Carranza v. County Council for Howard County, Maryland

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
AMANKAYA CARRANZA 	*
*
Plaintiff,
*
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-3144-JMC
*
COUNTY COUNCIL FOR
HOWARD COUNTY, MARYLAND. 	*
Defendants 	*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Amankaya Carranza 	September 12,
2025, against her former employer, County Council for Howard County, Maryland. (ECF No. 1).
The lawsuit arises from alleged disability discrimination. 	Id. 	Plaintiff asserts unlawful failure to
accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (the
- 	1;
unlawful disability discrimination under the ADA (Count II); and unlawful retaliation violations
of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 749(b) (Count III). (ECF No. 1). Presently before the Court
is Defendant 	Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 14).
The motion has been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 14, 15, 18) and no hearing is necessary. 	See 	Loc. R.
105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons set forth herein,
alternative, for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) shall be GRANTED.
1 	Plaintiff does not cite to any statute under the Failure to Accommodate claim; however, from what the Court can
Compare 	(ECF Nos. 1, ECF No. 15). Plaintiff does not make any indication that she seeks redress under MFEPA
under Count II or Count III. Thus, the Court considers MFEPA only with respect to Count I.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Defendant employed Plaintiff as an administrative assistant since October 30, 2023. (ECF
Nos. 1 at 2; 14-3 ).2
included the following tasks:
Provides senior technical level administrative support for the Executive
Assistant (Board Administrator), Zoning Board, Board of Appeals, Board of
License 	Commissioners, 	Alcoholic 	Beverage 	Hearing 	Board, 	and 	Hearing
Examiner.
Receives applications, petitions, reports, records and other materials and
reviews same for completeness, accuracy and sufficiency for further processing and
processes 	same; 	assembles 	additional data as 	necessary; 	maintains 	complex
records.
Researches submitted information for verification as needed; coordinates
the collection of additional data related to pending applications/cases.
Serves as an initial point of contact with the public and media to ascertain
needs and assemble information or arrange a response to inquiries. Manages Public
Information Act request. Investigates and follows up on citizen complaints and
inquiries.
Schedules 	meetings; 	and 	maintains 	schedules 	for 	Boards, 	Hearing
Examiner, Executive Assistant and/or Council Administrator; prepares agendas;
verifies proper notice of meetings.
Sets up, monitors, records, streams, attends and provides staff/technical
assistance for Council and board meetings as required, (including night meetings).
Operates the Council Control Room for live multi-camera productions,
Prepares, updates and maintains video graphics for streamed productions.
Supports recordkeeping functions by maintaining case files, documentation
of exhibits, logs, journals, files, other permanent legislative, council records,
Decision and Orders of the Boards. Distributing documents upon request and
posting online.
Develops, updates, and maintains content for Council and/or Board social
media / webpages, including conversion of audio recordings and video of meetings.
2 	When the Court cites to a specific page number or range of page numbers, the Court is referring to the page numbers
provided in the electronic filing stamps located at the top of every electronically filed document. Where a document
does not have an electronic filing stamp, the Court is referring to the page numbers at the bottom of the document.
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Provides 	general 	secretarial 	support 	including; 	drafts 	and/or 	edits
correspondence, resolutions, briefing. Decision and Orders, and other written
materials for own, or members of the Council Office.
Processes forms, such as expense vouchers, travel approval, and other
documents in accordance with County and Council policies.
Greets Council guests, answers telephone inquiries, and provides public
information as directed.
Acts in back up capacity to the Executive Assistant in all Board functions
or functions of payroll, ordering, accounting, enrolling legislation and other duties
as assigned by the Council Administrator.
(ECF No. 14-4).
Plaintiff alleges she suffered an ankle injury on November 9, 2024, that required surgery.
(ECF No. 1 at 2). 	On November 16, 2024, Plaintiff submitted Family and Medical Leave Act
Michelle Harrod. (ECF No. 14-6). Plaintiff requested a Full-Time Absence from November 12,
2024, to December 2, 2024. 	Id
- 	pacity and treatment spanning from November
11, 2024 to January 7, 2025. 	Id. 	at 5. The doctor further indicated Plaintiff would not be able to
sit, stand, walk, drive, bend, stoop, twist, or crouch for extended periods of time after surgery. 	Id.
at 7. 	, and
Plaintiff was permitted to take leave from November 19, 2024, to January 7, 2025. (ECF No. 14-
7).
