Gore-Reed v. Blue Ribbon Restaurants Novi, LLC d/b/a Famous Dave's

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTINA GORE-REED,
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 2:24-cv-11258
v. 	Honorable Susan K. DeClercq
United States District Judge
BLUE RIBBON RESTAURANTS
NOVI, LLC
d/b/a FAMOUS DAVE’S, a Michigan
corporation,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 17)
Christina Gore-Reed, an African American woman, brings this action against
her former employer, alleging racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.
Now, after the close of discovery, the defendant-employer, Blue Ribbon Restaurants
Novi, LLC (“Blue Ribbon”), moves for summary judgment on all claims. Blue
Ribbon contends that Gore-Reed cannot establish discrimination, harassment, or
retaliation for lack of evidence. Additionally, Blue Ribbon asserts that it had
legitimate, non-discriminatory, and non-retaliatory reasons for terminating Gore-
Reed’s employment, including poor performance, failure to complete training, and
poor attendance and tardiness.
This Court will deny Blue Ribbon’s motion for summary judgment because a
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reasonable jury could find in Gore-Reed’s favor on each of her claims. As discussed
below, Gore-Reed has presented sufficient evidence to support a hostile work
environment claim, and to establish prima facie showings of racial discrimination
and retaliation. Further, although Blue Ribbon proffers non-discriminatory and non-
retaliatory reasons for terminating Gore-Reed, a reasonable jury could find that those
reasons were pretext for discriminatory and retaliatory motives.
I. BACKGROUND
A. 	Work Structure and Supervisory Personnel
Christina Gore-Reed worked as a catering call center specialist for Blue
Ribbon Restaurants Novi, LLC from August 2022 to June 2023. ECF No. 18 at
PageID.364. Gore-Reed’s duties included answering customer calls, providing
catering information, and fulfilling catering orders. ECF No. 17-2 at PageID.135.
Lindsay Evanson was the direct manager of all the call center specialists, including
Gore-Reed. Id. at PageID.134. Bridget Wagner, Director of Marketing, served as
Gore-Reed’s 	second-level 	manager. 	Id. 	at 	PageID.135; 	ECF 	No. 	17-9 	at
PageID.268–69. Two months after hiring Gore-Reed, Blue Ribbon moved to its
current “open concept” office in Troy, Michigan. ECF No. 17-3 at PageID.169–70.
This office design allowed Gore-Reed to work in close proximity to other call
specialists and in the same building as the CEO, CFO, and HR of Blue Ribbon. ECF
No. 17-2 at PageID.134–35. CFO Michael Devlin oversaw operations at the Troy
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office. ECF No. 17-4 at PageID.200. A few weeks prior to Gore-Reed’s termination,
Alicia Zanotti was hired as the new HR manager. ECF No. 18-11 at PageID.538.
B. 	Onboarding Process.
In 	August 	2022, 	Gore-Reed 	was 	hired 	along 	with 	another 	employee,
Katherine McKinnon, a biracial African American woman. See ECF No. 18-3 at
PageID.404, 407. Gore-Reed and McKinnon were the only non-white employees in
the call center. Id. After only a few months, McKinnon quit, citing in her resignation
letter an uncomfortable and unwelcoming environment, favoritism, and disparate
treatment regarding who was able to work from home. ECF No. 17-2 at PageID.137–
38.
Gore-Reed says that following training, she caught on quickly to the job’s
duties. ECF No. 18-3 at PageID.427 (“We did over the phone training…. I would
say for the most part, I felt that I got the hang of it.”). Gore-Reed’s role also required
proficient use of a software called Caterease. ECF No. 17-2 at PageID.139. Evanson
testified that Blue Ribbon requires all call center specialists to undergo a three-week
training, culminating in working at an actual catering event to best understand the
role. ECF No. 17-2 at PageID.135. According to CFO Devlin, Gore-Reed had not
completed her training after nine months into her employment because she had not
done an outside event. ECF No. 17-4 at PageID.202. But according to Gore-Reed,
she did not know that working an outside event was necessary for completing her
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training. ECF No. 18-4 at PageID.454. The call center’s specialist schedule indicates
that, after five months on the job, on February 6, 2023, Gore-Reed was asked about
doing an event and she said she was still not ready to participate in one. ECF No.
18-20 at PageID.673. No other opportunity for Gore-Reed to participate in an outside
event is noted in the record.
On October 7, 2022, Wagner sent an e-mail to Evanson detailing McKinnon’s
and Gore-Reed’s progress. ECF No. 17-6 at PageID.230. In the e-mail, Wagner laid
out some on-the-job errors that Gore-Reed and McKinnon had made and highlighted
a need for additional training for them. Id. Wagner requested that Evanson schedule
a performance review to “verify their knowledge and skillset.” Id. Wagner expressed
concern that McKinnon and Gore-Reed’s progress was slower than others and
reasoned it could be due to the company moving, power outages, reduced shifts, or
“them leaving constantly or calling off.” Id.
On January 10, 2023, McKinnon quit. ECF No. 18-20 at PageID.672. She left
a letter that stated she did not agree with a warning she received and did not feel as
valued as the other employees. ECF No. 18-5 at PageID.462. She also mentioned an
uncomfortable and unwelcoming environment, favoritism, and disparate treatment
regarding who was able to work from home. ECF No. 17-2 at PageID.137–38. One
of her co-workers, Nichole Kahsin expressed that she was glad McKinnon was no
longer there, describing McKinnon as an “angry black girl.” ECF No. 18-3 at
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PageID.420.
