USA v. Quiah

8:25-cr-00074Mdd25 nov 2025

Testo completo

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
CECEIRO A. QUIAH,
Defendant/Appellant, 	pro se.
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Criminal Case No. 25-cr-00074-LKG
Dated: November 25, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	INTRODUCTION
In this matter, the Appellant 	pro se, Ceceiro A. Quiah, appeals his conviction of: (1)
driving with a breath alcohol content of .08% or higher, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(2);
and (2) unsafe operation of a vehicle, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.22(b)(1), following trial held
on February 6, 2025. 	See 	ECF Nos. 1 and 1-4. The appeal is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 5, 9 and
14. For the reasons discussed below, the Court: (1) 	AFFIRMS 	the Appellant’s convictions and
(2) 	DISMISSES 	the appeal.
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Case Overview
As background, on April 26, 2024, the Appellant was arrested by the United States Park
Police (“USPP”) and charged by violation notice with the following four offenses: (1) driving
under the influence of alcohol, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(1); (2) driving with a breath
alcohol content of .08% or higher, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(2); (3) unsafe operation of
a vehicle, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.22(b)(1); and (4) failure to maintain proper control of a
motor vehicle, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.22(b)(3). 	See 	ECF No. 9 at 1; 	see also United States
v. Quiah, CBA-24-po-3764 (ECF Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5). On September 18, 2024, the Appellant
appeared for his initial appearance, during which U.S. Magistrate Judge C. Bruce Anderson
scheduled trial for December 5, 2024. 	See 	United States v. Quiah, CBA-24-po-3764 (ECF Nos.
2 and 8).
On October 9, 2024, Defense counsel entered an appearance in the case and requested
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discovery. 	United States v. Quiah, CBA-24-po-3764 (ECF Nos. 11 and 12). Thereafter,
Defense Counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence on October 30, 2024. 	United States v.
Quiah, CBA-24-po-3764 (ECF No. 13).
On November 21, 2024, the Government filed a consent motion to continue the trial date,
because the arresting officer was scheduled for professional training on the December 5, 2024,
trial date. 	United States v. Quiah, CBA-24-po-3764 (ECF No. 14). The Defense later objected
to this motion for a continuance on November 22, 2024. 	United States v. Quiah, CBA-24-po-
3764 (ECF No. 15).
On November 26, 2024, the Court granted the Government’s motion to continue and
rescheduled the trial date to February 6, 2025. 	United States v. Quiah, CBA-24-po-3764 (ECF
No. 19). On January 22, 2025, the Government filed a response in opposition to the Appellant’s
motion to suppress evidence. 	United States v. Quiah, CBA-24-po-3764 (ECF No. 20).
Prior to commencing the trial, the Magistrate Judge held a hearing on the Appellant’s
motion to suppress. ECF No. 9 at 3. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Magistrate Judge
denied the Appellant’s motion. 	Id.
The Trial
The Court held a bench trial in this matter on February 6, 2025. 	United States v. Quiah,
CBA-24-po-3764 (ECF No. 21). During the trial, the Government presented USPP Officers
Christian Callahan and Shanique Stewart as witnesses. ECF No. 9 at 4.
During the trial, Officer Callahan testified that, on April 26, 2024, he was patrolling the
northbound Baltimore-Washington Parkway (“BW Parkway”) in the area of Powder Mill Road,
when he saw a black Cadillac Escalade enter the ramp to the BW Parkway. Tr. at 10:11-11:20
(ECF No. 9-1). Officer Callahan also testified that he observed the Cadillac swerving to the
extent that it crossed the fog line and nearly struck the concrete wall on the ramp. 	Id. 	at 11:21-
14:16.
In addition, Officer Callahan testified that he continued following the Cadillac
northbound and the vehicle continued to swerve, crossing both the center dotted line and the fog
line multiple times. 	Id. 	at 11:21-16:17. And so, Officer Callahan testified that he activated his
cruiser’s front radar, and it recorded the Cadillac’s speed at 76 miles per hour (“m.p.h.”) in a 55-
m.p.h. zone. 	Id. 	at 11:21-12:1, 25:16-20 and 129:15-19.
Officer Callahan also testified that he activated emergency equipment to initiate a traffic
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stop, after following the vehicle for approximately five miles. 	Id. 	at 16:18-17:21. Officer
Callahan then approached the vehicle on the passenger side, for officer safety, and he made
contact with the driver through the passenger side window. 	Id. 	at 17:22-18:22.
Officer Callahan testified that he smelled an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from
the vehicle and that he observed that the Appellant’s eyes were glassy, the Appellant’s speech
was stumbling and confused and the Appellant was fumbling with documents. 	Id. 	at 18:23-
20:10. Officer Callahan also testified that he identified the Appellant as the driver of the vehicle
based on his Maryland driver’s license. 	Id. 	at 20:11-21:1.
Officer Callahan further testified that he asked the Appellant to step out of the vehicle, to
perform standardized field sobriety tests (“SFSTs”). 	Id. 	at 21:8-10 and 55:12-19. 	In this regard,
Officer Callahan testified that when he walked to the driver’s side of the vehicle to assist the
Appellant in safely exiting the vehicle, he smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming
from the Appellant’s person and again observed the Appellant’s glassy eyes. 	Id. 	at 55:12-56:23.
