West v. UnitedHealth Group Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
BRANDON R. WEST
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 25-1436
:
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment
law case is the motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) to dismiss
the 	complaint 	and 	compel 	arbitration 	filed 	by 	Defendants
UnitedHealth 	Group, 	Inc., 	Optum 	Services, 	Inc., 	Melissa 	Kivela,
James Jean-Louis, Eric Yoegel, and Shirell Stratton (collectively,
“Defendants”), (ECF No. 9), and the motion to expedite the Rule 16
scheduling 	conference 	filed 	by 	Plaintiff 	Brandon 	R. 	West
(“Plaintiff”), 	(ECF 	No. 	11). 	The 	issues 	have 	been 	briefed, 	and
the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no 	hearing 	being 	deemed 	necessary. 	Local
Rule 105.6. 	For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss the
complaint 	and 	compel 	arbitration 	will 	be 	granted 	in 	part 	and 	the
motion to expedite the Rule 16 scheduling conference will be denied
as moot.
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I. 	Background1
Pro 	se 	Plaintiff 	Brandon 	West 	is 	a 	U.S. 	Army 	veteran 	with
documented service-connected disabilities, which were disclosed to
his 	employer. 	(ECF 	No. 	1 	¶ 	2). 	In 	June 	2018, 	Plaintiff 	joined
UnitedHealth Group2 as a Sales Implementation Manager. 	(Id. ¶ 1).
He 	received 	an 	offer 	letter 	on 	June 	11, 	2018, 	from 	UnitedHealth
Group, which specified that the offer was to work in a division of
OptumCare. 	(ECF 	No. 	9-4, 	at 	2). 	Underneath 	the 	heading
“Conditions of Your Employment with UnitedHealth Group,” the offer
letter included a paragraph regarding an arbitration provision:
Included within New Employee Connect (powered
by 	Click 	Boarding) 	is 	UnitedHealth 	Group’s
Employment Arbitration Policy. 	The Policy is
a 	binding 	contract 	between 	you 	and
UnitedHealth 	Group 	to 	resolve 	through
arbitration 	all 	covered 	employment-related
disputes that are based on a legal claim, and
mutually 	waive 	the 	right 	to 	a 	trial 	before 	a
judge 	or 	jury 	in 	court 	in 	favor 	of 	final 	and
binding 	arbitration. 	Your 	agreement 	to 	be
bound by the terms of the Policy is a condition
of 	your 	employment. 	You 	will 	be 	required 	to
read and electronically acknowledge in the New
Employee 	Connect 	your 	understanding 	and
acceptance 	of 	the 	Policy. 	Your
1 	All 	facts 	are 	alleged 	in 	the 	complaint 	or 	included 	in
documents supporting the motion to compel arbitration briefing.
2 Plaintiff notes that he was employed by UnitedHealth Group
and 	“Optum.” 	(ECF 	No. 	1, 	at 	4). 	Defendant 	Optum 	Services, 	Inc.
is identified as a “wholly owned subsidiary” of UnitedHealth Group
that operates in Maryland. 	(Id.).
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acknowledgement must be received prior to your
start date.
(Id. 	at 	4). 	Plaintiff 	electronically 	acknowledged 	that 	he 	read
and 	agreed 	to 	the 	Employment 	Arbitration 	Policy 	(“Arbitration
Policy” 	or 	“Policy”) 	on 	June 	13, 	2018. 	(ECF 	No. 	9-3, 	at 	8).
During 	his 	tenure, 	Plaintiff 	“consistently 	received 	favorable
performance evaluations.” 	(ECF No. 1 ¶ 1).
In 	April 	2024, 	Plaintiff 	took 	approved 	Family 	and 	Medical
Leave 	Act 	(“FMLA”) 	leave 	after 	the 	birth 	of 	his 	son. 	(Id. 	¶ 	3).
He 	returned 	to 	work 	on 	July 	22, 	2024, 	under 	a 	half-day
reintegration schedule, and soon transitioned back to a full-time
schedule. 	(Id. ¶ 5). Following his return, Plaintiff was “excluded
from 	partner 	focused 	strategy 	team 	calls, 	senior 	strategy
meetings, 	and 	client 	conversations 	. 	. 	. 	without 	justification.”
(Id. 	¶ 	6). 	Several 	of 	his 	responsibilities 	were 	reassigned, 	and
his requests for clarification about his role and responsibilities
were “denied or ignored by senior leadership.” 	(Id. ¶¶ 7, 8).
On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff met with Defendants Melissa Kivela
and James Jean-Louis to discuss a “previously resolved Corrective
Action 	Plan.” 	(Id. 	¶ 	9). 	At 	the 	time, 	Ms. 	Kivela 	was 	the
Implementation Director of the South Region and Plaintiff’s direct
supervisor, 	(Id. 	at 	4), 	and 	Mr. 	Jean-Louis 	was 	Regional 	Vice
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President 	of 	Sales, 	(Id.).3 	During 	the 	meeting, 	Defendant 	Jean-
Louis 	“emphasized 	heightened 	expectations” 	for 	Plaintiff’s
performance 	following 	his 	leave 	and 	remarked 	“FMLA 	wasn’t
available when I started – I just worked through it.” 	(Id. ¶¶ 10-
11).
