USA v. Willis et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
In 2023, Livonia police officers began investigating Barry Willis for drug
trafficking. During their investigation, officers saw Willis leave from a house on
Littlefield Street in Detroit on his way to sell drugs to a confidential informant.
Eventually, the officers obtained a warrant to search Willis’ residence, his business,
and the Littlefield house.
Although the investigation had centered on Willis, when a number of officers
arrived at the Littlefield house to execute the warrant, they found Frances Bryant.
Bryant said she was the house cleaner, but the officer leading the search arrested her
based on the existence of a large drug operation in the Littlefield basement. The police
then interviewed Bryant. She informed them that she was Willis’ girlfriend and that
their meeting place was the Littlefield house.
Based in part on the information that Bryant provided during her interview,
the officers obtained a warrant to search three cellphones that they had seized at the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANCES BRIEANNA BRYANT,
Defendant.
Case No. 24-20187
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS [70] AND SETTING EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON
ADDITIONAL MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS [69, 84]
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Littlefield house. Two belonged to Bryant, and at least one contained evidence that
she 	was 	involved 	in 	the 	drug 	operation 	at 	Littlefield. 	Given 	her 	post-arrest
statements and the evidence on her phones, the government has charged Bryant
with, among other things, conspiring with Willis to distribute fentanyl.
Bryant has filed three motions to suppress: one challenging her arrest and two
challenging the search of her phones. For the reasons provided below, the Court finds
that Bryant’s arrest was unlawful and thus will GRANT her motion to suppress the
evidence obtained as a result of her arrest. (ECF No. 70.) And as further explained
below, the Court will set an evidentiary hearing on the other two motions.
In 2023, Livonia police officers began investigating Barry Willis for drug
trafficking when a confidential informant told Officer Sean Tamer that “Blue,” who
owned a gas station in a particular area of Detroit, had been selling heroin. (See ECF
No. 78-2, PageID.504.) Using Google maps and some databases, Tamer was able to
connect Barry Willis with the gas station. (See id. at PageID.504–505.) He also found
a photo of Willis, which the informant confirmed was the person he knew as “Blue.”
(See id. at PageID.505.)
In February 2024, Tamer directed the first of two controlled buys from Willis.
Tamer had the informant call Willis’ cellphone and arrange a heroin purchase. (Id.
at PageID.505.) At the arranged meeting place, an officer watched as Willis arrived
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in his vehicle, the informant got in and out of Willis’ vehicle, and Willis drove off. (Id.)
The substance bought from Willis tested positive for fentanyl. (Id.)
The second controlled buy took place in March 2024. Earlier that month, an
officer who followed Willis departing from his gas station saw Willis enter a residence
on Littlefield Street in Detroit. (Id. at PageID.506.) The day of the buy, an officer
observed Willis exit the Littlefield house and get into his vehicle. (Id. at PageID.507.)
When Willis drove off, officers followed. (Id.) Willis stopped on his way to meet the
informant, and officers observed a transaction that, in their view, was “consistent
with” a drug sale. (Id.) When Willis met the informant, the buy took place in a similar
fashion to the first. (Id.) And as before, the substance purchased from Willis tested
positive for fentanyl. (Id.) Later that day, an officer observed Willis leave the
Littlefield house, engage in another transaction “consistent with” a drug sale, and
then drive back to the Littlefield house. (Id. at PageID.508.)
Using the information gained from investigating Willis, Tamer sought and
obtained a search warrant. The Littlefield Warrant (as the parties call it) permitted
a search of Willis’ gas station, his home in Clinton Township, and the Littlefield house
in Detroit. Among other things, the Littlefield Warrant allowed officers to search
these locations for “any and all records or documents* pertaining to controlled
substances,” which, according to the asterisk, included digital records. (Id. at
PageID.500–501.) And, “[i]n order to search for any such items,” the Littlefield
Warrant permitted officers to seize and search “[a]ny . . . cellular telephone” that they
found at the three locations. (Id. at PageID.501.)