Officer Callahan also testified that the Appellant was unsteady on his feet and needed to be
assisted to the front of his vehicle. 	Id. 	at 56:3-14. And so, Officer Callahan conducted SFSTs on
an area of the roadside that was paved, dry and smooth. 	Id. 	at 57:1-5.
With regards to the SFSTs administered to the Appellant, Officer Callahan testified that he
started with the horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) test and that the Appellant displayed six out
of six clues indicating intoxication: lack of smooth pursuit in both eyes, distinct and sustained
nystagmus at maximum deviation in both eyes, and onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees
present in both eyes. 	Id. 	at 58:4-61:5. Officer Callahan also testified that the Appellant failed to
follow instructions during the HGN test, by following the officer’s stimulus with his head rather
than his eyes, and at times failing to follow the pen at all. 	Id. 	at 61:2-5.
Officer Callahan testified that he next conducted the walk and turn (“WAT”) test and that
the Appellant exhibited three of eight possible clues. 	Id. 	at 61:6-63:14. Specifically, Officer
Callhan testified that the Appellant missed heel to toe steps, stepped off the line and used his
arms to balance, and that the Appellant had to be instructed multiple times and repeatedly
interrupted him. 	Id. 	at 61:9-62:12 and 67:6-74:11.
Officer Callahan further testified that he next conducted the one leg stand (“OLS”) test,
during which the Appellant displayed two clues, namely, the Defendant swayed while balancing
and put his foot down. 	Id. 	at 63:15-64:18. Officer Callahan also testified that the Appellant kept
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interrupting him with repetitive questions and required multiple demonstrations of the test and
that the Appellant refused to submit to a portable roadside breath test (“RBT”). 	Id. 	at 64:19-65:4
and 74:12-79:11.
Given this, Officer Callahan testified that he believed that the Appellant was under the
influence of alcohol. 	Id. 	at 65:2-11. During the trial, USPP Officer Shanique Stewart also
testified that she also believed the Appellant was under the influence of alcohol. 	Id. 	at 94:14-17.
And so, the Officers placed the Appellant under arrest and transported the Appellant to USPP
District Four Police Station. 	Id. 	at 81:23-82:1 and 101:21-23.
Officer Stewart testified that, once the Appellant arrived at the police station, she
administered a breath test to the Appellant using the Intoximeter EC/IR-II. 	Id. 	at 102:1-19.
Officer Stewart also testified that the Appellant was very uncooperative, questioning everything
and requiring multiple individuals to assist in answering his questions, delaying the procedure
during the breath test. 	Id. at 102:10-16.
In addition, Officer Stewart testified that she was trained and certified in operating the
Intoximeter. 	Id. 	at 102:10-103:11. Officer Stewart further testified that she advised the
Appellant of his 	Miranda 	rights and of the USPP 36 C.F.R.§ 4.23 chemical testing notice, which
establishes implied consent to a breath test where an officer has probable cause to believe an
individual was driving under the influence of alcohol on federal lands. 	Id. 	at 103:12-24.
Officer Stewart further testified that she started a 20-minute observation period of the
Appellant to ensure that the Appellant retained no mouth alcohol during the breath test. 	Id. 	at
104:6-17. In this regard, Officer Stewart testified that the Appellant’s observation period was
restarted once due to the Appellant burping, which may introduce mouth alcohol. 	Id. 	at 104:6-
105:16. Officer Stewart also testified that the second 20-minute observation period was
completed with the Appellant being observed by an officer at all times. 	Id. 	at 106:3-22. And so,
after the second 20-minute observation period, the Appellant blew two valid breath samples into
the Intoximeter, and the instrument recorded his breath alcohol content. 	Id. 	at 106:25-107:13.
Lastly, Officer Stewart testified that the Intoximeter was in proper working order when
the Appellant’s breath test was conducted. 	Id. 	at 107:14-16.
During the trial, the Government introduced into evidence a breath testing instrument
certification notice, which indicates that the Intoximeter used for the Appellant’s breath sample
“has been tested and found to be suitable for use in analyzing breath alcohol for evidential
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purposes” and that “[t]he instrument conforms to the standards required by the United States
Department of Transportation for evidential breath alcohol measurement.” 	Id. 	at 107:17-122:15;
see also 	ECF No. 9-13 (Trial Exhibit 4). The Intoximeter shows the Appellant’s first breath
sample was positive for alcohol at a level of .123 grams per 210 liters of breath. ECF No. 9-14
(Trial Exhibit 5). The Appellant’s second breath sample registered at a level of .119 grams per
210 liters of breath. 	Id.
The Appellant’s Convictions And Sentence
After closing arguments, the Magistrate Judge found the Appellant guilty of driving with
a breath alcohol content of .08 or higher and unsafe operation of a vehicle, and he acquitted the
Appellant of driving under the influence of alcohol and failure to maintain control of a vehicle.