Plaintiff 	“remained 	fully 	compliant 	with 	all 	licensure,
communication, 	and 	productivity 	standards,” 	but 	continued 	to 	be
isolated from projects and “decision-making forums.” 	(Id. ¶¶ 13-
14). 	His 	weekly 	meetings 	with 	regional 	leadership 	were
“micromanaged 	by 	[Defendant] 	Kivela 	and 	newly 	assigned 	support
personnel who resided outside the region.” 	(Id. ¶ 15). 	Plaintiff
was the only male employee on Defendant Kivela’s team at this time;
two “similarly situated female colleagues within the same regional
team” had previously taken leave under FMLA but “returned to full
duties without limitation or adverse action.” 	(Id. at ¶¶ 16-17).
On September 17, 2024, fifty-seven days after his return from
FMLA leave, Plaintiff was terminated “without prior written notice
or 	progressive 	discipline.” 	(Id. 	¶¶ 	18-19). 	The 	termination
conversation was led by Defendants Kivela and Jean-Louis, who cited
3 	Plaintiff 	names 	two 	additional 	individual 	defendants 	but
only provides brief allusions to them in his complaint. 	Defendant
Eric 	Yoegel, 	who 	was 	President 	of 	the 	South 	Region, 	“ignored
[Plaintiff]’s requests for support and mentorship.” (ECF No. 1, at
4). 	Defendant Shirell Stratton was the Vice President in the Mid
Atlantic 	Market 	and 	“disregarded 	repeated 	operational 	concerns
raised by [Plaintiff].” 	(Id.).
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“ambiguous 	marketing 	outreach 	supporting 	concerns 	without 	any
supporting documentation of company policy” as the rationale. 	(Id.
¶¶ 20-21). 	Defendants later asserted the termination was based on
“an alleged violation involving a single outbound marketing call.”
(Id. 	¶ 	23). 	According 	to 	Plaintiff, 	“[t]his 	rationale 	was
inconsistent with internal guidance, was never previously cited as
a concern, and emerged only after Plaintiff’s return from protected
leave and disclosure of his [Veterans Affairs] disability rating.”
(Id.). 	He 	adds 	that 	he 	received 	no 	progressive 	discipline 	or
warnings 	related 	to 	the 	call 	before 	his 	termination, 	and 	that
similarly situated employees were not disciplined for “comparable
actions.” 	(Id.).
Plaintiff 	filed 	his 	complaint 	in 	this 	court 	on 	May 	5, 	2025.
(ECF 	No. 	1). 	The 	complaint 	brings 	six 	counts: 	violation 	of 	the
FMLA, 	29 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2615 	(Count 	I), 	violation 	of 	Title 	VII 	of 	the
Civil 	Rights 	Act, 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2000e 	(Count 	II), 	violation 	of 	the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Count
III), 	retaliation 	under 	the 	ADA 	(Count 	IV), 	wrongful 	termination
under Maryland common law (Count V), and pretextual termination in
violation of public policy (Count VI). 	(Id. at 8-9). 	Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration on
June 4, 2025. 	(ECF No. 9). 	The same day, Plaintiff filed a motion
to 	expedite 	the 	Rule 	16 	scheduling 	conference. 	(ECF 	No. 	11).
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Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion to
dismiss and compel arbitration on June 5, 2025, (ECF No. 12), and
Defendants 	filed 	a 	reply 	on 	June 	17, 	2025, 	(ECF 	No. 	14).
Defendants filed a response in opposition to the motion to expedite
the Rule 16 scheduling conference on June 17, 2025, (ECF No. 13),
and Plaintiff did not file a reply.
II. 	Standard of Review
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) governs motions to dismiss for improper
venue. 	Another 	court 	in 	this 	district 	recently 	described 	the
standard 	for 	motions 	under 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	12(b)(3) 	in 	the
arbitration context:
As 	the 	[United 	States 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for
the] 	Fourth 	Circuit 	has 	explained,
“arbitration clauses are enforced in court by
way 	of 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure
12(b)(3) 	motions 	to 	dismiss 	for 	improper
venue. 	In 	considering 	such 	motions, 	courts
may 	examine 	evidence 	outside 	the 	pleadings—
including, 	as 	relevant 	here, 	the 	contract
containing 	the 	applicable 	arbitration
clause.” 	Amos 	v. 	Amazon 	Logistics, 	Inc., 	74
F.4th 	591, 	594 	n.2 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2023). 	Further,
“[a] 	plaintiff 	is 	obliged 	[] 	to 	make 	only 	a
prima 	facie 	showing 	of 	proper 	venue 	in 	order
to 	survive 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss. 	In 	assessing
whether 	there 	has 	been 	a 	prima 	facie 	venue
showing, 	we 	view 	the 	facts 	in 	the 	light 	most
favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff.” 	Aggarao 	v. 	MOL
Ship 	Mgmt. 	Co., 	675 	F.3d 	355, 	366 	(4 th 	Cir.
2012) (citations omitted).
David v. Tesla, 720 F.Supp.3d 390, 395 (D.Md. 2024). 	As indicated
by the fact that courts may consider evidence outside the pleadings
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in 	this 	context, 	“[m]otions 	to 	compel 	arbitration 	exist 	in 	the
netherworld 	between 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	and 	a 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment.” 	Ford 	v. 	Genesis 	Fin. 	Sols., 	Inc., 	726 	F.Supp.3d 	441,
448 (D.Md. 2024) (quoting PC Constr. Co. v. City of Salisbury, 871
F.Supp.2d 	475, 	477–78 	(D.Md. 	2012)), 	aff’d, 	No. 	24-1341, 	2025 	WL
1540933 	(4 th 	Cir. 	May 	30, 	2025). 	Treating 	the 	motion 	to 	compel
under 	the 	summary 	judgment 	standard 	is 	proper 	when 	the 	formation
of 	an 	arbitration 	agreement 	is 	disputed. 	Id.; 	see 	also 	Reed 	v.