C. 	Performance Review
In 	November 	2022, 	Evanson 	conducted 	a 	review 	of 	Gore-Reed’s
performance. ECF No. 17-7. Evanson says she conducted the review at 90 days,
instead of the standard 30, due to “excessive absences and delayed training.” ECF
No. 17-2 at PageID.139. On the one hand, Evanson’s review praised Gore-Reed’s
customer service skills on the phone. ECF No. 17-7 at PageID.234. But on the other,
Evanson recommended that Gore-Reed continue to practice with the Caterease
software to “experience a lower percentage of error.” Id. Evanson also offered
additional training resources to Gore-Reed. Id. Evanson graded Gore-Reed between
“Meets Expectations” and “Work in Progress” for the “Availability and Attendance”
prong. Id. at PageID.233.
D. 	Attendance.
Within Gore-Reed’s performance review, Evanson commented about her
attendance. See ECF No. 18-6 at PageID.524. Evanson wrote, “[i]n your first 3
months I have recorded numerous call offs. You should continue improving your
attendance as I see this already moving in the right direction.” Id. Blue Ribbon’s
schedule provides a day-to-day account of which specialists called off, left early, or
arrived late. ECF No. 18-20.
As the record appears to demonstrate, Gore-Reed called off at least 26 times,
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left early at least 10 times, and was late to work at least 12 times between August
2022 and May 2023. See ECF No. 18-20 at PageID.666–676. Lauren Bewley,
another specialist, called off at least 8 times, left early at least 22 times, and was
tardy at least 8 times. Id. Haley Cohen called off at least 12 times, left early at least
20 times, and was late at least 3 times. Id.
Notably, that tally differs from Blue Ribbon’s calculations. As set forth in a
table in its reply brief, Blue Ribbon provides the following tally for that same period:
Representative 	Called off Work 	Cut Early/Asked to
Leave Early1
Late for Work
Gore-Reed 	33 	9 	21
Bewley 	10 	16 	6
Cohen 	12 	8 	2
Kahsin 	5 	5 	3
Rew 	2 	5 	0
ECF No. 19 at PageID.683 (citing ECF No. 18-20).
E. 	Laptops and Remote Work.
Gore-Reed was not provided with a laptop, which made it so she was unable
to work from home. ECF No. 18-3 at PageID.427 She says that the white
specialists—Bewley, Cohen, and Kahsin—were given laptops or remote access, but
the African American specialists–Gore-Reed and McKinnon–were denied both
options. Id. According to Blue Ribbon, full-time laptops were given based on
1 This count by Blue Ribbon does not appear to differentiate between instances when
Blue Ribbon asked employees to leave early versus when employees requested to
leave early, which seems significant here.
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seniority, thus, Gore-Reed and McKinnon simply were given desktops instead
because they were new hires. ECF No. 17-2 at PageID.138.
The specialist schedule shows that McKinnon and Gore-Reed were given a
paid day off in October 2022 while the company was moving offices because “they
[were]n’t ready to work from home.” ECF No. 18-20 at PageID.669; see also ECF
No. 17-9 at PageID.282. The schedule also remarks that Gore-Reed was “no longer
allowed to WFH” on December 23, 2022. ECF No. 18-20 at PageID.671. But on
January 26, 2023, Evanson offered Gore-Reed the opportunity to work from home
after a medical procedure, but Gore-Reed called off instead. ECF Nos. 17-8 at
PageID.258; 18-20 at PageID.672. Gore-Reed and Blue Ribbon agree that there was
a laptop available for any employee to take home on the weekends. ECF No. 17-3 at
PageID.193. But Gore-Reed says that the weekend laptop offered to her was
outdated, poorly working, and barely usable. ECF No. 18-4 at PageID.454.
F. 	Workplace Incidents and Complaints
Starting in October 2022, Gore-Reed states her white co-workers began to
mock and ridicule African American customers, including by displaying at least six
or seven pictures of them with crude, racially insensitive speech bubbles attached.
ECF Nos. 18-4 at PageID.454; 18-3 at PageID. 406, 409, 418. One picture may have
been of a customer who was not African American. ECF No. 18-3 at PageID.409;
see also ECF No. 17-8 at PageID.253. Gore-Reed also testifies that her co-worker,
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Nichole Kahsin, would make racially insensitive comments to her directly, including
comments about her hair. ECF No. 18-3 at PageID.411, 418, 420. Gore-Reed also
testified her white co-workers used African American slang, mocked perceived
African American speech patterns, constantly commented about Gore-Reed’s hair,
and referred to multiple delivery locations as ghetto. ECF No. 18-3 at PageID.411,
418.
Gore-Reed says she first complained to Evanson about racially insensitive
comments in December 2022. ECF No. 18-3 at PageID.418. But she says Evanson
never addressed these concerns in a meeting or otherwise. Id. at PageID.421.
Gore-Reed says her co-workers then began to “sabotage” her work in response
to her complaints about them. ECF NO. 18-3 at PageID.419. This included changing
Gore-Reed’s notes in Caterease and fabricating notes in her name. Id. She says that
her co-workers began to shun her as well. See id. at PageID.421 (“No one would talk
to me and things of that nature.”). On March 28, 2023, the schedule notes that Gore-
Reed was having issues with Kahsin. ECF No. 18-20 at PageID.674. It says that
Gore-Reed “arrived unwilling to work until she vented” about feeling isolated and
left out at work. Id. According to Evanson, Gore-Reed’s complaints did not mention
race and instead focused on the poor working relationship between Gore-Reed and
Kahsin. ECF No. 17-2 at PageID.144. Evanson met with both employees separately
to address the issue. Id.