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In March 2024, Livonia police officers, led by Sergeant Andrew Coletta,
executed the warrant on Willis’ three properties. (See ECF No. 94, PageID.606, 608.)
At Willis’ gas station, they found $3,000 and a gun. (ECF No. 29-3.) At his home in
Clinton Township, officers seized $134,000 in cash, a gun, and a key to the Littlefield
house. (Id.) They also found Willis and arrested him. (See ECF No. 94, at PageID.606–
607.)
Once Willis was in custody, Coletta and his team executed the warrant on the
Littlefield house. After the officers broke through a side door, someone Coletta was
unfamiliar with came out the front door: Frances Bryant. (ECF No. 94, PageID.628,
664; Hardin Bodycam, 00:00–00:20.)
As Coletta led the team inside, Sergeant William Hardin stayed with Bryant
outside. (ECF No. 94, PageID.628.) Bryant told Hardin that she did not live at the
residence. (ECF No. 78-4, PageID.514.) When Hardin asked if Bryant was “[h]ere at
a bad time?” Bryant explained, “I just cleaned the house, so I just stayed last night.”
(ECF No. 78-4, PageID.514.) Hardin would later explain he found this statement
suspicious. (ECF No. 94, PageID.631.) When Hardin asked Bryant if she had
encountered anything while cleaning, Bryant motioned to the upper levels of the
residence and responded that she “only” cleaned upstairs. (Hardin Bodycam, 01:20–
01:30; see also ECF No. 94, PageID.631–632.) In time, Bryant asked Hardin who was
the subject of the warrant, and Hardin responded by asking who paid Bryant to clean
the residence. (Hardin Bodycam, 05:19–05:54; ECF No. 94, PageID.632.) Initially,
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Bryant responded a “third party,” but after Hardin said that the first name on the
warrant was “Barry,” Bryant stated that she cleaned for “Mike.” (ECF No. 78-4,
PageID.517; see also Hardin Bodycam, 05:30–06:11.)
Meanwhile, Coletta and other officers searched the Littlefield house. On the
main floor, they found two large monitors mounted to a wall, each displaying feeds
from several perimeter cameras. (ECF No. 94, PageID.610; Coletta Bodycam, 00:59–
01:30.) In the living room (which led to the front door where Byrant had exited),
officers found a gun and, in the wall at the top of the stairs, a money counter. (ECF
No. 94, PageID.616–617; Coletta Bodycam, 02:40–02:57, 03:09–03:11.)
Although the main floor and loft contained no drugs, the basement was a
different story. When Coletta reached the basement, he saw, in his words, the
“largest” drug-trafficking operation that he had seen in his 14-year career. (ECF No.
94, PageID.605, 612.) The basement contained around 40 kilograms of fentanyl,
digital scales, pill presses, and other tools of the drug trade. (See ECF No. 78,
PageID.476; Coletta Bodycam, 03:40–05:20.) Almost immediately upon seeing the
operation in the basement, Coletta, referring to Bryant, declared, “Well, she’s going
to jail.” (ECF No. 94, PageID.618; Coletta Bodycam, 04:33–04:35.)
After the officers finished a sweep of the house, Coletta had a “very brief”
conversation with Hardin. (ECF No. 94, PageID.613, 619, 633.) At that point, Colletta
still had no idea who Bryant was. Hardin recalled, “I told [Coletta] that [Bryant] told
me she was the cleaning lady and I’ve never came across a cleaning lady in my two
years of narcotic search warrants. And [Coletta] pretty much said the same thing.”
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(Id. at PageID.634–635; see also id. at PageID.619–620.) For his part, Coletta
informed Hardin that there was a large drug operation inside the house. (See ECF
No. 94, PageID.619–620, 634.) “[B]ased on the large scale and the very apparent drug
operation,” Coletta arrested Bryant for possession with intent to deliver narcotics.
(Id. at PageID.613, 623–624.)
On the day of her arrest, Tamer interviewed Bryant at the police station.
