United States of America v. Travis

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CARL EMERSON TRAVIS,
Defendant.
2:24-CR-20237-TGB-KGA
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RELEASE TO
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO
ATTEND HIS DAUGHTER’S
FUNERAL (ECF. NO. 60)
On October 29, 2025, this Court sentenced Defendant Carl Emerson
Travis to a 180-month term of imprisonment. On the same day, Mr.
Travis filed a motion to allow him to attend his daughter’s funeral,
scheduled for November 1, 2025. See ECF No. 60. The Government
opposes this motion. 	See 	ECF No. 61. Because the Court lacks the
authority to grant the relief sought, Mr. Travis’s motion is DENIED.
The Court does not have the authority to release Mr. Travis under
Chapter 207 — Release and Detention Pending Judicial Proceedings —
of Title 18, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3156, because Mr. Travis has already
been sentenced. Chapter 207 provides courts with the authority to
release a person “pending imposition or execution of sentence.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3141(b). However, Mr. Davis’s sentence was imposed and executed on
October 29, 2025. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (“A sentence to a term of
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imprisonment 	commences on the date the defendant 	is received in
custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence
service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence
is to be served.”); United States v. Williams, 601 F. App'x 685, 687 (10th
Cir. 	2015) 	(“A 	federal 	sentence 	normally 	commences 	immediately
following sentencing when, as here, the defendant is in primary federal
custody.”); United States v. Nkanga, 450 F. Supp. 3d 491, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (confirming that “‘execution’ and commencement are effectively
synonymous” (collecting cases)). Thus, the Court lacks the authority to
grant the relief sought under Chapter 207 of Title 18. Other courts have
come to the same conclusion when assessing parallel circumstances. See,
e.g., 	United States v. O'Neil, No. 19-01832, 2023 WL 402212, at *1
(D.N.M. Jan. 25, 2023) (finding that the court lacked authority under
§ 3141 to grant furlough to attend a funeral when defendant had already
been sentenced).
Instead, once a court has sentenced a person, the authority to
temporarily release that person from the place of their imprisonment has
been vested exclusively with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). 18 U.S.C. §
3622 (“The Bureau of Prisons may release a prisoner from the place of
his imprisonment for a limited period.”); see also United States v. Walker,
No. 17-83, 2024 WL 3982766, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2024) (“As the
Defendant was in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons … at the time of
the funeral and the Emergency Motion, it was the province of the Bureau,
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and not this Court, to determine whether Defendant could be released to
attend the funeral.”); United States v. Premachandra, 78 F.3d 589 (8th
Cir. 1996) (“We agree with the district court that 18 U.S.C. § 3622 vests
authority to grant medical furloughs with the Bureau of Prisons …, not
the 	federal 	courts.”). 	This 	statute 	specifically 	grants 	the 	BOP 	the
authority 	to 	temporarily 	release 	a 	prisoner 	“for 	the 	purpose 	of 	…
attending a funeral of a relative.” 18 U.S.C. § 3622(a)(2).
Nor is the Court authorized to grant compassionate release or
modify a team of imprisonment under these circumstances. Under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c), a “court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it
has been imposed except” in three circumstances, none of which, as
explained below, are present here.
First, the Bureau of Prisons has not moved for the compassionate
release 	of 	Mr. 	Travis 	and 	Defendant 	has 	not 	“fully 	exhausted 	all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring
a motion on the defendant's behalf.” § 3582(c)(1)(A). Failure to comply
with the exhaustion strictures set forth in the statute deprives a court of
authority to entertain the petition. See United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d
831, 834 (6th Cir. 2020).
Second, the sentence has not resulted “from arithmetical, technical,
or other clear error.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a); § 3582(c)(1)(B) (allowing for
modification of an imposed term of imprisonment under “Rule 35 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”). Additionally, the Court is not
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aware of any statute expressly permitting modification of an imposed
term of imprisonment under these circumstances. See § 3582(c)(1)(B)
(allowing for modification of an imposed term of imprisonment when
“expressly permitted by statute”).
Third, the sentencing range under which Mr. Travis was sentenced
has not been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. See § 3582(c)(2).
Thus, because none of the exceptions enumerated under § 3582 are
present, the Court is prohibited by statute from modifying Mr. Travis’s
term 	of 	imprisonment 	or 	granting 	compassionate 	release. 	See, 	e.g.,
O'Neil, 2023 WL 402212, at *1.
Accordingly, the Court does not have the authority to grant Mr.
Travis the relief he seeks. The Court notes that Mr. Travis may apply for
furlough with the Bureau of Prisons under 28 C.F.R. § 570.
Defendant Travis’s motion for temporary release to allow him to
attend his daughter’s funeral (ECF No. 60) is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 31, 2025 	s/Terrence G. Berg
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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