LTN Glob. Commc’ns, Inc., No. 24-cv-03649-JRR, 2025 WL 2653196, at
*3 	(D.Md. 	Sep. 	16, 	2025) 	(noting 	that 	arbitration 	clauses 	are
enforced 	by 	way 	of 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	12(b)(3) 	motions 	to 	dismiss, 	but
“where 	there 	are 	issues 	as 	to 	the 	validity 	of 	the 	agreement 	to
arbitrate, 	courts 	analyze 	such 	motions 	under 	a 	summary 	judgment
standard”).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) provides that a court “shall grant summary
judgment 	if 	the 	movant 	shows 	that 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	dispute 	as
to 	any 	material 	fact 	and 	the 	movant 	is 	entitled 	to 	judgment 	as 	a
matter 	of 	law.” 	In 	determining 	whether 	a 	moving 	party 	has 	made
that 	showing, 	a 	court 	must 	consider 	the 	facts 	and 	all 	reasonable
inferences 	drawn 	therefrom 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the
nonmoving 	party. 	Matsushita 	Elec. 	Indus. 	Co. 	v. 	Zenith 	Radio
Corp., 	475 	U.S. 	574, 	587 	(1986). 	A 	material 	fact 	is 	one 	that
“might 	affect 	the 	outcome 	of 	the 	suit 	under 	the 	governing 	law.”
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Anderson 	v. 	Liberty 	Lobby, 	Inc., 	477 	U.S. 	242, 	248 	(1986). 	A
dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such
that 	a 	reasonable 	jury 	could 	return 	a 	verdict 	for 	the 	nonmoving
party.” 	Id. 	In 	applying 	the 	summary 	judgment 	standard 	in 	the
context of compelling arbitration, “the burden is on the defendant
to establish the existence of a binding contract to arbitrate the
dispute.” 	Austin 	v. 	Experian 	Info. 	Sols., 	Inc., 	148 	F.4th 	194,
202 	(4th 	Cir. 	2025) 	(citation 	modified) 	(quoting 	Rowland 	v. 	Sandy
Morris Fin. & Est. Plan. Servs., 	LLC, 993 F.3d 253, 258 (4 th Cir.
2021)).
Plaintiff 	in 	this 	case 	is 	pro 	se. 	Courts 	hold 	pro 	se
pleadings 	to 	“less 	stringent 	standards 	than 	formal 	pleadings
drafted 	by 	lawyers.” 	Erickson 	v. 	Pardus, 	551 	U.S. 	89, 	94 	(2007)
(quoting 	Estelle 	v. 	Gamble, 	429 	U.S. 	97, 	106 	(1976)). 	The 	court
has 	an 	obligation 	to 	construe 	pleadings 	of 	self-represented
litigants 	liberally. 	Id. 	It 	is 	not 	necessary, 	however, 	to
“conjure 	up 	questions 	never 	squarely 	presented,” 	or 	to 	recognize
“obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts
to 	unravel 	them.” 	Beaudett 	v. 	City 	of 	Hampton, 	775 	F.2d 	1274,
1277-78 (4 th Cir. 1985).
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III. Analysis
A. 	Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration
Defendants 	move 	to 	dismiss 	this 	case 	for 	improper 	venue 	and
ask the court to compel arbitration based on the Arbitration Policy
that Plaintiff electronically acknowledged in June 2018. 	(ECF No.
9-1, 	at 	1-2). 	Plaintiff 	counters 	that 	he 	did 	not 	“knowingly 	or
voluntarily agree to arbitration” and procedural unconscionability
invalidates 	the 	Policy. 	(ECF 	No. 	12, 	at 	2-3). 	The 	court 	agrees
with 	Defendants 	that 	the 	Arbitration 	Policy 	is 	valid 	and
enforceable.
1. 	Validity of Arbitration Agreement
Defendants 	seek 	enforcement 	of 	the 	arbitration 	agreement
pursuant 	to 	the 	Federal 	Arbitration 	Act, 	9 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1 	et 	seq.
(“FAA”). 	“The 	FAA 	reflects 	‘a 	liberal 	federal 	policy 	favoring
arbitration 	agreements.’” 	Adkins 	v. 	Lab. 	Ready, 	Inc., 	303 	F.3d
496, 	500 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2002) 	(quoting 	Moses 	H. 	Cone 	Mem’l 	Hosp. 	v.
Mercury 	Constr. 	Corp., 	460 	U.S. 	1, 	24 	(1983)). 	An 	arbitration
agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds 	as 	exist 	at 	law 	or 	in 	equity 	for 	the 	revocation 	of 	any
contract.” 	9 U.S.C. § 2. 	In considering whether an agreement to
arbitrate 	is 	enforceable, 	courts 	must 	be 	“mindful 	of 	the 	FAA’s
purpose 	‘to 	reverse 	the 	longstanding 	judicial 	hostility 	to
arbitration 	agreements 	. 	. 	. 	and 	to 	place 	arbitration 	agreements
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upon the same footing as other contracts.’” 	Green Tree Fin. Corp.-
Ala. 	v. 	Randolph, 	531 	U.S. 	79, 	89 	(2000) 	(quoting 	Gilmer 	v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
Before determining if arbitration can be compelled, the court
must decide whether a valid arbitration provision exists. 	Section
4 	of 	the 	FAA 	“requires 	that 	the 	district 	court—rather 	than 	an
arbitrator—decide whether the parties have formed an agreement to
arbitrate.” 	Berkeley 	Co. 	Sch. 	Dist. 	v. 	Hub 	Int'l 	Ltd., 	944 	F.3d
225, 234 (4 th Cir. 2019). 	“Whether parties have a valid arbitration
agreement 	governing 	a 	dispute 	is 	a 	question 	of 	applicable 	state
contract 	law.” 	David, 	720 	F.Supp.3d 	at 	396 	(quoting 	Adkins, 	303
F.3d 	at 	501). 	Both 	parties 	proceed 	under 	the 	assumption 	that
Maryland law applies, (ECF Nos. 9-1, at 9-10; 12, at 2); thus, the
court will apply Maryland law.
