Davis v. Screening Reports, Inc.

1:25-cv-01785Mdd11 dic 2025

Testo completo

ERICTAVIA DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
V.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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* 	Civil No. 25-1785-BAH
SCREENING REPORTS, INC.,
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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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Plaintiff Erictavia Davis ("Plaintiff') brings this putative class action lawsuit against
Screening Reports, Inc. ("SRI") alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"),.15
U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (Counts I and 2); the Maryland Cons4mer Protection Act ("MCPA"), Md.
Code Ann., Commercial Law ("CL") §§ 13-301 et seq. (Count 3); and the Maryland Consumer
Credit Reporting Agencies Act ("MCCRAA"), CL§§ 14-1201 et seq. (Count 4). 	ECF 1, at 14-
20 (complaint). 	Pending before the Court is SRI' s motion to dismiss Counts 3 and 4 of the
complaint. ECF 21 (the "Motion"). Plaintiff filed an opposition, ECF 24, and SRI filed a reply,
ECF 25. All filings include memoranda of law. 1 The Court has reviewed all relevant filings and
finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loe. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). Accordingly, for the reasons
stated below, SRI's Motion is GRANTED and Counts 3 and 4 are DISMISSED. without
prejudice.
I
1 The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers ahd page numbers by the ECF-
generated page numbers at the top of the page.
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I. 	BACKGROUND 2
SRI is a "national_ provider of background screening services" that, among other things,
provides background screening reports to landlords regarding tenant applicants. 	ECF 1, at 5 ,r,r
16-17. 	In Febrnary of 2024, Plaintiff applied "for an apartment at Chesapeake Commons
Apartments ("Chesapeake Commons") in Baltimore, Maryland." 	Id. at 6 ,i 27. 	"Chesapeake
Commons informed Plaintiff that [it] require[s] all applicants to consent to a tenant screening
. report," so "Plaintiff provided her name, address, date of birth, and Social Se.curity Number" to
Chesapeake Commons for the screening report. Id. at 6-7,i,i 29-30. Plaintiff's ·tenant screening
report was completed by SRI and returned to Chesapeake Commons on Febrnary 13, 2024. Id. at
7 ,i,r 31-32. 	Plaintiff alleges that the report '.'was inaccurate, incomplete, and materially
misleading" because it noted that Plaintiff was involved in four eviction court proceedings,
including three that were "dismissed" and one "with a case number ofD-085-LT-21-015562 and
a date of June 4, 2021-list[ing] the disposition as 'eviction."' Id. ,i,i 33-34. All four cases were
also notated with "red 'X' marks." Id. ,i 34.
Plaintiff claims that the case identified in the report as having a disposition of eviction
"never actually resulted in an eviction," but rather that the eviction court "grant[ed] the landlord's
judgment of possession," but the landlord then "never received a warrant of restitution, and a
sheriff never visited Plaintiff's property." Id. ,i 35. According to Plaintiff, the reason the eviction
never occurred is that "the landlord filed the action durihg Maryland's COVID-19 moratorium on
residential evictions for non-payment of rent" so "the case took nearly five months to conclude,"
2 In assessing standing at the motion to dismiss stage, the court "accept[s] all allegations in the
complaint as trne and construe[s] those allegations .'in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."'
Buscemi v. Bell, 964 F.3d 252, 258 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'[ Sec.·
Agency, 857 F.3d 193,208 (4th Cir. 2017)) .
. 2
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and during that time "Plaintiff moved out," which made "eviction a literal impossibility." Id at 8
Plaintiff alleges that the report "led the landlord [at Chesapeake Commons] to believe th,at
Plaintiff had-been evicted by a previous landlord." Id ,r 38. Further, she alleges that "the inclusion
of the dismissed. cases with a red 'X' mark is materially misleading" because "a reasonable
landlord would [] infer from [SRI]' s report that these cases represent a red flag against Plaintiff."
Id ,r 40. 	Plaintiff claims that "Chesapeake Commons denied [her] application" "[a]s a result of
[SRI]'s inaccurate and misleading screening report" which "threaten[ed] her housing security."
Id ,r 41.
