant to provide self-care’ to mean one’s ability to independently perform
activities of daily living and provide basic personal care (e.g., use the toilet, shower,
ambulate, eat, etc.).” United States v. Bolze, No. 09-093, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
193627, at *24–25 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 20, 2020) (collecting cases); see also United States
v. Jarvis, No. 20-00561, 2024 WL 3039952, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 18, 2024) (“Self-
Case 4:18-cr-20224-LJM-SDD ECF No. 117, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 5 of 11

6
care refers to something more basic—the ability to independently carry out standard
daily living tasks such as dressing, eating, or taking prescribed medication.”).
Indeed, Holly’s motion acknowledges that he does not require assistance with
activities of daily living such as bathing, walking, and toileting. (ECF No. 111,
PageID.974.) The prison medical records supplied by the government confirm that
Holley ambulates freely. (ECF No. 115 (Sealed).) He is able to take classes and
participate in programming. (ECF No. 111, PageID.996–997.) The warden likewise
explained that Holley “reside[s] on an open housing unit,” is “independent with [his]
activities of daily living,” and that “FMC Devens is able to manage [his] medical needs
at this time.” (Id. at PageID.984.)
Thus, compassionate release is not warranted under § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B).
3.
The provision most applicable to Holley’s circumstances is § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C),
which states that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist where “[t]he defendant
is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical
care that is not being provided and without which the defendant is at risk of serious
deterioration in health or death.” Again, there is no dispute that Holley suffers from
serious, degenerative medical conditions. This was also true at that time Holley was
sentenced. That is the reason the Court recommended, and the BOP designated
Holley to, a Federal Medical Center. The Sixth Circuit has “recognized that end-stage
kidney failure . . . is an extraordinary and compelling circumstance counseling in
favor of compassionate release.” United States v. Moody, No. 24-4095, 2025 U.S. App.
Case 4:18-cr-20224-LJM-SDD ECF No. 117, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 6 of 11

7
LEXIS 28524, at *6 n.3 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025). But the present record does not
suggest that Holley lacks adequate care and treatment at FMC Devens.
As the government explained in response to one of Holley’s requests to extend
his self-reporting date, “FMC Devens has on-site medical care available seven days a
week, with medical staff on duty at all times, and additional access to local medical
facilities and medical referral centers. FMC Devens also has all specialty areas of
medicine available, which specifically includes dialysis treatment for inmates with
renal failure.” (ECF No. 109, PageID.957–958 (citations omitted).) For his part,
Holley attaches a recent news article about the budget and staff cuts at FMC Devens
and the risks to inmate care as a result. (ECF No. 111, PageID.1007–1011.)
But the 600 pages of Holley’s medical records (which are not even a complete
set) support the warden’s position that FMC Devens is presently able to manage
Holley’s medical care. (ECF No. 115 (Sealed).) He receives dialysis and appropriate
medications for his other conditions as well as regular medical monitoring by and
visits with healthcare providers who have been responsive to his health concerns.
(Id.) As aptly summarized by the government, “Holly’s medical records confirm that
his health appears to be well maintained.” (ECF No. 113, PageID.1040); see also
United States v. Larkin, No. 21-20755, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31738, at *9 (E.D. Mich.
Feb. 21, 2025) (“The Court has carefully reviewed those records and finds that they
show that [defendant] has received continuous and adequate medical care. He has
been regularly provided his required medications and care, testing, and treatment
Case 4:18-cr-20224-LJM-SDD ECF No. 117, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 7 of 11