After surgery, Plaintiff alleges she was unable to walk and suffered from extensive mobility
challenges. (ECF No. 1 at 2). 	Plaintiff asserts that she soon requested a telework accommodation
during her recovery period. 	Id. 	On November 26, 2024, Plaintiff forwarded an email to the Office
-9). In that letter, Dr. Hoffler
[p]atient had surgery on 11/19/24 on her left ankle. Patient must be allowed to telework
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from home starting 12/2/24 	Id. 	Afterwards, Ms. Harrod
and the public. It is impossible to complete [all of her] job responsibilities. 	Are we required to
fulfill this accommodation? 	(ECF No. 14-10) (emphasis in original). Several more emails ensued,
in-person contact and an in-office presence in order for the
(ECF No. 14-11). On November 27, 2024, a senior administrative analysis in OHR
emailed Plaintiff regarding a factual 	note and the medical
note he sent in support of 	telework request. (ECF No. 14-12). Specifically,
Dr. Hoffler indicated that Plaintiff suffered
and OHR sought clarification regarding her incapacitation status. 	See id. 	The OHR also indicated,
Temporary requests for telework can be considered when the employee is not
incapacitated, 	and 	the 	job 	duties 	lend 	themselves 	to 	telework. 	Supervisors
determine the duties that can be performed remotely. Our understanding from your
management team is that many of your duties require you to be in the office.
Nevertheless, we will review your request along with additional information that is
needed to make a determination with your department.
Id.
On December 13, 2024, the OHR followed up with Plaintiff and asked her to obtain
additional forms from Dr. Hoffler so they could evaluate her telework request. (ECF No. 14-13).
While the letter from Dr. Hoffler was pending, Ms. Harrod sent an email on Decmember 16, 2024,
to OHR with suggestions of a few projects Plaintiff could perform remotely. 	(ECF No. 14-14).
Id. 	Additionally, Ms. Harrod
noted that the suggested projects would require only forty work hours and therefore would not
, which was over a month. 	Id. 	On December 17, 2024,
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11/19/24-1/7/25. 	-15). Then, the OHR
notified Plaintiff that,
until January 8th. We cannot allow you to work, even part time from home, with
01/07/2025.
(ECF No. 14-16).
On January 2, 2025, Plaintiff submitted an additional FMLA request, which sought leave
until February 10, 2025. (ECF No. 14-17). She also requested information from OHR regarding
short term disability benefits. (ECF No. 14-18). On January 3, 2025, OHR
short term disability benefits request, informing that because 	injury and subsequent
disability occurred before the start of her benefits election date, she would not be able to obtain
them. (ECF No. 14-19). On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff emailed Ms. Harrod and OHR indicating
due to ongoing health
concerns resulting from [her] 	(ECF No. 14- 	fter careful consideration
and consultation with my healthcare team, I have come to the difficult decision that resigning is
the best course of action for my health as I am unable to perform the physical demands of the
current position. 	Id.
Plaintiff asserts in the Complaint that
(ECF No. 1
at 2).
reasonable accommodation, including through remote work as she could have been able to
complete her duties from home without limitations caused by her motility issues. 	Id. 	at 4. Plaintiff
does not describe any of the purported duties she could have performed from home. 	See id. 	She
avers, 	[i]
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Id. 	that she had no other choice and was being forced out of her
position by Defendant, Plaintiff was constructively discharged and likewise resigned on or about
Id. 	Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal
19, 2025. 	Id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
of Civil Procedure 56. (ECF No. 12).
Blakely v.
Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 611 (4th Cir. 2013), 	as amended 	(Oct. 22, 2013). Summary judgment is
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 246-47
(4th Cir. 2002); 	see also Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986))).
All parties must be given some indication by the Court that it is treating a pleading filed in
Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177
(4th Cir. 1985). 	When the moving party styles its responsive motion as a motion for summary
judgment, as is the case here, and attaches additional materials to its motion, the non-moving party
is considered notified, and the Court may treat the motion as one for summary judgment. 	See
Laughlin v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260 	61 (4th Cir. 1998).