Plaintiff disputed the alleged inaccuracies contained in the report directly to SRI and "on
or around July 24; 2024," SRI. responded that it would not change the report, attaching "a
screenshot from Maryland Judiciary Case Search's website" as evidence of the "court records used
to make [its] decision." Id. at 9 ,r,r 42-44 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff asserts that
the screenshot from Maryland Judiciary Case Search "only reflect[ed] 	a 'Landlord Tenant
Disposition,"' and not an eviction. 	Id ,r 44. 	In August of 2024, "Plaintiff again disputed the
information with- [SRI] ... advising ... that she [was] never evicted" and "attached the full court
records to that effect." 	Id. at 10 ,r 45. 	SRI responded "[o]n or ab_out September 5, 2024" and
"refused to correct [its] reporting," allegedly stating, "this is the disposition that is shown on the
court site regarding this court case" which was "showing as an eviction on the report" because "the
judgement [sic] of this case number was in favor of the Landlord." 	Id ,r 47 (internal quotation
marks 	omitted). 	• Further, 	SRI advised that ·the red 	"X" marks 	on the report were "not
recommendations for denial but are indications of what items in the report failed the communities
[sic] qualifying criteria." Id. ,r 49 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in complaint).
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Plaintiff alleges four causes of action against SRJ, including violations of (1) § 168le(b)
of the FCRA for "failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum accuracy of eviction
record information" in tenant screening reports, ECF 1, at 15163 (Count l); (2) § 1681i(a) of the
FCRA for "fail[ing] to perform a reasonable reinvestigation of[] disputed inforination," id. at 15-
16170 (Count 2); (3) the MCPA based on alleged "unfair or deceptive trade practices," id, at 16
1 76 (Count 3); and (4) the MCCRAA for "failing to register, file a bond, or otherwise prove
[SRJ's] financial viability," id. at 18185 (Count4). 	As noted, SRI seeks to dismiss only Counts
3 and 4 of Plaintiffs complaint. See ECF 21.
II. 	LEGALSTANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) governs motions to dismiss for lack of standing,
whfch relate to subject matter jurisdiction. 	Stone v. Trump, .400 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (D. Md.
2019); see also Pruitt v. Resurgent Cap. Servs., LP,. 610 F. Supp. 3d 775, 779 (D. Md. 2022)
(explaining that motions to dismiss for lack of standing are considered under Ru_le 12(b)(l)).
"Article III gives fe1eral courts jurisdiction only over 'cases and controversies,' U.S. Const. art.
III, § 2, cl. I, and the doctrine of standing identifies disputes appropriate for judicial resolution."
Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation a/Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982)). "Motions to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are properly granted where a claim fails to allege.facts upon
which the court may base jurisdiction." Davis v. Thompson, 367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md.
2005) (citing Crosten v. Kamauf, 932 F. Supp. 676,679 (D. Md. 1996)).
"The fact that a suit is a class action 'adds nothing to the question of standing, for even .
named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they personally have been injured,
not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong
and which they purport to represent."' 	Hall v. Camden Dev., Inc., Civ. No. DKC-25-366, 2025
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WL 2720222, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 24, 2025) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted). 	'~[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each
form of relief sought." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (I'OC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 185 (2000).
III. 	ANALYSIS
SRI moves to dismiss 'Plaintiffs claim under the MCPA (Count 3) arguing that Plaintiff
"fails to plead any facts to satisfy the injury requirement needed to confer standing," or, in the
alternative, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "for failure to state aclaim under the MCPA." ECF 21_-1, at
4. 	SRI also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs claim under the MCCRAA (Count 4) because Plaintiff
failed to plead actual damages, or alternatively, because Plaintiff cannot recover damages due to
the economic loss doctrine. Id. at 12-13.