Tr. at 123:22-131:24 (ECF No. 9-1). And so, the Magistrate Judge imposed fines and costs
totaling $380 and 12 months of probation with standard and mandatory conditions of probation,
as well as special conditions, including total abstinence from alcohol, substance abuse testing,
and alcohol abuse treatment. 	Id. 	at 133:20-135:14. Thereafter, the Appellant filed this appeal
pro se 	on March 20, 2025. ECF No. 1.
III. 	STANDARDS OF DECISION
A. 	Standard Of Review
The scope of an appeal of a conviction by a magistrate judge is the same as in an appeal
to a Court of Appeals from a judgment entered by a district judge. Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g)(2)(D).
And so, when conducting an appellate review of a magistrate judge’s judgment of conviction,
this Court “utilizes the same standards of review applied by a court of appeals in assessing a
district court conviction,” rather than conducting a “trial de novo.” 	United States v. Bursey, 416
F.3d 301, 305 (4th Cir. 2005).
In this regard, the Court should not disturb factual findings made by a magistrate judge
after an evidentiary hearing on suppression issues absent clear error. 	United States v. Williams,
808 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). When the magistrate judge has denied a
motion to suppress, the Court “view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.” 	Id. 	at 245 (citing 	United States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 689 (4th Cir. 2013)).
The Fourth Circuit has also held that “[a] district court’s ultimate determination of a reasonable-
suspicion question is assessed de novo.” 	Id. 	at 244 (citing 	United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
275 (2002) and 	Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). In addition, the magistrate
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judge’s admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 	United States v. Hager, 721
F.3d 167, 199 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Lastly, the Court’s review of a magistrate
judge’s decision to grant or deny a continuance is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. 	See
United States v. Clinger, 681 F.2d 221, 223-24 (4th Cir. 1982).
B. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. And so, it is well-established that the temporary detention of individuals during the
stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose,
constitutes a “seizure” of persons within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and must be
reasonable. 	See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); 	United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
It is also well-established that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is not an onerous one.
See, 	e.g., 	United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-75 (2002) (“Because the ‘balance between
the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security,’ . . . tilts in favor of a standard
less than probable cause in brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles, the Fourth
Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that
criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’”) (first quoting 	United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975), then quoting 	United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). To meet this standard,
the officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts,” establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 	Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
In determining whether the stop or prolonged detention was reasonable, courts are
encouraged to “credit[] the practical experience of officers who observe on a daily basis what
transpires on the street.” 	United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 1993); 	accord
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273-74 (permitting “officers to draw on their experiences and specialized
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to
them that might well elude an untrained person”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); 	United
States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d 339, 343-45 (4th Cir. 2010). The Fourth Circuit has also held that
“[o]bserving a traffic violation provides sufficient justification for a police officer to detain the
offending vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic
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stop.” 	United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing 	Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)); 	see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); 	United
States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2005). And so, the Court’s determination of
whether reasonable suspicion justified a stop or detention should be based on the totality of the
circumstances, not giving undue attention to individual factors. 	See, 	e.g., 	Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273
(reaffirming the “totality of the circumstances” standard).
Relevant to the pending appeal, the Court evaluates whether the facts amount to reasonable
suspicion of drunk driving, “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer.” 	Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit held that an officer’s
observations that the defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and was shaking, plus his observation
of an open bottle of alcohol on the rear passenger side floorboard, after a valid traffic stop, were
sufficient to permit an extension of the traffic stop to determine intoxication. 	United States v.
Washington, 338 F. App’x 316, 318-19 (4th Cir. 2009). The Fourth Circuit has also held that
reasonable suspicion existed to justify performing SFSTs where the driver’s “breath smelled like
alcohol, as observed by an officer trained in DUI detection, and that it was 2:15 in the morning
and [the driver] intended to drive onto the [Fort Monroe] base to visit a hotel.” 	United States v.
Turner, No. 95-5606, 1996 WL 85165, at *1 (4th Cir. 1996); 	see also Ferris v. State, 355 Md.
356, 391 (1999) (“Bloodshot eyes, in conjunction with the odor of alcohol emanating from the
person, would ordinarily provide the police with reasonable suspicion that a driver was under the
influence of alcohol.”). And so, this Court has held that “driving conduct alone can establish
reasonable suspicion of impairment . . . to justify a roadside sobriety test.” 	Pulsifer v. Prince,
No. MJM-22-3080, 2024 WL 2783898, at *8 (D. Md. May 30, 2024) (quoting 	Amundsen v.
Jones, 533 F.3d 1192, 1200 n.4 (10th Cir. 2008)).
C. 	Breathalyzer Tests
The Fourth Circuit has “long recognized that a ‘breathalyzer test’ is the ‘best means of
obtaining evidence of . . . breath alcohol content.’” 	United States v. Ahlstrom, 530 F. App’x 232,
238 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting 	United States v. Reid, 929 F.2d 990, 994 (4th Cir. 1991)). In this
regard, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that:
[T]he Intoximeter and its functions were shown to be generally
reliable and accurate. According to the Intoximeter’s attestation
clause, the device “ha[d] been approved by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) as conforming to the model
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specifications for evidential breath alcohol measurement devices.” .