During her interview, Bryant admitted that she was Willis’ girlfriend of two to three
years (ECF No. 78-5, PageID.536), that she knew Willis was married and had another
house (id. at PageID.527, 538), that they would see each other at the Littlefield house
(id. at PageID.538, 540), and that one of the guns that was recovered in the Littlefield
house was hers (id. at PageID.536). Bryant further admitted that in the two weeks
before the search, she had stayed at the Littlefield house a few days a week. (Id. at
PageID.529, 535.)
About 20 days after searching the Littlefield house, Robert Kim, one of the
Livonia police officers involved in the investigation of Willis, sought a warrant to
search three cell phones recovered from Littlefield. (ECF No. 78-3, PageID.512–513.)
In his affidavit, Kim described the drug operation in the Littlefield basement and
that two guns were recovered from the house. (Id. at PageID.512.) He stated that
Bryant 	was 	present 	when 	officers 	searched 	the 	Littlefield 	house. 	(Id.) 	And,
apparently referring to Bryant’s interview statements, Kim stated, “Bryant admitted
to officers that she [w]as staying at [the Littlefield house] for approximately two years
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and stays at the residence three to four days a week.” (Id.) Kim added that Bryant
had also admitted that two of the three phones—a white-silver Samsung and a gray-
black iPhone—were hers. (Id.)
The same state court judge who had issued the Littlefield Warrant reviewed
Kim’s affidavit and issued what the parties refer to as the Cell-Phone Warrant. (See
generally ECF No. 78-3.)
Months later, federal agents searched Bryant’s phones. (See ECF No. 97-2,
PageID.727.) The government says that this search uncovered evidence that Bryant
was “involved in obtaining pill presses and other narcotics manufacturing materials”
for the Littlefield drug operation. (ECF No. 78, PageID.479.)
The government charged Bryant with, among things, conspiring with Willis to
distribute fentanyl. (See ECF No. 34, PageID.273.)
Bryant has filed three motions to suppress.
In one, she argues that her arrest was unlawful and that any evidence obtained
as a result of her arrest should be suppressed. (ECF No. 70.) The Court held an
evidentiary hearing on this motion on September 12, 2025. (See generally ECF No.
94.)
Bryant also seeks to suppress evidence obtained from searching her phones on
the grounds that (1) the affidavits in support of the two warrants did not provide
probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be found on her phones and (2)
both warrants fail the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. (ECF Nos. 69,
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84.) (In her briefs, Bryant only expressly challenged the Cell-Phone Warrant as not
sufficiently particular, but based on the hearing, the Court believes Bryant intended
to make that challenge to the Littlefield Warrant, as well. (See ECF No. 94,
PageID.677.))
The Court begins with the lawfulness of Bryant’s arrest.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” seizures, which means that
to 	arrest 	someone, 	officers 	must 	have 	probable 	cause 	to 	believe 	that 	person
committed, or was in the process of committing, a crime. See Fisher v. Jordan, 91
F.4th 419, 425 (6th Cir. 2024). Although probable cause is not “readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232
(1983), there are guidelines. On one end of the spectrum, officers need “more than a
reasonable suspicion” to arrest someone. Fisher, 91 F.4th at 419. On the other, officers
can arrest someone without believing it is more-likely-than-not that the person
committed a crime. See id.
At bottom, this Court must decide whether the “facts and circumstances”
known to the arresting officer would warrant a “prudent man” in believing that the
arrestee “committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 91 (1964).
Not only do the parties disagree on the answer to that question, they also
disagree on one of the question’s premises: the “facts and circumstances” known to
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Coletta, the arresting officer. From the government’s perspective, everything that
Hardin knew from his conversation with Bryant is part of the factual basis for
assessing probable cause, whether he shared it with arresting officer Coletta or not.
(See ECF No. 94, PageID.646; ECF No. 96, PageID.710.) This would include, for
example, that Bryant purported to be the unusual cleaner who spends the night at
the house she cleans. From Bryant’s perspective, the probable-cause determination
cannot be based on information that Hardin knew but did not tell Coletta. (ECF No.