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On May 26, 2023, Gore-Reed says her co-workers falsely accused her of
taking a customer’s credit card slip, causing Gore-Reed to become emotional and
express her feelings of discrimination. ECF No. 18-3 at PageID.421–24; ECF No.
18-10 at PageID.536. Evanson sent Gore-Reed and others home early. Id. at
PageID.424; ECF No. 17-2 at PageID.151. That night, Gore-Reed sent Evanson a
text message and mentioned “go[ing] to the EEOC.” ECF No. 18-9 at PageID.553.
Evanson states she drafted an Employee Warning Documentation for Gore-Reed,
which she dated May 26, that included notes about Gore-Reed’s attendance and
performance issues from prior documents. ECF Nos. 18-16; 18-5 at PageID.484–85.
The document, however, may not have been actually drafted until June 1. ECF Nos.
18 at PageID.374; 18-16 at PageID.632 (showing document was created June 1,
2023, at 2:30 PM); 18-18 at PageID.660 (Blue Ribbon clarifying that document was
drafted on June 2, 2023).
By e-mail, Evanson collected employee statements about the May 26 incident,
including 	one 	she 	prepared 	herself, 	which 	mentioned 	that 	Gore-Reed 	was
threatening to contact a lawyer about a discrimination claim. ECF Nos. 18-5 at
PageID.476; 18-10 at PageID.536. Evanson requested a statement from Gore-Reed,
but Gore-Reed responded that she would rather send it to HR or the CEO. ECF No.
18-9 at PageID.553 (the actual text messages). Evanson documented Gore-Reed’s
response as a refusal to provide a statement. ECF No. 18-5 at PageID.484.
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CFO Devlin reviewed the statements and planned to meet with Gore-Reed on
May 30, 2023, to discuss the incident and her performance. ECF No. 17-4 at
PageID.202. In the meantime, Evanson and Wagner, Evanson’s supervisor, were
tasked 	with 	gathering 	information 	regarding 	Gore-Reed’s 	performance 	and
attendance and presenting it to Devlin over the weekend. ECF Nos. 18-5 at
PageID.473; 17-4 at PageID.205. Gore-Reed, however, did not come to work May
30 due to car troubles, so Devlin decided he would terminate her employment
instead. ECF No. 17-4 at PageID.204. However, he did not send the e-mail
immediately, wanting instead to wait to terminate Gore-Reed in person. Id.
G. 	Complaint to CEO and Response
On the evening of May 30, 2023, Gore-Reed e-mailed Baum, Blue Ribbon’s
CEO. ECF No. 18-14. She detailed her concerns about her work environment. Id.
Because of this email, Devin decided to delay Gore-Reed’s termination and
investigate her claims. ECF No. 17-4 at PageID.204. Blue Ribbon’s HR department
then conducted a “formal investigation” on May 31st and June 1st. ECF No. 17-8 at
PageID.237. The investigation consisted of interviews with Evanson, Wagner, and
the other call center specialists, all of whom “stated that they have never made
racially insensitive comments or mocked African American culture or customers.”
Id. They also denied bullying or sabotaging Gore-Reed. Id. at PageID.238. As well
as speaking to those employees, the HR department also asked other departments
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located in the office “if they ha[d] ever heard racial comments/jokes from the call
center,” and all department reported never overhearing such comments. Id.
Ultimately, the investigation produced a written report dated June 5, 2023.
ECF No. 17-8 at PageID.249–253. The findings of that report are restated, in full,
here:
At the conclusion of the investigation, it was found that Christina’s
claims of enduring a racially hostile work environment and being
treated differently than the other employees are unsubstantiated. HR did
not find any evidence during this investigation that supports this claim.
Christina was offered multiple chances to complete her training by
Lindsay, to which Christina declined this. Christina was aware that she
was not eligible to work from home until she completed her training.
Lindsay demonstrated (with photographic evidence of text messages)
that she has always been kind, supportive and accommodating towards
Christina. It was found that the Catering Call Center employees do
engage in light humor regarding difficult customers. None of these
comments were found to be racists or offensive. HR has still instructed
Lindsay to discourage this behavior in the future and take corrective
action if it continues after a warning.
Of note Christina never approached HR with these concerns prior to
termination.
Id. at PageID.253.
In the meantime, Gore-Reed says that soon after she sent her e-mail to Baum,
Bewley alerted her to a Facebook post made by Evanson. ECF Nos. 18-3 at
PageID.412; 17-14. As shown in the screenshot provided by Gore-Reed, the text of
that post in full is as follows:
This nappy head b**** filed a complaint against me I have never in my
15 yrs have ever dealt with such a b**** that makes up shit about me I
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feel so humiliated how dare you.
ECF No. 18-19.
Evanson denies making this post and alleges that it is doctored, providing
records from Facebook that Blue Ribbons views as corroborating her account. ECF
Nos. 18-5 at PageID.485; 17-15 (Facebook “metadata” log).
H. 	Termination and Lawsuit
On June 1, 2023, Alicia Zanotti terminated Gore-Reed via email, citing
excessive absences and poor performance. ECF No. 17-13. After her termination,
Gore-Reed avers that Bewley informed her of a meeting that occurred with the
remaining specialists during which management instructed Kahsin and Cohen “to
take down the customer photos in their cubicles.” ECF No. 18-4 at PageID.455.
Gore-Reed filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC in October 2023.
ECF No. 2 at PageID.10. The EEOC issued her a right-to-sue letter on May 13, 2024.
Id. Later that same day, Gore-Reed sued Blue Ribbon. ECF No. 1. Gore-Reed
amended her complaint the same day. ECF No. 2.
