Ramirez Ruano v. Scratch Kitchen & Bistro, LLC et al

8:23-cv-02461Mdd23 dic 2025

Testo completo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
FATIMA MARIA RAMIREZ RUANO
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 23-2461
:
SCRATCH KITCHEN & BISTRO, LLC,
et al. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment
wage 	dispute 	are 	the 	motion 	to 	set 	aside 	judgment 	or, 	in 	the
alternative, 	to 	permit 	satisfaction 	of 	judgment 	through
installment 	payments, 	(ECF 	No. 	70), 	and 	the 	motion 	to 	stay
enforcement of judgment filed by Bernadette Crystal Rousseau (“Ms.
Rousseau”), 	(ECF 	No. 	71). 	The 	issues 	have 	been 	briefed, 	and 	the
court 	now 	rules, 	no 	hearing 	being 	deemed 	necessary. 	Local 	Rule
105.6. 	For the following reasons, the motions will be denied.
I. 	Background
Because the facts underlying this suit are recounted in full
elsewhere, 	(ECF 	Nos. 	42, 	at 	1–5; 	68, 	at 	1–5), 	only 	a 	brief
recitation 	of 	the 	facts 	relevant 	to 	the 	pending 	motions 	is
necessary 	here. 	From 	around 	August 	2022 	to 	August 	2023, 	Fatima
Maria 	Ramirez 	Ruano 	(“Plaintiff”) 	worked 	as 	a 	cook 	for 	Scratch
Kitchen & Bistro, LLC (“Scratch Kitchen”), a restaurant owned and
operated by Ms. Rousseau and Vital Correia (“Mr. Correia”). 	(ECF
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No. 	47 	¶¶ 	1, 	11–12). 	Plaintiff 	alleged 	that 	she 	consistently
worked 	overtime, 	but 	that 	Scratch 	Kitchen, 	Ms. 	Rousseau, 	and 	Mr.
Correia 	(collectively, 	“Defendants”) 	failed 	to 	pay 	her 	overtime
wages, (Id. ¶¶ 18, 25, 75); she further alleged that when she asked
Ms. Rousseau to pay her overtime wages, Ms. Rousseau responded by
threatening 	to 	report 	Plaintiff 	to 	immigration 	authorities, 	(Id.
¶¶ 	41–46). 	Plaintiff 	then 	retained 	counsel 	and 	sent 	a 	demand
letter to Defendants for her unpaid wages. 	(Id. ¶¶ 47–48). 	When
Defendants did not meet Plaintiff’s demand, she filed suit in this
court seeking recovery under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)
and various provisions of Maryland law. 	(ECF No. 1). 	Proceeding
pro se, Defendants Ms. Rousseau and Mr. Correia each filed a motion
to dismiss. 	(ECF Nos. 20; 38). 	The court granted Ms. Rousseau’s
motion in part and Mr. Correia’s motion in full. 	(ECF No. 42, at
19, 21). 	Although Scratch Kitchen was initially represented, (ECF
Nos. 	22; 	23), 	its 	counsel 	later 	withdrew 	before 	filing 	a
dispositive motion, (ECF Nos. 36; 41). 	Because business entities
can 	only 	appear 	in 	this 	court 	through 	a 	licensed 	attorney, 	Local
Rule 101.1.a, the clerk ultimately entered default against Scratch
Kitchen, (ECF No. 44).
Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint against Defendants
that asserted new allegations against Ms. Rousseau and Mr. Correia,
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but not against Scratch Kitchen. 	(ECF Nos. 47; 50 ¶ 2). 	Neither
Ms. 	Rousseau 	nor 	Mr. 	Correia 	responded 	to 	the 	amended 	complaint.
Accordingly, Plaintiff moved for default against Ms. Rousseau and
Mr. 	Correia, 	(ECF 	No. 	51), 	which 	the 	clerk 	subsequently 	entered,
(ECF 	Nos. 	53; 	54). 	Plaintiff 	then 	moved 	for 	default 	judgment
against 	all 	Defendants. 	(ECF 	No. 	58). 	None 	of 	the 	Defendants
responded to the motion for default judgment, but Ms. Rousseau did
move 	to 	vacate 	the 	clerk’s 	entry 	of 	default, 	(ECF 	No. 	59). 	The
court denied Ms. Rousseau’s motion, (ECF No. 66), and then entered
default judgment on August 1, 2025, against all Defendants jointly
and severally in the total amount of $45,338.25, (ECF No. 69).