“To be binding and enforceable, contracts ordinarily require
consideration.” 	Cheek v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atl., Inc., 378
Md. 	139, 	147 	(2003). 	Under 	Maryland 	law, 	the 	“[forbearance] 	to
exercise a right or pursue a claim” can be sufficient consideration
for an agreement. 	Id. at 148. 	(quoting Chernick v. Chernick, 327
Md. 	470, 	480 	(1992)). 	The 	Arbitration 	Policy 	shows 	that 	both
UnitedHealth 	Group 	and 	Plaintiff 	have 	foregone 	their 	right 	to
pursue employment-related claims in court:
This 	Policy 	creates 	a 	contract 	between
UnitedHealth Group and employee requiring both
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parties 	to 	resolve 	employment-related
disputes (except the excluded disputes listed
below) that are based on a legal claim through
final and binding arbitration. 	Arbitration is
the exclusive forum for the resolution of such
disputes, and the parties mutually waive their
right 	to 	a 	trial 	before 	a 	judge 	or 	jury 	in
federal or state court in favor of arbitration
under the Policy.
(ECF 	No. 	9-3, 	at 	3). 	This 	“mutual 	exchange 	of 	promises 	to
arbitrate constitutes valid consideration.” 	David, 720 F.Supp.3d
at 396 (citing Cheek, 378 Md. at 153). 	The Arbitration Policy is
supported by consideration.
Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	(1) 	the 	Arbitration 	Policy 	is
unenforceable because he did not “knowingly or voluntarily agree”
to 	arbitration, 	and 	(2) 	procedural 	unconscionability 	invalidates
the Policy. 	Both arguments fail.
In 	support 	for 	his 	argument 	that 	he 	did 	not 	knowingly 	or
voluntarily 	agree 	to 	arbitration, 	Plaintiff 	states 	that 	the
Arbitration Policy was “neither presented as a distinct agreement
nor acknowledged by Plaintiff in any standalone fashion,” because
it 	was 	presented 	as 	part 	of 	a 	click-through 	“Employee 	Handbook.”
(ECF 	No. 	12, 	at 	2-3). 	The 	record 	supports 	neither 	contention.
The Arbitration Policy submitted as part of Defendants’ motion to
dismiss shows Plaintiff electronically acknowledged the Policy “in
a 	standalone 	fashion.” 	(ECF 	No. 	9-3, 	at 	8). 	The 	Policy 	states
“By selecting the ‘I have read and agree to the above’ button, you
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are 	signing 	this 	agreement 	electronically. 	You 	agree 	that 	your
electronic 	signature 	is 	the 	legal 	equivalent 	of 	your 	manual
signature on this Agreement.” 	(Id.). 	According to the document,
Plaintiff signed the document electronically on June 13, 2018, two
days after receiving his offer letter. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff has not
disputed that the electronic signature is valid. 	Such electronic
signatures, including as part of a longer onboarding process, have
been 	held 	to 	establish 	that 	an 	individual 	signed 	an 	arbitration
agreement. 	See Mason v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, No. 20-cv-1908-DLB,
2021 WL 4820520, at *5 (D.Md. Oct. 15, 2021).
Plaintiff provides a screenshot of the email with the click-
through 	onboarding 	documents 	he 	received, 	which 	he 	contends
“underscores 	that 	no 	standalone 	arbitration 	clause 	was 	presented
or 	referenced 	during 	the 	process.” 	(ECF 	No. 	12, 	at 	3). 	But 	a
review of the screenshot shows that one of the modules is clearly
labeled “Arbitration Agreement,” showing that even the overview of
the 	onboarding 	documents 	flagged 	that 	there 	was 	an 	Arbitration
Policy. 	(ECF 	No. 	12-3, 	at 	2). 	He 	also 	contends 	that 	“no
opportunity 	was 	given 	to 	consult 	legal 	counsel 	before
acknowledging 	the 	content.” 	(ECF 	No. 	12, 	at 	3). 	Plaintiff
received 	his 	offer 	letter 	on 	June 	11, 	2024, 	which 	included 	a
paragraph notifying him of the Arbitration Policy. 	(ECF No. 9-4,
at 	2-4). 	Plaintiff 	signed 	the 	arbitration 	policy 	electronically
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two days later. 	(ECF No. 9-3, at 8). 	Plaintiff’s email containing
the onboarding materials is dated June 15, 2018 – four days after
he 	received 	the 	offer 	letter.4 	(ECF 	No. 	12-3, 	at 	2). 	Plaintiff
certainly 	had 	the 	opportunity 	to 	consult 	legal 	counsel 	if 	he
wished. 	Finally, Plaintiff notes that the Arbitration Policy had
a “take-it-or-leave-it” design. 	(ECF No. 12, at 3). 	But this is
not dispositive either:
“even 	a 	take-it-or-leave 	it 	proposition, 	by
itself, 	does 	not 	establish 	procedural
unconscionability.” 	Randolph[ 	v. 	RRR 	Bowie,
LLC., No. 22-cv-2150-PX], 2023 WL 7110516, at
*4[ (D.Md. Oct. 27, 2023)]. 	Even contracts of
adhesion—those 	“drafted 	unilaterally 	by 	the
dominant party and then presented on a ‘take-
it-or-leave-it’ 	basis”—are 	only
unconscionable 	if 	“the 	terms 	in 	the
arbitration 	clause 	are 	so 	one-sided 	as 	to
oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party
or [where] there exists an egregious imbalance
in 	the 	obligations 	and 	rights 	imposed 	by 	the
arbitration 	clause.” 	Walther 	v. 	Sovereign
Bank, 386 Md. 412, [431] (2005). 	There is no
such imbalance here, where both Plaintiff and
4 The record does not explain why the screenshot of the email
containing the onboarding materials, (ECF No. 12-3, at 2), is dated
two 	days 	after 	Plaintiff 	signed 	the 	Arbitration 	Policy, 	(ECF 	No.