Id.; 	see also Sol v. M&T Bank, No. 8:22-CV-02999-AAQ,
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2024 WL 327086, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2024) (collecting cases). 	Under such circumstances, it
-moving party into a fencing match without
, 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th
because the party needs discovery to properly oppose the motion, the party should file a Rule 56(d)
affidavit informing the cou 	Sol
Id. 	(quoting 	Woodbury v. Victory Van Lines,
286 F. Supp. 3d 685, 693 (D. Md. 2017)). Plaintiff has not filed a Rule 56(d) affidavit or indicated
what additional documents, if any, she seeks to review during discovery.
In light of
motion as a motion for summary judgment is premature at this time; it cannot be said that Plaintiff
is forced into a fencing match without a sword or mask. 	McCray, 741 F.3d at 483. 	The notice
discovery is necessary to resolve the present motion 	or even the instant litigation. 	See Morris v.
Carvajal, Civil Action No.: TDC-20-2420, 2021 WL 1928419, at *1 (D. Md. May 13, 2021)
not argue discovery was necessary to resolve the motion). Both parties attached emails, affidavits,
photos, and other evidence 	to their filings. (ECF
Nos. 14-3 	14-22; 15-2 	15-6; 18-1 	18-2). 	The record contains numerous documents and
description; email correspondence
relating to how exactly the Defendant processed her accommodation requests; affidavits pertaining
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and FMLA leave documentation. Moreover, several of these documents are not of the type that
could typically be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. 	Shields v. Verizon Md., LLC, No. 1:23-CV-02932-JMC, 2024 WL 1050996, at *4 (D.
Md. Mar. 11, 2024) 	Those limited circumstances are matters of public record, documents
explicitly incorporated into a complaint by reference or attached to the complaint as exhibits, or
any document submitted by the movant that was not attached to or expressly incorporated in a
complaint, so long as the document was integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the
document 	s authenticity.
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
evidence is such that a reasonable
J.E. Dunn Const. Co. v. S.R.P. Dev. Ltd.
, 115 F. Supp. 3d 593, 600 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A nonmov
Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens
Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing 	Scott
v. Harris
obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding
Heckman v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 	800 (D. Md. 2013)
(quoting 	Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778 	79 (4th Cir. 1993)). Consequently, a party cannot
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create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences.
See Deans v. CSX Transp., Inc., 152 F.3d 326, 330 	31 (4th Cir. 1998).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A.
for the First Time in her Opposition Motion.
As an initial matter, the Motion to Dismiss memoranda raise a concern regarding an un-
pled allegation referenced 	-4). Although the complaint makes
reference only to one requested accommodation (telework) in addition to FMLA leave, Plaintiff
indicates for the first time in her Opposition Motion that she requested a wheelchair as an
alternative accommodation. 	Id.
Id. 	Plaintiff relies on
her affidavit in support of her new failure to accommodate issue. (ECF No. 15 at 8).
In the Fourth Circuit, a plaintiff
Zachair Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F.
Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D. Md. 1997), 	aff'd, 141 F.3d 1162 (4th Cir. 1998). 	Indeed, many courts
at the motion to dismiss stage. 	E.g., 	Burroughs v. Dorsey Run Corr., Civil Action No. GLR-23-
1223, 2024 WL 3832346, at *1 n.4 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 2024) (holding a plaintiff to the allegations
in its complaint when construing a motion to dismiss as a motion as a motion for summary
judgment); 	see also 	Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo
axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to
Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984)
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abrogated by Schmees v. HC1.Com, Inc., 	3 	77 F.4th 	483, 489 (7th Cir. 2023))), 	aff'd, 2 F.3d 56 (4th
Cir. 1993).
Here, Plaintiff refers to an alleged wheelchair accommodation request for the first time in
her opposition
accommodation also constitutes an ADA violation. (ECF No. 15 at 8). However, Plaintiff does
not include any reference to a wheelchair request in the Complaint. 	See 	(ECF No. 1). Plaintiff does
not even plead that she made certain other accommodation requests in addition to telework. 	Id.
Moreover, the record is devoid of
a wheelchair, including medical records. Therefore, the Court declines to consider the wheelchair
argument as a basis for 	failure to accommodate claim at this juncture. 	Burroughs, 2024
WL 3832346, at *1 n.4
denial of a wheelchair allegation, she must follow the procedures set forth under Rules 8 or 15 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	Zachair, 965 F. Supp. At 748 n.4.