On 	August 	5, 	2025, 	Ms. 	Rousseau, 	on 	her 	own 	behalf 	and
purportedly 	on 	behalf 	of 	Scratch 	Kitchen, 	moved 	to 	set 	aside 	the
judgment 	or, 	in 	the 	alternative, 	to 	permit 	satisfaction 	of 	the
judgment 	through 	installment 	payments.1 	(ECF 	No. 	70). 	Two 	days
1 	Ms. 	Rousseau 	filed 	her 	motion 	to 	set 	aside 	the 	judgment,
which 	invoked 	Rule 	60(b), 	(ECF 	No. 	70 	¶ 	6), 	four 	days 	after 	the
court 	entered 	default 	judgment 	against 	her. 	The 	United 	States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has instructed that “if a
post-judgment 	motion 	is 	[timely] 	filed 	. 	. 	. 	and 	calls 	into
question the correctness of [the] judgment it should be treated as
a 	motion 	under 	Rule 	59(e), 	however 	it 	may 	be 	formally 	styled.”
Dove v. CODESCO, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4 th Cir. 1978). 	A Rule 59(e)
motion must be filed within twenty-eight days. 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).
Ms. Rousseau filed her motion well within the Rule 59(e) deadline.
Courts 	in 	this 	circuit 	have 	split 	on 	what 	it 	means 	to 	“question
the correctness” of the judgment under the CODESCO rule. 	Compare
Glanville 	v. 	Mayor 	& 	City 	Council 	of 	Balt., 	No. 	23-cv-3395-EA,
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later, 	she 	filed 	a 	motion 	to 	stay 	enforcement 	of 	the 	judgment
pending resolution of her earlier motion. 	(ECF No. 71). 	Plaintiff
has not responded to either motion.
II. 	Analysis
A. 	The Movant
Ms. Rousseau purports to file both of her pending motions on
behalf of herself and Scratch Kitchen. 	(ECF Nos. 70; 71). 	Because
Scratch 	Kitchen 	is 	an 	entity 	rather 	than 	an 	individual, 	however,
only 	a 	licensed 	attorney 	can 	file 	motions 	on 	its 	behalf. 	Local
Rule 101.1.a. 	Ms. Rousseau is not an attorney, so her motions are
2025 WL 1359218, at *3 (D.Md. May 9, 2025) (“It therefore appears
that 	a 	motion 	that 	seeks 	to 	vacate 	a 	judgment, 	as 	opposed 	to
correct any substantive error in a merits decision, satisfies the
[question the correctness] component of a Rule 59 motion.”), with
Guzman v. Acuarius Night Club LLC, No. 24-cv-330, 2024 WL 3593867,
at 	*4 	(D.S.C. 	July 	30, 	2024) 	(holding 	that 	the 	movant 	did 	not
question 	the 	correctness 	of 	the 	judgment 	when 	it 	raised 	various
defenses to the motion upon which judgment was entered but did not
argue that the judgment itself was erroneous). 	Ms. Rousseau does
not argue in her motion that the court’s judgment was substantively
erroneous. 	Even 	if 	Ms. 	Rousseau’s 	motion 	does 	“question 	the
correctness” of the judgment for the purpose of CODESCO, however,
and 	thus 	should 	be 	considered 	under 	Rule 	59(e), 	her 	motion 	would
still 	fail. 	A 	Rule 	59(e) 	motion 	“need 	not 	be 	granted 	unless 	the
district court finds that there has been an intervening change of
controlling 	law, 	that 	new 	evidence 	has 	become 	available, 	or 	that
there 	is 	a 	need 	to 	correct 	a 	clear 	error 	or 	prevent 	a 	manifest
injustice.” 	Robinson 	v. 	Wix 	Filtration 	Corp. 	LLC, 	599 	F.3d 	403,
411 (4th Cir. 2010). 	There is no clear error or manifest injustice
unless the movant shows that the court’s decision was “dead wrong.”
TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 194 (4 th Cir. 2009) (citation
modified). 	Ms. Rousseau does not attempt to establish any of these
grounds for relief.
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not properly brought on behalf of Scratch Kitchen. Accordingly,
the pending motions apply only to Ms. Rousseau.