8
when necessary, including consultation with and treatment by relevant cardiology
specialists.”).
At this time, given the current record, the Court cannot find that the BOP is
unable to manage Holley’s challenging health conditions such that he needs to be
released immediately.
4.
The Court can more quickly dispose of Holley’s remaining options. (See ECF
No. 111, PageID.968.)
An extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release exists if a
defendant establishes that he is “housed at a correctional facility affected or at
imminent risk of being affected by (I) an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease, or
(II) an ongoing public health emergency.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D). Holley has
made no such showing as to FMC Devens.
Lastly, Holley references the catch-all provision under which an extraordinary
and compelling reason for release can be established where “[t]he defendant presents
any other circumstance or combination of circumstances that, when considered by
themselves or together with any of the reasons described in paragraphs (1) through
(4) [medical conditions, age, family circumstances, victim of abuse], are similar in
gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4).” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5).
True, Holley “has completed several rehabilitation programs,” “has helped
several inmates learn the bible,” and “has not received any disciplinary write-ups.”
(ECF No. 111, PageID.981.) This is commendable conduct and consistent with the
Case 4:18-cr-20224-LJM-SDD ECF No. 117, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 8 of 11

9
good works Holley provided to his community before the underlying offense. But “good
conduct and rehabilitation in prison are ‘expected from all inmates.’” United States v.
Johnson, No. 11-20767, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138835, at *9 (E.D. Mich. July 21,
2025 (collecting cases). In other words, these efforts are not extraordinary and
compelling or similar in gravity to the other reasons set forth in the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statement.
In sum, Holley has not established an extraordinary and compelling reason
that warrants his immediate release from prison.
C.
Acknowledging that the Sixth Circuit has recognized end-stage renal disease
as an extraordinary and compelling circumstance, see Moody, supra; United States v.
Jones, No. 21-1232, 2021 WL 5918305, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 23, 2021), this Court may
“still deny relief if it finds that the ‘applicable’ § 3553(a) factors do not justify it.”
United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2020). The defendant carries
the burden to show that the sentencing court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) factors would
be “different if conducted today” than at the time of sentencing. United States v.
Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951, 954 (6th Cir. 2021).
But Holley’s motion offers no real analysis of the factors. So he has failed to
carry his burden. Indeed, he has forfeited the issue. United States v. Alderson, No.
23-1779, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6474, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2024) (“Before turning
to the § 3553(a) factors, we note that [defendant] has likely forfeited any argument
on the district court’s balancing of § 3553(a) factors because his brief is ‘skeletal’ at
Case 4:18-cr-20224-LJM-SDD ECF No. 117, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 9 of 11

10
best and requires us ‘to put flesh on its bones,’ which we are loath to do.” (quoting
United States v. Hendrickson, 822 F.3d 812, 829 n.10 (6th Cir. 2016))).
Additionally, Holley’s medical issues are not new. They existed and the Court
considered them at the time of sentencing. See United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555,
569 (6th Cir. 2021) (“A court must first find that the facts of the defendant’s personal
circumstances 	changed 	after 	sentencing 	in 	a 	way 	that 	is 	‘extraordinary 	and
compelling,’ before a court is permitted to weigh (or revisit) the § 3553(a) factors.”
(emphasis omitted)).
Lastly, reducing Holley’s sentence further would not satisfy the purposes of the
§ 3553(a) factors. As the government aptly summarized:
Holley and his codefendant conducted an aggravated fraudulent scheme
that had devastating financial and emotional effects on its victims. The
scheme, which Holley led, ensnared at least 141 recognized victims
across multiple states, who suffered losses of more than $ 8.8 million.
His actions were made more egregious by his position of trust as a
pastor, and his abuse of that position to gain access to the retirement
funds and savings of his elderly victims.
(ECF No. 113, PageID.1042.) Thus, to end Holley’s term of imprisonment now would
fail to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide
adequate deterrence or punishment, or avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, see
18 	U.S.C. 	§ 3553(a)(2)—especially 	where 	Holley’s 	already 	reduced 	sentence
accounted for many of the facts weighing in his favor, particularly his serious health
conditions.
So 	even 	evaluating 	the 	relevant 	§ 3553(a) 	factors 	does 	not 	warrant 	an
additional reduction in Holley’s sentence.
Case 4:18-cr-20224-LJM-SDD ECF No. 117, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 10 of 11

11
II.
For these reasons, Holley’s motion for compassionate release (ECF No. 111) is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 5, 2025
s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
United States District Judge
Case 4:18-cr-20224-LJM-SDD ECF No. 117, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 11 of 11