9-3, at 8). 	Above the onboarding module is the sentence “This is
the 	final 	step 	in 	our 	New 	Employee 	Connect 	process 	you 	will 	need
to complete prior to your first day.” 	(ECF No. 12-3, at 2). 	This
could 	imply 	that 	the 	onboarding 	materials 	were 	completed 	in
multiple batches, but neither party explains.
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[employer] 	bound 	themselves 	to 	arbitrate 	all
employment-related disputes[.]
David, 	720 	F.Supp.3d 	at 	397-98. 	As 	in 	David, 	both 	parties 	have
bound 	themselves 	to 	arbitration, 	meaning 	there 	is 	no 	egregious
imbalance.
Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	rushed 	process 	for 	reviewing 	his
onboarding 	documents 	rises 	to 	the 	level 	of 	procedural
unconscionability. 	(ECF 	No. 	12, 	at 	3). 	Specifically, 	he 	states
that 	“the 	onboarding 	process 	was 	compressed 	into 	a 	one-hour
period,” 	which 	did 	not 	provide 	sufficient 	time 	to 	negotiate 	or
meaningfully understand the documents.5 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff provides
a 	declaration, 	where 	he 	says 	he 	was 	“instructed 	to 	complete 	all
orientation materials through an electronic portal within a single
one-hour 	session. 	No 	alternative 	options 	or 	extended 	time 	were
made 	available.” 	(ECF 	No. 	12-1, 	at 	2). 	In 	support, 	he 	cites 	to
the 	same 	screenshot 	of 	the 	email 	with 	the 	onboarding 	documents
5 	Plaintiff 	also 	attaches 	an 	email 	chain 	which 	he 	argues
“confirms 	that 	Optum 	personnel 	characterized 	the 	process 	as
‘cumbersome’ and not suitable for adequate review.” 	(ECF No. 12,
at 	3). 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	the 	exhibit 	actually 	reflects 	that
a particular form that Plaintiff had to fill out was “cumbersome.”
(ECF No. 14, at 7 n.1). 	A review of the email chain, (ECF No. 12-
2), 	shows 	another 	employee 	saying 	“Please. 	. 	. 	complete 	the
attached 	document 	and 	send 	it 	back 	to 	me 	ASAP.” 	(Id. 	at 	2). 	A
single 	document 	is 	attached, 	titled 	“BWest 	IRF 	needs
completion.pdf.” 	(Id. at 3). 	When Plaintiff acknowledges that he
will 	fill 	out 	the 	form, 	the 	employee 	responds 	“Great. 	Call 	me 	if
you need help, it’s a bit cumbersome.” 	(Id. at 4). 	This does not
support Plaintiff’s contention that Optum characterized the entire
onboarding process as “cumbersome.”
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saying 	it 	“support[s] 	my 	assertion 	that 	newly 	hired 	employees. 	.
. 	were 	given 	only 	a 	one-hour 	period 	to 	complete 	a 	multi-layered,
complex 	set 	of 	onboarding 	documents,” 	with 	“no 	mention 	of 	an
individual 	arbitration 	agreement 	or 	waiver 	page.” 	(Id. 	at 	3).
His 	attachment 	contradicts 	both 	contentions. 	The 	only 	reference
to 	a 	time 	period 	in 	the 	email 	is 	above 	the 	three 	categories 	of
modules, which provide an “Estimated Time” range of 15-20 minutes
or 20-25 minutes, (ECF No. 12-3, at 2). This does not support his
contention 	of 	a 	mandatory 	one-hour 	period 	to 	complete 	the
documents. 	As discussed above, the screenshot also clearly shows
that 	“Arbitration 	Agreement” 	is 	listed 	in 	the 	overview 	as 	one 	of
the 	documents 	he 	needs 	to 	complete. 	Plaintiff’s 	exhibit
contradicts his declaration, and “inconsistencies are insufficient
to 	sustain 	a 	genuine 	dispute 	of 	material 	fact.” 	Future 	Field
Sols., 	LLC 	v. 	Van 	Norstrand, 	No. 	23-cv-1301-DKC, 	2026 	WL 	183522,
at *25 (D.Md. Jan. 23, 2026) (citing Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736
F.2d 946, 960 (4 th Cir. 1984)).
