Parikh v. Fogleman

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
(SOUTHERN DIVISION)
NAMISH PARIKH, 	*
Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civil Case No. 8:24-CV-03627-AAQ
CHRISTOPHER C. FOGELMAN, 	*
Defendant. 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a case alleging that a Maryland state court judge improperly entered an Order.
Plaintiff Namish Parikh brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Associate
Circuit Court Judge Christopher C. Fogleman, alleging denial of access to court, retaliation,
fabrication of evidence, and violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 31, at 16, 21, 23, 31. Pending before the Court
is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a
Claim. ECF No. 32. For the following reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction; accordingly, it shall
grant Defendant’s Motion and dismiss the case.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Namish Parikh brings this action against Defendant Christopher C. Fogleman,
Associate Circuit Court Judge for Montgomery County, Maryland.1 ECF No. 31, at 1. Plaintiff is
a resident of the state of Maryland. 	ECF No. 31, at 7. 	Defendant is an Associate Judge of the
1 Unless otherwise stated, all facts in the Background are from the Second Amended Complaint.
Because the case is currently before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts
all well-pled allegations from the Complaint as true for the purpose of deciding the Motion. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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Circuit Court for Montgomery County, having served in that capacity since 2019. ECF No. 31, at
7.
In June 2016, upon the death of Plaintiff’s father, Dinesh O. Parikh (“Decedent”),
Plaintiff’s ex-wife, Oxana M. Parikh (“Ms. Parikh”), became the personal representative of
Decedent’s estate. ECF No. 31, at 2; ECF No. 32-4, at 1. On July 11, 2016, Decedent’s daughter,
Tina Parikh-Smith (“Ms. Smith”), filed a Petition for the Removal of Personal Representative and
for Appointment of Successor Personal Representative. ECF No. 32-4, at 1. After a hearing on
the matter, Judge Gary E. Bair, Associate Judge of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
Maryland, sitting as the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, issued an order
removing Ms. Parikh as the personal representative of Decedent’s estate and appointing a
disinterested third-party personal representative, Lynn C. Boynton (“Ms. Boynton”). ECF No. 31,
at 11; ECF No. 32-4, at 1-2.
Following years of extensive litigation over the Decedent’s estate, Defendant signed an
order on November 13, 2023, declaring Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant. ECF No. 31-1, at 14.
The order permanently enjoins Plaintiff from filing “any pleading, motion, or other paper,” relating
to the Decedent’s estate, or “filing in the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County, Maryland or
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland any new action relating to the [Decedent’s
estate], without first obtaining leave of the Court by obtaining permission from the Administrative
Judge or their designee.” ECF No. 31-1, at 14-15. Plaintiff appealed this order to the Appellate
Court of Maryland. ECF No. 32-2, at 43.
Throughout the underlying estate matter and the pending case, Plaintiff has maintained that
Decedent’s estate settlement is unlawful because: 1) the personal representative, Ms. Boynton,
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used a different last name in prior court proceedings; and 2) the Decedent’s spouse unlawfully
benefited from the estate. ECF No. 31, at 10.
Plaintiff filed this Second Amended Complaint against Defendant on April 21, 2025,
alleging that Defendant denied Plaintiff access to the state courts, retaliated against Plaintiff to
protect those within the Defendant’s “inner circle,” and deliberately fabricated, suppressed,
omitted, altered or destroyed evidence in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 31, at 16, 21,
23. Plaintiff also alleges that he has been treated differently than others with whom he is similarly
situated due to intentional or purposeful discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the 14 th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 	ECF No. 31, at 31-32. 	Plaintiff has sued
Defendant in his individual capacity seeking compensatory and punitive monetary damages. ECF
No. 31, at 36-37. Plaintiff also seeks a constructive trust over all attached or seized funds from his
personal bank account. ECF No. 31, at 28, 37.
On May 5, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim. ECF No. 32. Plaintiff filed a Response on June 2, 2025.
ECF No. 38. This Court held a Motions Hearing on July 29, 2025, regarding Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss. ECF No. 44. Plaintiff filed a Supplement to his Response in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss on August 6, 2025. ECF No. 46.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) raises the question of whether the court has the competence or
authority to hear the case.” Davis v. Thompson, 367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005). “The
burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction” lies with “the party asserting jurisdiction.”
Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 362 (4th Cir. 2010). Motions relying on
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Rule 12(b)(1) share the same standard as motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6). Evans v. United States, 105 F.4th 606, 615 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[W]here the defendant
contends that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction,
the district court assesses the motion under the same standard as one brought under Rule
12(b)(6).”). Accordingly, to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the complaint
must “set forth facts,” accepted as true, upon which the court can conclude that “jurisdiction is
proper.”2 Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must “draw[] all reasonable factual inferences . . . in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 248 (4th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff must provide more than
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007); mere legal conclusions are not “entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679. In assessing a 12(b)(1) motion, “the court may look beyond the pleadings and
the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on
the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.”3 	Stahlman v. United
States, 995 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600,
606 (D. Md. 2003)); see also Durden, 736 F.3d at 300.
ANALYSIS
2 “A defendant” can also “contest subject matter jurisdiction” through an alternative path: “by
attacking the veracity of the allegations contained in the complaint.” Durden, 736 F.3d at 300. “In
that situation, the presumption of truthfulness normally accorded a complaint’s allegations does
not apply, and the district court is entitled to decide disputed issues of fact.” Kerns v. United States,
585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). 	Defendants do not challenge the accuracy of Plaintiff’s
allegations; accordingly, the Court applies the standard for a facial challenge.
3 For this reason, the Court considers the attachments to Defendant’s Motion, ECF Nos. 32-2 to
32-7, in its analysis.
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Defendant moves for dismissal on numerous grounds, including lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, abstention, and failure to state a claim. ECF No. 32. For the reasons stated below,
Younger abstention, absolute judicial immunity, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine apply, limiting
the Court’s jurisdiction. 	However, Defendant has failed to show that Eleventh Amendment
immunity bars suit against him. 	Because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and must
abstain from adjudicating Plaintiff’s claims, it will not address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. See
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 93-95 (1998) (explaining that a federal court
may not issue a decision on the merits if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction).
I. 	Younger Abstention Cautions Against Federal Intervention.
“[A]bstention is an exception to the general rule that federal courts must decide cases over
which they have jurisdiction.” 	Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. McVey, 37 F.4th 89, 96 (4th Cir. 2022).
Specifically, Younger abstention “counsels federal-court abstention when there is a pending state
proceeding.” 	Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). The doctrine acknowledges that “state
courts are fully competent to decide issues of federal law,” Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n W. Va.,
396 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2005), reflecting a “strong policy against federal intervention in state
judicial processes in the absence of great and immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff.”
Moore, 442 U.S. at 416.
The Supreme Court in Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs identified the three circumstances
in which Younger abstention applies: (1) “ongoing state criminal prosecutions,” (2) “certain ‘civil
enforcement proceedings,’” and (3) “pending ‘civil proceedings involving certain orders . . .
uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.’” 571 U.S.
69, 78 (2013) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S.
350, 368 (1989)). If a case falls into one of the three categories outlined above, a federal court
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should consider if there is (1) an “ongoing state judicial proceeding,” that (2) “implicate[s]
important state interests,” and (3) provides “an adequate opportunity . . . to raise constitutional
challenges.” Middlesex Cnty Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
Even if one of the Sprint categories applies and the three Middlesex factors weigh in favor of
abstention, there are exceptions to the court’s duty to abstain. The Court may maintain jurisdiction
if Plaintiff can show (1) “bad faith or harassment” by state officials responsible for the prosecution;
(2) a state statute that is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions”;
or (3) other “extraordinary circumstances” or “unusual situations”. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 49-64 (1971).