. . NHTSA certification is widely accepted by courts as evidence of
a device’s reliability. 	. . . 	And this is for good reason. The NHTSA,
a unit of the Department of Transportation, has been evaluating
breath alcohol testing devices for evidential use for thirty years. 	. . .
It “provid[es] a centralized qualification test program for breath-
testing devices designed to collect evidence in law enforcement
programs.” . . . Notably, to achieve NHTSA approval, a device must
undergo a rigorous battery of tests, conducted “semi-annually or as
necessary.” 	. . .
Second, evidence was introduced to show that the Intoximeter was
accurately 	calibrated 	at 	the 	time 	the 	test 	was 	administered.
Specifically, the Intoximeter’s attestation clause indicated that the
device had been “certified as accurate within the past 90 days by a
United 	States 	Park 	Police 	technician 	who 	is 	certified 	by 	the
instrument manufacturer to calibrate and conduct accuracy checks.”
. . . Indeed, it had been calibrated on November 14, 2011, less than
two months before it was used for [the Defendant]. . . . Additionally,
Officer Gillespie testified that the Intoximeter is designed to conduct
a self-diagnostic test before use, and will take itself out of operation
if a malfunction is detected. He is well trained in its use, and stated
that the self-diagnostic test did not reveal any problems.
Ahlstrom, 530 F. App’x at 239-40 (citations omitted). In addition, the Fourth Circuit has
observed that “the list of approved devices is published in the Federal Register, 	see, 	e.g.,
Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Alcohol Measurement Devices, 77 Fed.Reg.
35747–01 (June 14, 2012), and subject to judicial notice by this Court.” 	Id. 	at 239 n.5 (citing 44
U.S.C. § 1507 (“The contents of the Federal Register shall be judicially noticed.”)).
D. 	Continuances And Speedy Trial Violations
Lastly, in 	Barker, the Supreme Court established a balancing test to determine whether a
Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation has occurred, pursuant to which the Court weighs the
following four factors: (1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s
assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 	Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 524, 530
(1972). To prevail on a constitutional speedy trial claim, a defendant must establish that “on
balance,” these four factors weigh in his favor. 	See 	United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 148
(4th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has also held that the Court does not need to conduct a
speedy trial inquiry unless the defendant can show “that the interval between accusation and trial
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has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial delay.’”1 	Doggett v.
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992) (quoting 	Barker, 47 U.S. at 530-31). Given this,
“[i]f the delay is not uncommonly long, the inquiry ends there.” 	United States v. Grimmond, 137
F.3d 823, 827–28 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing 	Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 (stating that “by definition, [a
defendant] cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact,
prosecuted his case with customary promptness”)); 	see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (noting that
“[u]ntil there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry
into the other factors that go into the balance”). And so, the Fourth Circuit has held that a delay
of more than one year is “presumptively prejudicial.” 	Grimmond, 137 F.3d at 828.
In addition, the Court must also assess whether the Defendant has actually suffered
prejudice as a result of the delay. When considering the delay’s adverse impact on the defense,
the Court considers: “(1) whether there was an oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) the anxiety
and concern suffered by the accused; and (3) the possibility that the defense was impaired.”
United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 272 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing 	Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). In this
regard, the Defendant must point to specific evidence that affirmatively supports this contention
that his defense was impaired. 	See 	Hall, 551 F.3d at 273 (citing 	Grimmond, 137 F.3d at 830).
And so, a general allegation of prejudice based upon conjecture is an insufficient to establish
actual prejudice. 	See id.
IV. 	ANALYSIS
In this appeal, the Appellant challenges his criminal convictions for driving with a breath
alcohol content of .08 or higher and unsafe operation of a vehicle upon the following three
grounds: (1) the traffic stop at issue in this case was unlawfully extended under 	Rodriguez v.
United States; (2) the breathalyzer test administered to the Appellant “lacked scientific
validation”; and (3) the Government’s request to continue the trial resulted in prejudice to the
Appellant. 	See 	ECF No. 5 at 1-9. And so, the Appellant requests that the Court reverse the
1 	When considering the Government’s reason for a delay, the Court should assign “different weights . . . to
different reasons” and characterize the reasons as either valid, improper or neutral. 	See United States v.
Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 828 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting 	United States v. 	Barker, 407 U.S. 524, 531 (1972)).
In this regard, a deliberate attempt by the prosecution to delay a defendant’s trial to gain a tactical
advantage would constitute an improper reason and weigh heavily against the Government. 	United States
v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 272 (4th Cir. 2009). Reasons for delaying a trial that are neutral include a lack of law
enforcement manpower or government resources. 	See Grimmond, 137 F.3d at 828.
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Magistrate Judge’s findings of guilty on the driving with a breath alcohol content of .08 or higher
and unsafe operation of a vehicle charges, and dismiss these charges with prejudice. 	See id. 	at 9-
10. In the alternative, the Appellant request that the Court remand this matter to the Magistrate
Judge to, among other things, conduct an evidentiary hearing on these issues. 	Id.
