United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development v. Bryant et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
Plaintiff/Substitute Trustee,
v. 	Civil No.: 8:25-cv-00523-JRR
DONNA V. BRYANT, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss, and in the Alternative, For
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 12, the “Motion.”) The court has reviewed all papers; no hearing
is necessary. 	Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). 	For the reasons set forth below, the Motion,
construed as a motion to dismiss, will be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff, the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”),
initiated the underlying action by filing a “Complaint [for] Notice of Default and Foreclosure Sale”
(the “Notice”) in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland (Case No. C-16-JG-24-
013191) on October 1, 2024, against Defendant Donna V. Bryant. 	(ECF No. 8-2 at p. 1.)2
According to the Notice, a Deed of Trust was executed by Defendant Donna V. Bryant in favor of
Generation Mortgage Company as Beneficiary, and Micasa Title Group, LLC, as Trustee on
1 For purposes of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pled facts set forth in the
Complaint. (ECF No. 4.) Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017).
2 The court may take judicial notice of matters in the public record and publicly available information on state and
federal government websites. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d 602,
611 (D. Md. 2011) (quoting Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009)); United States v.
Garcia, 855 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 2017).
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January 11, 2010, for the subject property located at 8112 Alcoa Drive, Fort Washington, MD
20744 (the “Property”). Id. at p. 7. 	On March 19, 2019, the Deed of Trust was assigned to HUD
and subsequently recorded on March 20, 2019, in the office of the Land Records of Prince
George’s County, Maryland. Id. The Notice stated that a default had occurred because a payment
due on July 22, 2024, was not made and remained unpaid as of the date of the Notice, the
“Borrower” Defendant Bryant had died, the Property was “not the principal residence of at least
one surviving Borrower, and no payment ha[d] been made sufficient to restore the loan to
currency[.]” Id.
Accordingly, HUD initiated foreclosure proceedings pursuant to the Single Family
Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. § 3751, et seq. (ECF No. 8-2 at p. 7.) 12 U.S.C. §
3758 sets forth the requirements for service of notice of a foreclosure sale, “notwithstanding any
notice requirements of any State or local law.” Pursuant to Maryland Rule 12-102, HUD filed a
lis pendens action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Maryland by filing the Notice.
(ECF No. 8-2.)
On October 25, 2024, pro se Defendant Bryant-Stewart filed a Motion to Intervene (ECF
No. 83 at pp. 1–4) in the state court action as the personal representative for the Estate of Donna
V. Bryant, which the court subsequently granted on November 14, 2024. (ECF No. 8-5 at pp. 1–
2.) On December 9, 2024, Ms. Bryant-Stewart filed a “Compliant [sic] to Quite Title” (ECF No.
4; the “Complaint”) against HUD in the same state court action, which the court construes as a
quiet title claim against HUD. 	(ECF No. 4.) 	Ms. Bryant-Stewart’s Complaint was filed in the
same state court action and was not assigned a new or different case number.
The Complaint asserts Ms. Bryant-Stewart acquired the Property through inheritance and
is “the current holder of legal and equitable title to the [P]roperty.” (ECF No. 4 ¶ 1.) She alleges
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that “[a] cloud exists on the title of the [P]roperty due to an unperfected lien (adverse possession
claim),” which affects her ownership, and HUD “asserts an interest in the property that is adverse
to [her] title.” Id. ¶¶ 4–5. She seeks, inter alia, to halt the foreclosure proceedings3 and to “Quiet
Title” in her favor by declaring her the sole owner of the Property and extinguishing “all adverse
claims, liens, or encumbrances[.]” Id. ¶ 7.
HUD removed the action to this court on February 20, 2025 (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1442(a)(1), and filed the Motion on May 21, 2025. Defendant Bryant-Stewart
did not oppose removal to this court and failed to respond to HUD’s Motion, thus conceding the
arguments presented by HUD.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d)
HUD brings its Motion as a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. “A
motion with this caption implicates the court’s discretion under FED. R. C IV. P. 12(d).” Snyder v.
Md. Dep’t of Transp., No. CCB-21-930, 2022 WL 980395, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2022). Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides, “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” FED. R. C IV. P. 12(d). “Pursuant to Rule 12(d), the
Court has discretion to determine whether to accept evidence outside the pleadings, and thus
convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion.” Coleman v. Calvert Cnty., No. GJH-15-920,
2016 WL 5335477, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 22, 2016) (citations omitted).
3The court notes that in its Motion, HUD states that “[o]n February 11, 2025, a foreclosure sale was held involving
the subject [P]roperty, at which [HUD] submitted the highest bid . . . [and] the deed to the subject [P]roperty was
transferred to HUD.” (ECF No. 12-1 at pp. 4–5.)
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“There are two requirements for a proper Rule 12(d) conversion.” Greater Balt. Ctr. for
Pregnancy Concerns. Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013).
“First, all parties must ‘be given some indication by the court that it is treating the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion as a motion for summary judgment,’ which can be satisfied when a party is aware ‘material
outside the pleadings is before the court.’” Snyder, 2022 WL 980395, at *4 (quoting Gay v. Wall,
761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985)). 	Second, the parties must first “be afforded a reasonable
opportunity for discovery.” Gay, 761 F.2d at 177.