Younger abstention is appropriate in the instant matter. 	First, Plaintiff’s appeal of the
vexatious litigant order constitutes a pending civil proceeding uniquely involving the state court’s
interest in performing its judicial functions. See Strickland-Lucas v. Citibank, N.A., ELH-16-0805,
2017 WL 2876475, at *7 (D. Md. July 6, 2017) (“[c]ases in the third category generally involve a
state’s contempt process or a state court’s efforts to enforce its own order or judgment”);
Accohannock Indian Tribe v. Tyler, SAG-21-02550, 2021 WL 5909102, at *13 (D. Md. Dec. 14,
2021) (assuming the proceedings on appeal in Maryland Circuit Court constitute an ongoing state
judicial proceeding); ECF No. 31-2, at 2; ECF No. 32-2, at 38, 43; ECF No. 32-5. 	Plaintiff
appealed the vexatious litigant order to the Appellate Court of Maryland on November 14, 2023.
ECF No. 32-2, at 38; ECF No. 32-5, at 1. The appeal is still pending with the Appellate Court of
Maryland. ECF No. 32-2, at 43. Additionally, the case implicates an important state interest – its
ability to effectively manage its judicial system and conserve limited resources. See Harper, 396
F.3d at 352 (“enforcing state court judgments cuts to the state’s ability to operate its own judicial
system, a vital interest for Younger purposes”); Washburn v. McCarthy, No. 149491-FL, 2021 WL
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4477449, at *8 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 30, 2021) (affirming a vexatious litigant order where
“[s]uch frivolous and vexatious litigation unquestionably imposed an unnecessary and undue
burden on the courts”). “[W]here vital state interests are involved, a federal court should abstain
‘unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.’” Middlesex, 457 U.S.
at 432 (quoting Moore, 442 U.S. at 426).
Finally, Maryland state courts provide an adequate opportunity for Plaintiff to raise his
constitutional claims. See Balunsat v. Cecil Cnty. Gov’t, RDB-12-0360, 2012 WL 6681914, at *6
(D. Md. Dec. 21, 2012) (“the Maryland state judicial system may address and decide issues of
constitutional and other federal law”); Freed v. Worcester Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 69 Md. App.
447, 455-57 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (adjudicating an appeal of an access to courts claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983); Mayor and City of Council of Balt. v. Guttman, 190 Md. App. 395, 403-409
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (deciding the plaintiff’s federal First Amendment retaliation claim).
The Fourth Circuit has held that when a Plaintiff is “able to present their claims and have them
addressed in state court” federal intervention is inappropriate. Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237,
244 (4th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff alleges that the Court should nonetheless maintain jurisdiction over the case
because Defendant has used “false identities to misdirect this [court], inject[ed] fake wives into
this federal matter and in orphans’ court, conceal[ed] and fail[ed] to report to law enforcement
counterfeit documents that [are] on [their] face a ‘cut-and-paste’ job.” 	ECF No. 46, at 12.
Allegedly, these acts are intended to “misappropriate millions of dollars from decedents, their
offspring, and their designated ‘legatees.’” Id.
Even accepting all well-pled allegations from the Second Amended Complaint as true,
these circumstances do not justify the Court’s continued jurisdiction. “Neither the Supreme Court
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nor [the Fourth] Circuit has delineated an exhaustive list of situations that rise to the level of
extraordinary circumstances” but Fourth Circuit decisions have indicated that the “path to
extraordinary circumstances is exceedingly narrow.” Air Evac EMS, Inc., 37 F.4th at 99-100. The
personal representative’s use of a different last name in prior court proceedings does not constitute
the sort of extraordinary circumstances that would eliminate the court’s duty to abstain, ECF No.
31-6, at 2; nor are Plaintiff’s allegations that the Decedent’s allegedly invalid spouse benefited
from the estate. 	ECF No. 31, at 10. 	Under Fourth Circuit precedent, there must be actual
impediments to the state forum’s ability to allow the plaintiff to litigate their federal claim, which
Plaintiff has not alleged. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 37 F.4th at 102 (finding extraordinary circumstances
where state Commissioner’s actions presented an actual impediment to West Virginia’s ability to
address the applicable federal issue); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d
244, 251 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding extraordinary circumstances where Congress has passed
legislation to “define[] an entire category of cases in which ‘extraordinary circumstances’ exist to
justify federal court intervention”); Simopoulos v. Va. State Bd. of Med., 644 F.2d 321, 327-29 (4th
Cir. 1981) (explaining that the bad faith and patent unconstitutionality exceptions to Younger
abstention apply “if the state procedure fails to provide the federal plaintiff with an adequate