The Government counters that the Court should affirm the Appellant’s convictions,
because: (1) Officer Callahan had reasonable articulable suspicion to extend the traffic stop
involving the Appellant’s vehicle and to conduct SFSTs; (2) the Breathalyzer test was properly
administered and admitted into evidence at trial; and (3) the Government’s request for a
continuance did not prejudice the Appellant. ECF No. 9 at 8-23. And so, the Government
requests that the Court affirm the Appellant’s convictions and dismiss this appeal. 	Id. 	at 24.
For the reasons discussed below, a careful review of the evidentiary record in this case
shows that Officer Callahan’s decision to extend the Appellant’s traffic stop and to conduct
SFSTs was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion that the Appellant had been driving
under the influence of alcohol. The evidentiary record also shows that the Magistrate Judge did
not err by admitting the Appellant’s Breathalyzer test results into evidence during the trial below.
The Appellant also has not shown that he was prejudiced by the Government’s request to
continue the trial. And so, the Court: (1) AFFIRMS the Appellant’s convictions and (2)
DISMISSES this appeal.
A. The Trial Delay Did Not Prejudice The Appellant
As an initial matter, the Appellant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the
Government’s successful motion to continue the trial in this matter for 62 days. To determine
whether a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation has occurred in this case due to a continuance,
the Court considers and balances the following four factors: (1) the length of delay; (2) the
reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 524, 530 (1972). And so, to prevail on his Speedy Trial challenge in
this appeal, the Appellant must establish that “on balance,” these four factors weigh in his favor.
United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 148 (4th Cir. 1995).
Relevant to the pending motion, the Court considers the following factors when assessing
a delay’s adverse impact on the defense: “(1) whether there was an oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (2) the anxiety and concern suffered by the accused; and (3) the possibility that the
defense was impaired.” 	United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 272 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing 	Barker,
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407 U.S. at 532). In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has held that a delay between accusation and
trial of more than one year is “presumptively prejudicial.” 	Grimmond, 137 F.3d at 828. A
defendant must point to specific evidence that affirmatively supports this contention that his
defense was impaired. 	See Hall, 551 F.3d at 273 (citing 	United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d
823, 830 (4th Cir. 1998)). And so, a general allegation of prejudice based on conjecture is not
sufficient to establish actual prejudice. 	See id.
In this appeal, the Appellant argues that he was prejudiced by the two-month continuance
of the trial date in this criminal matter, because the Government used the additional time to file
an untimely response to his motion to suppress evidence. 	See 	ECF No. 5 at 8. In this regard, the
Appellant argues that the continuance afforded the Government more time to respond to his
motion to suppress and put him at a disadvantage, because he did not have sufficient time to file
a reply brief before the trial. 	See id. 	And so, the Appellant contends that the Government’s
request for a continuance of the trial date “prolonged the pendency of the charges” brought
against him, and “damaged [his] professional standing, eligibility for federal security clearances,
employment opportunities, and income.” 	Id.
The Appellant’s argument is not persuasive for several reasons. First, the delay of the trial
in this matter extended the case by just 62 days. Notably, the litigation history for this case
shows that the Appellant was prosecuted and ultimately convicted in this case in less than one
year. In fact, the Appellant’s trial concluded approximately 286 days after his April 26, 2024,
arrest. Given this, the delay in this case is not presumptively prejudicial. 	See 	Grimmond, 137
F.3d at 828 (holding that a delay between accusation and trial of more than one year is
“presumptively prejudicial”).
Second, the Appellant fails to show how he was prejudiced by this delay. While the
record evidence substantiates the Appellant’s argument that the Government filed a belated
response in opposition to his motion to suppress, the Appellant does not explain how the
continuance, or this late filing, actually prejudiced his defense. The litigation history of this case
shows that the Defendant neither filed a reply brief in support of his motion to suppress, nor
requested an extension of time to submit such a filing prior to the trial. 	See 	United States v.
Quiah, CBA-24-po-3764 (docket reflecting no such filings). The litigation history also shows
that the Appellant did not object to the filing of the Government’s response during the
proceedings below. 	See id. 	Given this, the Appellant’s claim of prejudice is simply a general
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allegation of prejudice that is based on conjecture and not sufficient to establish actual prejudice
in this case. 	See 	Hall, 551 F.3d at 273.
Lastly, while the Defendant did assert his right to a speedy trial before the Magistrate
Judge granted the continuance, the remaining factor that the Court weighs also does not support a
finding of a speedy trial violation in this case. Notably, the reason given by the Government for
the continuance was that Officer Callahan would be in training on December 5, 2024, and thus,
not available to testify during the trial. 	See 	ECF No. 9 at 2. Given this, the above factors weigh
against finding a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation in this case.
B. The USPP Did Not Unlawfully Extend The Traffic Stop
The evidentiary record in this case also shows that Officer Callhan appropriately
extended the Appellant’s traffic stop, because he had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the
Appellant had been driving while under the influence of alcohol. It is well-established that this
Court’s “ultimate determination of a reasonable-suspicion question is assessed de novo.” 	United
States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing 	United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 275 (2002) and 	Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). And so, the Court
considers the factual record and the totality of the circumstances in this case to determine
whether the extension of the Appellant’s traffic stop was supported by a reasonable articulable
suspicion. 	See, 	e.g., 	United States v. 	Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (reaffirming the “totality
of the circumstances” standard).