This case is in its infancy and there has been no discovery. In light of the foregoing, and
where, as here, the court need not consider matters outside the pleading, the court declines to
convert the Motion, and will therefore evaluate the Motion as one to dismiss per Rule 12(b)(6).
As such, the court declines to consider the exhibits attached to HUD’s Motion.4 F ED. R. C IV. P.
10(c); Goines v. Valley Comm. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165–166 (4th Cir. 2016).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A motion asserted under Rule 12(b)(6) “test[s] the sufficiency of a complaint;” it does not
“resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”
Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, “a Rule 12(b)(6) motion should only
be granted if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and
drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain
4 In considering the Motion, the court may of course consider “documents integral to and relied upon in the
complaint, . . . so long as the plaintiff does not question their authenticity.” Fairfax v. CBS Corp., 2 F.4th 286, 292
(4th Cir. 2021). 	Here, no party argues, nor does the court discern, that the attached exhibits are integral to the
Complaint. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d. 602, 611 (D. Md.
2011) (explaining that a document is integral to a pleading if “its ‘very existence, and not the mere information it
contains, gives rise to the legal rights asserted’”) (quoting Walker v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 517 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (E.D.
Va. 2007)).
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that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.”
Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244.
“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 	“Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and footnote omitted). “[A] complaint that provides
no more than ‘labels and conclusions,’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action,’ is insufficient.” Bourgeois v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 3d 423, 434 (D. Md. 2014)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	“The [c]ourt must be able to deduce ‘more than the mere
possibility of misconduct’; the facts of the complaint, accepted as true, must demonstrate that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Evans v. 7520 Surratts Rd. Operations, LLC, No. 8:21-CV-01637-
PX, 2021 WL 5326463, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 16, 2021) (quoting Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
126 F. Supp. 3d 521, 526 (D. Md. 2015)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the court is ever mindful that pro se filings “must be construed
liberally, . . . so as to do substantial justice,” and are held to less stringent standards than filings
drafted by lawyers. 	Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Erickson v.
Paradus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); FED. R. C IV. P. 8(f); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
“In practice, this liberal construction allows courts to recognize claims despite various formal
deficiencies, such as incorrect labels or lack of cited legal authority.” Wall v. Rasnick, 42 F.4th
214, 218 (4th Cir. 2022). 	Such liberal construction, however, does not absolve Plaintiff from
pleading a plausible claim, and this court “may not act as an advocate for a self-represented
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litigant” by “conjur[ing] up” issues not presented. 	Desgraviers v. PF-Frederick, LLC, 501 F.
Supp. 3d 348, 351 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting Bey v. Shapiro Brown & Alt, LLP, 997 F. Supp. 2d 310,
314 (D. Md. 2014), aff’d, 584 F. App’x 135 (4th Cir. 2014); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775
F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
A. Propriety of Removal
Given HUD’s designation as Plaintiff in the underlying action, the court first assesses
whether HUD’s removal of this action was proper. In its Notice of Removal, HUD explains that
removal is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, because this matter “appears to be a civil action
of which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or arising under
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,” and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1),
“because the matter is a civil action commenced in a State court and the action is against the United
States.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5–6.)
Federal courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even where the parties do not contest it. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
514 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). Although not
raised by HUD here, the court finds that this action was properly removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1444.5 28 U.S.C. § 1444 provides, “[a]ny action brought under section 2410 of this title against
the United States in any State court may be removed by the United States to the district court of
the United States for the district and division in which the action is pending.” Pursuant to § 2410,
“the United States may be named a party in any civil action or suit in any district court . . . to quiet
5 The court takes judicial notice of HUD’s Response to Order to Show Cause in United States Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development v. Ealy (Case No. 8:25-cv-00528-ABA; ECF No. 18). The facts and procedural posture of
this case mirror those in the Ealy case. There, Judge Abelson ordered the parties to show cause why the case should
not be remanded for lack of federal jurisdiction or untimeliness. Among other arguments, HUD’s response cites 28
U.S.C. § 1444 as a proper basis for removal.
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title to . . . real or personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other
lien.” 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1).
As set forth above, HUD initiated foreclosure proceedings pursuant to the Single Family
Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. § 3751, et seq. Section 3758 of the Act sets forth
the requirements for service of notice of a foreclosure sale, “notwithstanding any notice
requirements of any State or local law.” 12 U.S.C. § 3758. It provides, “[n]ot less than 21 days
before the date of the foreclosure sale, the notice of default and foreclosure sale shall be filed in
the manner authorized for filing a notice of an action concerning real property according to the
law of the State in which the security property is located[.]” 12 U.S.C. § 3758(1). HUD filed the
lis pendens action as to the subject property in accordance with the Maryland Rules.6 The action
merely provides “constructive notice of the pending action as to the subject real property located
in that county.” 	MD. R ULE 12-102(b). 	Here, the pending action was the imminent foreclosure
proceeding initiated by HUD.