opportunity to litigate in the state forum”).4
II. 	Absolute Judicial Immunity Applies.
Absolute immunity applies to “officials whose special functions or constitutional status
requires complete protection from suit.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). Judges
4 Plaintiff notes that when Younger abstention applies, a stay of the case, as opposed to dismissal
with prejudice is the proper course. ECF No. 46, at 4-5 (citing Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited
Partnership v. Beaufort County, 105 F.4th 554, 559-60 (4th Cir. 2024)). This may have been an
appropriate course were it not for absolute immunity or the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
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fit squarely within this category of officials who are entitled to immunity from suits for money
damages in their individual capacities. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Harmon
v. Md. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, ELH-13-605, 2013 WL 867992, at *4 (D. Md. March
7, 2013). Judicial immunity is immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment of damages.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judicial immunity supports the principle that a “judicial
officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” 	Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10 (quoting
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1872)).
There are two circumstances in which a plaintiff may overcome a judge’s assertion of
judicial immunity. First, “a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions.” Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11-12. Second, “a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id.
Defendant is an Associate Circuit Court Judge for Montgomery County, Maryland entitled
to judicial immunity. 	ECF No. 31, at 1. 	Plaintiff challenges an order Defendant entered in
Orphans’ Court. 	ECF No. 31-1, at 14. 	Defendant’s order satisfies prong one, as it is the
prototypical judicial act for which a judge is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from individual
liability for damages. 	Harmon, 2013 WL 867992, at *4 (holding plaintiff’s challenge to an
Orphans’ Court judgment to be a “judicial” act).
Plaintiff nonetheless maintains that judicial immunity does not apply, alleging that
Defendant acted without jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that the Orphans’ Court lacked jurisdiction
to issue the injunction regarding filings in Circuit Court, reasoning that Maryland law does not
grant such broad authority to the Orphans’ Court and that a separate action should have been
initiated in Orphans’ Court before Defendant issued the injunction. ECF 38, at 12-18.
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Defendant’s arguments fail to satisfy the high standard required to defeat an assertion of
judicial immunity. Judges are “subject to liability only when [acting] in the ‘clear absence of all
jurisdiction.’” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871)).
Section 2-101 of the Maryland State Code establishes the jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Courts over
decedents’ estates and provides that the Orphans’ Court “may conduct judicial probate, direct the
conduct of a personal representative, and issue orders that may be required in the course of the
administration of an estate of a decedent.” 	E.T. § 2-102(a). 	Section 2-103 gives the Orphans’
Court “the same legal and equitable powers to effectuate its jurisdiction, punish contempt, and
carry out its orders, judgments and decrees as a court of record with general jurisdiction in equity.”
E.T. § 2-103. Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, Maryland grants the Orphans’ Court the authority
to issue orders, including injunctions to manage the court’s docket.5 See Radcliff v. Vance, 360
Md. 277, 286 (Md. 2000) (extending the Orphans’ Court’s jurisdiction to “such matters as are
necessarily incident to the exercise of the powers expressly granted to them”); Kroll v. Fisher, 182
Md. App. 55, 62 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (upholding the Orphans’ Court’s authority to issue an
order for the accounting of a personal representative’s management of an estate); Vangrack,
Axelson & Williamowsky, P.C. v. Estate of Abbasi, 261 F. Supp. 2d 352, 357 (D. Md. 2003)
(upholding an Orphans’ Court order authorizing estate’s personal representative to pay interim
5 Even if it is questionable whether the Orphans’ Court had the power to issue the injunction, the
Court cannot conclude that Defendant acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. See King v. Myers,
973 F.2d 354, 357 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed
broadly . . . ”); see also Perlmutter v. Verone, No. GLH-14-2566, 2015 WL 4757183, at *3 (D. Md.
Aug. 11, 2015) (holding that absolute judicial immunity applied where judges were “acting within
their respective judicial capacities and jurisdiction in presiding over the Orphan[s’] [C]ourt” and
the challenges were to the judge’s rulings made while presiding over proceedings relating to the
estate matter); see Harmon, 2013 WL 867992, at *4 (applying absolute judicial immunity where
plaintiff challenged an Orphans’ Court judgment concerning a matter relating to a decedent’s
estate).