B. 	Motion to Set Aside Judgment
A party against whom default judgment is entered may move to
“set 	aside 	[the] 	final 	default 	judgment 	under 	Rule 	60(b).”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c). 	Ms. Rousseau moves to set aside the judgment
under Rule 60(b) “on the basis of excusable neglect and financial
hardship.” 	(ECF No. 70 ¶ 6). 	Rule 60(b) provides six grounds of
relief 	from 	a 	final 	judgment, 	although 	the 	only 	two 	relevant 	to
this 	case 	are 	“excusable 	neglect” 	under 	Rule 	60(b)(1) 	and 	“any
other 	reason 	that 	justifies 	relief” 	under 	Rule 	60(b)(6).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). 	Because Ms. Rousseau filed her motion pro se,
the 	court 	will 	construe 	it 	liberally, 	but 	not 	so 	liberally 	as 	to
become 	her 	advocate. 	United 	States 	v. 	Wilson, 	699 	F.3d 	789, 	797
(4th 	Cir. 	2012) 	(citing 	Boag 	v. 	MacDougall, 	454 	U.S. 	364 	(1982)
(per 	curiam); 	Weller 	v. 	Dep’t 	of 	Soc. 	Servs., 	901 	F.2d 	387, 	391
(4th 	Cir. 	1990)). 	As 	will 	be 	discussed, 	Ms. 	Rousseau 	does 	not
offer a meritorious defense in her motion to set aside the judgment
and thus fails to satisfy a threshold requirement of relief under
Rule 	60(b). 	Furthermore, 	she 	cannot 	satisfy 	the 	demanding
standards of Rule 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6). 	Consequently, her motion
to set aside the judgment is unavailing.
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1. 	Rule 60(b) Threshold Conditions
“To obtain relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b),” including
from a default judgment, “a moving party must first show (1) that
the 	motion 	is 	timely, 	(2) 	that 	he 	has 	a 	meritorious 	claim 	or
defense, 	and 	(3) 	that 	the 	opposing 	party 	will 	not 	suffer 	unfair
prejudice if the judgment is set aside.” 	United States v. Welsh,
879 F.3d 530, 533 (4 th Cir. 2018) (citing Nat’l Credit Union Admin.
Bd. 	v. 	Gray, 	1 	F.3d 	262, 	264 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1993)); 	Park 	Corp. 	v.
Lexington Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 894, 895–96 (4 th Cir. 1987) (applying
these 	threshold 	requirements 	to 	a 	Rule 	60(b) 	motion 	regarding 	a
default judgment). 	Generally, only when the movant has established
that 	these 	three 	conditions 	are 	met 	will 	the 	court 	consider 	the
grounds for relief set forth in Rule 60(b).
First, 	Ms. 	Rousseau’s 	motion 	is 	timely. 	All 	Rule 	60(b)
motions “must be made within a reasonable time,” and Rule 60(b)(1)
motions 	must 	be 	made 	within 	one 	year 	of 	the 	entry 	of 	judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 	60(c)(1). 	Ms. 	Rousseau 	moved 	to 	set 	aside 	the
judgment 	under 	Rule 	60(b) 	just 	four 	days 	after 	the 	court 	entered
judgment. 	There 	is 	no 	question, 	then, 	that 	her 	motion 	was 	filed
within 	one 	year 	of 	the 	judgment 	and 	in 	a 	reasonable 	time,
satisfying this condition.
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Second, Ms. Rousseau makes no attempt in her Rule 60(b) motion
to 	offer 	a 	meritorious 	defense 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	claims. 	Instead,
her 	motion 	focuses 	on 	her 	financial 	difficulties, 	(ECF 	No. 	70),
which 	do 	not 	relate 	to 	the 	merits 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	overtime 	wage
claims 	under 	the 	FLSA 	and 	Maryland 	law. 	Therefore, 	Ms. 	Rousseau
fails to satisfy this condition.
Finally, Plaintiff likely would not suffer unfair prejudice
if 	the 	judgment 	were 	set 	aside. 	Although 	frequently 	articulated
as 	a 	requirement, 	a 	showing 	of 	unfair 	prejudice 	to 	the 	opposing
party “is of lesser importance” and “not controlling.” 	See Nat’l
Credit 	Union, 	1 	F.3d 	at 	265; 	Compton 	v. 	Alton 	Steamship 	Co., 	608
F.2d 	96, 	102 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1979). 	Unfair 	prejudice 	does 	not 	include
“the 	protraction 	of 	proceedings, 	the 	time 	and 	expense 	of 	a 	new
trial, [or] the loss of post-judgment interest.” 	Werner v. Cabo,
731 	F.2d 	204, 	207 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1984). 	Vacatur 	of 	the 	judgment 	here
would surely prolong the proceedings and cause Plaintiff to incur
additional time and expense, but without a response from Plaintiff
to 	Ms. 	Rousseau’s 	motion, 	no 	further 	prejudice 	to 	Plaintiff 	is
discernible. 	Because the consequences to Plaintiff of vacatur are
not 	of 	the 	kind 	that 	constitute 	unfair 	prejudice, 	this 	condition
is met.