3 	In 	Schmees v. HC1.Com, Inc., 	the Seventh Circuit recognized that the purported prohibition against considering
additional claims in a brief stems from 	Chambliss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 274 F.Supp. 401 (E.D. Tenn. 1967),
Schmees, 77 F.4th at 489
(quoting 	Chambliss, 274 F.Supp. at 409). 	Thus, the court indicated despite wholehearted agreement with the
Chambliss 	Id. 	(collecting cases). 	In so doing, the
Schmees 	court opened a door to rare scenarios in which constructive motions for leave to amend may be implicated
by brief arguments. 	Id.; see also Adams v. C3 Pipeline Construction Inc., 30 F.4th 943, 971 (10th Cir. 2021)
cases interpret the inclusion of new allegations in a response to a motion for summary judgment as a potential request
onsidered the 	Schmees
or 	Adams 	holding. However, many post-Schmees 	cases in this district still rely on language quoted from 	Car Carriers,
Inc. 	E.g.,
McDowell v. iCaddilus, 	Inc., Case No. MJM-22-3172, 2024 WL 2816054, at *1 n.2 (D. Md. May 30, 2024) (citing
, 770 F. Supp. 1053, 1068 (4th Cir. 1991));
Servs., Civil No. TJS-23-2095, 2025 WL 1837402, at *15 (D. Md. July 2, 2025).
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B.
Undisputed Evidence Shows Plaintiff was Accommodated with Medical Leave
in a Job That Required an In-Office Presence She Could Not Fulfill.
against a qualified individual
Defendant argues Plaintiff 	failure to
accommodate claim fails as a matter of law
showing that she could perform the essential functions of her administrative assistant position with
(ECF No. 14-1 at 8). To
that end, Plaintiff argues in a conclusory fashion that her essential job duties could be completed
unspecified roles4
-4). Defendant also argues that it had no obligation to provide telework
as an accommodation because granting FMLA leave constitutes a reasonable accommodation in
-1 at 12).
she was an individual with a disability within the meaning of the statute; (2) that the employer had
notice of her disability; (3) that with reasonable accommodation she could perform the essential
CSRA, 12 F.4th 396, 414 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting 	Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. Cts., 780 F.3d 562,
579 (4th Cir. 2015)); 	Wilson v. Dollar General Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013).
to be reasonable, the accommodation must be effective (i.e., it must address the job-related
difficulties presented by the employee's disability), and it must allow the employee to attain an
4 	The Complaint also fails to specify which employees worked remotely. 	See 	(ECF No. 1).
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-disabled individual in the
Fleetwood v. Harford Sys. Inc., 380 F.Supp.2d 688, 699
(D.Md.2005) (citation omitted).
and (2) prove that it is reasonable. 	Smith, 12 F.4th 	at 414.
1. 	The Undisputed Evidence Shows Plaintiff Could Not Have Performed the
Essential Functions of Her Job Via Telework Her Job Required an In Person
Presence and Her Doctor Indicated She was Incapacitated During Her
Recovery.
, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994)
(quoting 	Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 	94 (5th Cir. 1993)); 	Jacobs, 780 F.3d at
579 	80. A reasonable accommodation
environment under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an
individual with a disability who is qualified
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).
Tyndall,
31 F.3d at 213. Here, Plaintiff alleges full time telework would allow her to perform the essential
functions of her job, without specifying in the Complaint or arguing in her brief how that would
be the case or which tasks she could perform from home.
To that end, Courts have been reluctant to conclude in a non-pandemic setting that full-
time telework is a reasonable accommodation. 	See, e.g., 	Davis v. Lockheed Martin Operations
Support, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 (D. Md. 2000) (recognizing that telework accommodations
-
Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 213); 	Broussard v. Panetta, No. CIV. CCB-11-3401, 2013
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WL 45902, at *8 (D. Md. Jan. 2, 2013) (indicating presence at the worksite is an essential function
absent unusual circumstances). Defendant correctly points out that
essential functions of a position, the ADA requires the Court to look at ... [the] employer's
(ECF No. 14-1 at 9) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111
description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be
considered 	42 U.S.C. § 12111; 	see also Elledge v.