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attorney fees to law firm); Willoner v. Davis, 30 Md. App. 444, 449 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976)
(upholding the Orphans’ Court’s authority to construe statutes); Kaouris v. Kaouris, 324 Md. 687,
716 (Md. 1991) (upholding the Orphans’ Court’s authority to interpret a marital settlement
agreement to determine a spouse’s entitlement to share in an estate).
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant crossed out “Circuit” and wrote “Orphans’” to docket
the injunction in Orphans’ Court, arguing that relabeling the court which issued the order renders
the order a non-judicial act. ECF No. 31, at 8. This argument fails; what appears to be an attempt
to correct a previously mislabeled document does not change the judicial nature of issuing the
order. 	Gibson v. Goldston, 85 F.4th 218, 224 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[i]ssuing an order is a judicial
function”); Harmon, 2013 WL 867992, at *4 (holding Orphans’ Court judgment is a “judicial”
act). The relevant inquiry to determine whether an act is “judicial” is the nature and function of
the act. 	See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362 (holding there was no merit to the argument that a judge’s
actions became nonjudicial when he “performed the type of act normally performed only by
judges”). Courts look to the “act’s relation to a general function normally performed by a judge”
to determine whether the act was judicial in nature. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13. Plaintiff is challenging
an order Defendant entered in Orphans’ Court. ECF No. 31-1, at 14. The accompanying informal
action—crossing out “Circuit” and relabeling the document “Orphans”—does not deprive the
complete act of its judicial character. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (holding
that informal, ex parte proceedings do not render a judge’s act to be non-judicial in character).
Moreover, Circuit Court Judges in Montgomery County, Maryland may sit as the Orphans’ Court,
which may explain the mislabeled document. See Willoner, 30 Md. App. at 448 (“a judge of the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County . . . may also sit as a judge of the Orphans’ Court for
Montgomery County”); Vangrack, Azelson & Williamowsky, P.C., 261 F. Supp. 2d at n.3 (“the
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Orphans’ Court in Montgomery County, as a matter of tradition, is known as ‘The Circuit Court
for Montgomery County Sitting as the Orphans’ Court’”).
III. 	The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars Plaintiff’s Case.
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from hearing “cases brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
federal district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Inds. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 281 (2005). The
doctrine prohibits “claims that ‘seek [ ] redress for an injury caused by the state-court decision
itself’ because they ‘ask[ ] the federal district court to conduct an appellate review of the state-
court decision.’” 	Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 464 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Davani v. Va.
Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006)). “The doctrine derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1257,
a federal statute that vests the U.S. Supreme Court—and only the United States Supreme Court—
with jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court decisions in cases raising questions of federal
law.” Harmon, 2013 WL 867992, at *2 (emphasis added); D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 482 (1983) (holding that “[r]eview of such judgments may be had only in [the Supreme
Court]”); Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970)
(explaining that Congress has not given “lower federal courts . . . any power to review directly
cases from state courts”). “Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the
power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress
pursuant thereto.” Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng’g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir.
2004) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)). 	“[W]hen a
federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
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Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint requires abstention based on the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. 	Plaintiff’s lawsuit “complain[s] of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and
seek[s] federal-court review and rejection of that judgment.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 531
(2011). First, each count complains of injury caused by the state-court judgment which enjoined
Plaintiff from pursuing further litigation in Orphans’ Court and Circuit Court. Lance v. Dennis,
546 U.S. 459, 464-65 (2006). Counts I, II, and III allege the order resulted in Plaintiff’s deprivation
of access to courts, constituted retaliation against Plaintiff, and prevented him from challenging
fabricated evidence. ECF No. 31, at 16, 21, 23. Count IV alleges that the order resulted in Plaintiff
being “treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated,” in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 	Id. at 31-32. 	Each of these legal claims points to the same source of
injury: the Maryland vexatious litigant order. If the state court had not issued this order, Plaintiff
would not be enjoined from litigating in Maryland Orphans’ and Circuit Courts, and, based on
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, there would be no injury. See Moseley v. Winston, RDB-
18-810, 2018 WL 3740699, at *4-5 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2018) (applying Rooker-Feldman where “all
of [Plaintiff’s] alleged constitutional injuries stem[med] from [a] child support proceeding” in state
court because the requested relief “would render the judgment ineffectual”). 	Although the
category of cases “complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment” is narrow, this
case falls within it. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291.