Even assuming his contention about only receiving an hour to
complete 	his 	onboarding 	paperwork 	is 	accurate, 	Plaintiff 	has 	not
shown 	procedural 	unconscionability. 	Plaintiff 	received 	clear
notice 	of 	the 	Arbitration 	Policy 	in 	his 	offer 	letter 	two 	days
before 	he 	electronically 	signed 	the 	Arbitration 	Policy. 	The
reference 	to 	the 	Arbitration 	Policy 	within 	the 	offer 	letter 	is 	a
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16
single paragraph under the heading “Conditions of Your Employment
with UnitedHealth Group,” and the entire offer letter is only four
pages long. 	Under these circumstances, the Arbitration Policy was
not procedurally unconscionable. 	The situation is akin to that in
David, 	where 	the 	plaintiff 	argued 	that 	he “was 	not 	provided
adequate time nor guidance to review the complex contractual terms
[of an arbitration provision].” 	David, 720 F.Supp.3d at 398. 	The
court 	declined 	to 	find 	the 	arbitration 	provision 	unconscionable
because “[h]is argument is belied by the Offer Letter itself: the
language is not particularly complex, the Offer Letter spans fewer
than 	four 	pages, 	and 	the 	portion 	relating 	to 	arbitration 	spans
only 	about 	one.” 	(Id.). 	The 	same 	analysis 	controls 	here. 	The
Arbitration Policy is valid and not unconscionable.
2. 	Compelling Arbitration
The next step is to decide whether compelling arbitration is
appropriate in this case.
In 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit, 	a 	litigant 	can 	compel
arbitration 	under 	the 	FAA 	if 	he 	can
demonstrate 	“(1) 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	dispute
between 	the 	parties, 	(2) 	a 	written 	agreement
that 	includes 	an 	arbitration provision 	which
purports 	to 	cover 	the 	dispute, 	(3) 	the
relationship 	of 	the 	transaction, 	which 	is
evidenced 	by 	the 	agreement, 	to 	interstate 	or
foreign commerce, and (4) the failure, neglect
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or refusal of the [litigant] to arbitrate the
dispute.”
Adkins, 	303 	F.3d 	at 	500-01 	(quoting 	Whiteside 	v. 	Teltech 	Corp.,
940 F.2d 99, 102 (4 th Cir. 1991)).
Factors one, three, and four can be dispensed quickly. 	There
is 	clearly 	a 	dispute 	between 	the 	parties, 	satisfying 	the 	first
factor. 	UnitedHealth 	Group 	argues 	that 	this 	dispute 	implicates
interstate 	commerce, 	the 	third 	factor, 	for 	two 	reasons:
“UnitedHealth 	Group 	and 	Optum 	have 	their 	principal 	places 	of
business 	in 	Minnesota, 	while 	Plaintiff 	worked 	in 	Maryland.
Additionally, Plaintiff has alleged claims against all Defendants
under 	the 	FMLA, 	Title 	VII, 	and 	the 	ADA, 	which 	are 	all 	federal
statutes 	and 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	Congress’s 	commerce-clause
power.” 	(ECF No. 9-1, at 11). 	Plaintiff does not dispute either
ground, and the interstate commerce factor is satisfied. 	See Rota-
McLarty 	v. 	Santander 	Consumer 	USA, 	Inc., 	700 	F.3d 	690, 	697 	(4 th
Cir. 2012) (noting that the reach of the FAA is broad and enforcing
an 	arbitration 	provision 	included 	in 	‘a 	contract 	evidencing 	a
transaction involving commerce’” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)). 	Finally,
Plaintiff does not dispute that he refused to arbitrate his claims,
(ECF No. 9-1, at 11), satisfying the fourth element.
The only element remaining is the second element, “a written
agreement that includes an arbitration provision which purports to
cover the dispute.” 	Adkins, 303 F.3d at 500-01. 	Because the court
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18
already determined that the Arbitration Policy is a valid written
agreement, 	the 	only 	remaining 	question 	is 	whether 	it 	purports 	to
cover the dispute. 	As relevant here, the scope of the Arbitration
Policy expressly includes:
[T]ort 	claims, 	common 	law 	claims; 	equitable
claims; 	claims 	for 	discrimination 	and
harassment; retaliation claims; and claims for
violation 	of 	any 	federal, 	state 	or 	other
governmental 	law, 	statute, 	regulation 	or
ordinance, except claims excluded below.
(ECF 	No. 	9-3, 	at 	3). 	Each 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	is 	covered 	by
this language. 	His complaint includes four “claims for violation
of 	[a] 	federal. 	. 	. 	law” 	under 	the 	FMLA 	(Count 	I), 	Title 	VII 	of
the 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	(Count 	II), 	and 	ADA 	(Counts 	III, 	IV). 	One
count, “Wrongful Termination under Maryland Common Law” (Count V),
is 	a 	common 	law 	claim. 	The 	final 	count, 	“Pretextual 	Termination
in 	Violation 	of 	Public 	Policy” 	(Count 	VI), 	states 	it 	arises 	from
“federal 	and 	state 	employment 	protections,” 	which 	are 	also
contemplated 	by 	this 	clause. 	Further, 	none 	of 	these 	claims 	is
included within the scope of the Arbitration Policy’s exclusions:
Claims 	excluded 	from 	mandatory 	arbitration
under the Policy are (i) Workers’ Compensation
benefit 	claims 	(but 	workers’ 	compensation
discrimination 	and/or 	retaliation 	claims 	are
covered); 	(ii) 	state 	unemployment 	or
disability 	insurance 	compensation 	claims;
(iii) claims for severance benefits under the
UnitedHealth 	Group 	Severance 	Pay 	Plan; 	(iv)
claims for benefits under UnitedHealth Group’s
other 	ERISA 	benefit 	plans; 	(v) 	claims 	for
benefits 	under 	UnitedHealth 	Group’s 	Short-
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19
Term Disability Plan; (vi) claims that may not
be 	the 	subject 	of 	a 	mandatory 	arbitration
agreement 	as 	provided 	by 	Section 	8116 	of 	the
Department 	of 	Defense 	(“DoD”) 	Appropriations
Act 	for 	Fiscal 	Year 	2010 	(Pub. 	L. 	111-118),
Section 	8102 	of 	the 	Department 	of 	Defense
(“DoD”) 	Appropriations 	Act 	for 	Fiscal 	Year
2011 	(Pub. 	L. 	112-10, 	Division 	A), 	and 	their
implementing regulations, or any successor DoD
appropriations 	act 	addressing 	the
arbitrability of claims; and (vii) claims that
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection 	Act 	or 	other 	controlling 	federal
law 	bars 	from 	the 	coverage 	of 	mandatory 	pre-
dispute arbitration agreements.