A. 	Plaintiffs Claims-Under the MCCRAA and MCP A
The MCCRAA requires a consumer reporting agency3 to register with the State and file a
surety bond or irrevocable letter of credit annually. CL§§ 14-1215 ("A consumer reporting agency
shall register each year with the Commissioner [of Financial Regulation of the Maryland
Department of Labor] under this subtitle."); 14-1217(a) (requiring "a consumer reporting agency"
to "file a surety bond or irrevocable letter of credit" with the Commissioner unless an exemption
is granted). The statute provides a private right of action to consumers when a consumer reporting
agency either willfully, § 14-122l(a), or negligently, § 14-1221(b), fails to comply with "any
requirement" under the MCCRAA, which can result in recovery of actual damages and attorneys'
3 A consumer reporting agency is defined as "any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a
cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling.or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties[.]" CL§ 14-1201(f)(l).
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fees and costs. Id. § 14-122l(a)-(b). Punitive damages, however, are only recoverable for willful
failure to comply. Id § 14-1221(a).
Under the MCP A, any entity doing business in Maryland is prohibited from engaging in
any "unfair, abusive, or deceptive trade practices," CL § 13-301, including, as relevant to
Plaintiff's complaint, making a "[f]alse, falsely 	disparaging, or misleading oral or written
statement, visual description, or other representation of any kind which has the capacity, tendency,
or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers," CL§ 13-301(1), and failing "to state a material
fact if the failure deceives or tends to deceive," CL § 13-301 (3). The MCPA also includes a private
right of action, but it "is limited to recovery for 'injury or loss sustained."' 	Shadrin v. Hunter
Warfield Inc., Civ. No. ELH-22-3228, 2023 WL 4664037, at *24 (D. Md. July 19, 2023) (quoting
CL § 13-408).
As to the relevant claims, Plaintiff alleges that SRI is a consumer reporting agency that
failed to register as required and similarly failed file the requisite surety bond in apparent violation
of the MCCRAA. 	ECF 1, at 3 19. 	Count 3 alleges a violation of the MCPA based on SRI's
alleged failure to register and file a bond, whereby Plaintiff asserts that SRI' s noncompliance with
state requirements rendered its "consumer reports and dispute responses" illegitimate. Id. at 17 1
78. 	Plaintiff contends that SRI mislead and deceived consumers into believing its reports were
legitimate in violation of the law by "failing to state the material fact to either landlords or tenants
that it never registered or filed a bond." Id. 1 80. Plaintiff asserts SRI's alleged acts of misleading
and deception constitute an "unfair and deceptive trade practice" in violation of the MCPA. Id. at
16177. Based on this violation, Plaintiff alleges she and the putative class "suffered cognizable
and legally compensable injury or loss, including but not limited to payment of application fees
that were not owed." Id. at 17181. Plaintiff also alleges that the violation resulted in the denial
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of Plaintiffs application to Chesapeake Commons, putting her "on the brink of homelessness."
Id. at2iJ6. 4
As noted, Plaintiff alleges in Count 4 that SRI has violated the MCCRAA "by failing to
register, file a bond, or otherwise prove their financial viability." Id. at 18 ,i 85. Plaintiff claims
that SRI's failure to register and its alle_ged false statement that it was registered caused her and
the putative class actual injury, "including the payment of application fees and the continued
publication of false and defamatory information as part of the tenant screening process, damage to
reputation, embarrassment, and humiliation." Id. ,i 86. Plaintiff alleges that such violations were
willful or negligent. Id. ,i,i 87-88.
B. . 	' As Pied, Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Bring Her MCP A and MCCRAA Claims
SRI moves to dismiss Plaintiffs MCPA claim (Count 3) for lack of standing. 	ECF 21-1,. 	'
at 7-8. 	Whether a plaintiff has standing to sue is a threshold inquiry for any lawsuit. 	Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587,597 (2007). "As the party seeking to invoke
federal jurisdiction, Plaintiff]] bear[s] the burden of establishing standing." 	In re Gerber Prod.
Co. Heavy Metals Baby Food Litig., Civ. No. 121-269(MSN)(JFA), 2022 WL 10197651, at *4
(E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2022) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992));
Spokeo, Inc. 	v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). 	To establish standing, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that they have "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
4 Though Plaintiff did not provide details about the denial of her housing application in her
complaint, ECF 1, at 17 iJ 81, she addresses it in her reply memorandum, ECF 24, at 12· (explaining
that Plaintiffs "concrete and particularized injuries" include "the denial of her housing application
. and payment of an application fee"). 	Ordinarily, "an argument raised for the first time in a reply
brief or memorandum will not be considered." Clawson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 451
F. Supp. 2d 731, 734 (D. Md. 2006). However, because Plaintiff"restates each of the preceding
allegations" in her claim for relief, the Court will cons_ider the injury as part of the harm Plaintiff
alleges resulted from SRI's violation of the MCPA.