This is not a case in which “[a] plaintiff’s injury at the hands of a third party [was] ‘ratified,
acquiesced in, or left unpunished by’ a state-court decision without being ‘produced by’ the state-
court judgment.” Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hoblock v. Albany
Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2005)); see also Davani, 434 F.3d at 719-20
(concluding that Rooker-Feldman did not apply where Plaintiff lost an employment discrimination
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suit in Virginia state court, then raised similar complaints in federal court, because the underlying
discrimination caused the harm—not the state court’s judgment). This case differs from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hulsey v. Cisa, where the plaintiffs
brought suit in federal court seeking relief against the defendants—the opposing parties in the state
court proceedings—“for alleged RICO violations, fraud, and abuse of process” stemming from
Defendants’ conduct in prosecuting several defamation suits in state court. 	947 F.3d at 250.
Importantly, the injury in Hulsey did not result from the state court judgment, but rather from third
parties’ allegedly fraudulent actions in pursuing their cases. Id. Accordingly, although the injuries
occurred in the context of the state-court cases, they were “merely enabled” by the state court
rulings—not caused by them. Id. at 251.
The vexatious litigant order context in this case differs. Plaintiff’s injury as he frames it—
Defendant foreclosing his use of the judicial system—is one and the same with the Maryland
court’s order resulting in the injunction against him. 	See ECF No. 31, at 17-22, 24, 33-35
(characterizing the injury to Plaintiff as arising from Defendant’s order blocking Plaintiff’s access
to the courts). 	The overwhelming thrust of the Second Amended Complaint and the equal
protection count, in particular, is that Plaintiff is complaining of alleged damage from the state
court order itself, not the process that led to the order. Id. at 33 (alleging that Defendant’s order
had the impact of “depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional right to petition Md. courts”); id. at 35
(“Any reasonable person would have known that Plaintiff possessed a clearly established
constitutional right to basic equal protection . . . [s]uch a basic constitutional question of one’s
access to courts to seek redress and to petition, to be free from retaliation from exposing those
within Defendant’s ‘inner circle’ . . . , as well as to be free from fabricated/omitted evidence . . .”);
id. at 36 (alleging that Defendant “denied [Plaintiff’s] access to courts”). Although there is some
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language in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleging that Defendant conducted the
underlying proceedings in a discriminatory manner, see id. at 33 (“Defendant created two classes:
those within his ‘inner circle’ who benefit from obtaining unlawful orders and bank seizures using
false identities or negotiating leverage of being able to threaten to do so, and unrepresented
immigrants who don’t receive the same benefit and tactical advantage”), Plaintiff’s claims are
largely focused on the damage from the vexatious litigant order. Id. at 17 (characterizing the injury
as the “loss of all rights to challenge” issues in court); id. at 20 (“Defendant hindered Plaintiff by
entering an injunction that bars Plaintiff from filing anything . . . in orphans’ and circuit courts);
id. at 22 (“Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff by impeding his exposure of corruption and
holding liable imposters, barrators, and fraudsters”); id. at 24 (“Defendant’s use of fabricated
evidence deprived Plaintiff of his right to seek redress in Md. courts”). 	The Court’s present
conclusion is not unique; this Court has previously held that Rooker-Feldman applies in this
context. 	See Monbo v. Richmond American Homes of Md., Inc., No. 24-cv-2869, 2025 WL
1207384, at *4 (D. Md. April 25, 2025) (holding that Rooker-Feldman barred claims in which
plaintiff asked the federal district court to stand in for the state appellate court and review state
court judge’s rulings).