As stated in her amended complaint, Gore-Reed asserts race discrimination
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Michigan’s
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”). ECF No. 2 at PageID.13. Gore-Reed
also asserts a count of retaliation under the same statutes. Id. at PageID.14. In May
2025, Blue Ribbon moved for summary judgment, ECF No. 17, which was fully
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briefed, ECF Nos. 18;19. A hearing on the motion is not necessary. See E.D. Mich.
LR 7.1(f)(2).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
As set forth in Civil Rule 56(a), courts may only grant summary judgment
where “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Jackson v. Genesee Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 999 F.3d 333,
343 (6th Cir. 2021). When deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists,
courts must “view the facts in the record and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” id.,
which in this case is Gore-Reed. This means that the determination is to be made
without judging credibility or weighing conflicting evidence. See Briggs v. Univ. of
Cin., 11 F.4th 498, 507 (6th Cir. 2021). A fact is “material” if it affects the action’s
outcome, and an issue is “genuine” if “a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict
for the nonmovant.” Rodgers v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 442, 448 (6th
Cir. 2002).
At the summary judgment stage in indirect-proof cases like this, courts apply
the same three-part, 	burden-shifting 	framework 	for 	racial 	discrimination 	and
retaliation claims under Title VII, § 1981, and the ELCRA. See McDonnell Douglas
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973) (articulating framework); Curry v. SBC
Commc’ns, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 805, 824–25 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (collecting cases
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and applying McDonnell Douglas standard); see also Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191
F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir. 1999) (“We review claims of alleged race discrimination
brought under § 1981 and the Elliot-Larsen Act under the same standards as claims
of race discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”).
First, a plaintiff must make a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. See In
re Rodriguez, 487 F.3d 1001, 1008–11 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying McDonnell
Douglas framework to employment discrimination and retaliation claims). The
burden then shifts to the defendant-employer to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory, and non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. at
1008. Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut the employer’s proffered
rationale by showing that it was pretextual. Id.
Unlike Gore-Reed’s discrimination and retaliation allegations, her claim of
harassment via a hostile work environment does not proceed along the three-part
McDonnell 	Douglas 	framework. 	Instead, 	the 	claim 	is 	assessed 	in 	a 	more
straightforward matter whereby Gore-Reed need only present evidence satisfying
five elements, as set forth below. See Curry, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
III. DISCUSSION
A. 	Racial Harassment: Hostile Work Environment
Blue Ribbon argues that Gore-Reed’s racial harassment claims must be
dismissed because she has failed to provide evidence that harassing conduct was
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sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment
and that it was unaware of race-based harassment, or alternatively, it took reasonable
action in response. This Court disagrees.
To establish a prima facie case of racial harassment based on a hostile work
environment under Title VII and the ELCRA, Gore-Reed must show: “(1) [s]he
belongs to a protected group; (2) [s]he was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3)
the harassment was based on race; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or
privilege of employment[;] and (5) defendant knew or should have known about the
harassment and failed to take action.” Curry, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (quoting Moore
v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1078–79 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Blue Ribbon does not dispute the first three elements: that Gore-Reed is
African American, that she suffered some harassment, and that the harassment was
related to her race. See ECF No. 17 at PageID.119–24. Accordingly, this Court will
evaluate only the fourth and fifth elements.
1. 	The harassment possibly affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment
Blue Ribbon argues that the harassing conduct alleged by Gore-Reed was not
sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment.
ECF No. 17 at PageID.120–22.
When assessing a hostile work environment claim, courts “look at the totality
of the alleged harassment to determine whether it was sufficiently severe or
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pervasive to alter the conditions of a plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive
working environment.” Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co., 973 F.3d 469, 482 (6th Cir. 2020)
(citation modified). Circumstances to consider include “the frequency of the
discriminatory 	conduct; 	its 	severity; 	whether 	it 	is 	physically 	threatening 	or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance.” Id. (citation modified). “Both an objective
and subjective test must be met; in other words, the conduct must be so severe or
pervasive as to constitute a hostile or abusive working environment both to the
reasonable person and the actual victim.” Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs.,
453 F.3d 724, 733 (6th Cir. 2006).
The Sixth Circuit has held that plaintiffs alleging hostile work environment
claims face a “high bar,” noting that, for example, “in the context of alleged racial
discrimination, … even offensive and bigoted conduct is insufficient to constitute a
hostile work environment if it is neither pervasive nor severe enough to satisfy the
claim’s requirements.” Khalaf, 973 F.3d at 482–83 (citation modified). What this
means is that “occasional offensive utterances do not rise to the level required to
create a hostile work environment because, to hold otherwise would risk changing
Title VII into a code of workplace civility.” Phillips v. UAW Int’l, 854 F.3d 323, 327
(6th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted); see also Reed v. Procter & Gamble Mfg.
Co., 556 F. App’x 421, 432 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming summary judgment granted
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in employer’s favor on hostile work environment claim where the plaintiff was
subjected to offensive, race-based comments and his supervisor stood behind him
and made a noose with a phone cord). With these principles in mind, this Court turns
now to the parties’ arguments.
Blue Ribbon compares the comments made in this case to the “inappropriate
and racially insensitive comments and conduct” that the Sixth Circuit has held did
not meet the severe or pervasive standard in other cases. Id. at PageID.121–22 (citing
Woods v. FacilitySource, LLC, 640 F. App’x 478 (6th Cir. 2016)). Such comments
include 	referring 	to 	African 	Americans 	as 	“you 	people,” describing 	African
Americans as “dramatic” and “cheeky,” and asserting that African Americans enjoy
“fried chicken and Kool-Aid.” Id. at PageID.122.
However, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Gore-Reed, as this
Court must on a motion for summary judgment, there is sufficient evidence from
which a jury could conclude that the harassment was not limited to “a few isolated
events,” but rather was “‘day to day’; ‘constant’; and ‘all the time.’” ECF No. 18 at
PageID.379 (citing ECF No. 18-3). KahsinFor example, Gore-Reed alleges that
Kahsin mockingly spoke to her using “African American verbiage” “every day”
when speaking to Gore-Reed and that her white co-workers always had an issue with
her hair. ECF No. 18-3 at PageID.418, 420. She also points to a practice started by
Evanson whereby her white co-workers would collect, share, and display around the
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open-floor office images of African American customers with speech bubbles
referring to the customers as, among other descriptors, “nappy hair” and “fair-
skinned b*****.” ECF No. 18 at PageID.368–69 (citing ECF No. 18-3).
This conduct by Gore-Reed’s white co-worker was repeated across multiple
instances, was widespread throughout her workplace where she had to confront it,
and occurred across a range of months. Cf. id. at 319–20 (noting that workplace was
plagued with highly offensive, racist graffiti and sexually explicit drawings with
racial components,” and that plaintiff was frequently subjected to slurs and
derogatory comments); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 334–35 (6th
Cir. 2008) (holding that genuine issue of material fact precluded grant of summary
judgment where plaintiffs testified to ongoing acts of sexual harassment, including
crude solicitations for sex, invasions of personal space, and physical contact). Thus,
this resembles the “ongoing, commonplace, and continuous” sort of conduct that the
Sixth Circuit has held meets the severe and pervasive standard. See Armstrong v.
Whirlpool Corp., 363 F. App’x 317, 318, 324–27 (6th Cir. 2010) (reversing
summary judgment grant where a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
the 	alleged 	racial 	harassment 	was 	sufficiently 	severe 	and 	pervasive 	to 	alter
conditions of employment in case involving continual racial epithets spoken and
posting of racial graffiti at their workplace).
2. Blue Ribbon may have known about the harassment and failed to take action.
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Blue Ribbon next contends that there is no basis for employer liability because
Blue Ribbon was not aware of race-based harassment and took appropriate action to
address Gore-Reed’s concerns. ECF No. 17 at PageID.122–124. On this point, Blue
Ribbon asserts that “at no point did [Gore-Reed] report racially harassing or
discriminatory behavior to Blue Ribbon’s human resources, Devlin himself or
anyone else.” Id. at PageID.123. Instead, it characterizes Gore-Reed’s complaints
“merely of rudeness by her coworkers, which is not unlawful.” Id. Blue Ribbon
further presses that it took action on Gore-Reed’s complaints, including through
Evanson speaking to Kahsin “on several occasions” and Evanson sitting in the call
center area “to observe their behavior and deter alleged poor behavior.” Id. at
PageID.123–24.
However, the record contains evidence that Gore-Reed regularly complained
to Evanson—her direct supervisor—and others that her work environment was
racially hostile. 	See, e.g., 	ECF No. 18-3 	at 	PageID.418 	(testifying 	that she
complained to Evanson about Kahsin’s mocking use of perceived African American
speech patterns and Kahsin’s derogatory comments regarding her hair).. For
example, Gore-Reed says that she complained to Evanson as early as December
2022, complained to her second-line supervisor, and even complained to the CEO
just days before her termination. See ECF No. 17-12. Also, to the extent that Evanson
sat in the call center area among images of African American customers with speech
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bubbles referring to the customers as, among other descriptors, “nappy hair” and
“fair-skinned b*****,” a reasonable jury could find that Evanson was aware that
Gore-Reed’s concerns were related to race. 	Id. at PageID.381 (citing Moore v.
KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a reasonable jury could find a racially hostile work environment where
plaintiff’s supervisor witnessed a co-worker call plaintiff a “n****r”)).
Blue Ribbon’s argument that it took action on Gore-Reed’s complaints is
more compelling than its argument on the previous element. Indeed, Gore-Reed does
not expend much ink challenging this assertion, simply arguing in conclusory
fashion that “Evanson … took no, or certainly no effective, action.” ECF No. 18 at
PageID.381.
But, like the issue of Blue Ribbon’s awareness, this argument is unavailing all
the same. Despite Evanson’s testimony that she admonished Kahsin and sat in the
call center to deter additional abuse, there is evidence that Evanson may have made
a Facebook post referring to Gore-Reed as “a nappy head b**** … who filed a
complaint against me.” ECF No. 18-9. Although the authenticity of this post is in
dispute, a reasonable jury could question whether one alleged harasser sitting in
among other alleged 	harassers 	is 	a response that 	“manifests 	indifference or
unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known.”
Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, 517 F.3d 321, 338 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Blankenship
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v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872–73 (6th Cir. 1997)). It is also
particularly notable that after Gore-Reed complained to Evanson about an incident
where a white co-worker said to McKinnon that “a Black person made hot sauce”
because “Black people love hot sauce,” Evanson disciplined only McKinnon, an
African 	American 	employee. 	ECF 	No. 	18-3 	at 	PageID.407–08. 	But 	more
importantly, Gore-Reed has presented evidence that her colleagues continued to
harass her and began sabotaging her work after she complained and that nothing was
done to stop this continued hostility. See Harsco Corp. v. Renner, 475 F.3d 1179,
1188–89 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a reasonable jury could find that employer’s
corrective action was insufficient where harassment continued afterwards); see also
Garcia v. Los Banos Unified Sch. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1227 (E.D. Cal. 2006)
(concluding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether employer
took reasonably measured corrective action where harassment continued after
employer’s intervention and noting that “[i]t is for the trier of fact to decide the
adequacy and significance of the employer's conduct.”); McDaniel v. Fulton Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (“Furthermore, plaintiff's
allegations that [co-workers] continued to harass her even after she filed formal
complaints … create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County
Defendants took prompt remedial action after the plaintiff filed a formal complaint
of harassment.”). Thus, this Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist
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as to whether Blue Ribbon knew or should have known about the harassment and
whether Blue Ribbon failed to take “prompt and appropriate corrective action.” Id.