97, PageID.721–722.) In other words, the parties dispute the breadth of the collective-
knowledge doctrine.
In its well-trodden form, the collective-knowledge doctrine applies when one
officer has information amounting to probable cause and directs another officer, one
who lacks the required factual basis, to effectuate the arrest. See United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1985). This is sometimes referred to as “vertical” collective
knowledge. See Commonwealth v. Privette, 204 N.E.3d 967, 975 (Mass. 2023)
(discussing doctrine at length).
But 	some 	courts 	have 	departed from 	this 	familiar road and adopted 	a
“horizontal” collective-knowledge doctrine. This version comes in a few varieties and
has 	divided 	courts. 	See 	id. 	at 	976–78 	(summarizing 	split); 	United 	States 	v.
Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 493 (4th Cir. 2011) (same). At its most expansive, the
horizontal collective-knowledge doctrine permits an arrest based on information
known 	to 	officers 	working 	as a 	single unit—even if 	the information 	was not
communicated to the arresting officer. See United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026,
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1032 (9th Cir. 2007); Privette, 204 N.E.3d at 978 (explaining that “the minority
view . . . has allowed information to be aggregated amongst officers even absent
evidence of any sort of communication between them”).
The 	Sixth 	Circuit, 	however, 	has 	not 	travelled 	far 	down 	the 	horizontal-
collective-knowledge road. The Court typically requires some sharing of information
or, at a minimum, a joint decision to arrest. See, e.g., Bauman v. Millisor, No. 21-
1527, 2022 WL 35470, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 2022) (explaining that officers reasonably
concluded plaintiff was disorderly based on both their individual observations and
the information they “communicated . . . among themselves before placing [plaintiff]
under arrest”); Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d 401, 412 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the
“collective-knowledge doctrine” permits an officer to “conduct a stop based on
information obtained from fellow officers” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Collins v. Nagle provides a useful waypoint. There, four investigators surveyed
a property for unlawful mining, and, when they tried to leave, they found that two
individuals had blocked the exit road with a truck. Id. at 491. While some of the
investigators had seen this act before, it was new to Nagle. See id. at 491, 494 n.3.
With the road blocked, the four investigators “discussed among themselves” what to
do with the two obstructors. See id. at 492. After their discussion, Nagle and one or
two of the other investigators proceeded to arrest the pair. Id. In later court
proceedings, the arrestees argued that because Nagle was unaware of the prior road-
blocking incidents (as well as other inculpatory information known to the other
investigators), their arrest was not supported by probable cause. See id. at 494.
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Relying on its prior decision in United States v. Woods, the Sixth Circuit rejected that
argument: “Since the knowledge of the mining investigators working together on the
scene and in communication with each other is mutually imputed, we do not require
that every arresting officer possess all of the information that, when amassed, gives
rise to probable cause.” Nagle, 892 F.2d at 495; see also United States v. Woods, 544
F.2d 242, 260 (6th Cir. 1976) (“[W]hen a group of agents in close communication with
one another determines that it is proper to arrest an individual, the knowledge of the
group that made the decision may be considered in determining probable cause, not
just the knowledge of the individual officer who physically effected the arrest.”).
Here, unlike the officers in Nagle and Woods, Hardin and Coletta did not
jointly decide to arrest Bryant (and did not share information beyond that Bryant
said she was a cleaner). The record could not be clearer that it was Coletta—and
Coletta alone—who decided to arrest Bryant. (ECF No. 94, PageID.624, 633.)
That makes United States v. Blair the proper pathway. There, two officers—
Munday and Holmes—were working as a team to surveil a suspected drug house. 524
F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 2008). Munday parked where he could see the house; Holmes
parked where he could not. Id. at 745. In time, Munday saw what he believed to be a
“hand-to-hand drug transaction” at the house. Id. When the suspected buyer drove
off, Munday radioed Holmes, but “Holmes was unsure to which vehicle [Munday] was
referring.” Id. at 750. Even so, Holmes stopped a car for a broken light. Id. at 745,
749. Holmes then extended the stop beyond what was necessary to issue a ticket, and,
eventually, additional officers and a canine unit arrived on scene. See id. at 745–46,
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752. The officers found drugs on the driver, Blair, which led to his indictment. Id. at
746.