IV. 	Eleventh Amendment Immunity Does Not Bar Suit Against Defendant.
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
Const. Amend XI. 	Eleventh Amendment immunity “protects the States, their agencies, and
officials . . . acting in their official capacities” from being sued in federal court for money damages
without their consent. Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2018); Adams v. Ferguson, 884
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F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985)). However,
this immunity does not “extend to suits under § 1983 against state officials who are sued in their
individual capacities.” Murphy v. Virginia, 21-1253, 2022 WL 17484286, at *1 (4th Cir. 2022);
Jordan v. Davis, ELH-22-1541, 2023 WL 2478862, at *7 (D. Md. March 13, 2023) (“personal
capacity suits, which seek to impose individual liability on a government official for an action
taken under color of State law, are also not barred by the Eleventh Amendment”).
To bring suit under § 1983 against a defendant in his individual capacity, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant “acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights.” Francis v.
Maryland, ELH-21-1365, 2023 WL 2456553, at *18 (D. Md. March 10, 2023) (citing Vinnedge v.
Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant signed and unlawfully
docketed the vexatious litigant order, granting a permanent life-time injunction against Plaintiff.
ECF No. 31, at 7. 	Plaintiff alleges that Defendant deprived Plaintiff of his access to the court
system, retaliated against him and admitted fabricated evidence, all in in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; and, separately, violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. ECF No. 31, at 16, 21, 23, 31.
Looking to the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant
“in his individual capacity.” ECF No. 31, at 1. Courts consider a variety of factors to determine
whether a suit is brought against the defendant in their individual capacity, including the types of
damages requested, who money is sought from, and who is being sued. The inquiry to determine
whether an official is being sued in his individual capacity is “best understood as a reference to the
capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged
injury.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991). While “the mere incantation of the term ‘individual
capacity’ is not enough to transform an official capacity action into an individual capacity action,”
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Lizzi v. Alexander, 255 F.3d 128, 137 (4th Cir. 2001), when a plaintiff states in their complaint that
he is bringing an individual capacity suit, the court must ask whether anything “in the remainder
of the complaint, or in the record, undermines [the] clear statement” showing that the state is the
real party in interest. Adams, 884 F.3d at 225. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive monetary
damages. ECF No. 31, at 1. The Fourth Circuit has held that a plaintiff’s request for compensatory
damages in a suit brought under § 1983 “may itself be evidence that a state officer is being sued
in their personal capacity ‘since such relief is unavailable in official capacity suits.’” Gibbons v.
Gibbs, 99 F.4th 211, 216 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff also seeks “a constructive trust over all attached/seized personal bank account funds,”
which does not require payment of state funds. ECF No. 31, at 37; see Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (observing that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits where the relief sought
“requires payment of state funds”). 	Moreover, Plaintiff specifically asserts claims against
Defendant, not the current judge presiding over the underlying estate matter, even though
Defendant has withdrawn from his position as Circuit Court Judge in the underlying matter. ECF
No. 31, at 9; cf. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 n.11 (“In an official-capacity action in federal court,
death or replacement of the named official will result in automatic substitution of the official’s
successor in office.”).
Defendant, in response, relies on Martin v. Wood to argue that the Court need not defer to
Plaintiff’s characterization of the lawsuit as an individual-capacity suit. 	772 F.3d 192 (4th Cir.
2014); ECF No. 32-1, at 14. In Martin, the Fourth Circuit established a five-factor test to “identify
the real, substantial party in interest.” Martin, 772 F.3d at 196. However, the Fourth Circuit has
declined to apply Martin’s five factor test to claims brought under 42 U.S. § 1983. Adams, 884
F.3d at 226 (“We refuse to apply to § 1983 claims these factors, which we articulated for use in
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considering claims under a very different statute, and which would undermine the very purpose of
§ 1983.”). The Fourth Circuit has held that applying the Martin factors, which focus on the official
character of defendant’s actions, to section § 1983 claims would “absolutely immunize state
officials from personal liability for acts within their authority and necessary to fulfilling
governmental responsibilities.” 	Adams, 884 F.3d at 226 (citing Hafer, 502 U.S. at 28). 	Thus,
based on the information available at this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot conclude that
Eleventh Amendment immunity applies.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 32) is granted. This case shall be closed.
So ordered.
Date: 	January 23, 2026 	_________/s/______________
Ajmel A. Quereshi
United States Magistrate Judge
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