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challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision." Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338. "[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each
form ofreliefsought." Friends of the Earth, Inc.; 528 U.S. at 185.
"To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered 'an invasion of a
legally protected interest' that is 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical."' Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339. "[A ]fter Spokeo, a plaintiff may not satisfy
the strictures of Article III by alleging 'a bare procedural violation, divorced from any' concrete
harm."' 	Edmondson v. Eagle Nat'/ Bank, 344 F.R.D. 72, 76-77 (D .. Md. 2023) (citing Spokeo,
578 U.S. at 341). "To satisfy standing's causation requirement, the alleged injury must be 'fairly
... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent
action of some third party not before the court."' DiCocco v. Garland, 52 F.4th 588, 592 (4th Cir.
2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). A plaintiff must show a "causal
connection between th~ injury and the conduct complained of." 	Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 	The
causal connection must not be excessively attenuated. Id. at 560-61.
Also important here, where SRI concedes standing as to Plaintiffs first two counts,
"standing is not dispensed in gross." 	Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n.6. 	Rather, '"a plaintiff must
demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press' and "'for each form of relief that is sought."
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm 'n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuna,
547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)).
Plaintiff describes the alleged violation of the MCPA as SRI's use of"false or misleading
statements or representations with the capacity, tendency, or effect of misleading consumers, in.
that its consumer reports and dispute responses purported to be legitimate, when they were not, by
reason of [SRI]'s lack of the mandatory registration and bond." ECF 1, at 17 i! 78. 	As to Count
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4, she alleges that she suffered "real and actual harm _and injury, including the payment of
application fees and the continued publication of false and defamatory information as part of the
tenant screening process, damage to reputation, embarrassment, and humiliation." Id. at 18 ,r 86.
SRI argues that "Plaintiff fails to show how her interest in SRI's registration and bonding status is
'personal' and ,'specific,' or how she was affected in a way different from the public generally"
given that "SRI's lack of a of license or bond would have no bearing on the contents or quality of
its report on Plaintiff." 	ECF 21-1, at 5. Plaintiff counters that SRI's failure to register or post a •
bond was not shared with "Chesapeake Commons, which, in.reliance on [SRI's] tenant screening
report, denied OPlaintiffs housing application, causing her housing-related injury." ECF 24, at
. 	'
13. 	The Court agrees with SRI and finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege an injury-in-fact and,
even assuming that she did, Plaintiff fails to tie those alleged injuries to the allegedly unlawful
conduct outlined in Counts 3 and 4.