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Due to Ms. Rousseau’s failure to offer a meritorious defense
in 	her 	motion, 	she 	is 	not 	entitled 	to 	relief 	under 	Rule 	60(b).
Even 	if 	Ms. 	Rousseau 	had 	satisfied 	the 	threshold 	conditions 	to
entitle 	her 	to 	Rule 	60(b) 	relief, 	however, 	she 	does 	not 	advance
viable arguments for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule 60(b)(6).
2. 	60(b)(1): Excusable Neglect
Rule 	60(b)(1) 	permits 	relief 	from 	a 	final 	judgment 	due 	to
“mistake, 	inadvertence, 	surprise, 	or 	excusable 	neglect.”
Regarding excusable neglect, courts typically distinguish between
neglect 	by 	the 	party’s 	attorney 	and 	neglect 	by 	the 	party 	itself,
granting 	relief 	far 	less 	liberally 	in 	the 	latter 	circumstance.
See Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp.,
843 	F.2d 	808, 	811 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1988). 	“When 	the 	party 	is 	at 	fault,
the 	[judicial 	system’s 	interest 	in 	finality 	and 	efficiency]
dominate[s] 	and 	the 	party 	must 	adequately 	defend 	its 	conduct 	in
order 	to 	show 	excusable 	neglect.” 	Id. 	Interpreting 	“excusable
neglect” 	in 	a 	separate 	statutory 	provision, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of
the 	United 	States 	explained 	that 	the 	determination 	must 	“tak[e]
account 	of 	all 	relevant 	circumstances,” 	including 	“the 	danger 	of
prejudice . . ., the length of the delay and its potential impact
on 	judicial 	proceedings, 	the 	reason 	for 	the 	delay, 	including
whether it was in the reasonable control of the movant, and whether
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the 	movant 	acted 	in 	good 	faith.” 	Pioneer 	Inv. 	Servs. 	Co. 	v.
Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993) (citing In
re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 943 F.2d 673, 677 (6 th Cir. 1991)); see
also In re McCain, 353 B.R. 452, 461 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 2006) (applying
Pioneer to the context of Rule 60(b)(1)).
Ms. 	Rousseau 	cannot 	establish 	excusable 	neglect—her
inadequate 	reason 	for 	her 	delay 	is 	dispositive. 	She 	has 	always
proceeded 	pro 	se, 	so 	there 	is 	no 	neglect 	to 	attribute 	to 	an
attorney. 	Under the stricter standard where the party is at fault,
she 	has 	not 	adequately 	defended 	her 	conduct. 	She 	explains 	her
failure 	to 	respond 	or 	defend 	as 	the 	consequence 	of 	her 	“economic
distress 	and 	limited 	legal 	knowledge.” 	(ECF 	No. 	70 	¶ 	2). 	But
“mere 	financial 	hardship 	[is] 	insufficient 	justification 	for
vacating 	a 	final 	judgment 	under 	Rule 	60(b).” 	Randall 	v. 	Merrill
Lynch, 	820 	F.2d 	1317, 	1321 	(D.C. 	Cir. 	1987). 	Likewise, 	limited
legal 	knowledge, 	even 	when 	asserted 	by 	a 	pro 	se 	litigant, 	is
insufficient 	to 	establish 	excusable 	neglect. 	See, 	e.g., 	Nash 	v.
Bd. of Educ., No. 99-cv-9611, 2018 WL 2316337, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May
8, 	2018) 	(“[A] 	litigant’s 	unfamiliarity 	with 	the 	legal 	system 	or
ignorance 	of 	the 	law 	cannot 	form 	the 	basis 	for 	relief 	under 	Rule
60(b)(1) . . . [and] is no more excusable because he proceeded pro
se[.]” (collecting cases)). 	In fact, Ms. Rousseau has demonstrated
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legal 	knowledge 	throughout 	this 	litigation 	by 	filing 	a 	timely
motion 	to 	dismiss 	that 	this 	court 	found 	partially 	meritorious,
(ECF 	Nos. 	20; 	42, 	at 	17–19), 	as 	well 	as 	a 	motion 	to 	vacate 	the
clerk’s 	entry 	of 	default 	against 	her, 	(ECF 	No. 	59). 	Economic
distress and limited legal knowledge no more give rise to excusable
neglect when considered jointly than when considered individually.