In arguing that the stop was properly extended, the government relied on
Woods 	and 	the 	fact 	that 	Munday 	had 	seen 	an 	apparent 	hand-to-hand 	drug
transaction. See id. at 751. But Munday had not communicated that information to
Holmes before Holmes had extended the stop. See id. at 751–52. The Sixth Circuit
explained: 	“Had Officers 	Munday 	and Holmes 	decided together to 	stop Blair,
information known only to Officer Munday would be relevant.” Id. at 752. But “the
officers did not make a collective decision to stop Blair, and thus Officer Munday’s
knowledge of the hand-to-hand transaction cannot be imputed to Officer Holmes.” Id.
That reasoning fits perfectly here: had Coletta and Hardin decided together to
arrest Bryant, information known only to Hardin would be relevant. But Coletta
alone decided to arrest Bryant. (ECF No. 94, PageID.623–624.) So Hardin’s unspoken
knowledge cannot be imputed to Coletta.
The upshot is that only the following “facts and circumstances” will be
considered in assessing probable cause to arrest Bryant: (1) there was a massive drug
operation in plain view in the basement of the house and indicia of drug trafficking
on the other floors, (2) Bryant was alone at the house when the officers executed the
warrant, and (3) Bryant said she was the cleaner. (See ECF No. 96, PageID.712
(reciting facts known to Coletta if collective-knowledge doctrine did not apply).)
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So would a prudent officer believe that a person is engaged in drug trafficking
because she was alone at a residence with a large, unhidden drug operation and
claimed to be the cleaner?
Start with two points of law. On the one hand, “a person’s mere propinquity to
others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise
to probable cause to search that person.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 (1979).
And this rule applies in the context of a drug house: a person’s “[m]ere presence at a
place where the government believes illegal drugs will be distributed will not provide
probable cause for an arrest on narcotics charges.” United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d
242, 260 (6th Cir. 1976). On the other hand, a person’s presence at a drug house is a
fact favoring probable cause to arrest. See United States v. Romero, 452 F.3d 610, 618
(6th Cir. 2006) (“[D]rug dealing is ‘an enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely
to admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence against him.’”
(quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003))).
A few cases illustrate how these points of law apply in circumstances similar
to the one Coletta faced.
In United States v. Robertson, officers had several reasons to believe that a
house was being used to make methamphetamine, including that Johnson, who had
an outstanding arrest warrant for manufacturing methamphetamine, appeared to be
residing there. See 833 F.2d 777, 778 (9th Cir. 1987). When officers approached the
house to execute the warrant, they saw “a woman, later identified as Steeprow,
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leaving the house on the walkway.” Id. at 779. The officers drew their guns and told
her to freeze. Id. Other officers proceeded inside and found Johnson and “equipment
characteristic of a crank lab.” Id. The officers then asked Steeprow if they could
search her backpack and, when she refused, they detained her at the scene until they
got a warrant. See id. They then searched Steeprow’s backpack and found meth
recipes. See id.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that officers had effectuated an arrest when they
detained Steeprow at gunpoint, id. at 781, and that they had done so without probable
cause, id. at 783. The court reasoned that while it was “undisputed that the officers
had probable cause to believe that criminal activity was afoot in the house,” the
government could not identify anything other than Steeprow’s “mere proximity to
Johnson and the house” that would lead a prudent person to think she had committed
a crime. See id. at 783. “For all that was then known to the officers, Steeprow was an
innocent visitor.” Id. at 782.
The same court later reached the opposite conclusion on slightly different facts.