As for the alleged "payment of application fees that were not owed," ECF 1, at 17 ,r 81,
even assuming application fees were paid, it bears noting that Plaintiff does not allege that she
actually paid any fees to SRI. 5 Instead, she claims that she provided her "name, address, date of
5 The Court notes that Plaintiffs allegations related to the payment of an application are extremely
vague and may merit dismissal on their own. Plaintiff asserts that she paid "application fees that
were not owed," ECF 1, at 17 ,r 81, but her complaint is devoid of any facts surrounding the
circumstances of the alleged payment. 	For example, in the recitation of factual allegations
underlying Plaintiffs complaint, she does not state that Chesapeake Commons charged a fee as
part of the application process, how much the fee was, or when she paid the fee. 	Instead, she
merely states that she "applied for an apartment at Chesapeake Commons[.]" 	Id. at 6 ,r 27. 	In·
detailing her individual claims, she alleges that she paid "application fees that were not owed, id •
at 17 ,r 81, and later notes "the payment of application fees," id. at 18 ,r 86. However,- the Court is
left to assume these fees were paid to Chesapeake Commons as Plaintiff is explicit in noting.that
"the _landlord procured a tenant screening report from [SRI],'' id. at 2 ,r 6, and in similarly alleging
that SRI "sells consumer reports, also called ... tenant screening reports ... to landlords," id. at
5 ,r 16 (emphasis added). 	Without any factual content to support her vague assertions about an
application fee, Plaintiff fails to meet the minimum pleading standards. 	-
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birth, and Social Security Number" to Chesapeake Commons, who in turn ordered a tenant
screening report from SRI. Id. at 7130'--31. Plaintiff is correct that the loss of the application fee,
even.if negligible, could satisfy the requirement for an injury that is redressable through financial
damages. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413,414 (2021) (explainfag that "monetary
harms" "readily qualify as injuries under Article III"). However, Plaintiff fails to connect the
payment of the application fee to Chesapeake Commons' use of SRI. 	Thus, Plaintiff fails to
articulate how the fact that SRI· may have lacked required licensure (or falsely claimed to
Chesapeake Commons.that it had it) resulted in an injury to Plaintiff as any application fee was
likely owed to Chesapeake Commons regardless of the provider Chesapeake Commons chose to
perform the tenant screen. See Zambali v: Shulman Rogers, P.A., Civ. No. 23-03194-SAG, 2024
WL 3161590, at *6 (D. Md. June 25, 2024) (noting-that when a tenant "still owed a rental debt to
his landlord," that landlord's failure to secure a license before collecting rent did not constitute an
injury). In that sense, Plaintiff essentially alleges mere statutory violations, which do not amount
to concrete harm to establish an injury in fact. 	TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 413; see also
Edmondson, 344 F.R.D. at 76-77. 6
Dismissal of the challenged claims is also warranted because Plaintiff fails to tie any
claimed injuries to the alleged violations of the MCCRAA and MCPA. • Though Plaintiff asserts
significant hardship from the denial of her housing application, including near homelessness, she
6 SRI also challenged Plaintiffs claim of"emotional distress," ECF 21-1, at.6, however Plaintiff
later clarified that she is not seeking damages for emotional distress, see ECF 24, at 13. SRI also
contends that Plaintiff has failed to plead "how she sustained actual damages, reputational damage;
[and] humiliation." ECF 21-1, at 8. However, Plaintiff does not appear to allege that she suffered
reputational damage based on SRI.'s MCPA violation, see ECF l, at 17181, and Plaintiffs reply
memorandum concedes as much, see ECF 24, at' 12 (identifying Plaintiffs injuries resulting from
SRI's alleged MCPA violation as "the denial of her .housing application and payment of an
application fee").
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fails to connect that alleged injury to SRI's alleged failure to post a bond or register under the
MCCRAA, or its purportedly false claim that it had done so. 	At best, Plaintiff articulates that	. 	.
Chesapeake Commons-not Plaintiff-may have relied on SRI's purportedly inaccurate claim that
it was registered and licensed, and thus Plaintiff fails to allege her own reliance sufficient to
connect the alleged harms she suffered to the conduct of SRI as alleged in Counts 3 and 4.
Relatedly, she fails to allege any .connection between SRI's failure to register (or its allegedly false
claim that it was registered) and Chesapeake Commons' ultimate denial of her housing application
which she contends resulted in an unquestionably difficult living situation. 	ECF 1, at 2 ,r 6
(alleging that "[a]s a result" of the denial of her application by Chesapeake Commons, "Plaintiff
had to resort to sleeping on couches and living with family members to avoid sleeping on the
street").
Specific to Count 3, Plaintiff fails to allege reliance on any specific misrepresentation or
omission by SRI made to Plaintiff. 	An MCPA claim "must plausibly aver that the defendant
engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice or misrepresentation on which the plaintiff relied, and
which caused actual injury" in order to survive dismissal. Innovations Surgery Ctr., P. C. v. United
Healthcare Ins. Co., 722 F. Supp. 3d 582, 594 (D. Md. 2024) (citing Ayres v. Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, 129 F. Supp. 3d 249, 270 (D. Md. 2015)) (emphasis added) .. Plaintiff fails
articulate any deceptive information shared by SRI beyond the bare allegation that SRI "purported
to be legitimate, when.they were not." ECF 1, at 17 if 78. Assuming this is an effort to allege an
active misrepresentation, Plaintiff never alleges that SRI claimed that it was registered and bonded,
much less that such a "misrepresentation substantially induce[d her]choice" to apply for the
apartment. 	Bank of Am., NA. v. Jill P. Mitchell Living Tr., 822 F. Supp. 2d 505, 532 (D. Md..
