Reeves v. University of Maryland Capital Region Health

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
STELLA REEVES
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 23-2169
:
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
CAPITAL REGION HEALTH 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently 	pending 	and 	ready 	for 	resolution 	in 	this 	case
asserting violations of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor
Act, 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1395dd 	(“EMTALA”), 	is 	the 	motion 	for
reconsideration 	filed 	by 	Stella 	Reeves 	(“Plaintiff”). 	(ECF 	No.
37). 	The 	issues 	have 	been 	briefed, 	and 	the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no
hearing 	being 	deemed 	necessary. 	Local 	Rule 	105.6. 	For 	the
following reasons, the motion will be denied.1
Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	reconsideration 	was 	filed 	within
twenty-eight days of the court’s summary judgment decision and is
therefore 	governed 	by 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	59(e). 	Mian 	v. 	LoanCare
Servicing 	Co., 	No. 	21-cv-2419-DKC, 	2022 	WL 	1538626, 	at 	*1 	(D.Md.
May 16, 2022). 	“Reconsideration is an ‘extraordinary remedy,’ to
be 	used 	‘sparingly,’ 	available 	on 	only 	three 	grounds: 	1) 	an
intervening 	change 	in 	controlling 	law; 	2) 	previously 	unavailable
1 The factual background is set forth in full in the court’s
summary judgment opinion. 	(ECF No. 35, at 1–3).
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evidence; or 3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice.” 	JTH 	Tax, 	Inc. 	v. 	Aime, 	984 	F.3d 	284, 	290 	(4 th 	Cir.
2021) 	(quoting 	and 	citing 	Pac. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Am. 	Nat’l 	Fire 	Ins.
Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4 th Cir. 1998)). 	A Rule 59(e) motion “may
not 	be 	used 	to 	relitigate 	old 	matters, 	or 	to 	raise 	arguments 	or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” 	Pac. 	Ins. 	Co., 	148 	F.3d 	at 	403 	(quoting 	11 	Wright 	&
Miller’s 	Federal 	Practice 	& 	Procedure 	§ 	2810.1 	(2 d 	ed. 	1995)).
Where a party presents newly discovered evidence in support of its
Rule 	59(e) 	motion, 	it 	“must 	produce 	a 	‘legitimate 	justification
for 	not 	presenting’ 	the 	evidence 	during 	the 	earlier 	proceeding.”
Id. (quoting Small v. Hunt, 98 F.3d 789, 798 (4 th Cir. 1996)).
Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	reconsideration 	provides 	the 	same
factual 	narrative 	as 	the 	one 	before 	the 	court 	at 	the 	summary
judgment stage, and it rehashes the same arguments.2 	With respect
to the summary judgment decision, Plaintiff does not argue a change
2 	Additionally, 	Plaintiff 	takes 	issue 	with 	the 	court’s
decision 	to 	decide 	the 	summary 	judgment 	motions 	without 	an 	oral
hearing. 	(ECF No. 37, at 1, 23). 	But this practice is permitted
by 	the 	local 	and 	federal 	rules 	and 	not 	contrary 	to 	due 	process.
Local 	Rule 	105.6 	(“Unless 	otherwise 	ordered 	by 	the 	Court, 	. 	. 	.
all motions shall be decided on the memoranda without a hearing.”);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 	78(b) 	(“By 	rule 	or 	order, 	the 	court 	may 	provide 	for
submitting 	and 	determining 	motions 	on 	briefs, 	without 	oral
hearings.”); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson, 334 F.2d 464, 467
(4th Cir. 1964) (“[A] hearing on motions filed in a district court
is 	not 	required 	by 	considerations 	of 	due 	process.” 	(collecting
cases)).
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in 	controlling 	law, 	raise 	previously 	unavailable 	evidence, 	or
identify a clear error of law or manifest injustice. 	Instead, she
simply 	disagrees 	with 	the 	decision. 	Disagreement, 	however, 	is
insufficient 	to 	justify 	the 	extraordinary 	remedy 	that 	Rule 	59(e)
offers.
After 	University 	of 	Maryland 	Capital 	Region 	Health
(“Defendant”) 	observed 	in 	its 	opposition 	that 	Plaintiff 	had 	not
argued 	any 	of 	the 	three 	grounds 	for 	reconsideration, 	Plaintiff
sought 	to 	address 	those 	grounds 	for 	the 	first 	time 	in 	her 	reply
brief. 	The 	general 	rule 	is 	that 	“new 	arguments 	cannot 	be 	raised
in a reply brief.” 	De Simone v. VSL Pharms., Inc., 36 F.4th 518,
531 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193,
197 	(4th 	Cir. 	2013)). 	That 	being 	said, 	Plaintiff 	is 	pro 	se, 	and
“trial courts are encouraged to liberally treat procedural errors
made 	by 	pro 	se 	litigants.” 	Bauer 	v. 	Comm’r, 	97 	F.3d 	45, 	49 	(4 th
Cir. 	1996). 	Therefore, 	the 	court 	will 	consider 	Plaintiff’s 	new
arguments raised in her reply brief. 	Although she still does not
contend 	that 	there 	was 	any 	change 	in 	controlling 	law, 	Plaintiff
does purport to offer “previously unavailable” evidence. 	She also
generally argues that the summary judgment decision contains clear
errors of law causing manifest injustice.
The 	“previously 	unavailable” 	evidence 	that 	Plaintiff 	brings
forward is the fact that she was previously employed by Defendant
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as an emergency room registration clerk, for which she was trained
that 	all 	patients 	seeking 	emergency 	medical 	treatment 	must 	be
“immediately” 	triaged. 	(ECF 	No. 	39, 	at 	2, 	4). 	Not 	only 	was 	the
evidence 	of 	her 	prior 	employment 	by 	Defendant 	previously
available, but Plaintiff also included it in her amended complaint.