, 979 F.3d 1004, 1009 (4th Cir. 2020)
However, at the summary judgment stage, the
employer's judgment will not be dispositive regarding whether a function is essential when
evidence on the issue is 	Kande v. Dimensions Health Corp., Case No.: GJH-18-2306,
2020 WL 7054771, at *10 (D. Md. Dec. 2, 2020) (citing 	Feldman v. Olin Corp., 692 F.3d 748,
755 (7th Cir. 2012)).
After thorough review, it is unclear how Plaintiff believes she could have performed her
job duties remotely. In support of her conclusory assertion that she could have done so, Plaintiff
points to the COVID-19 pandemic. (ECF No. 15 at 8). However, the Court finds this argument
unavailing, as the COVID-19 pandemic presented an unprecedented situation that required most
employees to work from home during a global state of emergency. 	See Davis, 84 F. Supp. 2d 707,
713 (D. Md. 2000) (noting that in the Fourth Circuit, attendance at work is presumed to be an
; 	Broussard, 2013 WL 45902, at *8.
doctor indicated would not be able to sit, stand, walk, drive, bend, stoop, twist, or couch for the
months in which she underwent treatment for her ankle. (ECF No. 14-
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-01/07/25. The patient is unfit to work in
the current job. 	(ECF No. 14-15). In her resignation letter, Plaintiff herself stated that she could
fter careful consideration and
consultation with my healthcare team, I have come to the difficult decision that resigning is the
best course of action for my health as I am unable to perform the physical demands of the current
position. 	-20).
Plaintiff does not even plead, let alone describe facts in her brief, that explain which tasks
she could perform from home or how her job duties were allocated day-to-day. 	See 	(ECF No. 1,
15); 	see also Davis, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (D. Md. 2000); 	Broussard, 2013 WL 45902, at *8. By
contrast, 	, which clearly
requires an in-person presence for setting up the physical technical equipment for the Council and
board meetings, physically operating the Council Control Room, and greeting Council guests.
(ECF No. 14-4 at 2).
Id. 	Taking all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is conceivable that certain
tasks like research, calendar maintenance, and other data-related tasks could be performed
remotely. 	See id. 	Of course, where
-person contact and an in-
, 	such statements are not dispositive at the summary judgment stage. 	Kande,
2020 WL 7054771, at *10; (ECF Nos. 14-10, 14-11).
Even still, Plaintiff does not point to any facts that creates a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether in-person tasks were an essential function of her job. She does not dispute that her
job required her to interact with the board members and the public or to set up the board room.
See generally 	(ECF No. 15). Moreover, she does not dispute that her own doctor told Defendant
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-15). 	She expresses vague
disagreement with the notion that she could not have performed the essential duties of her job, but
she provides only speculative arguments about the COVID-19 pandemic and her conclusory
assertion that she could have fulfilled all duties remotely. (ECF Nos. 1, 15-4). 	Based on the
undisputed evidence available to the Court, there is no genuine dispute that
an in-person presence to perform at least some of her essential duties and could not be
accommodated by full-time telework from November to January. 	Davis, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 713
(D. Md. 2000); 	Broussard, 2013 WL 45902, at *8.
statements to the contrary fail to create a genuine issue of material fact, even construing all
inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
claim fails as a matter of law.
2. 	Defendant Accommodated Plaintiff by way of Granting Plaintiff Leave
Under the FMLA and Is Not Required to Grant a Specific Accommodation
.
Even 	if 	a 	telework 	accommodation 	could 	be 	considered 	reasonable 	under 	these
circumstances, the ultimate discretion to choose among reasonable accommodations rests with the
employer. 	See Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 789 F.3d 407, 416 (4th Cir. 2015); 	Hankins
v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir.1996) 	[T]he employer providing the accommodation
has the ultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations and may choose the less
Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at
406 (2014)). The ADA authorizes unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation under certain
circumstances
Indeed,
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Defendant correctly asserts that regulatory guidance for the ADA clarifies that
of a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o). Defendant points to 	Hannah
v. United Parcel Service, Inc., which is also instructive here. 	Hannah v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., 72 F.4th 630, 637 (4th Cir. 2023). 	In 	Hannah
buttocks precluded him from performing his job. 	Id. 	at 634. Instead of permitting the plaintiff to
perform a paid position that did not require him to drive a delivery truck consistent with his
accommodation request, the defendant placed him on an unpaid leave of absence until his injuries
healed. 	Id.
Id. 	Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that a period of unpaid leave was a
where the disability that interferes with an employee's capacity to
complete assigned tasks is temporary and there is reason to believe that a leave of absence will
Id. 	at 637.