2011 ). Plaintiff similarly does not allege that she applied to Chesapeake Commons and consented
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to a tenant screening report based on SRI's representation that it was licensed and bonded. Plaintiff
does not even allege that she was aware that a tenant screening report would be required at the
time of her applica~iort and payment of a fee to Chesapeake Commons or proclaim knowledge of .
what entity would ·complete it. ECF I, at 6-71127, 29-30. Even construing her allegation that
SRI "fail[ed] to state.the material fact to either lan_dlords or tenants that it never registered or filed
a bond with the State of Maryland," id. at 17 1 80, as one alleging an omission by SRI sufficient
to make an MCPA claim, Plaintiff still fails to claim that she would not have applied for the
apartment "had [SRI] disclosed the omitted information." Mitchell Living Tr., 822 F. Supp: 2d_at
°535. Plaintiff fails.to allege a cognizable violation of the MCPA: 7
C. Plaintifrs Request for Leave .to Amend
Plaintiff asserts in her opposition that if any portion .of her complaint is dismissed, she
should be granted leave to amend. 	ECF 24, at 21-22. Ordinarily, requesting leave to amend in a
response in opposition to a motion to dismiss does· not constitute a proper motion for leave to
·amend. See Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharms. Inc., 549 F.3d-618, 630-31 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that
7 SRI also· alternatively moved to' dismiss Plaintiffs MCPA claim (Count 3) pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff did not plead particularized facts as required under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b). 	See ECF 21-1, at 10-11. -Plaintiff counters that the heightened pleading
standard of Rule 9(b) does not apply because ·her :MCPA claim is not based in fraud. 	ECF 24, at
14-15. 	Claims t!)at sound in fraud under the• MCPA are subject to the heightened pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b). 	Haley v. Corcoran, 659 F. Supp. 2d 714, 724 n.10 (D. Md. 2009).
However,- a party can allege· an unfair and deceptive trad(;) practice under sections other than § 13-
301 (9) of the MCPA "'without replicating a claim for common-law fraud"' and implicating the
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Bryant v. Koppers; Inc., 627 F. Supp. 3d 466,478
(D. Md. 2022) (quoting McCormick v. Medtronic,· Inc., 	101 A.3d 467, 493-94 (Md. App.
2014)), ajf'd, No. 22-2017, 2023 WL 3053017-(4th Cir. Apr. 24, 2023). Here, Plaintiffs MCPA
claim is grounded in Sections 13-301(1) and 13-301(3) of the MCPA, ECF 1, at 16-171177-80,
arguably obviating the rieed to satisfy Rule 9(b)' s heightened pleading standard. See McCormick,
101 A.3d at 494 (explaining that the heightened pleading standard does not apply to Sections 13-
301(1) or 13-301(3) of the MCPA), Given that the Court is dismissing Counts 3 and 4 on standing
grounds, it need not address this issue here.
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a motion for leave to amend was "never properly made" where the plaintiffs "requested leave to
amend only in a footriote of their response to defendants' motion to dismiss"). 	SRI opposes
amendment of the complaint with respect to Plaintiffs MCPA claim. 	ECF 25, at 5. 	The Court
makes no findings related to the viability of re-tooled MCPA or MCCRAA claims and dismisses
these Counts without prejudice. 	As such, the Court finds no reason to evaluate whether leave to
amend is appropriate at this time but notes that Plaintiff is entitled to seek whatever relief she
believes is due.
IV. 	CONCLUSION •
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Screening Reports Inc.'s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED and Counts 3 and 4 of will be dismissed without prejudice. 	Defendant is to file an
answer to the remaining counts within twenty-eight (28) days ..
A separate implementing Order will issue.
Dated: December 11, 2025 	Isl
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge
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