In United States v. Valencia-Amezcua, authorities were investigating Valencia-
Rodriguez for drug trafficking. 278 F.3d 901, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2002). When an officer
arrived at his house, Valencia-Rodriguez led them to an upstairs bedroom where
Amezcua was “sitting on a bed with two other men.” Id. at 904. After Amezcua and
the others were directed outside, officers found a hidden door blocked by the bed. Id.
at 905. Inside the secret room was evidence of drug manufacturing. Id. The officers
thus arrested Amezcua. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that Amezcua’s arrest was
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different 	from 	Steeprow’s 	because 	the 	house 	“contained 	a 	large-scale
methamphetamine 	production 	operation 	requiring 	the 	participation 	of 	several
workers,” Amezcua’s proximity to the secret room suggested that he may have exited
it before the officers’ arrival, and Amezcua’s position on the bed “suggested a purpose
to deter the officers” from discovering the secret room. Id. at 907–08 (distinguishing
Robertson).
A third case suffices to complete the mere-visitor picture. In United States v.
Pace, officers had a warrant to search Savides’ condominium for evidence of unlawful
gambling. 898 F.2d 1218, 1223 (7th Cir. 1990). When officers arrived at the condo,
Savides permitted them to enter. Id. Officers then saw Besase exit the kitchen, Pace
in the den, and a third person exit a bedroom. Id. In those three rooms, officers found
10 kilograms of cocaine and $63,000. Id. So the officers arrested all four individuals.
Id. In concluding that Besase’s and Pace’s arrests were supported by probable cause,
the Seventh Circuit noted that there were “large amounts of cocaine and money lying
in the open,” that “Savides trusted Pace and Besase enough to have them at his home
with the money and cocaine out in the open,” and that Besase and Pace “exit[ed]
rooms in which the police found large amounts of either cocaine or money.” Id. at
1240.
Although this case has similarities to Pace and Valencia-Amezcua, there are
material differences. To be sure, as in those cases, officers found Bryant in a house
with a large amount of drugs. And, similar to the condo owner in Pace, Willis trusted
Bryant to be in a house with an open and obvious drug operation in the basement and
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some other indicia of drug trafficking on the other floors. But, unlike in Valencia-
Amezcua, Bryant did nothing that could be interpreted as an attempt to deter officers
from discovering the drug operation. Cf. 278 F.3d at 907. And unlike the officers in
Pace, Coletta’s team did not walk in on what appeared to be an ongoing drug deal. Cf.
898 F.2d at 1223. Further, in both Pace and Valencia-Amezcua, the officers had
reason to think that the arrestees had recently exited rooms where drugs were out in
the open. See Pace, 898 F.2d at 1240; Valencia-Amezcua, 278 F.3d at 907. In contrast,
Bryant was never seen anywhere near the basement.
Bryant’s situation better aligns with Steeprow’s. The officers in Robertson
knew that Johnson was suspected of drug manufacturing but knew nothing about
Steeprow before they arrived at the suspected drug house. The facts are similar here:
the officers’ investigation had focused almost exclusively on Willis (indeed, the
warrant affidavit nowhere mentions Bryant), and Coletta knew nothing about Bryant
before he arrived at the Littlefield house. (ECF No. 94, PageID.664.) And when
officers arrived to arrest Johnson, they found Steeprow exiting the house. So too here.
True, Coletta had discovered the drug operation before he decided to arrest Bryant,
whereas it is unclear whether the officers who arrested Steeprow had discovered the
meth lab before arresting her. But even before entering the house that Steeprow had
exited, the officers had good reasons to think that drugs were being made there. See
Robertson, 833 F.2d at 778 (noting that it was “undisputed that the officers had
probable cause to believe that criminal activity was afoot in the house”). But that was
not probable cause to arrest Steeprow. See id. at 783. In short, as with Steeprow,
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Bryant’s mere presence at a residence used for drug trafficking is not probable cause
to believe she was involved in that enterprise.
What of the fact that Bryant had claimed to be the house cleaner? (See ECF
No. 94, PageID.634.) True, a fishy reason for being in a home with a massive drug
operation could be the “something more” that removes a case from Ybarra’s ambit.