(ECF No. 9-3, at 3). 	All of Plaintiff’s claims are clearly within
the scope of the Arbitration Policy, satisfying the final factor.
The court will compel arbitration.
3. 	Non-Signatory Defendants
The 	court 	must 	next 	address 	whether 	the 	non-signatory
Defendants 	can 	enforce 	the 	Arbitration 	Policy 	against 	the
Plaintiff. 	Defendants argue that the non-signatories can enforce
the Policy, (ECF No. 9-1, at 7), which Plaintiff does not dispute.
Judge Bredar previously described the appropriate test:
“Well-established 	common 	law 	principles
dictate 	that 	in 	an 	appropriate 	case 	a
nonsignatory 	can 	enforce. 	. 	. 	an 	arbitration
provision within a contract executed by other
parties.” 	Int'l 	Paper 	Co. 	v. 	Schwabedissen
Maschinen 	& 	Anlagen 	GMBH, 	206 	F.3d 	411, 	416–
17 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2000). 	As 	is 	relevant 	here, 	the
Fourth Circuit has explained that the
[A]pplication 	of 	equitable 	estoppel 	is
warranted 	when 	the 	signatory 	to 	the
contract 	containing 	the 	arbitration
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20
clause 	raises 	allegations 	of
substantially 	interdependent 	and
concerted 	misconduct 	by 	both 	the
nonsignatory 	and 	one 	or 	more 	of 	the
signatories to the contract. 	Otherwise,
the arbitration proceedings [between the
two 	signatories] 	would 	be 	rendered
meaningless 	and 	the 	federal 	policy 	in
favor 	of 	arbitration 	effectively
thwarted.
Brantley v. Republic Mortg. Ins. Co., 424 F.3d
392, 	396 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2005) 	(quoting 	MS 	Dealer
Serv. 	Corp. 	v. 	Franklin, 	177 	F.3d 	942, 	947
(11 th 	Cir. 	1999)) 	(alterations 	and 	quotations
omitted). 	The 	Fourth 	Circuit 	has 	explained
that, while there need not be “allegations of
collusion[,] . . . at a minimum, there must be
allegations of coordinated behavior between a
signatory 	and 	a 	nonsignatory 	defendant, 	and
that the claims against both the signatory and
nonsignatory 	defendants 	must 	be 	based 	on 	the
same 	facts, 	be 	inherently 	inseparable, 	and
fall 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	the 	arbitration
clause.” 	Aggarao[], 	675 	F.3d 	[at] 	374[]
(citation, 	quotations, 	and 	alterations
omitted).
David, 720 F.Supp.3d at 399.
Plaintiff’s 	offer 	letter 	was 	signed 	by 	Marybeth 	O’Connor,
(ECF 	No. 	9-4, 	at 	5), 	and 	printed 	on 	letterhead 	reading
“UnitedHealth 	Group,” 	(Id. 	at 	2). 	While 	UnitedHealth 	Group 	is 	a
defendant 	in 	this 	case, 	Marybeth 	O’Connor 	is 	not. 	UnitedHealth
Group 	is 	a 	signatory 	to 	the 	agreement. 	See 	David, 	720 	F.Supp.3d
at 	399 	(assuming 	the 	corporate 	employer 	was 	a 	signatory 	to 	the
arbitration 	provision 	when 	the 	offer 	letter 	named 	the 	corporate
defendant). 	As 	Defendants 	point 	out 	in 	their 	motion, 	“the
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21
Arbitration 	Policy 	specifies 	that 	the 	parties 	to 	the 	agreement
include[] UnitedHealth Group’s subsidiaries.” 	(ECF No. 9-1, at 8
n.3). 	Both 	parties 	agree 	that 	Defendant 	Optum 	Services, 	Inc. 	is
a subsidiary of UnitedHealth Group, (Id.; ECF No. 1, at 4). 	Thus,
Optum Services, Inc. is also a signatory to the Arbitration Policy.
That leaves the remaining Defendants - Melissa Kivela, James
Jean-Louis, 	Eric 	Yoegel, 	and 	Shirell 	Stratton 	– 	as 	non-
signatories. 	The 	court 	finds 	that 	all 	may 	compel 	arbitration.
“Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	the 	non-signatories 	and 	[the
signatories] are virtually indistinguishable and are based on the
same facts.” 	David, 720 F.Supp.3d at 399. Plaintiff does not bring
each 	claim 	against 	specific 	Defendants, 	(ECF 	No. 	1, 	at 	8-9), 	and
bases each claim on the same set of facts involving all Defendants.