See id.
Hannah. 	Indeed,
-person
a January 7, 2025, return to work date. (ECF Nos. 14-6, 14-7, 14-9). 	Similar to the 	Hannah
plaintiff, Plaintiff here fails to point to any reason as to why granting her medical leave is an
unreasonable accommodation for a temporary disability that precluded her from working on-site.
See 	(ECF Nos. 1, 15). Plaintiff concedes that Defendant provided her a leave of absence and that
she sought out and received FMLA leave. (ECF No. 1, 15); 	Hannah, 72 F.4th at 637. From what
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would have preferred a different accommodation of his choosing. 	Id. 	As Defendant points out,
the 	Hannah 	court found that unpaid leave was a reasonable accommodation when the 	Hannah
plaintiff did not apply for it and even objected to it. 	Id. 	By contrast, Plaintiff asked for leave and
promptly received it. 	See id.; 	see also 	Dieng v. Orkin, LLC, Civil Action No. 21-cv-0482-LKG,
2025 WL 403794, at *9 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2025) (granting summary judgment on a failure to
accommodate claim when the defendant permitted the plaintiff to take unpaid leave for several
months during an injury recovery period). 	Thus, based on the undisputed record, no reasonable
jury could conclude that granting the FMLA leave Plaintiff requested instead of her telework
request was a failure to accommodate. 	See id.
Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment under
Count I5 	is GRANTED.
C. 	Claim Based on Disability Discrimination Fails Because She
Was Not a Qualified Individual and There is No Evidence Suffered an
Adverse Employment Decision Based on Her Disability.
and (3) that [her employer] discharged her (or took other adverse employment action) because of
Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015) 	As an
initial 	matter, 	Fleetwood 	v. 	Harford 	Sys. 	Inc., 	[A] 	qualified 	individual 	with
a disability 	...can 	perform 	the essential functions of 	[her] 	job 	with 	or 	without 	reasonable
accommodation. 	Essential functions 	are the fundamental job duties of the employment position
5
Destiny Charity Rose Teel v. Md. Natural Treatment
Solutions, LLC, RDB-23-1694, 2024 WL 1075421, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 12, 2024).
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that the person with the disability holds or desires. 	Fleetwood v. Harford Sys. Inc., 380 F. Supp.
2d 688, 698 	99 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). Based on the reasoning above,
See supra 	Section
III.B.
However, even if Plaintiff was a qualified individual capable of performing the essential
functions of her job with or without an accommodation, there is no evidence on the record 	nor
any Plaintiff could conceivably produce with discovery 	that creates a genuine issue of material
fact concerning (1) an adverse employment action or (2) that any adverse employment action
constituted was based on her disability.
1. 	There Is No Evidence Showing Plaintiff was Constructively Discharged.
against by h[er] employer to the point where a reasonable person in h[er] position would have felt
Evans v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, 193
(4th Cir. 2019) (quoting 	Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 136 S.Ct. 1769, 1777, 195 L.Ed.2d 44
Id. 	(quoting 	Penn. State
Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004)). 	Courts must
objective standard. 	Heiko v. Colombo Savings Bank, F.S.B, 434 F.3d 249, 262 (4th Cir. 2006)
Evans, 936 F.3d at
193.
intolerability. On the other hand, when the conduct is isolated or infrequent, it is less likely to
Id.
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Defendant constructively discharged the
Plaintiff by insisting that the Plaintiff remain on unpaid leave instead of granting Plaintiff a
reasonable accommodation.
Id. 	Defendant retorts,
Here, there were merely thirty-two (32) business days (excluding weekends and
began and January 9, 2025, when Plaintiff resigned 	In this short amount of time,
the County made good-faith attempts to analyze whether Plaintiff should be
allowed to telework full time in lieu of the continuous FMLA leave, which Plaintiff
previously requested and received. As discussed 	supra, the County ultimately
quired in-person
attendance.
(ECF No. 18 at 12).