Summary judgment, therefore, is inappropriate as to Gore-Reed’s hostile work
environment claim.
B. 	Racial Discrimination: Prima Facie Case
“The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a
claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional
discrimination.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153
(2000). To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination via disparate
treatment, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she is a member of a protected group, (2)
she was subject to an adverse employment decision, (3) she was qualified for the
position, and (4) she was ... treated differently than similarly situated non-protected
employees.” Curry, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (quoting Russell v. Univ. of Tol., 537
F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 2008)) (citation modified). Here, the parties agree that Gore-
Reed has made a showing as to the first two elements since she is an African
American woman and her employment was terminated. But Blue Ribbon disputes
the third and fourth elements.
1. A reasonable jury could find that Gore-Reed was qualified for her position.
Blue Ribbon argues that Gore-Reed was not qualified for the call center
specialist position. ECF No. 17 at PageID.119. Her lack of qualification, Blue
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Ribbon argues, is evidenced by her “poor attendance and performance.” Id. It is also
evidenced, Blue Ribbon proceeds, by her failure to complete the required training.
Id.
However, at this summary judgment stage, this Court “must evaluate whether
a plaintiff established his qualifications independent of the employer’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons for discharge.” Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto, Inc., 280
F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Cline v. Cath. Diocese of Tol., 206 F.3d 651,
661 (6th Cir. 2000) (warning that doing otherwise risks “improperly conflating the
distinct stages of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry”). Therefore, at this stage in the
McDonnell Douglas inquiry, this Court may not consider Blue Ribbon’s argument
that Gore-Reed was unqualified as evidenced by the performance, attendance, and
tardiness issues that it says ultimately cost her the job.
This leaves a record where Gore-Reed indisputably had 10 years of experience
in customer service prior to working for Blue Ribbon. ECF No. 18-4 at PageID.453.
Also, Evanson praised her customer service skills in a positive evaluation and later
testified that Gore-Reed’s performance was fine. ECF No. 17-7 at PageID.234.
These two considerations tilt squarely in Gore-Reed’s favor. See Cicero, 280 F.3d
at 585–86 (emphasizing plaintiff’s “extensive background in human resources
management” and the “good evaluations” plaintiff received during his employment).
And although Blue Ribbon contends that Gore-Reed was unqualified because
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she did not complete her training, this consideration does not tilt strongly enough
against Gore-Reed to merit summary judgment. Merely having one uncompleted
component of her training—attendance at a live catering event—does not appear to
have stopped her from performing the job. Thus, on the record before this Court as
limited by Cline and Cicero, a reasonable jury could conclude that Gore-Reed was
qualified for purposes of a prima facie showing of discrimination.
2. A reasonable jury could find that Gore-Reed was treated differently than
similarly situate white peers.
Blue Ribbon also contends that Gore-Reed was not treated differently than
similarly situated, non-protected employees. ECF No. 17 at PageID.117–118. Blue
Ribbon points out that any differences were due to “legitimate business decision[s]”
rather than discriminatory motives. Id. at PageID.118. For instance, Blue Ribbon
points out that Gore-Reed and McKinnon were not given laptops to work from home
because of resource limitations and seniority; they simply were the last two call
center employees hired at the time, and there were no more weekday laptops to
allocate at that time. Id. at PageID.118. Blue Ribbon also asserts that, although other
employees were allowed to work from home, Gore-Reed was not because she had
not completed her training. Id.
Two issues cut against Blue Ribbon’s position. First, Evanson told Gore-Reed
that she was “working on” getting her a laptop, ECF No. 18-3 at PageID.428, but
one was never provided for over nine months thereby casting doubt as to Blue
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Ribbon’s seniority explanation. ECF No. 18 at PageID.383. This is remarkable
because Blue Ribbon does not allege an inability to secure a laptop over that nine-
month span. Second, the record does not indicate that any of Gore-Reed’s white
peers’ attendance or tardiness was scrutinized or disciplined. To be sure, Blue
Ribbon attributes that difference in treatment to the different frequency with which
the employees called off, noting that “no other employee missed nearly as much time
as [Gore-Reed] during the first nine months of her employment.” ECF No. 17 at
Page ID.118. That may be correct, but whether Gore-Reed’s white peers suffered
from reasonably similar issues with respect to their attendance and tardiness involves
a tricky line-drawing question that juries are well-equipped to handle. Given either
of the tallies calculated above, this Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find
that Gore-Reed’s white peers suffered from sufficiently similar attendance and
tardiness issues despite calling off, leaving early, and showing up late less often. See
ECF No. 18-20 at PageID.666–76 (schedule); see also ECF No. 17 at PageID.683
(Blue Ribbon’s tally). Thus, the delay in securing Gore-Reed a laptop and the
difference in treatment between at least arguably similar employees creates a
genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide.
With those four elements met, Gore-Reed has established a prima facie case
of racial discrimination via disparate treatment. That precludes summary judgment
at this step of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
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C. 	Retaliation: Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing four elements: “(1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) her exercise
of such protected activity was known by the defendant; (3) thereafter, the defendant
took an action that was materially adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection
existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.” Rogers v.