Accordingly, the court is satisfied that Ms. Bryant-Stewarts’s Complaint to quiet title
against HUD instituted a separate civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1), although it was filed
in the same state court docket. Despite the caption of the Complaint, the parties’ substantive roles
are reversed. HUD is more appropriately characterized as a defendant and Ms. Bryant-Stewart as
6 Maryland Rule 12-102 provides, “In an action to which the doctrine of lis pendens applies, the filing in the land
records of a county in which real property that is the subject of the action is located of either (1) a certified copy of
the complaint giving rise to the lis pendens or (2) a Notice of Lis Pendens . . . is constructive notice of the pending
action as to the subject real property located in that county.” M D. RULE 12-102(b). The court notes that amendments
to Rule 12-102(b) were adopted by the (then) Maryland Court of Appeals in 2022 and, prior to those amendments,
notice of a lis pendens was effected by the filing of the complaint in the county in which the affected real property
was located. M D. RULE 12-102(b) committee note. HUD appears to have followed the pre-amendment requirements
by filing its Notice in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.
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a plaintiff. Therefore, the court finds the Complaint falls within the scope of § 1444 and the court
has jurisdiction over this action.7
B. HUD’s Motion
HUD argues that the Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “does not meet basic
pleading requirements”, and “[t]here is no statutory authority included to support the one allegation
in the claim, ‘a could exists on the title of the [P]roperty due to an unperfected lien that affects
[Bryant-Stewart’s] ownership.’” (ECF No. 12-1 at p. 8.) As noted previously, Ms. Bryant-Stewart
failed to respond to the Motion and, as such, is deemed to concede HUD’s assertions.
Although a complaint need not contain detailed allegations, the facts alleged must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level; and a complaint must contain “more
than labels and conclusions,” as “‘courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Further, a
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at
570. An adequately stated claim may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint. Id. at 561. Further, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a
pleading that sets forth a claim for relief shall contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief; and
7 The Notice of Removal also raises a question as to timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) because HUD removed
this action more than 30 days after receipt of the Complaint, however, such a defect would be procedural. The Fourth
Circuit has held that “a district court is prohibited from remanding a case sua sponte based on a procedural defect
absent a motion to do so from a party.” Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 2008).
Accordingly, the court will not remand this action for untimeliness, as the parties have not raised the issue.
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(3) a demand for the relief sought.
FED. R. C IV. P. 8(a). Each “allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” FED. R. C IV. P. 8(d)(1).
Importantly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555).
Liberally construing Ms. Bryant-Stewart’s Complaint, the court finds that she attempts to
assert a quiet title claim against HUD. 	With respect to actions affecting property on which the
United States has a mortgage or other lien, “the United States may be named a party in any civil
action or suit in any district court . . . to quiet title.” 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1). Pursuant to the Quiet
Title Act (“QTA”), federal courts “have exclusive original jurisdiction of civil actions under [28
U.S.C. §] 2409a to quiet title to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed
by the United States.”8 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f); see also Block v. N. Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. &
Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983) (holding that “Congress intended the QTA to provide the
exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the United States’ title to real
property.”)
The QTA sets forth its own pleading standard, which requires a complaint to “set forth with
particularly the nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property,
the circumstances under which it was acquired, and the right, title or interest claimed by the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(d). “If the plaintiff does not assert any such right [], the statute cannot
come into play.” Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S.
209, 218 (2012). While the Fourth Circuit has not defined the level of particularity required under
8 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a), “[t]he United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this
section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security
interest or water rights.”
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§ 2409a(d), the Ninth Circuit looks to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and other particularized
pleading standards for guidance, explaining that “particularity generally necessitates a great deal
of specificity[]” and requires a pleading to set forth the relevant circumstances in significant detail
such that a defendant can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations. McMaster v. United
States, 731 F.3d 881, 897–898 (9th Cir. 2013).
Here, the Complaint alleges that Ms. Bryant-Stewart resides at the subject Property, she
acquired “legal and equitable title to the [P]roperty” through inheritance, and asserts that HUD
“may claim” an interest in the Property that is adverse to her title. (ECF No. 4 ¶ 1.) She further
contends that “[a] cloud exists on the title of the property due to an unperfected lien,” which she
describes as an adverse possession claim affecting her ownership. Id. ¶ 4. These allegations are
not sufficiently particularized to state a claim under the QTA’s pleading standard. The Complaint
provides only conclusory statements regarding Ms. Bryant-Stewart’s inheritance of the Property
and offers no facts as to the circumstances under which it was acquired. Moreover, the assertions
regarding HUD’s interest are speculative, referring only to a possibly that HUD “may” claim an
adverse interest in the Property without identifying the nature or the source of such interest. The
vague and conclusory allegations leave HUD without the requisite particularized facts necessary
to defend against or answer the claim to quiet title.
In sum, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the pleading standard of § 2409a(d). 	Therefore, the
Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, by separate order, the Motion (ECF No. 12) shall be
granted.9
/S/
February 6, 2025 	______________________
Julie R. Rubin
United States District Judge
9 Given that the Complaint warrants dismissal on the grounds discussed above, the court need not address HUD’s
argument that the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to properly serve the federal agency under Rule 4(i).
(ECF No. 12-1 at p. 7.)
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