In this regard, the Supreme Court has made clear that a traffic stop need only be
supported by reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. 	See Kansas v. Glover,
589 U.S. 376 (2020) (traffic stop valid where deputy had reasonable suspicion that the suspect’s
driver’s license was revoked). The Fourth Circuit has also held that “[o]bserving a traffic
violation provides sufficient justification for a police officer to detain the offending vehicle for
as long as it takes to perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.” 	United States v.
Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing 	Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005));
see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); 	United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d
776, 781 (4th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has also explained that reasonable suspicion
means something “more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch’ of criminal
activity” but “less . . . than probable cause.” 	Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000)
(quoting 	Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). And so, the Court’s determination of whether
Case 8:25-cr-00074-LKG Document 15 Filed 11/25/25 Page 12 of 18
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reasonable suspicion justified a stop or detention should be based on the totality of the
circumstances, not giving undue attention to individual factors. 	See, 	e.g., 	Arvizu, 534 U.S. at
273.
Relevant here, the Court evaluates whether the facts amount to reasonable suspicion of
drunk driving, “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.”
Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit held that an officer’s observations
that the defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and was shaking, plus his observation of an open
bottle of alcohol on the rear passenger side floorboard, after a valid traffic stop, were sufficient
to permit an extension of the traffic stop to determine intoxication. 	United States v. Washington,
338 F. App’x 316, 318-19 (4th Cir. 2009). The Fourth Circuit has also held that reasonable
suspicion existed to justify performing SFSTs where the driver’s “breath smelled like alcohol, as
observed by an officer trained in DUI detection, and that it was 2:15 in the morning and [the
driver] intended to drive onto the [Fort Monroe] base to visit a hotel.” 	United States v. Turner,
No. 95-5606, 1996 WL 85165, at *1 (4th Cir. 1996); 	see also Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 391
(1999) (“Bloodshot eyes, in conjunction with the odor of alcohol emanating from the person,
would ordinarily provide the police with reasonable suspicion that a driver was under the
influence of alcohol.”). And so, this Court has held that “driving conduct alone can establish
reasonable suspicion of impairment . . . to justify a roadside sobriety test.” 	Pulsifer v. Prince,
No. MJM-22-3080, 2024 WL 2783898, at *8 (D. Md. May 30, 2024) (quoting 	Amundsen v.
Jones, 533 F.3d 1192, 1200 n.4 (10th Cir. 2008)).
In this case, the evidentiary record shows that Officer Callahan had a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol when he extended the
traffic stop to conduct SFSTs for several reasons.
First, the record evidence shows that Officer Callahan observed the Appellant driving on
BW Parkway in an erratic manner and speeding. During the trial below, Officer Callahan
testified that, on April 26, 2024, he was patrolling the northbound BW Parkway in the area of
Powder Mill Road, when he saw the Appellant’s vehicle enter the ramp to the BW Parkway and
he observed the vehicle swerve to the extent that it crossed the fog line and nearly struck the
concrete wall on the ramp. Tr. at 11:21-14:16 (ECF No. 9-1). Officer Callahan also testified
that he continued following the Appellant’s vehicle and that the vehicle continued to swerve,
crossing both the center dotted line and the fog line multiple times. 	Id. 	at 11:21-16:17. In
Case 8:25-cr-00074-LKG Document 15 Filed 11/25/25 Page 13 of 18
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addition, Officer Callahan testified that he activated his cruiser’s front radar and recorded the
vehicle’s speed at 76 m.p.h. in a 55-m.p.h. zone. 	Id. 	at 11:21-12:1, 25:16-20 and 129:15-19.
Given this, Officer Callahan testified that he followed the vehicle for approximately five miles
and he activated emergency equipment to initiate a traffic stop. 	Id. 	at 16:18-17:21. And so,
Officer Callahan’s trial testimony that he observed the Appellant speeding and driving erratically
on BW Parkway, before he initiated a traffic stop, supports a finding of reasonable articulable
suspicion to conduct the initial traffic stop. 	See Pulsifier, 2024 WL 2783898, at *8.
Second, the record evidence also shows that Officer Callahan had a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol during the initial traffic
stop, to justify extending the traffic stop. In this regard, Officer Callahan testified that, after the
Appellant stopped his vehicle, Officer Callahan approached the vehicle on the passenger side, for
officer safety, and made contact with the Appellant through the passenger side window. 	Id. 	at
17:22-18:22. Officer Callahan also testified that he smelled an odor of alcohol coming from the
vehicle’s passenger compartment. 	Id. 	at 55:12-56:23. This testimony is corroborated by the
video evidence, which shows Officer Callahan commenting that he smelled the odor of alcohol
and then askied the Appellant whether he had been drinking. 	See 	ECF No. 9-10 (Officer
Callahan body cam footage).