Henry Ford Health Sys., 897 F.3d 763, 775 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation modified); see
also Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 552 F.3d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2009)
(describing the burden as a “burden of production”); Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493,
500 (6th Cir. 1987) (“That is a burden easily met.”). Here, Blue Ribbon disputes
only the first and fourth elements.
1. Gore-Reed showed that she engaged in a protected activity.
First, Blue Ribbon argues that Gore-Reed has not established that she engaged
in a protected activity. Specifically, Blue Ribbon contends that “[Gore-Reed]
speaking to Evanson regarding Kahsin did not constitute protected activity for
purposes of a retaliation claim” because “there is no evidence that this conversation
involved or was directed at [Gore-Reed] or her race.” ECF No. 17 at PageID.125.
This argument lacks merit. “Protected activity,” for purposes of a retaliation
claim, can include an internal “complaint to management about discriminatory
employment practices” so long as it goes “beyond a vague charge of discrimination.”
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Kovacs v. Univ. of Tol., 711 F. Supp. 3d 697, 706 (N.D. Ohio 2024) (citing Jackson,
999 F.3d at 344–45) (citation modified). As for what such a complaint must be
directed at, the Sixth Circuit has clarified that “opposing any practice that the
employee reasonably believes to be a violation of Title VII” amounts to protected
activity. Johnson v. Univ. of Cin., 215 F.3d 561, 579 (6th Cir. 2000).
Gore-Reed testified that she did just that. As early as December 2022, Gore-
Reed complained to Evanson about racial harassment. 	See 	ECF No. 18-3 at
PageID.418 (testifying that she complained to Evanson about Kahsin’s mocking use
of perceived African American speech patterns and Kahsin’s derogatory comments
regarding her hair). And as late as May 30, 2023—just two days before her
termination—Gore-Reed 	e-mailed 	Blue 	Ribbon’s 	CEO 	complaining 	of 	racial
discrimination and harassment. ECF No. 17-12 (explaining that “[r]acism definitely
has 	been 	the biggest 	issue I have experienced” and 	raising 	concerns 	about
“discrimination” and a “hostile work environment”). The content of her complaints
is also reflected in notes that Evanson took on May 26th memorializing threats by
Gore-Reed to contact a lawyer about a discrimination claim. ECF No. 18-10 at
PageID.536 (“Christina is threatening to hire a lawyer and has been collecting
evidence of being discriminated against.”). All of this occurred within one week
before her termination on June 2, 2023. Thus, there is, at minimum, a genuine
question of material fact as to whether Gore-Reed engaged in protected activity.
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2. Gore-Reed established a causal nexus between her complaints and termination.
Next, Blue Ribbon argues that Gore-Reed has not established a causal
connection between the protected activity and her termination. ECF No. 17 at
PageID.125–26. This argument falls flat for two reasons.
Most notably, the timing here gives rise to a reasonable inference that Gore-
Reed’s complaint was, at least in part, cause for her termination. See Lindsay v.
Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 418 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Causation can be proven indirectly
through circumstantial evidence such as suspicious timing.”); see also Mickey v.
Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008) (“In those limited number
of cases [] where an employer fires an employee immediately after learning of a
protected activity, we can infer a causal connection between the two actions, even if
[plaintiff] 	had 	not 	presented 	other 	evidence 	of 	retaliation.”). 	Recall, 	after
experiencing yet another instance of harassment on May 26th, Gore-Reed e-mailed
the CEO on May 30th, ECF No. 18-14, and Blue Ribbon terminated her less than
two days later on June 1st, ECF No. 17-13. Cf. DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408,
421–22 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that 21-day period between protected activity and
termination was “significant enough to constitute indirect evidence of a causal
connection so as to create an inference of retaliatory motive”); Handy-Clay v. City
of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 546 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he chronology of events
supports an inference of causation, particularly because [plaintiff] was terminated
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the day after she made her own records requests.”); see also Lemaster v. Lawrence
Cnty., 65 F.4th 302, 310 (6th Cir. 2023) (“[I]f the act occurs within “days or weeks”
of the speech, the close proximity can sometimes (if rarely) permit an inference that
the one motivated the other.”).
Further, 	under 	a 	“cat’s 	paw” 	theory—by 	which 	a 	biased 	supervisor’s
discriminatory or retaliatory animus can be attributed to a decision-maker in certain
circumstances—a 	reasonable 	jury 	could 	consider 	Evanson’s 	Facebook 	post
(lamenting a “nappy head b****” who filed a complaint) as evidence of a causal
connection between the complaint and Gore-Reed’s imminent termination. See
Marshall v. The Rawlings Co. LLC, 854 F.3d 368, 377–78 (6th Cir. 2017)
(discussing application of cat’s paw theory to employment discrimination and
retaliation claims). To be sure, Blue Ribbon contends that this post was fabricated.
ECF No. 17 at PageID.114. But this Court may not make credibility determinations
and must view disputed facts in a light most favorable to Gore-Reed as the non-
moving party. See Jackson, 999 F.3d at 343; Briggs, 11 F.4th at 507.
Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether there existed a
causal connection between Gore-Reed’s protected activity and her subsequent
termination. Thus, with showings made as to each element, summary judgment is
improper at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
D. 	Legitimate Business Reasons and Pretext
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With the prima facie cases for discrimination and retaliation established, the
burden shifts to Blue Ribbon to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory, and non-
retaliatory reason for terminating Gore-Reed. Curry v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 669 F.
Supp. 2d 805, 824 (E.D. Mich. 2009) . In its briefing, Blue Ribbon provides several
such reasons, including poor performance, failure to complete training, poor
attendance, and tardiness. ECF No. 17 at PageID.126. Gore-Reed does not dispute
that Blue Ribbon’s articulated rationales meet its burden at this stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework. See generally ECF No. 18.