Examples of constructive discharge cases make clear that there is no evidentiary support
on the record necessary to meet the high bar to prove constructive discharge. In 	Williams v. Giant
Food, Inc., the Fourth Circuit concluded that a plaintiff was not constructively discharged when
she alleged her supervisors yelled at her, told her she was a poor manager, gave her poor
performance evaluations, chastised her in front of customers, and required her to work with an
injured back. 	Williams v. Giant Food, Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir. 2004). Affirming the lower
[d]issatisfaction
with work assignments, a feeling of being unfairly criticized, or difficult or unpleasant working
conditions are not so intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to resign. 	Id. 	(quoting 	Carter
v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 1994)); 	,
222 F.Supp.3d 459, 476 (D. Md. 2016) (concluding that the circumstances there were no more
intolerable than those in 	Williams 	on an objective standard inquiry). 	In 	Bowen v. Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, this Court dismissed a Title VII claim
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20
spoke to her in a 	belittling
manner, 	yelled at her, told an Agent Assistant not to assist [the plaintiff] in entering certain
documents, and began to require [the plaintiff] to meet with her once a day.
of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., Civil Action No. RDB-17-1571, 2018 WL 1784463, at *9 (D. Md.
; 	. 	Ins. Co., Civil Action No. PX-19-1235, 2021
WL 391700, at *8 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2021) (granting summary judgment on an ADA constructive
work remotely before she claimed telework constituted an intolerable working environment and
the plaintiff lat
with an allegation of intolerable working conditions).
Against that backdrop, it can hardly be stated that granting FMLA leave 	as requested by
Plaintiff herself 	Plaintiff
applied for and received leave. 	(ECF No. 14-6). 	Plaintiff points to no evidence
. 	See generally
(ECF No. 1). Moreover, the Complaint fails to allege any other conduct that could be considered
so intolerable such that Plaintiff was forced to resign. 	See Williams, 	370 F.3d at 434; 	Bowen, 	2018
WL 1784463, at *9; 	Brady, 222 F.Supp.3d at 476.
-20).
was forced into intolerable conditions by way of the medical leave she asked for or that Defendant
took discriminatory action against her. 	Harrison, 2021 WL 391700, at *8. 	Further, because the
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leave. 	Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, no reasonable jury
could find that granting a request for less than two months of medical leave meets the high bar to
prevail on a constructive discharge claim. 	Williams, 	370 F.3d at 434; 	Bowen, 	2018 WL 1784463,
at *9; 	Harrison, 2021 WL 391700, at *8.
(ECF No. 14) is GRANTED with respect to Count II.
D.
Defendant Retaliated Against Plaintiff on the Basis of Her Disability.6
In determining whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated, courts apply the same
standards as under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); 	see also Doe v. U. of
Maryland Med. System Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1265 n.9 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining that where
the Rehabilitation
of retaliation, or proceed under a burden-s 	Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. Cts., 780
F.3d 	562, 	577 	(4th 	Cir. 	2015) 	(quoting 	Rhoads 	v. 	FDIC, 	257 	F.3d 	373, 	391 	(4th
Cir.2001)). 	McDonnell Douglas 	burden-
shifting, she must show (i) that she engaged in protected activity and, (ii) because of this, (iii) her
Id. 	When a plaintiff makes a prima
6 	brief (ECF No. 14-1), Defendant urges the Court to dismiss the
Rehabilitation Act claim based on 	to exhaust administrate remedies. (ECF No. 14-1 at 7). However,
Defendant concedes in its reply brief that no such requirement exists for non-federal employees. (ECF No. 18 at 13)
(citing 	Magness v. Harford Cnty., Civil No. ELH-16-2970, 2018 WL 1505792, at *15) (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2018)). Thus,
the Court disregards the administrative exhaustion argument.
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Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm'n v. Optimal Sols. & Techs., Inc., 	422 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1042-43 (D. Md. 2019).
defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is
Jennings v. Frostburg State Univ., 679 F. Supp. 3d 240, 272 (D. Md. 2023). Thereafter,
Optimal Sols. & Techs., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 3d at 1043.
(1) a qualified individual or (2) that there was any adverse action given the undisputed evidence
. 	Id. 	Without any evidence of an adverse
action, the record lacks any evidence that can possibly support an inference of unlawful
discrimination 	See id. 	at 1042. Based on the analysis above, no
reasonable jury could find in favor of Plaintiff as a matter of law.
GRANTED under Count III.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
ECF No. 14) is GRANTED,
and summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant. The Clerk is directed to close the
case.
Date: January 13, 2026 	/s/
J. Mark Coulson
United States Magistrate Judge
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