Officer Callahan further testified that he observed that the Appellant’s eyes were glassy
and that the Appellant’s speech was stumbling and confused, and he was fumbling with
documents, during the initial traffic stop. Tr. at 18:23-20:10 (ECF No. 9-1). But the Magistrate
Judge determined that “he did not notice any slurring” and any fumbling by the Appellant was
not unusual for “somebody that is stopped” by the police. 	Id. 	at 53:25-55:6. Based upon a
review of the video evidence, the Court agrees. And so, the evidence of reasonable articulable
suspicion here is that Officer Callahan observed the Appellant driving erratically and speeding,
and that Officer Callahan detected the smell of alcohol coming from the passenger compartment
of the vehicle, before he decided to extend the traffic stop.
The evidence before the Court also shows that, once the Appellant exited the vehicle,
Officer Callahan observed the Appellant behaving in a manner suggesting that the Appellant was
under the influence of alcohol. Notably, Officer Callahan testified that, when he walked to the
driver’s side of the vehicle to assist the Appellant in safely exiting the vehicle, he smelled the
odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the Appellant’s person and again observed the
Case 8:25-cr-00074-LKG Document 15 Filed 11/25/25 Page 14 of 18
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Appellant’s glassy eyes. 	Id. 	at 55:12-56:23. Officer Callahan also testified that the Appellant
was unsteady on his feet and needed to be assisted to the front of his vehicle. 	Id. 	at 56:3-14.
Officer Callahan’s observations are, to an extent, corroborated by the video evidence. 	See 	ECF
No. 9-10. And so, Officer Callahan testified that he conducted SFSTs on an area of the roadside
to determine if the Appellant was under the influence of alcohol. Tr. at 57:1-5 (ECF No. 9-1).
Given these facts, the Court is satisfied that the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the subject traffic stop shows that Officer Callahan’s decision to extend the traffic stop, and to
administer SFSTs, was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion that the Appellant was
driving under the influence of alcohol.
The Appellant’s arguments to show that the extension of the subject traffic stop violates
Rodriguez v. United Sates 	are also not persuasive. The Appellant first argues that Officer
Callahan did not have a new and independent reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop,
because the smell of alcohol was not individualized to him and could be attributed to the
passenger in the vehicle. 	See 	ECF No. 5 at 3-4. But, the Fourth Circuit has held that an officer
who smells alcohol in the passenger compartment of a vehicle following a crash may reasonably
infer that either the driver, or the passenger, or both individuals, were drinking at the time of the
crash. See United States v. Blakeney, 949 F.3d 851, 860 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing 	Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 (2003)). The Appellant next argues that Officer Callahan’s testimony
that he slurred his speech and was glassy eyed was either rejected by the Magistrate Judge, or
unsupported by the body-worn camera footage. As discussed above, the Magistrate Judge did
not find that the Appellant slurred his speech based upon the video evidence and the video
evidence also does not show that the Appellant’s speech was slurred or that he was glassy-eyed.
See 	Tr. at 53:25-55:6 (ECF No. 9-1). But the Magistrate Judge did find that the Appellant made
a “huge pause and his eyes got big,” and he did not directly answer Officer Callahan when asked
whether the Appellant had been drinking. 	Id. at 54:22-25. The video evidence also makes clear
that, when Officer Callahan again asked the Appellant whether he had been drinking for a
second time, the Appellant paused and did not answer the question. 	See 	ECF No. 9-10.
Given this, the Court agrees that the totality of the circumstances in this case shows that
Officer Callahan had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the Appellant had been driving
under the influence of alcohol to allow him to lawfully continue the traffic stop and to ask that
the Appellant exit the vehicle. 	See 	Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. For this reason, the Court
Case 8:25-cr-00074-LKG Document 15 Filed 11/25/25 Page 15 of 18
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AFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge’s finding of reasonable articulable suspicion and DENIES the
Appellant’s appeal on this issue.
C. The Magistrate Judge Properly Admitted
The Appellant’s Breathalyzer Test Results
As a final matter, the Appellant has not shown that the Magistrate Judge erred by
admitting his breathalyzer test results into evidence during the trial. The Fourth Circuit has
“long recognized that a ‘breathalyzer test’ is the ‘best means of obtaining evidence of . . . breath
alcohol content.’” 	United States v. Ahlstrom, 530 F. App’x 232, 238 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting
United States v. Reid, 929 F.2d 990, 994 (4th Cir. 1991)). In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has
held that:
[T]he Intoximeter and its functions were shown to be generally
reliable and accurate. According to the Intoximeter’s attestation
clause, the device “ha[d] been approved by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) as conforming to the model
specifications for evidential breath alcohol measurement devices.” .
. . NHTSA certification is widely accepted by courts as evidence of
a device’s reliability. 	. . . 	And this is for good reason. The NHTSA,
a unit of the Department of Transportation, has been evaluating
breath alcohol testing devices for evidential use for thirty years. 	. . .
It “provid[es] a centralized qualification test program for breath-
testing devices designed to collect evidence in law enforcement
programs.” . . . Notably, to achieve NHTSA approval, a device must
undergo a rigorous battery of tests, conducted “semi-annually or as
necessary.” 	. . .
Second, evidence was introduced to show that the Intoximeter was
accurately 	calibrated 	at 	the 	time 	the 	test 	was 	administered.
Specifically, the Intoximeter’s attestation clause indicated that the
device had been “certified as accurate within the past 90 days by a
United 	States 	Park 	Police 	technician 	who 	is 	certified 	by 	the
instrument manufacturer to calibrate and conduct accuracy checks.”