Additionally, 	courts 	in 	this 	district 	have 	allowed 	non-signatory
employees to enforce an arbitration clause “when the non-signatory
party 	is 	an 	employee 	of 	the 	signatory 	corporation 	and 	the
underlying 	action 	in 	the 	dispute 	was 	undertaken 	in 	the 	course 	of
the 	employee’s 	employment.” 	Dennie 	v. 	MedImmune, 	Inc., 	No. 	16-
cv-3643-PX, 2017 WL 2930462, at *4 (D.Md. July 10, 2017) (quoting
Grand Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 748 F.3d 1, 11 (1 st
Cir. 	2014)); 	see 	also 	David, 	720 	F.Supp.3d 	at 	399. 	The 	non-
signatories 	may 	enforce 	the 	Arbitration 	Policy 	against 	the
Plaintiff.
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4. 	Rule 56(d) Discovery
In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff requests
in 	the 	alternative 	that 	the 	court 	grant 	“limited 	discovery 	under
Rule 	56(d) 	to 	explore 	the 	nature 	and 	structure 	of 	the 	onboarding
system, 	policy 	delivery, 	employee 	knowledge, 	and 	arbitration
clause visibility.” 	(ECF No. 12, at 4). 	Under Rule 56(d), “[i]f
a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, 	it 	cannot 	present 	facts 	essential 	to 	justify 	its
opposition, the court may . . . allow time to obtain affidavits or
declarations 	or 	to 	take 	discovery.” 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	56(d)(2).
According 	to 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit, 	“a 	court 	may 	deny 	a 	Rule 	56(d)
motion 	‘when 	the 	information 	sought 	would 	not 	by 	itself 	create 	a
genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact 	sufficient 	for 	the 	nonmovant 	to
survive summary judgment.’” 	Hodgin v. UTC Fire & Sec. Ams. Corp.,
885 	F.3d 	243, 	250 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2018) 	(quoting 	Pisano 	v. 	Strach, 	743
F.3d 927, 931 (4 th Cir. 2014)).
The 	record 	is 	clear 	that 	Plaintiff 	signed 	the 	Arbitration
Policy 	two 	days 	after 	receiving 	his 	offer 	letter, 	which 	clearly
called 	out 	the 	Arbitration 	Policy 	he 	would 	be 	expected 	to 	sign.
Plaintiff’s own exhibit showing the onboarding system prominently
identified 	an 	“Arbitration 	Agreement” 	in 	the 	overview 	of 	the
documents. 	(ECF No. 12-3, at 2). 	Plaintiff cannot show that any
additional 	information 	about 	the 	“onboarding 	system, 	policy
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23
delivery, 	employee 	knowledge, 	and 	arbitration 	clause 	visibility”
would create a genuine issue of material fact. 	Plaintiff’s request
for discovery under Rule 56(d) will be denied.
5. 	Appropriate Remedy
Defendants 	have 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	and 	specifically 	ask 	this
court to dismiss without prejudice pending arbitration. 	(ECF No.
9-1, 	at 	12). 	Courts 	in 	this 	district 	have 	used 	their 	discretion
to stay the action, however, during the pendency of the arbitration
rather than dismiss the action without prejudice. 	See Reed, 2025
WL 2653196, at *11; Miranda Sorto v. Carrols LLC, No. 23-cv-2263-
DKC, 	2024 	WL 	2783906, 	at 	*8 	(D.Md. 	May 	30, 	2024). 	In 	Smith 	v.
Spizzirri, 	601 	U.S. 	472 	(2024), 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of 	the 	United
States 	held 	that 	“[w]hen 	a 	federal 	court 	finds 	that 	a 	dispute 	is
subject 	to 	arbitration, 	and 	a 	party 	has 	requested 	a 	stay 	of 	the
court 	proceeding 	pending 	arbitration, 	the 	court 	does 	not 	have
discretion 	to 	dismiss 	the 	suit 	on 	the 	basis 	that 	all 	the 	claims
are 	subject 	to 	arbitration.” 	Id. 	at 	475-76. 	While 	the 	Fourth
Circuit clarified that the case does not state anything about “what
happens 	when 	the 	appealing 	party 	never 	requests 	a 	stay,” 	Mod.
Perfection, 	LLC 	v. 	Bank 	of 	Am., 	N.A., 	126 	F.4th 	235, 	243–44 	(4 th
Cir. 	2025), 	the 	court 	will 	exercise 	the 	discretion 	to 	stay 	the
case. 	As 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	stated 	in 	Smith, 	a 	stay 	pending
arbitration 	appears 	to 	better 	align 	with 	Congress’ 	intention 	in
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24
the 	FAA: 	“[i]f 	a 	district 	court 	dismisses 	a 	suit 	subject 	to
arbitration 	even 	when 	a 	party 	requests 	a 	stay, 	that 	dismissal
triggers the right to an immediate appeal where Congress sought to
forbid such an appeal.” 	Smith, 601 U.S. at 478.
B. 	Motion to Expedite Scheduling Conference
Because the court will grant the motion to compel arbitration,
Plaintiff’s 	motion 	to 	expedite 	the 	scheduling 	conference 	will 	be
denied as moot.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss and
compel arbitration will be granted in part and Plaintiff’s motion
to 	expedite 	the 	scheduling 	conference 	will 	be 	denied 	as 	moot. 	A
separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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