See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92 (providing that proximity to criminal activity, “without
more,” does not amount to probable cause). But in this Court’s opinion, Bryant’s
statement that she was the cleaner—unadorned by the suspicious facts that Hardin
did not communicate to Coletta—is not fishy enough for a reasonable officer to
immediately believe that Bryant was a participant in the drug operation. While drug
traffickers are unlikely to invite Molly Maid into the hub of their drug operation, they
might trust a close friend (or girlfriend or family member) to clean their residence—
even with drugs left out in the open. Like everyone else, people who sell drugs for a
living have close friends and family who are not their “coworkers.” And here, based
on Coletta’s bodycam video, the house appeared quite clean.
To summarize, the officers’ investigation had centered on Willis. When they
arrived at the Littlefield house, Bryant happened to be there. And as soon as Coletta
saw the large drug operation in the basement, he believed that Bryant should “go[]
to jail.” (ECF No. 95, PageID.618, 623.) But at that moment, a prudent officer would
not have arrested Bryant, because doing so would have meant arresting her based on
her mere presence at a drug house. See United States v. Stewart, No. 20-56, 2020 WL
6255676, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 23, 2020) (“[W]hile a homeowner’s willingness to leave
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a visitor in the presence of drugs is a factor in establishing probable cause to arrest,
it, alone, does not support probable cause.”). While Coletta later learned that Bryant
said she was the cleaner, that explanation for her presence is not suspicious enough
to take this case out from under Ybarra’s umbrella. Accordingly, the Court narrowly
finds that a prudent officer, knowing only what Coletta knew, would not yet have
believed that Bryant possessed the drugs at Littlefield with the intent to deliver
them.
The government resists this result with Fisher v. Jordan, 91 F.4th 419 (6th
Cir. 2024). (See ECF No. 78, PageID.482–483.) But that case is not like this one.
There, officers obtained a warrant to search Steven and Leslie Fisher’s home on
suspicion of a marijuana grow operation in the garage. Fisher, 91 F.4th at 423. When
officers arrived to execute the warrant, Leslie told them that she knew her husband
had been growing marijuana in the garage, but that she never went in the garage
and did not know the operation’s extent. See id. The officers arrested Leslie and
Steven for possession with intent to deliver, id. at 425, and, after the charges against
Leslie were dropped, she sued the officers for unlawful arrest, see id. at 424. The Sixth
Circuit found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Leslie because (1) she had
admitted to using marijuana grown by her husband, id. at 426, (2) she “lived at and
owned the site of the grow operation,” id., and (3) the “house was filled with signs of
drug trafficking,” id. at 427. Although that third fact, to a much lesser degree, is
present here, the other two are not: Bryant did not admit to using the drugs at the
Littlefield house, she did not own the Littlefield house, and, at the time of her arrest,
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officers did not know that she often stayed there. So there were more reasons for an
officer to think Fisher possessed drugs than to think Bryant did.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	will grant 	Bryant’s 	motion 	to 	suppress 	evidence
obtained as a result of her arrest. (ECF No. 70, PageID.442.)
That determination leads to more questions. Because Bryant’s arrest was
unlawful, the Court must determine what evidence was obtained as a result of her
arrest. This in turn involves considering how events would have unfolded had Bryant
not been arrested.
United States v. Waide makes this point. There, when officers arrived to
execute a search warrant on Waide’s apartment, Waide was not present, but his
mother was. 60 F.4th 327, 333 (6th Cir. 2023). She phoned Waide, informing him of
the warrant and asking him to return to the apartment. Id. When Waide arrived, he
offered to retrieve what the officers were looking for (a recording device), but the
officers nonetheless threatened to execute the warrant. See id. This prompted Waide
to confess that he may have marijuana in the apartment, which, in turn, led to an
inspection of his car where marijuana was also found. See id. The officers’ threat to
execute the warrant also caused Waide’s mother and his cousin to try to destroy
evidence inside the apartment. See id. at 334. In response, the officers obtained a key
from Waide and entered the apartment; when they did, they found sinks clogged with
a “white substance.” See id.