A contrary conclusion would undermine the finality of any judgment
involving 	an 	economically 	disadvantaged 	pro 	se 	litigant. 	See
Augusta 	Fiberglass, 	843 	F.2d 	at 	811 	(explaining 	that 	when 	the
party, 	rather 	than 	his 	attorney, 	is 	at 	fault, 	“the 	judicial
system’s need for finality . . . dominate[s]”).
Consequently, Ms. Rousseau’s motion to set aside the judgment
under Rule 60(b)(1) for excusable neglect fails.
3. 	60(b)(6): Catchall
Ms. Rousseau does not explicitly invoke Rule 60(b)(6), which
provides 	for 	relief 	from 	a 	final 	judgment 	for 	“any 	other 	reason
that 	justifies 	relief,” 	but 	her 	emphasis 	on 	financial 	hardship
suggests 	that 	she 	intended 	to 	do 	so. 	(ECF 	No. 	70 	¶¶ 	2–5). 	Rule
60(b)(6) 	places 	a 	particularly 	heavy 	burden 	on 	the 	moving 	party,
requiring 	a 	demonstration 	of 	“extraordinary 	circumstances” 	to
justify 	relief. 	See 	Aikens 	v. 	Ingram, 	652 	F.3d 	496, 	500–01 	(4 th
Cir. 	2011) 	(citing 	Liljeberg 	v. 	Health 	Servs. 	Acquisition 	Corp.,
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486 	U.S. 	847, 	863 	n.11, 	864 	(1988)). 	Ms. 	Rousseau 	explains 	that
she 	has 	no 	significant 	assets 	and 	relies 	on 	family 	for 	personal
support 	and 	to 	provide 	for 	her 	children. 	(ECF 	No. 	70 	¶¶ 	3–5).
Financial 	hardship, 	however, 	is 	common 	rather 	than 	extraordinary
and 	cannot 	meet 	the 	demanding 	standard 	of 	Rule 	60(b)(6). 	See,
e.g., 	S.E.C. 	v. 	SBM 	Inv. 	Certificates, 	Inc., 	No. 	06-cv-866-DKC,
2011 	WL 	5974566, 	at 	*2 	(D.Md. 	Nov. 	28, 	2011) 	(holding 	that 	a
party’s 	financial 	inability 	to 	comply 	with 	a 	consent 	judgment 	is
not 	an 	extraordinary 	circumstance); 	Long 	v. 	Carberry, 	151 	F.R.D.
240, 	245 	(S.D.N.Y. 	1993) 	(“These 	personal 	problems—illness 	and
financial hardship—although evocative of sympathy, do not rise to
the 	level 	of 	extraordinary 	circumstances 	contemplated 	by 	Rule
60(b)(6).” (citation modified)). 	Accordingly, Ms. Rousseau is not
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
C. 	Motion to Permit Satisfaction Through Installment
Payments
If 	her 	motion 	to 	set 	aside 	the 	judgment 	is 	denied, 	Ms.
Rousseau 	requests 	that 	the 	court 	allow 	her 	“to 	satisfy 	[the]
judgment through monthly installment payments of $100 . . . until
the judgment is paid in full.” 	(ECF No. 70 ¶ 7). 	It is not within
the 	court’s 	power 	to 	approve 	such 	a 	payment 	schedule 	on 	the
judgment 	debtor’s 	motion 	in 	a 	case 	of 	this 	sort; 	rather, 	that 	is
a 	matter 	for 	the 	parties 	to 	work 	out 	among 	themselves. 	If
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Plaintiff 	proceeds 	to 	enforce 	the 	judgment 	through 	attachment 	or
garnishment 	proceedings, 	Ms. 	Rousseau 	may 	seek 	to 	exempt 	such
property 	as 	is 	permissible 	under 	federal 	and 	Maryland 	law. 	See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 407; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-504;
Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 15-601.1.
D. 	Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment
Because 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	attempted 	to 	enforce 	the 	judgment
prior 	to 	this 	opinion, 	Ms. 	Rousseau’s 	motion 	to 	stay 	enforcement
of the judgment is now denied as moot.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Rousseau’s motion to set aside
judgment or, in the alternative, to permit satisfaction of judgment
through installment payments and her motion to stay enforcement of
judgment will be denied. 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
Case 8:23-cv-02461-DKC Document 73 Filed 12/23/25 Page 12 of 12

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