. . . Indeed, it had been calibrated on November 14, 2011, less than
two months before it was used for [the Defendant]. . . . Additionally,
Officer Gillespie testified that the Intoximeter is designed to conduct
a self-diagnostic test before use, and will take itself out of operation
if a malfunction is detected. He is well trained in its use, and stated
that the self-diagnostic test did not reveal any problems.
Ahlstrom, 530 F. App’x at 239-40 (citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit has also observed that
“the list of approved devices is published in the Federal Register, 	see, 	e.g., Conforming Products
List of Evidential Breath Alcohol Measurement Devices, 77 Fed.Reg. 35747–01 (June 14, 2012),
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and subject to judicial notice by this Court.” 	Id. 	at 239 n.5 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (“The
contents of the Federal Register shall be judicially noticed.”)).
In this appeal, the evidence before the Court shows that the Appellant’s breathalyzer test
results were properly admitted into evidence, because the breathalyzer test used by the USPP
was reliable and accurate. The Appellant argues that “the government submitted no certificate of
analysis, no manufacturer documentation, and no testimony to verify that the specific calibration
or testing met [National Institute of Standards and Technology] standards. ECF No. 5 at 5. But,
his argument is contradicted by the record evidence.
Notably, the record evidence shows that the Government established that the Appellant’s
breathalyzer test was reliable and accurate. During the trial below, Officer Stewart testified that
she administered a breath test to the Appellant using the Intoximeter EC/IR-II when the
Appellant arrived at the police station. Tr. at 102:1-19 (ECF No. 9-1). Officer Stewart also
testified that she was trained and certified in operating the Intoximeter. 	Id. 	at 102:10-103:11.
With regards to the administration of the breathalyzer test, Officer Stewart testified that
she started a 20-minute observation period of the Appellant to ensure that the Appellant retained
no mouth alcohol during the breath test. 	Id. 	at 104:6-17. Officer Stewart also testified that the
second 20-minute observation period was completed with the Appellant being observed by an
officer at all times. 	Id. 	at 106:3-22. And so, after the second 20-minute observation period, the
Appellant blew two valid breath samples into the Intoximeter, and the instrument recorded his
breath alcohol content. 	Id. 	at 106:25-107:13.
Importantly here, Officer Stewart testified that the Intoximeter was in proper working
order when the Appellant’s breath test was conducted. 	Id. 	at 107:14-16. The Government also
introduced into evidence the breath testing instrument certification notice, which indicates that
the Intoximeter used for the Appellant’s breath sample “has been tested and found to be suitable
for use in analyzing breath alcohol for evidential purposes” and that “[t]he instrument conforms
to the standards required by the United States Department of Transportation for evidential breath
alcohol measurement.” 	Id. 	at 107:17-122:15; 	see also 	ECF No. 9-13 (Trial Exhibit 4). The
Intoximeter shows the Appellant’s first breath sample was positive for alcohol at a level of .123
grams per 210 liters of breath. ECF No. 9-14 (Trial Exhibit 5). The Appellant’s second breath
sample registered at a level of .119 grams per 210 liters of breath. 	Id.
The record evidence also makes clear that the Appellant’s breathalyzer test results
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include a signed attestation certifying that the breath sample results were analyzed by an
instrument approved by the national highway traffic safety administration as conforming to the
model specifications for evidential breath alcohol measurement devices. 	See 	ECF No. 9-13
(Trial Exhibit 4). In addition, the breath test report states that the test instrument’s date of
certification was February 26, 2024, which was approximately two months before the
breathalyzer test was administered to the Appellant in this case. 	See id. 	at 1.
Lastly, the Court also observes that the Federal Register lists the Intoximeter, the
breathalyzer test instrument used in this case, as an approved evidential breath measurement
device. 	See Ahlstrom, 530 F. App’x at 239 n.5; ECF No. 9-13 (certification notice that certifies
that the Intoximeter EC/IR, serial number 010688, had been tested and found suitable for use in
analyzing breath alcohol levels for evidential purposes.). Given this evidence, the Court is
satisfied that the Intoximeter was authenticated through this evidence and shown to be reliable.
See Ahlstrom, 530 F. App’x at 239-40 (breath alcohol tests are admissible if they are consistent
with general standards for evaluating the reliability of machine-generated evidence.). And so,
Court also AFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge’s decision to admit the breathalyzer test into
evidence at trial and DENIES this Appellant’s appeal on this issue.
V. 	CONCLUSION
In sum, the Appellant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the 62-day continuance of
his trial. The record evidence also shows that the extension of the Appellant’s traffic stop was
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion and that the Magistrate Judge properly admitted
the Appellant’s breathalyzer test results into evidence during the trail. And so, for the foregoing
reasons, the Court:
(1) 	AFFIRMS 	the Appellant’s convictions; and
(2) 	DISMISSES 	the appeal.
A separate Order shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Lydia Kay Griggsby
LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY
United States District Judge
Case 8:25-cr-00074-LKG Document 15 Filed 11/25/25 Page 18 of 18

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