As it turned out, the warrant was invalid. Id. at 335.
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In deciding what evidence should be suppressed, the Sixth Circuit examined
what would have happened absent the officers’ attempt to execute an invalid warrant.
The court reasoned that Waide’s mother would not have phoned Waide to return
home, in which case officers would not have inspected his car. See id. at 340. Further,
absent the threat of executing the invalid warrant, Waide would not have confessed
to having marijuana in his apartment, and Waide’s mother and cousin would not have
attempted to destroy the drugs inside the apartment. See id. at 340–41. As such, the
Sixth Circuit found that the drug evidence the officers found as a result of their
threats to execute an invalid warrant should be suppressed. See id. at 343; cf. United
States v. Cooper, 24 F.4th 1086, 1096 (6th Cir. 2022) (framing inevitable-discovery
question as, “[i]f the illegal protective sweep had never happened, would officers have
sought Walton’s consent to search?”).
Here, 	some 	aspects 	of 	the 	“what 	would 	have 	happened?” 	inquiry 	are
straightforward. For instance, had Bryant not been arrested, officers would not have
brought her to the police station, and she would not have been interviewed. In which
case, she would not have admitted to authorities that she had been meeting Willis at
the Littlefield house for years and that, shortly before the search, she had been
staying there several nights a week. (See ECF No. 78-5, PageID.535, 540.) And,
although somewhat less straightforward, it would not be too difficult to excise
Bryant’s interview statements from the Cell-Phone Warrant and then assess the
pared-down affidavit for probable cause. See United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345,
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357–58 (6th Cir. 2005) (removing unlawfully obtained information from affidavit and
reassessing for probable cause).
But without further development of the factual record, important aspects of
how events would have unfolded are unknown. In particular, had Bryant been free to
leave, would officers have searched her purse? And if the answer is “no,” then
(presumably) they would not have discovered the Samsung phone inside of it. In
which case, it becomes entirely unclear whether authorities would have ever searched
that phone. (Bryant’s iPhone might be a different story: officers found that phone in
the 	living 	room 	and, 	had 	Bryant 	never 	claimed 	ownership 	of 	it, 	the 	officers
presumably would have searched the phone under the assumption that it was Willis’.)
The existence of the Littlefield Warrant does not render this inquiry about the
phone in Bryant’s purse moot. The Court is well aware that the government
maintains that independent of the Cell-Phone Warrant, the Littlefield Warrant
permitted the seizure and search of Bryant’s phones. (See ECF No. 96, PageID.713–
14.) Assuming (without deciding) that the government is correct on that point, it at
most establishes that Coletta and his team had authority to seize and search Bryant’s
Samsung phone, i.e., that they could have done so. But “could” is not “would.” The
former depends on the validity and scope of the Littlefield Warrant; the latter
depends on the officers’ intent. Cf. United States v. Siciliano, 578 F.3d 61, 69 (1st Cir.
2009) (providing that whether officers would have sought a warrant absent an
unlawful search is a factual inquiry that turns on the officers’ intent).
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Given that it is unclear whether officers would have searched Bryant’s
Samsung had they not arrested her, and because it appears that phone contained
inculpatory evidence, the prudent approach is to hold a second evidentiary hearing.
Moreover, because the prior evidentiary hearing centered on Bryant’s arrest, a second
hearing would permit exploration of issues specific to her phones.
For the reasons given, Bryant’s motion to suppress fruits of unlawful arrest
(ECF No. 70) is GRANTED. An evidentiary hearing to determine which fruits of the
arrest should be suppressed is set for November 3, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. Additionally,
the parties should be prepared to address (with evidence) whether officers would have
used the Littlefield Warrant to search Bryant’s phones had they not sought or had
they not been granted the Cell-Phone Warrant.
Dated: October 21, 2025
s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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