Hague v. Steiner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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KIMBERLY HAGUE, 	*
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Plaintiff, 	*
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v. 	* 	Civil Case No. SAG-25-01278
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DAVID STEINER, 	*
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Defendant. 	*
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* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kimberly Hague (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against the Postmaster General of the United
States, David Steiner1, (“Defendant”), alleging employment discrimination and retaliation. ECF 1.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss two counts of the complaint, ECF 13, Plaintiff opposed the
motion, ECF 17, and Defendants filed a reply, ECF 22. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6
(D. Md. 2025). For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted and
Counts Two and Three of the complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, although Count One
will proceed to discovery.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts described herein are derived from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are taken as true for
purposes of this motion. Plaintiff began working for the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) in
November of 2019. ECF 1 ¶ 7. She became a Flex Clerk at the Rock Hall Post Office in June of
2020. Id. ¶ 8. In November, 2021, Richard Nickerson became the Postmaster of Rock Hall. Id.
1 Plaintiff’s Complaint also names other federal officials, along with the Former Postmaster
General. ECF 1. Plaintiff now concedes that the other officials should be dismissed, ECF 17-1 at
1 n.1. The Clerk will be directed to substitute David Steiner for Louis DeJoy and to dismiss the
remaining named defendants.
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¶ 11. Nickerson has more than 20 years of experience but had been the subject of “several gender-
based discrimination claims by his female subordinates.” Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.
When Nickerson transferred to Rock Hall, he immediately began mistreating Plaintiff and
her two female co-workers, who were mail carriers. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. In particular, Nickerson walked
around the office with his pants drooping, exposing his bare buttocks. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff repeatedly
asked him to pull up his pants, but Nickerson generally refused and, on one occasion, leaned over
Plaintiff so that she could see his penis before he pulled up his pants. Id. ¶¶ 20–22.
Nickerson also routinely berated Plaintiff, including with the use of profanity. Id. ¶ 23. He
also intentionally walked past her down a narrow hallway so that he could press his body against
Plaintiff’s to get by. Id. ¶ 24. Nickerson also insisted that Plaintiff contribute her own money to
the cash draw if it was short, in violation of USPS policy. Id. ¶ 25. He repeatedly made reference
to a woman’s “place in the world” and suggested that men “make[] the rules.” Id. ¶ 27.
As a result of this mistreatment, Plaintiff began seeing a mental health counselor for anxiety
and depression. Id. ¶ 28. Nickerson would deny her requests for time off to see her counselor and
would insist to see her doctor’s notes, which he would then leave openly exposed on his desk. Id.
¶ 29.
In August, 2022, one of the female mail carriers retired. Id. ¶ 30. Nickerson hired a male
replacement, and he did not yell and curse at the male carrier like he did with Plaintiff and her
female co-worker. Id. ¶ 31.
Plaintiff complained to a USPS Manager of Post Office Operations (“MPOO”), but no
corrective action ensued. Id. ¶¶ 32–38. In March, 2023, Plaintiff contacted USPS’s EEO Office to
make a formal complaint. Id. ¶ 39. However, on April 8, 2023, an EEO representative told her “the
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only thing that would happen is a conversation” with Nickerson and encouraged Plaintiff to close
her case. Id. ¶ 40. She did. Id.
In the spring of 2023, Plaintiff again tried to complain to a new MPOO but again received
no assistance. Id. ¶¶ 41–43. In February, 2024, Nickerson began calling Plaintiff on her cellphone
while standing in close proximity, and then glaring at her without saying anything. Id. ¶ 45. He
also began pressing his body against Plaintiff’s at the cash register and breathing on her neck. Id.
¶ 46. He continued to curse and use profanity towards Plaintiff, including in front of a customer.
Id. ¶ 47.
On April 8, 2024, Plaintiff initiated a second complaint to the EEO Office, and she
subsequently also emailed USPS management to complain about discrimination and harassment.
Id. ¶¶ 48–49. On April 18, 2024, USPS placed Nickerson on paid leave while it investigated his
loss of USPS property. Id. ¶¶ 50–51. During Nickerson’s leave, he repeatedly drove past the Rock
Hall Post office and Plaintiff’s home, which was on a dead-end street. Id. ¶ 53.
Plaintiff formalized her EEO complaint on June 18, 2024. Id. ¶ 54. However, on July 16,
2024, the agency dismissed the complaint, erroneously finding that it consisted only of two claims.
Id. ¶ 55. Four days later, Plaintiff learned from her co-worker that Nickerson would be returning
to work from his administrative leave. Id. ¶ 56. Plaintiff then emailed the then-Postmaster General
to outline her claims of discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. Id. ¶ 57. She received
no response. Id. ¶ 58.
Plaintiff sought medical attention for a panic attack she suffered at the thought of working
with Nickerson again. Id. ¶ 59. The physician restricted her from work for one week. Id. ¶ 60. The
MPOO contacted Plaintiff to discuss the work restriction, declined to transfer Nickerson to another
office, but offered to transfer Plaintiff to another office until USPS got it “straightened out.” Id.
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¶¶ 41, 61–62. Plaintiff agreed to a temporary transfer to the Chestertown Post Office. Id. ¶ 63. At
that office, however, Plaintiff’s hours were changed, and her new supervisor attempted to
discipline her for actions or omissions of others. Id. ¶¶ 64, 66. Nickerson also called the
Chestertown Post Office every day. Id. ¶ 65. Because Plaintiff’s mental health conditions
worsened, her physician “restricted her work schedule.” Id. ¶ 67. Her supervisor refused to accept
the work restrictions, and her physician ultimately restricted Plaintiff from working at USPS
altogether, beginning in August of 2024. Id. ¶¶ 68–69. She has remained on unpaid leave since
that time. Id. ¶¶ 70–71. Nickerson has continued to drive past her home repeatedly. Id. ¶ 71.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on April 21, 2025, asserting claims for hostile work
environment/harassment (Count One), constructive discharge (Count Two), and retaliation (Count
Three). See generally id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Defendant argues that Counts Two and Three are subject to dismissal for failure to state a
claim. Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a
motion to dismiss. See In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty.
Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165–66 (4th Cir. 2016); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,
243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if
the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with “fair notice” of the
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claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007).
To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts
sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) (“Our decision in Twombly
expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’ . . . .”); see also Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d
93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). However, a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” in
order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Further, federal pleading rules “do not
countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the
claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam).
Nevertheless, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555; see Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a
complaint provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action,” it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, to satisfy the
minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth “enough factual matter (taken
as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is
improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556.
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint” and must “draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts]
in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440
(4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th
Cir. 2015). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). “A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is
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met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the
factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably
infer” that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia,
655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Constructive Discharge (Count Two)
In Count Two, Plaintiff claims constructive discharge, which requires her to allege facts to
plausibly establish that her “working conditions [became] so intolerable that a reasonable person
in [her] position would have felt compelled to resign.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555 (2016)
(quoting Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004)). The Supreme Court has explained
that “a constructive discharge claim accrues . . . when the employee gives notice of his
resignation.” Id. at 564.
Plaintiff’s claim, then, tries to fit a square peg into a round hole. This Court need not decide
whether she has adequately alleged intolerable working conditions or whether a reasonable person
would have felt compelled to resign in her circumstances, because no constructive discharge claim
has yet accrued. Plaintiff remains employed by USPS, despite her unpaid leave status. And
Plaintiff offers no authority to suggest that a constructive discharge claim is viable when the
complainant remains employed. As a result, her allegations are properly addressed via her Count
One claim for hostile work environment and harassment, not through a claim for constructive
discharge. Her Count Two claim must be dismissed.
B. 	Retaliation (Count Three)
Count Three alleges retaliation. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting direct
evidence of retaliation, such as statements made regarding an intent to retaliate against her for her
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various complaints and charges. Instead, she contends that she made “a series” of complaints about
discrimination and harassment that resulted in USPS “taking a series of adverse employment
actions, including, but not limited to, extreme verbal abuse, transferring [Plaintiff] to less desirable
position, and constructively discharging [Plaintiff].” ECF 1 ¶¶ 83–84.
There can be no doubt that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity on multiple occasions.
But, once again, there is a mismatch between the facts Plaintiff alleges and her legal theory. The
“extreme verbal abuse” Plaintiff has alleged was ongoing, essentially from the beginning of
Nickerson’s work at Rock Hall until her transfer to Chestertown. She has not alleged any facts
suggesting that Nickerson’s verbal abuse changed in any way in response to any of her complaints
or charges or that it dissuaded her from making or supporting a charge of discrimination, as she
continued to make such complaints throughout her tenure. In addition, as noted above, Plaintiff
has not pleaded constructive discharge.
Plaintiff’s final suggested “adverse employment action” is her transfer to a “less desirable
position.” Her Complaint, however, does not allege facts suggesting that Chestertown is “less
desirable.”2 Moreover, the Complaint is clear that the transfer was voluntary. It alleges that the
2 In her opposition, Plaintiff alleges that the Chestertown Post Office was less desirable because
it was not in her hometown. ECF 17-1 at 15. That fact does not appear in the Complaint, and
Plaintiff cannot amend her Complaint through her motions briefing. Also, in both her Complaint
and opposition, Plaintiff alleges that her work hours changed in Chestertown, but in neither place
does she suggest that the change was adverse or explain why it was less desirable, either
objectively or subjectively. Additionally, in her opposition, Plaintiff alleges that Nickerson knew
that his paid administrative leave for the lost property occurred as a result of a complaint she had
made. ECF 17-1 at 14. That fact also is not alleged in the Complaint, which neither mentions
Plaintiff’s notifying management about the lost property nor Nickerson’s awareness that she had
made such a complaint. Finally, Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that her supervisor at the
Chestertown Post Office attempted to discipline her for the alleged conduct of others. The
complaint contains no allegations, however, suggesting that the MPOO would have known
Plaintiff’s new supervisor would do so such that this Court could infer a retaliatory intent in
offering the transfer.
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MPOO “offered to transfer [Plaintiff] to another office until USPS got it ‘straightened out’” and
that Plaintiff “agreed to a temporary transfer to the Chestertown Post Office.” As the Fourth Circuit
has explained, “If an employee voluntarily requests a transfer, and the employer agrees to it, there
is no actionable adverse action.” Laird v. Fairfax Cnty., 978 F.3d 887, 894 (4th Cir. 2020).
Particularly because Plaintiff alleges no facts explaining why Chestertown would be a less
desirable assignment, she has not plausibly alleged that her agreed temporary transfer occurred in
retaliation for any of her charges or complaints.
It is clear that Plaintiff has amply pleaded facts stating a viable claim for hostile work
environment and harassment, explaining Defendant’s decision not to seek dismissal of that count.
But her remaining legal claims do not comport with the facts she has alleged, making dismissal of
those claims appropriate.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF 13, is
GRANTED and Plaintiff’s constructive discharge and retaliation claims are dismissed without
prejudice. The Clerk will also be directed to substitute David Steiner for Louis DeJoy and to
dismiss the remaining named defendants. A separate Order follows.
Dated: February 9, 2026 	/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
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