Consequently, the burden shifts back to Gore-Reed to show that the proffered
reasons were pretextual. Curry, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 824. To meet that burden, Gore-
Reed must “must produce evidence that either the proffered reason: (1) has no basis
in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the adverse employment action; or (3) was
insufficient to warrant the adverse action.” Ladd, 552 F.3d at 502. Blue Ribbon
argues that Gore-Reed has failed to do so. ECF No. 17 at PageID.127.
The record, however, is rife with evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that Blue Ribbon’s proffered reasons were pretextual. To start, there is
evidence that Blue Ribbon’s proffered reasons are duplicitous. For example, there is
a question about whether Evanson and Wagner “concocted an ‘Employee Warning
Documentation’ which they backdated to May 26, 2023 (pre-termination).” ECF
Nos. 18 at PageID.364; 18-16. Indeed, metadata for the Word version of the
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document showed it was created and last edited on June 1—not May 26, as written.
ECF Nos. 18-16; 18-5 at PageID.484–85 (admitting to backdating the document). A
reasonable jury could view this backdating as an attempt at damage control by
retroactively producing documentary support for the termination. See Kelly v. Acct.
Control Techs., Inc., No. 1:17-cv-320, 2018 WL 4005597, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22,
2018) (concluding plaintiff had made preliminary showing of pretext where plaintiff
“offered evidence that [director of operations] had asked him to falsify and backdate
documents so that [employer] could terminate a colleague who had been diagnosed
with cancer before she could take FMLA leave for cancer treatment”). Additionally,
such a jury could draw the same inference from the inaccuracies in Zanotti’s
testimony. Zanotti, for example, testified that Gore-Reed had received two prior
warnings for attendance prior to her termination, ECF No. 18-11 at PageID.543. But
see ECF Nos. 17-2 at PageID.149 (Evanson testifying that there were no written
warnings given to Gore-Reed about her performance). Thus, a reasonable jury could
find that Blue Ribbon’s decision-makers are not credible with respect to their reasons
for Gore-Reed’s termination.
A reasonable jury could also find that Blue Ribbon’s reasons are simply not
credible in their own right—or, in other words, that the proffered rationale does not
hold up to scrutiny. See Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 714 (6th
Cir. 2007) (“One way in which a plaintiff may demonstrate pretext is by showing
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that the reason given by the employer is ultimately found to be mistaken, foolish,
trivial, or baseless.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Blue Ribbon’s stated
concerns with Gore-Reed’s performance, attendance, and tardiness are at least
arguably 	inconsistent 	with 	Gore-Reed’s 	performance 	reviews 	and 	Evanson’s
subsequent 	evaluation. 	Recall, 	Evanson 	graded 	Gore-Reed 	between 	“Meets
Expectations” and “Work in Progress” for the “Availability and Attendance” prong.
ECF No. 18-6 at PageID.522. In that performance review, Evanson noted “Your
phone work and interaction with guests is wonderful. You have a smile on 100
percent of the time and have a knack for customer service.” Id. at PageID.524. Of
the 	11 	assessment 	categories, 	Evanson 	graded 	Gore-Reed 	as 	either 	“Meets
Expectations” or “Work in Progress” for 9, and “Action Required” for only 2 items,
which the review itself conceded “take time to learn.” Id. at PageID.521–22.
Evanson also later testified that Gore-Reed was a valuable employee who “helped
control the catering executions, [] helped control our ability to make sales, [and]
participated in our daily tasks.” ECF No. 18-5 at PageID.464. Lastly, CFO Devlin
testified that he decided to terminate Gore-Reed at least in part because there was
“nobody else in the company that was missing work as much as her,” ECF No. 17-
4 at PageID.201, but he also conceded that he did not “compare her record to the
other call center specialists with respect to days off or call offs or late arrivals or
early departures,” id.
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In 	addition, 	Blue 	Ribbon’s 	actions 	and 	inactions 	regarding 	employee
discipline could further support a reasonable jury finding that Blue Ribbon’s
proffered reasons are pretextual. First, Blue Ribbon appears to have not followed its
own internal progressive disciplinary policy under which intermediate, less severe
disciplinary action could and possibly should have been pursued before terminating
Gore-Reed for her attendance and tardiness, including a verbal or written warning
for the first violation and a suspension for the second violation. See ECF Nos. 18-5
at PageID.469; 17-16 at PageID.335. Second, Blue Ribbon did not terminate or
otherwise take adverse employment action against Gore-Reed’s white peers, Bewley
and Cohen, both of whom a reasonable jury could find similarly struggled with
attendance and tardiness. See ECF No. 18-20 at PageID.666–676. The Sixth Circuit
has held that this can support a finding of pretext. Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res.
Agency, Inc., 946 F.3d 883, 896 (6th Cir. 2020) (“We have held that failure to
uniformly 	apply 	a progressive discipline policy 	can be evidence of pretext,
especially when the company asserts that policy as a rationale for the employee's
termination.”).
In light of these considerations, this Court concludes that a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether Blue Ribbon’s proffered reasons for terminating
Gore-Reed were pretextual. See Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir.
2012) (“[A] prima facie case and a showing of pretext can support a jury verdict for
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the plaintiff.”). Because Gore-Reed has made out prima facie cases of discrimination
and retaliation, this genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on
both her discrimination and retaliation claims. See id.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, 	it 	is 	ORDERED 	that 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 17, is DENIED.
This is not a final order and does not close the above-captioned case.
/s/Susan K. DeClercq
SUSAN K. DeCLERCQ
United States District Judge
Dated: November 12, 2025
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