There, she explained that she was “a prior emergency room medical
registration 	clerk” 	at 	University 	of 	Maryland 	Capital 	Region
Health, 	where 	she 	was 	“trained 	. 	. 	. 	to 	thoroughly 	[e]xamine 	and
[s]creen and evaluate each and every patient.” 	(ECF No. 5 ¶ 37).
She 	further 	alleged 	that 	she 	was 	“extremely 	familiar 	with 	the
appropriate 	standard 	[for] 	screening 	and 	examination.” 	(Id. 	¶
42). 	The 	resume 	attached 	to 	her 	amended 	complaint 	corroborated
her 	work 	experience 	in 	various 	Maryland 	hospitals 	from 	2010–2019
as 	an 	emergency 	room 	registration 	clerk, 	among 	other 	positions.
(Id. at 20–21).
The 	only 	new 	evidence, 	then, 	is 	that 	Plaintiff 	had 	been
trained 	to 	triage 	patients 	seeking 	emergency 	medical 	treatment
“immediately.” 	Evidence 	was 	previously 	unavailable 	only 	if 	it
could “not have been discoverable prior to judgment by the exercise
of 	reasonable 	due 	diligence.” 	JTH 	Tax, 	984 	F.3d 	at 	292 	(citing
Boryan 	v. 	United 	States, 	884 	F.2d 	767, 	771 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1989)). 	At
least 	superficially, 	the 	fact 	that 	Plaintiff 	was 	trained 	by
Defendant 	to 	render 	“immediate” 	triage 	was 	discoverable 	through
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her 	own 	reasonable 	due 	diligence, 	especially 	given 	that 	she
mentioned 	her 	training 	in 	her 	amended 	complaint. 	She 	argues,
however, 	that 	this 	evidence 	was 	“previously 	unavailable” 	to 	her
because 	the 	head 	trauma 	she 	suffered 	during 	the 	emergency 	room
visit 	in 	question 	has 	permanently 	affected 	her 	memory, 	and 	she
only 	recovers 	certain 	memories 	when 	her 	children 	remind 	her 	of
them. 	(ECF 	No. 	39, 	at 	2–3). 	It 	is 	possible 	that 	“recovered
memories 	may 	qualify 	as 	new 	evidence 	which 	‘could 	not 	have 	been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.’” 	In
re 	Stewart, 	78 	F.4th 	690, 	704 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2023) 	(Gregory, 	J.,
concurring 	in 	part 	and 	concurring 	in 	the 	judgment) 	(quoting 	28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)).
Even 	assuming 	that 	the 	court 	may 	consider 	the 	content 	of
Plaintiff’s 	previous 	training 	by 	Defendant 	as 	an 	emergency 	room
registration 	clerk, 	Plaintiff 	must 	still 	show 	that 	this 	new
evidence 	would 	have 	changed 	the 	outcome. 	See 	Am. 	Bar 	Ass’n 	v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 388 F.Supp.3d 23, 26 (D.D.C. 2019). 	She does
not 	do 	so. 	Plaintiff’s 	duty-to-screen 	claim 	under 	EMTALA 	was
deficient on summary judgment because she did not produce evidence
that Defendant “either (1) screened her differently than it would
screen any patient in her condition, or (2) that it deviated from
its 	own 	standard 	screening 	policy 	when 	it 	examined 	Plaintiff.”
(ECF 	No. 	35, 	at 	11). 	The 	fact 	that 	Defendant 	once 	trained
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Plaintiff at an unspecified date to triage patients seeking medical
care 	“immediately” 	does 	not 	cure 	these 	deficiencies. 	The
requirement that triage be “immediate” is a vague instruction and
one that does not inherently contain a set time limit. 	The measure
of what the hospital means by “immediate” is its average response
time 	to 	patients 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	condition. 	See 	Bergwall 	v. 	MGH
Health 	Servs., 	Inc., 	243 	F.Supp.2d 	364, 	372 	(D.Md. 	2002)
(explaining 	that 	a 	hospital 	satisfies 	its 	duty 	to 	screen 	if 	“the
hospital 	‘acts 	in 	the 	same 	manner 	as 	it 	would 	have 	for 	the 	usual
paying 	patient’” 	(quoting 	Cleland 	v. 	Bronson 	Health 	Care 	Grp.,
Inc., 	917 	F.2d 	266, 	272 	(6 th 	Cir. 1990))). 	Plaintiff 	still 	fails
to 	prove 	that 	Defendant 	deviated 	from 	its 	own 	standard 	screening
policy 	as 	it 	existed 	the 	day 	of 	her 	hospital 	visit. 	Finally,
Plaintiff’s 	claim 	continues 	to 	suffer 	from 	a 	lack 	of 	expert
testimony. 	(ECF 	No. 	35, 	at 	5 	(“Plaintiff 	was 	required 	to 	come
forward 	with 	record 	evidence, 	including 	expert 	testimony,
sufficient 	to 	sustain 	her 	burden 	of 	proof, 	and 	she 	has 	not 	done
so.”)). 	For 	these 	reasons, 	Plaintiff’s 	provision 	of 	“previously
unavailable” evidence is insufficient to warrant relief under Rule
59(e).
Plaintiff 	also 	repeatedly 	remarks 	that 	the 	summary 	judgment
opinion 	contained 	clear 	errors 	of 	law 	that 	work 	a 	manifest
injustice. 	(ECF 	No. 	39, 	at 	1, 	3, 	6, 	11). 	She 	does 	not 	identify
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any 	particular 	error 	of 	law, 	however, 	and 	her 	disagreement 	with
the outcome provides no ground for relief.
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for
reconsideration will be denied. 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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